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Summary 
1. Summary 
The 1985 White Paper, Completing the internal market, carried a great number of expectations 
with it. The Cecchini report, published in 1988, quantified these expectations and concluded 
that a substantial part (23%) of the benefits of completing the single market would derive from 
the effects of intensified competition. 
These high expectations of the effect of increased competition in the single market are at the 
heart of this study, which is part of a series that the European Commission has initiated. In line 
with the terms of reference, this study, by London Economics, the Instituto de Análisis 
Económico (Barcelona) and the Fachhochschule für Wirtschaft (Berlin), comprises an 
economic analysis of the evolution of competitive conditions in European markets, and how 
these have been affected by measures to complete the single market. Our analysis includes an 
examination of aspects of firm behaviour which may be preventing the benefits of effective 
competition in the single market being fully realized, and leads to an assessment of the role of 
competition policy in achieving these aims. 
1.1. Main findings 
The study reviews trends in integration and competition across individual markets. We use a 
variety of statistical indicators and consider competition issues arising from European 
competition cases as well as individual market studies. The study aims specifically to test and 
evaluate the following effects expected to arise from the single market programme: 
(a) reductions in the cost of doing trade across national borders are expected to lead to 
increased trade and the entry of new competitors into national markets; 
(b) markets that were previously mainly delineated by national borders are expected to 
become larger and market boundaries to be determined by the economic fundamentals; 
(c) market power and hence profit margins would be reduced, and within these larger 
markets tougher cross-border competition would ensure that inefficient firms would 
either exit the market or improve their performance; 
(d) in larger markets firms would be able to exploit economies of scale, leading to changes 
in market structure; 
(e) integrated larger markets would act as a spur to designing new products and undertaking 
increased R&D. 
Our study results in the following main conclusions: 
(a) There is strong evidence of the pro-competitive effects of integration. Integration in the 
EU has generally increased, when assessed against a variety of economic indicators 
derived from a large sample of sectors. Furthermore, our research provides econometric 
evidence of the significant impact of integration on price-cost margins, an important 
indicator of the intensity of competition in European markets. We also find significant 
evidence of a fall in cross-sector and cross-country differences in price-cost margins in 
the second half of the 1980s. 
(b) The full potential benefits have not yet been achieved. Although we find strong evidence 
that the single market programme has had beneficial pro-competitive effects, it seems to 
be the case that the full potential benefits of market integration are yet to be completely 
realized. Our econometric analysis confirms a fall in price-cost margins only for a subset 
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of those sectors where the impact of the single market programme was expected to be 
high. Achievement of the full benefits may take longer and may require further specific 
intervention by the Commission (e.g. national deregulation initiatives or external trade 
liberalization). 
(c) There are multiple drivers of competition including external trade liberalization as well 
as major changes in technology. Our data is consistent with deepening market 
integration, but we cannot in general rule out the possibility that there are other causes 
for movement towards more competitive outcomes. For example, in the case of soda 
ash, external trade liberalization was found to have a more significant impact in 
constraining prices than the single market programme. In the case of cars, external trade 
policy and competition policy appear to have inhibited rather than promoted integration; 
and in the case of air travel, external and internal trade liberalization are working in 
parallel. External and intra-EU trade flows are generally correlated and it is difficult to 
establish the respective impact of external trade liberalization and the single market 
programme. 
(d) The limits to integration should not be ignored. Case study evidence suggests that the 
scope for increased market integration is often limited due to the importance of transport 
costs (e.g. soda ash, beer) or because markets are already integrated at a European or 
global level. 
(e) There is considerable scope for anti-competitive responses. Both theoretical and 
empirical analyses suggest that there are a wide variety of strategic responses of firms 
which could lead to the potential benefits of integration not being fully achieved. For 
example, access to essential facilities in a previously national market may not be 
forthcoming at a reasonable price and cross-border entry may be hampered; firms may 
collude and share markets across the EU along national borders; pro-competitive direct 
entry into foreign markets may be avoided by joint ventures or licensing agreements; 
mergers may lead to market power even in a broader post-integration market; and 
finally, firms may call on national governments to protect them from the necessary 
adjustments to a more competitive environment. 
(f) There is a continued role for competition policy. The role of competition policy in 
promoting integration and securing the benefits of increased competition in integrated 
markets is reinforced by our study. The need for competition policy in larger markets 
remains. The single market programme, with very few exceptions, is not a substitute for 
a vigorous enforcement of competition policy. Dominant firm behaviour and anti-
competitive practices can arise irrespective of market size. However, if consistency is to 
be achieved, the conduct of national competition policy in integrated markets requires 
more coordination, particularly in areas where competition policy and industry 
regulation interact (e.g. access to essential infrastructure facilities). 
(g) The focus of competition policy in integrated markets needs to change. In many markets 
and industries, where integration has been substantially achieved, European competition 
policy, as reviewed across the case law of the last decade, could benefit from a clearer 
focus on the objective of competition as a means to promote economic efficiency rather 
than integration. Some types of cooperative behaviour of firms are possibly too easily 
exempted by the Commission (e.g. joint ventures and other cooperative agreements) 
because they are thought to facilitate integration, whereas others are too readily 
challenged as being incompatible with the single market (e.g. price discrimination and 
vertical agreements). 
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1.2. Supporting evidence 
1.2.1. Sectoral indicators 
The general evidence of positive trends in integration is derived from aggregate indicators of 
price convergence, trade flows, price-cost margins and changes in concentration, as well as 
extensive cross-sectoral data on trade flows and price-cost margins. The findings on the 
development of price-cost margins are to our knowledge unique and provide confirmation of 
the significant impact of the single market programme in two ways: 
(a) first, the data suggests a clear reduction in the variation of price-cost margins across 
sectors and countries after 1985; 
(b) second, the inclusion of a policy impact variable in our regression analysis confirms the 
significant cumulative effect on price-cost margins of policy measures implemented 
after 1986. 
The five indicators listed in the table below are on the whole consistent with what we would 
expect to see if integration had had effects. 
Table 1.1. Trends in integration 
Trade creation 
Price convergence 
Exploitation of economies of scale 
Reductions in price-cost margins 
Reduced variance of price-cost margins 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
(a) Trade between Member States has increased. External trade flows, however, also 
increased, suggesting perhaps that competition from outside has been an equally 
important factor in shaping the evolution of competition in the EU for these sectors. 
(b) Price differentials, particularly for consumer goods across the EUR-12, narrowed, in line 
with expected reductions in the costs of arbitrage across EU economies, with economic 
fundamentals becoming more similar. 
(c) We also expect market structure itself to be affected by integration, with firms exiting as 
a response to tougher competition even if the product differentiation potential allows 
additional players and niche suppliers to survive. Research in other studies in The Single 
Market Review appears to confirm these expectations. 
(d) The expectation that increased cross-border competition should lead to reduced market 
power and falling price-cost margins is generally confirmed. At the sectoral level this 
finding only applies to a subset of sectors, but not for some of those sectors for which 
EU internal trade barriers were considered to be relatively high (for example, public 
procurement sectors). 
(e) In addition, there is evidence that the dispersion of price-cost margins across countries 
has been substantially reduced. There appears to be a decisive downward trend in the 
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late 1980s, since which time the variance has halved. The equalization of price-cost 
margins across the EU is consistent with increased competition. 
1.2.2. Case study analysis 
We have analysed a number of markets in detail (cars, beer, soda ash, airlines). These case 
studies are revealing because they show that the effects of market integration may be very 
different in different markets. Some markets, like soda ash, a key raw material for the 
production of glass, have limited scope for integration due to high transport costs. Other 
markets, like cars and beer, remain substantially segmented along national or regional borders 
for a number of reasons and have only been partly affected by the single market programme. 
National distribution patterns dominate for historical reasons, and have not been radically 
challenged by either the single market programme or the intervention of the Commission's 
Competition Policy Directorate. Table 1.2 summarizes key features of our analysis of the 
selected markets. 
These case studies and the review of competition case law also illustrate some examples of 
what we have called 'anti-competitive responses' to integration. This confirms our general 
conclusion that achievement of the full potential benefits of integration may in some cases be 
hampered by the strategic behaviour of firms, despite on average there being consumer and 
efficiency benefits from integration. 
Table 1.2. Summary of market studies 
Initial market 
structure 
Single market 
measures 
Competition issues 
Integration 
; Soda ash 
i Oligopolistic 
! national 
! markets 
I Negligible 
; Major collusion 
1 case and 
i protection 
I through trade 
j policy measures 
I High, but 
1 markets limited 
; by transport 
! costs 
j Beer 
i National or 
j regional 
1 markets often 
! oligopolistic 
; Technical and 
I physical 
1 measures 
j Cross-country 
i licensing and 
i vertical 
! restraints 
j Moderate 
Cars 
Oligopolistic 
with national 
champions 
Important 
technical 
measures, 
continued block 
exemption for 
distribution 
arrangements 
Distribution 
agreements, 
strategic 
alliances and 
R&D JVs, 
VERs 
Relatively high 
at manu-
facturing level, 
low in 
distribution 
j Domestic 
j appliances 
j Fragmented 
i national 
I markets 
I Reduction in 
i cross-border 
1 transaction 
1 costs 
; Mergers 
I High with 
! remaining 
i market 
i segmentation 
i limited by taste 
Airlines 
Protected 
national 
monopolies/ 
international 
cartels 
Major 
liberalization 
pressures being 
implemented by 
1997 
Dominance, 
barriers to 
entry, joint 
ventures, 
mergers 
Still low 
Summary 
1.3. Analysis of competition issues 
Against this complex picture of the interaction of integration and competition, we have 
focused our attention on the analysis of behavioural obstacles to further integration. We 
believe that in many industries the remaining obstacles to integration are based on a 
combination of factors that can reinforce each other. For example, purchasing habits that are 
based on national preferences, or are due to environmental and cultural factors, can be 
exploited in conjunction with behaviour that may sometimes be anti-competitive. This 
behaviour then has the effect of maintaining some segmentation of markets along national 
borders. 
Our analysis of the behaviour of firms in the single market has focused on those strategic 
responses that are most closely related to the single market programme. Where possible, we 
generalize about the likelihood of such responses by type of industry and draw policy 
conclusions. 
(a) Price discrimination and parallel import restrictions. This competition issue is intimately 
connected with market integration. A number of cases dealt with by the Commission, 
involving branded goods, indicate a desire to segment markets that have different 
demand elasticities across the EU. Our analysis demonstrates that price discrimination 
can have several pro-competitive effects (output expansion and market-opening effects; 
competition for marginal consumers), suggesting a case by case approach when 
considering the application of Art. 85 to measures facilitating price discrimination. 
(b) Access restrictions. Typically these apply to industries where access to infrastructure 
facilities and networks are essential for entering a new market. Our analysis emphasizes 
the need for a proper definition of an essential facility that takes into account the costs of 
duplication and the lack of substitutes. 
(c) Collusion. Homogeneous goods industries with high sunk costs that are exposed to 
demand fluctuations have been shown to have strong incentives to enter into collusive 
agreements. Integration can be expected to make within-country collusion more difficult 
to sustain and less attractive. There is, however, little reason to suppose that market 
integration will reduce the scope for cross-country collusion, such as market sharing by 
national boundaries. This implies a continued need for tough enforcement of 
competition policy towards EU-wide cartels. The only other effective instrument against 
national market sharing appears to be external trade liberalization. 
(d) Joint ventures. A general picture emerges of a decline in the need to establish 
collaborative agreements in order to enter new markets following market integration. 
Nevertheless, our analysis highlights concerns over the potential anti-competitive effects 
of those agreements that avoid direct entry into new markets and combine the 
substitutable activities of two potential competitors. We observe that current treatment 
of such agreements may in some cases be too permissive. 
(e) Mergers. Contrary to general expectations, no obvious trend or generalizations can be 
made regarding merger activity in the single market. Nevertheless, we note that, as a 
result of market integration, the costs of inappropriate EU-wide merger policy are 
higher, since a mistake affects more consumers while the administrative burden on firms 
from the one-stop shop is lessened. 
(f) State aid. Industries that are subject to major restructuring under the single market 
programme may be particularly prone to state aid cases. Even if the official statistics do 
not record an increase in the amount of state aid granted to individual companies, there 
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are other Community programmes (Structural Funds) that are designed to support 
industries in lagging regions. Given that the distortive effect of state aid is felt more 
widely in larger, more integrated markets, great vigilance and careful analysis of their 
justification is required when adjudicating on the appropriateness of aid to specific 
companies. 
1.4. Policy conclusions 
Our main policy conclusion, that there is a continued role for a vigorous European competition 
policy, is borne out in the wide-ranging analysis of competition issues summarized above. 
Other policy conclusions relate to the relationship of competition policy with other 
Community policies and to the role of the Commission as a coordinator and facilitator of an 
effective competition policy across the EU. 
1.4.1. Trade policy and competition policy 
We reject the notion that trade policy and competition policy are substitutes in the sense that 
market integration should obviate the need for a vigorous competition policy. 
(a) Trade policy works differently from competition policy: the former enlarges markets and 
encourages competition by facilitating market access, while the latter is directed at the 
exercise of market power and other distortions of competition. 
(b) Trade policy and competition policy can either work in harmony or result in conflict 
(e.g. dumping policies undermining competition policy intervention). Similarly the 
single market programme, which is a form of internal trade policy, can work together 
with other policies or can create policy conflict. 
1.4.2. Efficiency and integration objectives of competition policy 
In our study we find that the execution of competition policy under Art. 85 in the EU appears 
to suffer from a perhaps excessive emphasis on behaviour that appears to inhibit integration 
rather than prevent or distort competition. Behavioural responses of firms to changes in the 
competitive environment are not easily found to be both anti-competitive and anti-integration, 
except for some well-defined situations such as explicit market sharing, cartels or price-fixing 
agreements across national markets. In many other instances, the objectives for increased 
integration and effective competition may clash. 
(a) Vertical restraints are generally not anti-competitive unless they are undertaken by 
dominant firms and serve to foreclose entry to new competitors; their effect on national 
market segmentation may be an undesirable by-product. 
(b) Licensing agreements by firms across Member States are considered a positive indicator 
of integration. Yet these agreements may or may not be anti-competitive depending on 
who agrees what, with whom and in what market environment. In other words, the 
identity of the parties to an agreement matters within the specific market context. 
1.4.3. The role of the Commission 
The final set of policy conclusions deals with the role of the Commission. Our assessment 
suggests, among other things, that in addition to the Commission's traditional task of direct 
enforcement of Community competition policy: 
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(a) there is a residual role to act as a regulatory authority when dealing with access 
restrictions that are not subject to national regulation; 
(b) similarly, there is a coordinating role for the Commission to secure the consistent 
application of competition policy in Member States. 
Furthermore, we consider that it is extremely valuable to make competition policy intervention 
contingent on market structure analysis. This is already done in the case of mergers where the 
analysis of dominance by the Merger Task Force is at the heart of the investigation. This 
structural approach does not replace a thorough analysis of the nature of competition in the 
relevant markets, but certainly helps to deal with certain types of behaviour quickly when, for 
example, concentration in the relevant market is low and allegations of anti-competitive 
behaviour cannot be sustained. Our conclusion on these issues is that market structure, 
monitoring and provision of market data by Eurostat would greatly facilitate the assessment of 
competition issues in the single market, whether undertaken by the Commission or by national 
competition authorities. 
The resources that need to be expended on this role (residual regulation, coordination of 
national merger policy, monitoring market structure) can be at least partly found from savings 
made in resources that are currently used to vet and monitor vertical agreements with no 
serious negative consequences for competition in the single market. 
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2. Introduction 
The single market programme, launched in 1985 with the White Paper, Completing the 
internal market, carried a great number of expectations with it. In the most wide-ranging study 
of its effects, the Cecchini report [1988] estimated the benefits of achieving the single market 
to be worth around 4.5% of European gross domestic product. These benefits were to be 
derived from the direct efficiency gains of eliminating non-tariff barriers, which impose costs 
on businesses doing trade across the EU. In addition, businesses were expected to take 
advantage of opportunities to sell across larger markets in the EU through the exploitation of 
economies of scale in production and distribution. The third major benefit would result from 
the effects of increased competition in integrated markets. While the Cecchini report 
associated most of the benefit of the completion of the single market with the direct efficiency 
gains resulting from the removal of trade barriers, and from exploiting economies of scale, 
23% of all gains were expected to result from the effects of intensified competition.1 
The competitive effects of internal trade liberalization are crucial not only for the benefits that 
arise from the improved allocation of resources, but also because competition is the chief 
mechanism through which efficiency gains are passed on to consumers. It is one thing to argue 
that the costs of doing business across Europe are coming down, but another matter to ask 
whether these cost reductions are passed on to consumers. Many obstacles to the operation of 
competitive markets exist, quite independently from those directly associated with the single 
market programme. The development of adequate policies to tackle these obstacles to 
competition can be expected to be of great benefit. 
An assessment of the changes in competitive conditions in the EU, and an investigation of the 
scope for strategic responses by businesses and government to single market measures, is 
therefore essential for an evaluation of the success of the single market programme. Equally 
important is to recommend policies to remove any remaining obstacles to competition and 
integration in the EU. 
2.1. Aim of the study 
In line with the terms of reference, this study comprises an economic analysis of the evolution 
of competitive conditions in European markets, and how these have been affected by measures 
to complete the single market. The analysis has three key aims: 
(a) to examine aspects of the competitive process which may be preventing the realization 
of the benefits of effective competition in the single market; 
(b) to examine the interaction between competitive conditions, competition policy 
interventions and the single market programme; 
(c) to reach conclusions about the role of competition policy and whether policy has to be 
adjusted once integration has substantially been achieved. 
Dealing with the first of these aims helps to identify the extent of the potential problem 
presented by strategic responses by business to the single market programme. Addressing the 
second is intended to assess the extent to which competition policy plays a major role in 
See also Silberston and Raymond [1996]. 
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achieving or frustrating integration. The third aim reflects the need to provide 
recommendation on future policy. In particular, this study needs to consider whether 
completion of the single market changes the need for competition policy intervention, or 
whether (and, if so, how much and of what kind) further intervention is required to realize the 
full benefits of the single market programme. 
2.2. Method of analysis 
The method of analysis is based on interviews with businesses, expert reviews of industry and 
market studies, and analysis of market data. 
The analysis has three elements. The first strand of analysis comprises a review of available 
statistics and the development of case study material to provide empirical foundations from 
which more generalized conclusions can be drawn. The second strand of analysis provides a 
rigorous theoretical evaluation of the main competition policy issues that arise as a 
consequence of the single market programme. These two elements of analysis need to be 
brought together in a third element. This integrates case studies and other case law with the 
theoretical analysis of competition issues, leading to a set of conclusions on the future 
direction of policy. 
2.2.1. Indicators of trends in integration 
The analysis of trends in integration reviewed aggregate statistical material across industrial 
sectors in the EU. We have also made use of the results of other studies and, where necessary, 
have undertaken our own research to update older studies. The principal indicators that we 
evaluate at the aggregate sectoral level include: 
(a) trade flows; 
(b) price differentials; 
(c) concentration; 
(d) price-cost margins. 
The research on the impact of the single market programme on price-cost margins across 
sectors and countries is, to our knowledge, wholly original and provides valuable insight into 
the development of integration. 
2.2.2. Case studies of the development of competition 
Six market studies have been selected to provide an empirical basis for the assessment of the 
main themes of this study, namely the extent to which markets have become more integrated, 
and the extent to which the competitive strategies of European companies have changed in 
response to single market measures. In this way the market studies should exemplify how 
competitive conditions have evolved. At the same time, the studies have been selected so that 
they assist in the policy analysis by illustrating potential conflicts between the single market 
competition policy and other objectives. They should also facilitate generalization to other 
markets, with respect to possible adjustments to national and EU competition policy 
instruments. 
The market studies we have selected cover soda ash, beer, cars and airlines. The main 
competition issues that these market studies address are as follows. 
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Soda ash. The anti-competitive behaviour of colluding, dominant firms may inhibit an 
enlargement of the economic market and result in market segmentation. Soda ash as a 
homogeneous, intermediate product may offer scope for generalization to other raw material, 
intermediate products, including cartonboard, cement, wood pulp and to some extent steel. 
Beer. Vertical restraints and cross-country licensing can limit entry and potentially lessen 
competition. Vertical restraints may take a range of forms: the case of beer represents 
predominately exclusive dealing and offers scope for generalization to petrol and other 
consumer products. 
Cars. Many European car makers pursue joint ventures and have some strategic alliances. 
Most of them organize their distribution at the national level in the form of selective 
distribution agreements. The car market raises issues of vertical restraint, market access and 
external trade policy. 
Airlines. Firms controlling absolute advantages can prevent market entry, and inhibit the 
development of competition and integration. The air travel industry is a key service sector and 
offers considerable scope for competition at the level of an integrated EU market. It thus 
represents an obvious choice for a case study. 
There are two other market overviews which cover interesting examples of industries that 
have changed radically over the last two decades. These market overviews are much less 
detailed than the four main market studies but offer useful background information. The 
market for telecommunication equipment has seen both technological changes and changes in 
the procurement of telecommunication operators, who themselves have been forced to operate 
in a more liberalized environment. The markets for domestic appliances on the other hand 
have been completely restructured through a series of mergers and acquisitions, and it is 
arguable that the market for washing machines, for example, no longer operates at a mainly 
national level. 
2.2.3. Analysis of competition policy issues 
The strategic responses of businesses to the single market programme raise a number of 
competition issues which are at the heart of this report. Firms will react to increased 
competitive pressures that result from trade liberalization in pro- as well as anti-competitive 
ways. We investigate the incentives for strategic behaviour that attempts to frustrate the aims 
of the single market. These competition issues are examined from a theoretical perspective and 
are illustrated with reference to our market studies, and further references to competition cases 
brought before EU competition authorities. There are six competition issues which are directly 
relevant to the theme of market integration. 
(a) Geographic price discrimination and parallel import restrictions are a major issue for 
policies towards integration. We examine in some detail the economic rationale for 
allowing or prohibiting these forms of vertical restraints, and we consider their validity 
in integrated markets. 
(b) Market access restrictions and entry barriers may be used by firms attempting to counter 
the pro-competitive effects of the single market. This may be through raising the costs of 
rivals' entry, foreclosure effects, horizontal pricing policies and, in particular, by limiting 
access to networks and other essential facilities. 
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(c) Collusion: firms may agree to share markets and coordinate price setting through 
collusive agreements, which would undermine the prospects for increased competition 
arising from market integration. Incentives to collude, and the sustainability of collusion, 
are themselves affected by single market measures. 
(d) Cooperative agreements: joint ventures and licensing arrangements form a major 
element in business strategies aimed at gaining or blocking market entry, and exploiting 
or limiting market integration. 
(e) Mergers, like joint ventures, can be an appropriate way to enter new markets or to 
exploit a firm's competitive advantage. There are, however, other motives that need to 
be assessed which relate to the maintenance, creation or extension of market power. 
(f) State aids and other forms of government support for undertakings may distort the 
operation of the single EU market, and may represent a response by governments to 
protect firms from the impact of single market measures. 
2.3. Structure of report 
This report falls naturally into three parts. 
Part 1 (Chapters 3-6) deals with the key concepts preceded by a short overview of the single 
market programme. The trends in integration and competitive conditions are reviewed at both 
an aggregate and sectoral level. In addition we summarize the results of selected case studies. 
Part 2 pursues in a rigorous manner a number of competition policy issues. Our discussion of 
these issues draws not just on our own case study material, but also refers to various 
competition cases brought before EU and national competition authorities (Chapters 7-12). 
Part 3 then draws out the main conclusions and provides policy recommendations which 
follow from our analysis (Chapters 13 and 14). 
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Part I Integration and competition 
The concept of an integrated economic market in Europe is as old as the idea of a unified 
Europe. The Treaty of Rome, one of the founding Treaties of the European Communities, 
already highlighted integration as the primary goal of the Community and linked it to 
competition policy as one of the means of achieving it. A new impulse to the European policy 
towards economic integration was given in 1985 with the presentation of the Commission's 
White Paper, Completing the internal market, which culminated in the signing of the Single 
European Act (SEA) in 1986. 
'Market integration' is a term which is often used but is seldom - if ever - clearly defined. In the 
political context of the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht, it has a highly normative content. 
European integration is what we are all supposed to be striving for. To some people, European 
integration is associated with freedom of movement of products, services, capital and labour 
across Europe. To others, European integration is often associated with the assumption of a 
European identity over and above a national identity. For the purposes of this study it is essential 
that we define this term more clearly. Market integration has to be given a precise meaning so 
that we can study its connection with competition, and draw conclusions as to the application of 
European competition policy with respect to the integration process. These conceptual issues are 
dealt with in Chapter 4. The mechanisms through which integration affects competition in 
product and input markets are also discussed, as are the types of anti- and pro-competitive 
behaviour to which the single market measures may give rise. 
What has been the effect of the single market programme in practice? What are the trends in 
integration across selected industries? What can we observe about the way the nature of 
competition has changed in specific markets? These and other questions are addressed in 
parallel studies in the Commission's research programme. The programme covers a wide 
range of industries and deals with specific themes, such as the effect of the single market 
programme on the exploitation of economies of scale, trade flows and prices. The aim of our 
study is to focus on the interaction of competition and integration, with a particular emphasis 
on the role of competition policy in dealing with pro- and anti-competitive responses to single 
market measures. In Chapter 5 we explore the effects of the single market programme and 
review trends in market integration and competition at an aggregate as well as a sectoral level. 
We make use of the results provided by other studies, as well as by our own original research 
into the development of price-cost margins across sectors, in order to confirm some of the 
expectations associated with the single market. In Chapter 6 we summarize the findings of 
selected case studies. These studies are illustrative and are specifically selected to highlight 
some of the strategic responses that firms can be expected to make when confronted with 
increased competitive pressures in integrated markets. The focus of these case studies is on 
identifying changes in competitive conditions, and on typical behavioural responses to these 
changes in the affected industries. 
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3. The single market programme 
What the single market programme seeks to achieve is the completion of the single market 
through a set of specific measures and policies that work alongside other existing policies. It is 
therefore important to set out the policy framework in which competition policy and 
integration policy interact. 
This chapter first provides a brief description of Community policy on integration, and then 
presents a brief summary of the main categories of measures that aim to complete the single 
market. The chapter also lists the main expectations associated with the single market 
programme and its impact on competition. 
3.1. The Treaty of Rome 
The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, lays down firm principles to govern the European 
Economic Community. Article 2 states that the goal of the Community is the establishment of 
a common market and a progressive approximation of the economic policies of Member 
States. In Article 3 (f) the Treaty states how this task should be achieved. Competition policy 
is given a central role, to ensure 'that competition in the common market is not distorted'. 
Article 5 provides that Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligation arising out of the Treaty. Article 7 adds a 
general prohibition on Member States from discriminating on the ground of nationality. 
Several provisions in the Treaty have a significant bearing on the nature of competition within 
the common market. In particular, the following articles set out the four fundamental liberties 
of movement of goods, services, labour and capital: 
(a) Articles 9-37 allow for actions to be taken against Member States where national 
regulations discriminate against imports and impede the free movement of goods; 
(b) Articles 48-58 govern the free movement of persons; 
(c) Articles 59-66 relate to problems in the services sector and promote the free movement 
of services; 
(d) Articles 67-73 concern the free movement of capital. 
The rules on competition allow the Commission to intervene directly in the operation of the 
common market. Several Articles give the Commission power to prevent both firms and 
Member States from impeding the achievement of a common market: 
(a) Articles 85 and 86 establish the principles for action to be taken against anti-competitive 
behaviour of firms in the common market; 
(b) Article 90 relates to support by Member State governments of public undertakings; 
(c) Articles 92-94 relate to firms which have been granted special or exclusive rights that 
have an effect on competition, or have been granted support in the form of state aids. 
The achievement of a common market is the overriding aim of the founding treaty and it 
guides the implementation and execution of European competition policy. 
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3.2. The role of European competition policy in promoting integration 
Many commentators on European competition policy have noted the overriding influence of 
integration policy. The former commissioner with direct responsibility for competition policy, 
Sir Leon Brittan, emphasized the unusual nature of European competition policy right at the 
beginning of his series of lectures on European competition law, when he comments that: 
'... the promotion of competition as a process and an economic system is inextricably 
intertwined with the goal of market integration. The concept is evident from the Treaty 
itself and is again explained in greater detail in the Commission's Competition 
Reports.'2 
and a few paragraphs later he comments that: 
'The combined goals of achieving an internal market and promoting competition create 
a form of competition law which does not fit neatly with any particular school of 
economic analysis used in other jurisdictions. For example, the Chicago School 
approach currently in favour in the USA is not directly relevant to EC Competition 
Policy. Chicago does not need to worry about creating a single market. Rather, it 
presupposes the existence of an integrated market.' 
Another leading textbook on UK and European competition law (Whish [1993]) talks of the 
multifaceted nature of European competition law. He underlines the fact that there are issues 
of particular importance, in addition to the primary objective of safeguarding individuals 
against the power of monopolists, or anti-competitive agreements made by independent firms. 
'... EEC competition law plays an important part in the overriding goal of achieving 
single market integration. The very idea of the common market is that internal barriers 
to trade within the EEC should be dismantled and that goods, services, workers and 
capital should have complete freedom of movement. Firms should be able to outgrow 
their national markets and operate on a more efficient scale throughout the 
Community. Competition law has both a negative and a positive role to play in this. 
The negative one is that it can prevent measures which attempt to maintain the 
isolation of one domestic market from another: for example national cartels, export 
bans and market sharing will be seriously punished. The positive role is that 
competition law can be moulded in such a way as to encourage inter-state trade, partly 
by levelling the playing fields of Europe as one catchphrase has it and partly by 
facilitating cross-border transactions and integration.' (Whish [1993, p. 14]) 
In practice this integration objective manifests itself in an emphasis on preventing measures 
taken by firms to divide up markets, and measures designed to prevent the commercial 
freedom to trade goods and services throughout the Community. The Commission has 
therefore pursued particularly vigorously the elimination of vertical restraints and territorial 
restrictions along national borders. 
Brittan, L., 'European competition policy: keeping the playing field level', CEPS, 1992, p. 3. 
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A case which particularly highlights the tension between the competition objective and the 
integration objective of EU competition policy is Distillers3 where the Commission challenged 
price discrimination supported by an export ban imposed by Distillers on its UK distributor. 
Distillers supplied a variety of whisky throughout Europe. For some brands Distillers was able 
to charge a premium price in some countries but not in others. UK consumers did not treat 
Red Label Whisky as a specially rare or premium brand whereas other countries did. The 
export ban was designed to market and promote Red Label on a country by country basis 
without arbitrage undermining the value of the product in high price countries. In the 
proceedings before the ECJ the Advocate General had been sympathetic to the case made by 
Distillers. However, the court ruled against Distillers without commenting on the merits of 
Distillers' arguments. It is arguable that without the ability of Distillers to market Red Label 
whisky profitably in some Member States, less efforts would be made to promote this 
particular brand, leading to a decrease in sales. 
3.3. The single market programme and the Single European Act 
European integration took a step forward with the launch of the single market programme. In 
the 1985 White Paper, the Commission expressed concern over the lack of substantial 
progress in achieving a single (previously called common) market. They proposed a series of 
measures to remove various non-tariff barriers on the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and labour within the EEC. 
In 1986, the 12 Member States adopted the single market programme by signing the Single 
European Act and agreed to a completion date of 1992. By the end of 1992 most of the 
legislative measures proposed by the Commission had been adopted. 
The single market programme generated great political momentum and provided the impetus 
for the implementation of new as well as dormant policy initiatives, not least in the 
traditionally protected sectors, such as transport and telecommunications. It also led to further 
political integration in the form of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, which established a 
framework for a common European foreign and security policy, as well as cooperative 
arrangements over home affairs and justice. In this study we focus on the impact of the single 
market programme, and it is to this that we now turn. 
The 1985 White Paper identified around 300 measures - later reduced to 282 - which aimed 
to remove three broad categories of barriers: physical, technical and fiscal. 
3.3.1. Physical barriers 
Physical barriers to trade involve limits to the free movement of goods and people across 
borders. 
Eleven measures aimed to remove physical barriers on goods, including VAT exemption for 
goods carried for personal consumption, and increases in tax-paid allowances for intra-
Community travel. A further seven measures aimed to reduce physical barriers on the free 
Competition vs. Distillers, Case 30/78[1980] ECR 2229, discussed for example in Whish [1993, p. 565]. 
As of 2 February 1993, 261 out of 282 measures had been adopted by the Council of Ministers. On 3 measures Member 
States had reached a common position, and the remaining 18 had been proposed. 
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movement of people, including VAT exemption for goods carried for personal consumption, 
and increases in tax-paid allowances for intra-Community travel. 
3.3.2. Technical barriers 
Technical barriers to trade involve differences in regulations, technical standards and 
specifications, public procurement, professional qualifications and financial rules, which 
obstruct companies trading their products across borders. 
169 measures - the majority of the single market measures - involved removing technical 
barriers. These can be divided into six further subcategories: 
(a) free movement of goods;5 
(b) liberalization of public procurement;6 
(c) free movement of labour and the professions;7 
(d) creation of a common market for services (financial services, transport and new 
technologies9); 
(e) measures to liberalize capital movements; 
(f) measures aimed at company mobility.10 
3.3.3. Fiscal barriers 
Fiscal barriers are elements of the government's tax and spending policies which make trade 
across borders more costly. Seventeen proposals were concerned with the removal of fiscal 
barriers, through the harmonization and approximation of indirect taxes and excise duties, as 
well as administrative cooperation in indirect taxation. These measures are not primarily 
aimed at eliminating distortions of trade between Member States but seek to bring about the 
equal treatment of consumers. For example, the harmonization of excise duties primarily 
affects the level of prices that consumers pay in the country of purchase. Excise duties are 
imposed equally on suppliers of imported goods and domestically produced goods, and are not 
distortive in the way that, for example, tariffs levied on cross-border transactions are. 
Nevertheless, they may have a distortive effect when they lead to arbitrage measures by 
consumers - or intermediaries - who want to take advantage of lower prices in third countries, 
and try to avoid payment of higher duties for domestic purchases. 
Eighty proposals concerned technical barriers to trade in goods. Most related to specific sectors (food, pharmaceuticals, 
motor vehicles, chemicals, agricultural machines, construction); however some were more general: e.g. procedures for 
assessing whether technical standards were met, and measures relating to the indication of prices on products. 
Seven measures. 
A number of proposals (12 measures) were intended to encourage the free movement of labour, mostly through 
achieving comparability and mutual recognition of qualifications. Others were concerned with rights of residence in 
other Member States, and with the coordination of laws on self-employed people. 
A number of measures were aimed at the liberalization of air, maritime and road transport, as well as leading to the 
application of EU competition rules to the transport sector. 
These were intended to encourage a single market in mobile telephony, TV broadcasting, telecommunication services 
and equipment. 
A number of other measures were aimed at making it easier for companies to operate across Europe, relating in 
particular to company law, intellectual and industrial property, including the approximation of trademark laws and tax 
barriers. 
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3.4. The expected impact of the single market programme 
The single market programme carried with it a great number of expectations. The Commission 
launched a major study that set out to quantify the beneficial impact of the various measures 
across a large number of sectors.11 In the Cecchini report [1988], the overall gains from the 
implementation of the single market programme were estimated to be the following: 
(a) to trigger a major relaunch of economic activity, adding on average 4.5% to the 
Community's GDP; 
(b) to simultaneously cool the economy, deflating consumer prices by an average of 6.1%; 
(c) to relax budgetary and external constraints, improving the balance of public finances by 
an average equivalent to 2.2% of GDP and boosting the Community's external position 
by around 1% of GDP; 
(d) to boost employment, creating 1.8 million new jobs, reducing the jobless rate by around 
1.5%. 
The 'technical' measures were seen as the most important for realizing the expected benefits 
from increased access to each market. The 1985 White Paper argued that while physical 
barriers impose a burden on industry, their significance is rather that they are 'the obvious 
manifestation of the continued division of the Community'. 
'While the elimination of physical barriers provides benefits for traders, particularly 
through the disappearance of formalities and frontier delays, it is through the 
elimination of technical barriers that the Community will give the large market its 
economic and industrial dimension by enabling industries to make economies of scale 
and therefore to become more competitive.' 
3.5. How does the single market programme affect competition? 
The removal of barriers to trade leads to what Krugman and Venables [1993, p. 3] describe as 
'a reduction in the cost of doing business across space', and Hoekman and Mavroidis [1994, p. 
3] 'a decline in the cost of contesting markets for foreign producers'. Measures aimed at 
fostering competition and promoting market integration affect the cost of selling in foreign 
markets in several different ways. 
(a) A reduction in firms' costs of entering foreign markets (which is a fixed cost). For 
example, one such fixed cost would be registering car models to check they comply with 
national technical and safety standards. 
(b) A reduction in the cost of supplying goods and services to other markets (which is 
equivalent to a reduction in the marginal cost of the delivered product).13 Examples are 
13 
See Cecchini, P. et al., The European Challenge -1992- The Benefits of a Single Market, Wildwood House, 1988. 
Although these barriers should have been removed, the practical impact is not yet very important: 'A uniform set of 
technical requirements was finally agreed upon in the EU and took effect in 1993. A car model that meets these 
requirements and has received type approval in one country can now, in principle but apparently not in practice, be sold 
in all EU countries without the need to fulfil any additional national requirement.' (Flam and Nordström [1995, p. 5]) 
Most studies seeking to estimate ex ante the effects of integration tend to model the move towards completion of the 
single market as a reduction in the cost of intra-EU trade. For example, Smith and Venables [1988], and Gasiorek, 
Smith and Venables [1991] assume that trade liberalization takes the form of an equiproportionate reduction in all the 
implicit barriers to trade between EU countries. In their models, the size of the reduction is chosen so that the direct 
cost saving achieved by the policy is equivalent to 2.5% of the value of base-level intra-EU trade. 
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border costs which arise from the requirement that goods have to be checked at the border 
(for reasons of taxation, as well as to uphold national health regulations and trade policies 
against non-member countries). Other examples are the costs of different technical 
regulations on product packaging and marketing which mean that every unit that is sold 
into a foreign market has to carry additional costs of adjustments. 
The distinction between these two effects on costs is not always clear-cut. While tariff barriers 
almost always relate to a per unit or per value charge on imports, most non-tariff barriers 
imply a mixture of fixed entry costs and variable per unit cost. For example, border costs can 
take the form of import-export paperwork; hiring specialized handling agents to deal with the 
procedures of intra-EU trade; delays at the border. 
Both types of costs, fixed and variable, affect entry into a foreign market, although in different 
ways. The first type simply reduces entry costs regardless of the scale of entry. The second 
type affects decisions to supply foreign customers in much the same way as a reduction in 
transport costs. More specifically, they reduce the costs that must be incurred in supplying a 
foreign customer relative to the cost of supplying a domestic customer at the same distance. 
Where market integration is achieved, there should be no difference in the cost of supplying 
foreign and domestic customers who are at the same distance from the supplier. In other 
words, the labelling of one customer as 'foreign' and the other as 'domestic' should have no 
economically relevant effect. 
In our terminology (see Chapter 4) the single market programme will have achieved its aim 
once firms and individuals consider their actions independent of national borders. In general, 
if cross-border trade between Member States becomes easier, differences in economic 
conditions between countries or regions within the EU will be eroded. Outcomes will become 
independent of borders as the range of available goods, the range of prices, the range of quality 
or employment opportunities become increasingly similar in all countries. For example, 
measures facilitating the free movement of labour will tend to erode differences in 
employment conditions that are due to national regulations. 
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the effects of different integration measures on the entry of 
new suppliers, the aggregate trade volume between Member States, and the product quality 
and prices faced by Consumers in individual Member States. 
Table 3.1. Effects of the single market 
Measure related to 
Direct harmonization of 
economic conditions 
Reduction in fixed costs of 
trade/entry 
Reduction in per unit cost 
of trade 
; Entry 
I Possibly induced by 
1 changes in demand and 
i supply; exit possible 
j Increased entry 
j Increased entry 
programme 
; Trade volume 
j Possibly reduced by 
j changes in demand and 
; supply 
; Increase due to higher 
; number of suppliers 
; Increase due to increase in 
! quantity supplied by 
1 existing suppliers and entry 
: of new suppliers 
; Economic conditions 
j (prices and qualities) 
j Directly affected by the 
j measures 
j Change due to change in 
; trade volume 
I Change due to change in 
! trade volume 
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Competitive conditions are changed in every case, either directly by harmonization measures 
which affect taxes, excise duties and general industry regulation, or indirectly through 
measures which increase entry and trade volumes. 
3.6. Conclusions 
This brief review of European competition and integration policy has provided the institutional 
background to our study. In particular, we sought to establish that the single market 
programme cannot be seen in isolation from the historical context and other Community 
policies. European competition policy itself is an instrument of Community integration policy, 
with the explicit remit in the Treaty of Rome to support the overall aim of establishing a 
common market. Furthermore, there is a rich history of intervention by the Commission's 
Competition Policy Directorate in pursuit of this aim. 
The single market programme is a deliberate attempt to re-enforce the trend towards 
integration. It is arguable that the impact of single market measures depends very much on the 
specific actions taken in industries that have traditionally been highly protected from the entry 
of new competitors. The general impact of reductions in trade barriers only establishes more 
favourable conditions within which firms can exploit new opportunities provided by specific 
liberalization measures. The next chapter deals more explicitly with the economic concepts 
that underlie integration and competition policy. After this mainly theoretical exploration, we 
then examine the empirical evidence of trends in integration and competition. 
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4. Concepts of market integration and competition 
4.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to set out an overall framework for the assessment of the 
relationship between market integration and competition, leading to an evaluation of the 
possible implications for competition policy at the EU level. 
We start in Section 4.2 by defining market integration as a state where the outcomes of 
economic decisions are independent of national frontiers - more succinctly, 'borders do not 
matter'. This is quite distinct from Europe comprising a single economic market. We then 
identify the potential economic benefits from market integration, including distributive effects 
and particularly the enhancement of economic efficiency through direct efficiency gains, 
economies of scale and competition effects. Subsequently, in Section 4.3, we develop the 
analysis of integration at a more disaggregated level, separating product markets, input 
markets, and the choice of product characteristics (product design). In Section 4.4 we examine 
the other main theme of this study, namely the notion of competition, and discuss in detail the 
ways in which competition may increase economic efficiency (also pointing out the main 
ambiguities and conflicts). Next, we consider a number of ways in which firms may take 
action to frustrate the pro-competitive effects of market integration (Section 4.5). 
4.2. Integration and integration policy 
4.2.1. What is 'market integration'? 
The public debate on the economics of 'European integration' has been most often concerned 
with the macroeconomic side of integration. This encompasses issues such as the best way to 
accommodate macroeconomic shocks in the face of labour immobility (optimal currency area), 
and the international transmission of shocks (see for example Bean [1992]). The informal 
notion of macroeconomic integration is usually described as a process whereby country-
dependent idiosyncrasies are lessened. According to this view, integration can be interpreted 
as a strengthening of the macroeconomic transmission mechanisms interlinking economies 
with each other. As a result, for example, changes in national GDPs would become more 
closely correlated. This means that country-specific shocks should affect all countries, and 
common shocks should impact upon all countries symmetrically. 
This study on integration and competition is expected to examine the interaction of the single 
market programme with competitive conditions and the anti-competitive responses of firms to 
integration. This market focus requires a microeconomic perspective with reference to product 
(output) markets and input markets (i.e. components, raw materials, labour and capital 
markets). We are also concerned with firms' strategies in the area of product design 
(especially product variety, advertising, and R&D). The appropriate notion of 'integration' 
should therefore encompass all these aspects. 
A suitably general definition, which we adopt in this study (and which is logically consistent 
with the macroeconomic notion of integration as given above), describes integration as a 
process whereby the outcomes of economic decisions become less dependent on the existence 
of borders. In integrated markets, firms will be able to consider entry into a product market 
ignoring the costs of selling across a national border. They will compete with other firms 
24 Competition issues 
across geographic markets that are no longer determined by national borders, except where 
natural geographic features impose transport costs along borders (e.g. coastlines). 
This general definition covers a number of outcomes of economic decisions such as 
purchasing of input or location of production facilities. For example, it may be argued that 
integration is already advanced in some respects in the car industry, where manufacturers 
generally operate their purchasing and sourcing of parts and components on a pan-European 
scale, leading to closer correlation of the prices of these across Member States. This is in 
contrast to the output market for passenger cars, where we still observe national price 
differentials and national distributional channels. Integration of the passenger car market 
cannot therefore be considered complete in terms of our general definition. 
The above definition of integration does not imply the absence of cross-country differences. 
Geography will still be important even in perfectly integrated markets. Location affects 
economic decisions - and therefore outcomes and welfare - due to: 
(a) transport costs; 
(b) differences in consumers' preferences across regions (as explained by culture, tastes, 
etc.); 
(c) differences in factor endowments; 
(d) firm-specific economies of scale (and in particular their interaction with transport costs 
and/or consumers' preference for variety); 
(e) local productive externalities and returns to specialization. 
In conclusion, markets can be considered integrated where national characteristics do not exert 
an influence above and beyond that of the factors listed above.15 The abolition of artificial border 
effects will lead to larger geographical markets across Europe, within which more firms are 
likely to compete. If markets are not integrated, due to barriers to trade and costs of entry, then 
national market segmentation and fragmentation of markets will remain. 
4.2.2. Why is market integration desirable? 
There are two main reasons why the integration of markets may be a desirable objective: one 
is a distributional objective, the other is based on efficiency benefits. These are logically 
distinct, and may indeed give rise to conflicting goals in some circumstances. 
First, market integration in the way defined ('borders do not matter') may have distributive 
effects which might be judged beneficial by public policy, in the sense that they should 
See, for example, Caballero and Lyons [1990a], Romer [1986], and Krugman [1990]. 
It is perhaps useful to illustrate this notion by way of an econometric analogy. Suppose we were to model some 
economic outcome. After taking into account country-specific factors, such as cross-country differences in preferences, 
factor endowments, etc., integration, according to this definition, would mean that dummy variables for each individual 
country should be insignificant. Vice versa, country dummies should be significant in the absence of integration. In 
product markets, for example, this approach implies there is market integration if (properly correcting for preference 
and endowment differences between countries) the distribution of relative prices within any particular country was the 
same as the EU-wide distribution. Hence notions such as 'the law of one price', which should prevail as a result of 
integration, are only to be used in this sense. Even within one country, there are often differences in prices due to 
differences in search costs. 
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encourage a convergence to similar conditions in different parts of the EU. There are three 
main benefits of more equal distribution. 
(a) Allocative efficiency requires that consumers who are similar (in the sense of having 
similar preferences and income levels - or else quasi-linear preferences) should receive 
similar allocations of goods and services. 
(b) There may be an equity argument for similar consumers being treated similarly, though 
economic analysis often ignores this aspect because it involves interpersonal comparisons. 
(c) Economic cohesion of different parts of the Union, in itself an objective of the EU, 
could be furthered by the integration process. If economic conditions become more 
similar across regions, there is less reason for socio-economic conflict, which should 
facilitate bargaining on issues of common interest. Moreover, increased economic 
interdependence between countries makes the disruption of cohesion more costly and 
therefore less likely to occur. 
The second reason why market integration may be desirable is that it may enhance economic 
efficiency through a reduction in impediments to trade and the promotion of competition 
across the EU. In practice, it may be the case that the efficiency objectives are in conflict with 
the distributive goals of market integration, and we will seek to discuss the conflicts as they 
emerge. 
We distinguish between three types of efficiency gains that may result from the single market 
programme. 
Direct efficiency gains 
The reduction of transport costs involved in eliminating trade barriers is per se a social 
benefit: resource allocation is improved, ceteris paribus, by a reduction in input costs. 
Resources can be saved by the ending of border controls and the abolition of administrative 
barriers on business. Lower cost producers can enter markets that were previously subject to 
extra costs associated with entry and cross-border trade. In addition, the removal of fiscal 
distortions and restrictions on procurement and other sectors should also deliver pure 
allocative efficiency gains, since economic decisions were previously distorted. 
Economies of scale effects 
Scale economies were the source of much of the Commission's estimated gains from 
integration. In the presence of economies of scale, integration which expands market 
boundaries may lead to efficiency gains. In other words, the increase in market size should 
create the opportunity and the incentive to exploit economies of scale (and scope). This should 
generate some efficiency gains regardless of the ex post market structure (even if integration 
were to lead to the unification of two previously separate markets into one monopoly, there 
could still be productive efficiency gains because of economies of scale effects).16 
These economies should be viewed cautiously, however, at least at the aggregate level: Kay [1989] argued that they 
should not be overestimated, as, for almost all products, the minimum efficient scale of production does not exceed 
10% of the European market. 
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Economies of scale can be external to the firm as well as internal. This means that a firm's 
productivity may increase when the output of other firms rises. External economies arise 
essentially from the public good nature of some inputs. The most plausible source of external 
economies are due to technological spillovers as a result of the partial appropriability of 
knowledge (see Romer [1986]). 
For example, Baldwin [1989] considers country-specific external economies (both in a static 
and a dynamic sense) as the main determinants of productivity gains and growth from '1992'. 
He estimates a medium-term growth bonus (from higher productivity and output raising the 
capital-labour ratio) leading to an output effect for '1992' about twice as large as the static 
gains estimated in the Cecchini report [1988]. Furthermore, there should be permanent (long-
term) dynamic effects which would increase (adding between 0.2-0.9 percentage points) the 
EU's long-term growth rate, over and above the 2.5-6.5% one-off increase in EU income from 
static efficiency gains, as estimated in the Cecchini report. Notice that if external economies at 
the national level are indeed substantial, the implication is that some countries may benefit 
more than others: there might be thus a conflict between efficiency and distributive effects, in 
that efficiency might lead to decreasing equity. Caballero and Lyons [1990a] also find 
evidence of country-specific inter-industry effects in four European countries. They [1990b] 
seek for evidence of externalities at the EU level, proposing a means of discriminating 
between inter-industry and intra-industry effects. The empirical results obtained on industry-
level data on manufacturing support the existence of inter-industry effects (estimated at around 
ECU 47 billion); however, support for cross-country intra-industry effects is weak. Internal 
economies are found to be already exploited to a significant degree - which casts some doubts 
on the Cecchini report's estimates of ECU 61 billion cost savings from economies of scale in 
manufacturing. 
Competition effects 
A reduction in trade barriers, which should imply both a reduction in transport costs and in 
fixed entry costs, should result in greater access to every sub-market. Competition is 
increased, and - to the extent that competition has positive efficiency effects (in the three 
dimensions we identified above) - this should improve economic outcomes. There might, 
however, be a conflict between the previous economies of scale effect and the competition 
effect, if the former leads to greater concentration. 
The Cecchini report associated 41% of the benefit of the completion of the single market with 
the direct efficiency gains resulting from the removal of trade barriers, 30% from exploiting 
economies of scale, 23% from the effects of intensified competition, and another 5% from the 
removal of barriers affecting trade.17 
This study does not primarily address distributive effects, direct efficiency gains, nor 
economies of scale (the latter forming the object of a separate study). It is specifically 
concerned with the efficiency gains realized through increased competition, induced by market 
integration and competition policy. Chapters 5 and 6 provide some empirical evidence of the 
benefits of increased competition, while the discussion of competition issues in Chapters 7-11 
analyses the scope for frustrating the competition process. The overall welfare assessment will 
See also Silberston and Raymond [1996]. 
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depend heavily upon the effectiveness of competition, and efficiency gains may be frustrated 
by strategic actions taken by firms to protect themselves from increased competition.18 
Before moving to a discussion of the impact of single market measures, it is important to 
acknowledge that convergence of economic conditions may also be induced by intensified 
trade with the outside world. A reduction in trade barriers between Europe and the rest of the 
world, in the context of the conclusions of the GATT Round on world trade, may introduce 
new incentives for EU firms (and individuals) to exploit scale economies and gain 
comparative advantages. It may also increase the number of competing suppliers on the 
European scene. These in turn can be expected to promote an internal adjustment process, 
leading to increased convergence and therefore also to integration in the way we have defined 
it.19 
One of the main challenges for any study of the consequences of internal integration measures 
is thus to separate their effects from the impact of removing business to trade world-wide. 
4.3. The dimensions of market integration 
The single market measures may be expected to affect integration along three relevant 
dimensions: 
(a) product markets (pricing, output); 
(b) input markets (capital, labour, location); 
(c) product design, and technology choices (horizontal and vertical product differentiation, 
advertising, R&D). 
For example, the elimination/simplification of border procedures, which implies an effective 
reduction in transport costs across the EU, should directly concern product and input markets. 
The harmonization of technical standards, removing the requirement to adapt products for 
different markets, should lessen the extent of artificial diseconomies of scale and scope, and is 
significant for product desiga The removal of restrictions on market access is obviously 
relevant to product markets, including the services sector (for example, entry may be easier in 
banking). 
In this section we consider in greater detail the relationship between integration, distributional 
issues and competition across the three dimensions - product markets, input markets and 
product design/ technology. 
18 This is illustrated, for example, by the variety of welfare results obtained by Smith and Venables [1988]: for the cement 
industry, for example, they estimated that welfare could increase by 2.2% or fall by 1%, depending on the assumptions 
adopted on competition between firms. 
Several studies of the extent of integration across countries (Neven and Roller [1991], Jacquemin and Sapir [1991, 
1988], but also Sleuwaegen and Yamawaki [1988], Yamawaki et al. [1989]) have examined the evolution of trade flows 
both within the EU and between the EU and the rest of the world. One result is that between 1975 and 1985, non-tariff 
barriers appeared to affect trade with the rest of the world more than intra-EU trade (the strength of non-tariff barriers 
was not a significant determinant of intra-EU trade flows). From these studies it appears, therefore, that competition 
from non-EU imports may have more of a pro-competitive effect on EU industry than increased imports from within the 
EU. 
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4.3.1. Economic integration in product markets 
In Section 4.2.1, market integration was defined as a process whereby outcomes of economic 
decisions become less dependent on national borders. We need to interpret this idea in the 
context of product markets. 
A common view of product market integration is that price distribution across countries 
should become more similar. Price dispersion is always limited by consumer arbitrage 
possibilities, therefore reduced costs of arbitrage will cause price distributions to become 
similar. 
This concept does not exclude the persistence of differences in outcomes. Established 
differences in preferences across regions may mean that outcomes, e.g. consumption levels, 
are quite different in different countries; hence even when prices converge, this does not mean 
that outcomes are the same. What matters is that, given preferences, outcomes should not be 
dependent on the presence of borders. 
Thus, as long as there are differences across regions, and there are some transport costs, there 
will be price dispersion. The degree of integration should then be correctly assessed on the 
basis of the correlation of prices, and transmission of shocks. That is, in a fully integrated 
market, local shocks should be transmitted into prices in other areas. For example, an increase 
in demand in country A should lead to a price increase in country Β - and a reduction in 
consumption of that product in country Β - if they are perfectly integrated. Similarly, a 
positive cost shock which raises the price in one country should be transmitted to other 
countries through arbitrage. Hence a high degree of integration means that prices are highly 
correlated. 
In this sense, we should interpret as moves towards integration in product markets any 
measures that reduce transport costs or other costs of arbitrage, and which increase the 
correlation of prices. This will have both distributional and competitive effects. 
Distributional effects 
Integration measures have distributional effects if they encourage consumer arbitrage which 
reduces price discrimination across geographic regions. Since price discrimination across 
regions always involves redistribution from one region to another, there is a distributive effect 
in eliminating price discrimination through pure consumer arbitrage. From an efficiency point 
of view, eliminating price discrimination may be welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing; 
indeed, this is one instance where the distributional goals of market integration may come into 
conflict with efficiency considerations. 
To give a simple example, suppose that markets in all countries were served by a single 
monopolist. Before introducing integration measures, this firm was able to price-discriminate 
across different countries, and charge different prices. If market integration measures eliminate 
all costs of consumer arbitrage, this does not affect the market power of the monopolist, but 
forces him to set a single price in all countries. This means that the price rises in some 
countries, and falls in other countries. It may even mean that this 'average' price is 
prohibitively high in some regions, which as a result choose not to buy. It is possible that 
consumers in regions where the price was previously lower may lose so much more in benefits 
Concepts of market integration and competition 29 
than those consumers that are gaining, that it may be judged that there is an overall reduction 
in welfare.20 
Competitive effects 
Integration may also have competitive effects. A reduction in the transport and arbitrage costs 
will reduce firms' marginal cost of supplying different markets, while any reduction in the 
fixed cost of market access should encourage new entry (both by domestic and foreign 
producers). This should lead to increased competition in the market place, with corresponding 
efficiency and concentration effects. The equilibrium configuration is difficult to predict: if 
domestic firms operate at different cost levels, then entry by foreign competitors should induce a 
shake-out of the domestic high-cost firms. As a result, EU-wide concentration might increase, 
particularly if the technology is such that foreign entrants may exploit economies of scale and 
come into the market with a lower cost. 
4.3.2. Economic integration in input markets 
Liberalization of factor markets (capital and labour) is one important aspect of integration, and 
has important distributional implications. Winters and Venables [1991] argue that 
consideration of factor markets is essential to addressing the issue of how the costs and 
benefits of 1992 are likely to be distributed across the EU. 
Capital and labour market mobility 
The single market programme contained several measures aimed at capital markets. These 
should imply lower costs of trading between different regions in Europe, which should 
increase the mobility of capital. This will facilitate direct investment, and as a consequence 
make it easier for investors to use arbitrage opportunities when economic conditions differ 
across countries. 
Similarly, a number of single market measures are aimed at the integration of labour markets, 
particularly facilitating the mobility of individuals across borders. However, even if barriers to 
labour mobility are removed, this may not necessarily lead to increased labour mobility, 
because lack of mobility may be induced by preferences. Indeed, empirical research shows that 
there is a high degree of aversion to mobility in many regions of Europe. In such a situation, 
the liberalization of capital markets has a second important effect. According to traditional 
trade theory, capital mobility should tend to result in equalization of wage rates, under the 
assumptions of the 'factor price equalization' theorem (which includes sufficiently similar 
initial endowments). Significant wage dispersion would only persist in the long term in labour 
markets if capital arbitrage across labour markets is not effective. 
There is an important caveat here, related to heterogeneity of skills in labour markets - and 
generally other endowments. If there is complementarity between high skills and capital 
investment in R&D, R&D investment will move out of regions with low-skilled labour, into 
regions with a higher proportion of high-skill labour, especially if there are relatively lower 
wages for higher-skilled workers in those regions. This may lead to a different proportion of 
high-skilled jobs in different regions, and to long-term differences in the wage distribution 
See Chapter 6 for a discussion of price discrimination as a competition issue in the single market. 
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between regions. This might imply that these high-skill regions will have more spillovers 
between firms in R&D, resulting in more growth through external economies - see Baldwin 
[1989] - since these are areas in which R&D is concentrated. Hence it may be the case that 
integration of some sub-markets actually leads to less integration, in the distributive sense of 
less similarity in living conditions.21 
Location decisions 
Relative input costs may be expected to affect location decisions. However the effect of 
integration does not lead to an immediate decision to relocate to minimize the cost of reaching 
a particular market. This is because firms have already made investment decisions, and sunk 
costs in production capacity. Since all investment decisions are marginal decisions (adding to 
existing capacity), it may be a long time before location structure converges to an optimal 
structure. Location structure soon after integration may not therefore be very different, and 
location patterns not necessarily a reliable indicator of the degree of market integration. 
Hence, location decisions depend partly upon historical decisions, and costs which are already 
sunk. Integration cannot be necessarily identified in the short term by location decisions that 
minimize the cost of getting the product to the customer. 
4.3.3. Economic integration in product design and technology choices 
Integration may have a further important effect on firms' decisions about the range (and 
quality) of products offered, the type of advertising and the way in which R&D is carried out. 
These choices, to do with degree of product differentiation, how products are advertised, and 
what technology is chosen, may be collectively described as the area of product design 
decisions by firms. 
Product variety 
A first important issue is the relationship between integration and product variety. How are 
firms' selection of product characteristics - e.g. models, versions - affected by integration? 
How does the availability of variety to consumers across Europe change with integration? 
According to intra-industry trade theories, which explain international trade as a result of 
product differentiation and scale economies, integration should be expected to lead to 
increased trade within each industry across the EU. In this way, integration would generate 
benefits because consumers would be given access to a larger range of products in all 
countries. Integration could also bring about allocative efficiency gains because of the 
following. 
(a) Consumers would be more likely to be matched with their preferred product variety. 
Trade barriers that distort relative prices might imply, for example, that consumers are 
buying a domestic product when they would actually prefer a foreign make. If these 
For an analysis of the analogous case in the US context, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992]. 
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barriers are eliminated, some marginal consumers, who were inefficiently buying the 
domestic product before, would be able to start buying their preferred product. 
(b) Consumers would be able to choose from a wider range of products. 
The range of products will be determined as a trade-off between the economies of scale of 
producing any one product, and consumers' preferences for variety. We can interpret 
integration as an increase in market size, and a larger market will support more varieties of 
products for given levels of economies of scale and preferences for variety. 
In addition, integration would encourage greater variety because the associated reduction 
in trade costs makes it profitable for firms to enter a market even with smaller quantities. 
Furthermore, there may be efficiency gains from exploiting previously unexploited 
economies of scale and scope, and thereby a wider product variety may be sustainable. 
(A possible analogy is the way in which technological improvements in packaging and 
transport have made it possible to buy tropical fruit anywhere in Europe at any time of 
the seasonal cycle.) 
Of course, it must again be emphasized that integration may not necessarily mean that the 
same range of products would be offered everywhere in Europe. Indeed, differences may 
persist in product range and specifications, if these reflect underlying preferences, and 
particularly if it is not very costly for firms to adapt the product to cater for local tastes and 
preferences. Even so, we should expect integration measures to increase the similarity of 
varieties offered across countries, because they reduce artificial diseconomies of scope and 
scale resulting from differences in regulations and standards. In this framework, one important 
measure of integration would be the correlation of product availabilities across countries. 
The alternative approach to intra-industry trade theory is the classical theory of increased 
exploitation of comparative advantage based on factor endowments, and 'specialization': 
inter-industry trade theory.22 From this perspective, trade liberalization should lead to 
relocation of production to reflect comparative advantages and factor endowments. However, 
in a European context the benefits in terms of allocative efficiency could be expected to come 
more from increased variety (product differentiation) than from comparative advantage and 
specialization. This is because factor endowments may not be very different across the EU 
(with some exceptions). Furthermore, if there is integration in capital markets (i.e. capital 
mobility), then we may expect some equalization of labour costs across Europe (relative factor 
prices will tend to equalize, see Helpman and Krugman [1989]), and the long-run effects of 
greater variety should be more important than comparative advantage effects. 
The evidence for this is that most of the observed trade growth in the EU has been intra-
industry trade. Neven [1990] examines intra-industry trade flows in Europe in 1985 for 29 
industries, and finds that - with the exception of Portugal and especially Greece - intra-
This is the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin explanation of international trade. Here, the existence of barriers to trade may 
prevent the exploitation of comparative advantages; if the elimination of such barriers through the single market 
programme makes it possible to exploit these advantages, prices may fall, which might foster allocative efficiency. 
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industry trade tends to prevail.23 Flam [1992] observes that most intra-Community trade, as 
indeed most world trade, is not driven by comparative advantage. 
Advertising 
As a general point, there are no 'markets' for advertising (and to a lesser degree for R&D) 
which can be compared conceptually to the product and factor markets discussed above. That 
is, advertising and R&D are not 'traded' in the classical sense. Hence restrictions of trade 
affect advertising and R&D only indirectly, through their direct effects on product and factor 
markets. Therefore measures which liberalize products and factor markets affect the incentives 
for advertising and R&D activities, which may in turn affect the distribution of economic 
outcomes in the community. 
In this framework, the 'globalization' of advertising (i.e. the adoption of a common 
advertising message across different countries) may or may not be a consequence of market 
integration. This will depend on the trade-off between economies of scale in advertising and 
the benefits of tailoring advertising to local culture. However, increasing returns to scale in 
advertising may also be exploited in segmented product markets. 
An important additional benefit of integrating advertising is that it can establish a single 
'global' reputation for quality. Reputation in one product market is tied to product quality in 
other markets, therefore a unified advertising strategy may give a stronger signal of a 
commitment to quality. 
Overall, globalization of advertising is not a direct implication of market integration, but is a 
consequence of market integration only if integration increases market access. For example, an 
integration measure that standardized security design on cars would not be sufficient to make 
car producers advertise globally. However, global advertising might be adopted because of 
economies of scale in designing an advertising campaign. For this reason, we should not take 
globalization of advertising as an indicator of the degree of market integration. 
Research and development (R&D) 
Further important issues are the location of R&D activity, and the possible changes in the 
organization of R&D: how does integration affect the location of R&D? How does it affect the 
way in which firms carry out R&D, e.g. their incentives to internalize the problem of R&D 
spillovers, or the threat of being leap-frogged in a patent race, through joint ventures or 
strategic alliances? 
On the first point (R&D location) it is not clear whether market integration should lead to a 
more or less even distribution of R&D activity across countries in Europe. With capital 
mobility (capital market integration), and in the absence of labour market mobility, R&D 
activity should follow the underlying endowments in skill levels, and this may lead to 
The industries where intra-industry trade was found to be more significant were clothing, footwear, wood, electrical 
machinery and tobacco processing. 'On the whole, trade arising from the 'classical' factors is fairly limited between 
European countries, at least in terms of the product scope' (Neven [1990, p. 23]). Neven also evaluates possible 
deviations from the equality of factor prices across Europe, which could be an indicator that comparative advantage is 
not exploited because of non-tariff barriers. He finds that there is some scope for exploiting comparative advantage (low 
labour costs) in Portugal and Greece, and in the UK (human capital), once barriers were removed. 
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concentration of R&D activity in regional centres with a dense agglomeration of highly skilled 
labour. As a result, market integration may well lead to unequal distribution of R&D, and 
wage incomes of skilled labour across different countries. 
In addition, R&D is an activity beset with productive spillovers. This may give strong local 
external economies of scale, and benefit the geographical concentration of particular R&D 
activities (e.g. Silicon Valley). 
4.4. Competition and efficiency 
Competition is the second major theme in this study. The aim of the study is to analyse the 
interaction between integration and competition and to examine the evolution of competition 
conditions in the single market. Earlier in this chapter we identified the efficiency gains 
associated with the single market programme, and emphasized that in this study we are 
particularly interested in assessing the benefit of increased competition in the single market. 
It is therefore crucial to understand how competition provides efficiency in the economy. 
Economics distinguishes three dimensions of efficiency. 
(a) Allocative efficiency. This means that: 
(i) prices reflect costs so that consumers make the right trade-offs; 
(ii) there is efficient organization of production (i.e. appropriate combinations of 
inputs, and economies of scale and scope exploited). 
(b) Productive (internal) efficiency, which means that, given output, production takes place 
in practice at minimum costs: hence productive efficiency implies that internal slack (X-
inefficiency) is absent. 
(c) Dynamic efficiency, which means that there is optimal trade-off between current 
consumption and investment in technological progress. 
4.4.1. Competition and allocative efficiency 
Traditionally, the economic literature has put particular emphasis on how competition might 
promote allocative efficiency (in layman's terms: how relatively more is produced of what 
people want and are willing to pay for). This mechanism is easier to understand and study 
empirically than other notions of efficiency. Quite simply, competitive pressures tend to push 
prices towards marginal costs by eroding market power. Given a certain number of firms in a 
market, the alignment of prices with marginal costs generates allocative efficiency. 
However, in some circumstances marginal cost pricing may conflict with other objectives. In 
particular, in the presence of increasing returns to scale, increasing the competitive pressures 
on prices may not give the optimal incentive for market entry.24 More competition (in the 
sense of more firms) causes prices to fall towards marginal costs, but at the same time less 
advantage is taken of scale economies related to fixed entry costs, and so average cost rises. 
Under fairly general conditions, the negative externality that an additional entrant imposes on 
existing firms, by taking business from them, may outweigh the positive externality to 
This point is illustrated by Mankiw and Whinston [1986], in a model of a symmetric, homogeneous goods, Cournot 
oligopoly, with fixed (and sunk) entry costs. Under these assumptions there is a trade-off between productive and 
allocative efficiency, resulting in too much entry from the point of view of welfare. 
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consumers in terms of lower price. Here more competition appears to be good for allocative 
efficiency, but bad for productive efficiency. 
When firms' costs differ, competition will, however, play an important role in selecting firms 
with more efficient technologies, and forcing the less efficient ones to leave the market. That 
is, competition ultimately causes efficient organizations to prosper at the expense of inefficient 
ones, which will eventually drop out. This selection process is 'good' for allocative efficiency 
(see Vickers [1994]), and also for productive efficiency. 
4.4.2. Competition and productive efficiency 
The causality between competition and productive efficiency is deeply rooted in economic 
folklore: starting from Hicks' notion that 'the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life', 
economists have always had a 'vague suspicion that competition is the enemy of sloth' (Caves 
[1980]). The theoretical literature is not in agreement on the exact nature of this relationship. 
However the empirical literature provides a relative wealth of evidence to support the notion 
that competition enhances productive efficiency. 
The theory tends to explain the existence of technical (or productive) inefficiencies through 
the following mechanisms. 
(a) Contractual and organizational failures: inefficiencies may be induced by second-best 
bargains struck between principals (firms' owners) and agents (hired managers), or 
managers at any level and their work-force, which means that the latter will not pursue 
profit-maximizing goals. These may depend on the degree of competition in the product 
market. In other words, rents from market power may take the form not of profits, but 
may instead be dissipated in the form of managerial slack (and more generally X-
inefficiency). 
(b) Strategic manipulation of cost levels to affect the nature of competition in the output 
market (see literature on strategic delegation, e.g. Vickers [1985], Fershtman and Judd 
[1987]; and others). The intuition here is that in oligopolistic settings firms have 
powerful incentives to soften price competition, and they may adopt devices which can 
support such an outcome. One option is to 'signal' to one's rival that one's costs are 
high. By committing itself to a course of action which increases its own costs, the firm is 
implicitly indicating that it is not going to follow an aggressive strategy on prices. The 
rival is better off conforming, and equilibrium prices are higher. 
On the first point, it seems plausible that competition may promote productive efficiency by 
overcoming various agency/informational problems, improving monitoring and therefore 
sharpening incentives and reducing sloth and slack. Competition may influence not only 
managerial effort, but also the effort of workers (if product market rents are shared with them 
in some ways). 
As the effects of competition on managerial slack can be modelled in different ways, and 
conclusions are sensitive to model specifications, there are still some ambiguities in the 
theoretical literature. For example, Hart [1983] proposes a model where inefficiency (slack) is 
explicitly the result of a conflict of incentives between owners and managers, and competition 
reduces inefficiency in 'good states'. In his model, an increase in competition ('captured' 
through an increase in the number of entrepreneurial firms) forces managers of managerial 
firms to work harder, because they cannot meet their profit targets - for example when an 
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exogenous reduction in costs leads to output expansion by their competitors, and lower prices. 
However changing the assumptions on the incentive scheme for managers, Scharfstein [1988] 
reaches different conclusions. 
Other models (e.g. Holmström [1982], Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983], and Mookherjee [1984]) 
emphasize a different reason why competition may sharpen incentives. Because a larger 
number of players implies greater opportunities for comparative performance evaluation, 
explicit incentive schemes should improve incentives the greater the number of players 
involved. The positive effects of competition are also reinforced as a result of the bankruptcy 
constraint (Schmidt [1985]; Vickers and Yarrow [1988]), whereby firms/managers tend to 
work harder when they are faced by the threat of going bankrupt. 
The second effect, i.e. the strategic manipulation of costs, is fairly clear-cut. It has been shown 
(Kühn [1994]), that increases in competition, due to a larger number of firms, reduce the 
effects of strategic manipulation. The idea is that as the number of competing firms increases, 
the marginal effects of their actions affect other firms less; and thus other firms will react less 
to commitments towards higher prices. Indeed, typically these strategic effects disappear faster 
than prices converge to marginal cost, as the number of firms increases. 
Though to some extent ambiguous, the conclusion from these models appears positive with 
regard to the claim that competition increases productive efficiency.25 The results from 
empirical literature are more clear-cut. To mention but a few, Caves and Barton [1990], and 
Caves et al. [1992] use frontier production function techniques to estimate technical efficiency 
indices in a number of industries, and relate these to concentration (as a proxy for 
competition). They find that increases in concentration beyond a certain threshold tend to 
reduce technical efficiency. Nickell et al. [1992] find that market concentration has an adverse 
effect on the level of total factor productivity. This means that (ceteris paribus) an increase in 
market concentration should be followed by a fall in productivity.26 
Overall, academic work up to this point appears to support the contention that competition has 
positive effects on productive efficiency. 
4.4.3. Competition and dynamic efficiency 
Dynamic efficiency is defined as the optimal trade-off between current consumption and 
investment in technological progress. The intensity of competition may be expected to affect 
the incentive to undertake R&D, since it will condition the firm's rewards from innovation.27 
In addition to problems of sensitivity to model specification, it must be mentioned that increased product market 
competition has been argued to increase X-inefficiency in some circumstances. For example, greater product market 
competition may lead to managers losing their jobs more frequently, and hence taking too short-term a view. A second 
very important point is that managers may divert their effort, from important but weakly monitored activities to 
unimportant but more visible activities, as a result of the improved monitoring from comparative performance 
evaluation in more competitive environments (Holmström and Milgrom [1987]). 
At the same time, firms with high market share tend to have higher productivity growth. Nickell [1993] further 
investigates the impact of competition on the productivity performance of a panel of UK manufacturing companies. The 
hypothesis is that firms which operate in a more competitive environment have higher levels of productivity, and/or 
higher rates of productivity growth. The intensity of competition is measured by concentration, import penetration, and 
a survey-based dummy for competition. The evidence in favour of the base hypothesis is rather weak. 
It is worth pointing out that there is in principle a trade-off between allocative and dynamic efficiency: costs might fall 
as a result of competition in technological innovation, yet this may actually lead to increased market concentration, and 
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These effects are potentially important for macroeconomic performance and ultimately for 
welfare, but are extremely difficult to unravel. 
Early discussions of the relationship between product-market competition and innovation (e.g. 
Schumpeter) held that the driving force in the process were firms with ex ante market power, 
rather than just the prospect of market power. An argument in favour of this position is the so-
called 'long purse' effect; due to capital market imperfections more monopolistic firms can 
more readily fund R&D expenditure out of retained profits (see Telser [1966]; Fudenberg and 
Tiróle [1986]). In this Schumpeterian view, as the product market becomes more competitive, 
the pay-off to innovation would become lower, and the incentive for R&D would be blunted. 
However this conjecture has been extensively challenged. More product-market competition 
could lead to stronger incentives to innovate, since a potential benefit of innovation is escape 
from tough competition, by earning a monopoly right to an invention protected by a patent 
(Arrow [1962]). 
The more recent theoretical literature on the subject has treated innovation as a patent race 
between firms, where the 'prize' from being first (and thus being able to appropriate the 
profits from the innovation) is the incentive spurring firms along. These micro models of R&D 
investments actually suggest that competitive pressures typically boost, rather than dampen, 
innovation. The optimal innovation pace will accelerate under the threat that actual (or 
potential) competitors may register the patent first. 
Overall, the welfare effects from this substantial literature are ambiguous, because there are 
always at least two effects at work: on the one hand, firms' private benefits from successful 
innovation are usually less than the social benefits. On the other hand, the result of R&D, i.e. 
knowledge, is a public good, and thus R&D expenditure by a number of firms may involve a 
wasteful duplication. 
In addition to product-market competitiveness effects, it is worth noting that there may also be 
a 'market-size effect' to the pay-off from innovation. If integration (i.e. removal of barriers) 
leads to an increase in the size of the market, this may increase the pay-off to innovation, i.e. the 
expected reward for winning a patent race, and therefore the incentive for firms to compete to 
achieve an innovation ahead of their rivals. 
Overall, although theoretical results are - as often - ambiguous, it is likely that competition 
increases the amount of R&D. However, whether this conclusion holds is necessarily an 
empirical question. 
The Schumpeterian hypothesis has been subject to extensive empirical testing, (Kamien and 
Schwarz [1975], Scherer [1967], Cohen and Levinthai [1989]). As Garcia Peftalosa [1996] 
remarks, the evidence is not strong because market concentration and R&D intensity may be 
prices in excess of marginal costs might be necessary in order to give firms a suitable return on their R&D effort (see 
von Weizsäcker [1980]). 
Notice, however, that integration may also increase the return to R&D through the impact of mergers of European 
firms, joint ventures, or less duplication of national research effort. Each of these would either increase the probability 
of a research project succeeding (or winning the patent race), or mean that a successful research effort would reach a 
larger share of the market. This may be expected to have an effect on the private return to innovation which is for some 
greater than the effect of growth of the EU market as a whole. 
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chiefly the result of industry characteristics rather than causally linked. Some recent empirical 
studies by Porter [1994], Nickell [1996], Geroski [1993] and Blundell et al. [1995] have all 
found that increased competition and market concentration promote innovative activity. This 
evidence seemingly contradicts the Schumpeterian view. 
4.5. The behaviour of competing firms in the single market 
Our previous discussion in this chapter leads us to characterize integration as a process of 
convergence of prices across borders (through arbitrage), increasing access to markets and 
therefore intensifying competition, increasing exploitation of economies of scale, leading to 
economic decisions that are independent of national borders. However, while some firms will 
be able to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the single market, others will want 
to resist the competitive threats that this development implies. 
Overall, it can be expected that the loss of price discrimination possibilities and the 
intensification of competition will tend to reduce firms' profits, unless the increased intensity 
of competition leads to higher levels of concentration. In some sectors that are particularly 
exposed to the single market programme (air travel comes to mind here) firms might have an 
incentive to frustrate the process of integration. That is, market integration might give firms 
additional motives to behave in an anti-competitive way, where it has the effect of threatening 
their profits and entrenched positions in the market. 
4.5.1. Pro-competitive responses: meeting the new competitive conditions 
Before focusing on the behaviour of firms that poses obstacles to integration, it is useful to 
consider the converse - the potential pro-competitive responses to the single market 
programme. The process whereby prices reflect costs and firms seek to determine their 
strategies independently of national frontiers would be consistent with the following. 
(a) Expansion and entry into foreign markets exploiting internal return to scale costs. The 
harmonization of technical standards should have enabled some firms to market their 
products not just in their domestic market but also in other geographical markets, 
without incurring additional costs to adapt their products to meet differing technical 
standards. This would then allow some firms to expand their production and exploit any 
available cost economies. 
(b) Removal of X-inefficiency. The entry of firms into new markets would prompt 
incumbent firms to improve their efficiency in order to sustain their profitability in the 
face of new competition. 
(c) Tougher price and service competition resulting from entry into foreign markets. 
Response to new entrants could also include increasing levels of competition on both 
price and quality of service, as incumbent firms seek to preserve market share and new 
entrants seek to establish a market position. 
(d) Exit of weakest firms and growth of strongest firms. The breakdown in collusive 
behaviour and the increasing levels of competition, coupled with the ability of firms to 
exploit potential economies of scale across new geographical markets, could lead to the 
weakest firms being forced out of business altogether, and the more successful firms 
becoming both larger and stronger. 
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(e) Search for process innovation to reduce costs. With the advent of increased rivalry, the 
pressure to reduce costs, either to be able to reduce prices or to increase profitability, 
intensifies and stimulates a search for new and more efficient processes. 
(f) Enhanced incentives for product innovation via two routes: market-size expansion, and 
more robust competition, implying an Arrow replacement effect and patent races. 
Increasing market opportunities, together with intensifying competition, serves both to 
stimulate further innovation in product development to win new customers and to fight 
off new competitors. 
(g) Improvement in the quality and variety of products. The enhanced incentives in product 
innovation should translate not just into new products but also into higher quality and 
greater variety of products. 
(h) Breakdown in collusive behaviour. With new entrants and changes in the size of 
potential markets, the 'pay-offs' to incumbent firms will change, and as a result any 
existing agreements may break down. Thus firms which had previously reached 
'arrangements' to share a particular market, now begin to find that those market-sharing 
arrangements yield insufficient or uncertain profits, and so begin to compete for market 
share. It is also arguable that the increased activity of regulatory (especially competition) 
authorities at the EU level makes it more difficult to sustain the national regulatory 
relationships which often sustain collusive behaviour. 
Anti-competitive responses 
The pro-competitive effects of single market measures can be undermined by the strategic 
behaviour of private undertakings. Firms which feel threatened by the impending or actual 
entry of newcomers into their domestic market might seek ways of strengthening their position 
through taking action to: 
(a) exclude rivals from markets; 
(b) share markets with rivals; 
(c) prevent parallel trade between markets. 
These various strategic responses of firms can be grouped under six headings. These headings 
form the structure within which the examination of the major competition issues in Part 2 of 
this report is undertaken. This classification does not directly correspond to the traditional 
framework under which European competition policy is usually evaluated. However, given the 
focus of this study on the interaction of integration and competition, it is felt that a perspective 
which gives particular prominence to strategic behaviour that relates to segmentation of 
national markets is most appropriate. 
Preventing consumer arbitrage 
If there are significant price differences between national markets, then consumers and 
intermediaries will be tempted to arbitrage between them. The single market programme 
makes it easier to exploit arbitrage opportunities as it removes some of the extra costs of 
purchasing goods in other Member States. We can therefore expect more cross-border 
shopping to occur, unless existing price differences are reduced. 
Firms might try to prevent consumer arbitrage by measures that prevent resale by 
intermediaries (e.g. exclusive dealing with restrictions to resale). Since there are economies of 
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scale in arbitrage (increasing returns to scale in terms of transport costs), if intermediaries are 
prevented from reselling in other markets arbitrage may not occur at all. 
Notice, however, that while these restrictions to arbitrage may prevent integration with respect 
to a specific product, they may not be anti-competitive. Price discrimination supported by 
parallel import restrictions may actually be desirable (i.e. welfare-enhancing) if it implies that 
markets are served which were not served before, or that firms compete more intensely at the 
margin for low-valuation consumers. Further, limiting discrimination in some cases may 
facilitate collusion. This is essentially because it may be generally easier to monitor deviations 
from an agreement where there is a unique focal price for several sub-markets, than to monitor 
deviations from a vector of prices for a variety of consumers. In other words, restricting price 
discrimination is equivalent to a reduction in the dimensionality of the problem, in order to 
make it easier to sustain collusion. Thus allowing some discrimination may be preferable. 
Erecting entry barriers and maintaining access restrictions 
Increased entry into larger markets is one of the expected consequences of the single market 
programme. A larger number of competitors who actively compete with each other is one of 
the main mechanisms through which the benefits of integration are expected to occur. Firms, 
however, may take a number of actions to prevent the entry of other EU firms into their 
national markets, in particular by denying access to essential infrastructure or simply by 
raising rivals' costs29 through vertical restraints and predatory pricing. 
For example, firms might be able to raise rivals' entry costs through vertical integration, or a 
variety of vertical agreements. Other potential means of deterring entry are through predatory 
behaviour, and strategic investment in R&D or advertising which serves to raise the sunk costs 
of entry. Another way in which firms might be able to raise entry costs is, for example, 
through lobbying for the introduction of technical standards which are favourable to them. 
It must be emphasized that the entry-deterrence problem is likely to be most significant where 
national concentration is already high and where the existence of national networks and 
essential facilities create access issues. Where this is not the case, entry-deterring strategies 
may be less effective, due to the difficulties of coordinating many firms in an attempt to 
exclude foreign rivals. 
Collusive behaviour and market sharing along national boundaries 
Market sharing along national boundaries is an effective form of collusion: since cross-border 
trade is particularly easy to monitor, collusive arrangements to share markets along national 
borders may be relatively easier to sustain than market-sharing arrangements within countries 
or across larger territories. 
The question is whether and how integration can be expected to change the incentives to 
collude. In some instances it may well be that collusion may persist after integration, as 
historical market shares may serve as focal points for coordination, even after integration. In 
other circumstances, integration will lead to new entry into a national market and undermine a 
collusive agreement. 
See Salop and Scheffman [1983]. 
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Efficiency defences for cooperative agreements 
There are many instances where firms cooperate to share facilities, or to coordinate their 
behaviour, in new markets that they want to enter jointly rather then separately. 
Cooperative motives largely explain the joint ventures and strategic alliances being formed 
between firms. For example, joint ventures in R&D may be equivalent in effect to the parties 
'merging' in the design of the next generation of products. (This is an area where competition 
policy may come into direct conflict with industrial policy, aimed at strengthening Europe's 
position as a whole in R&D, in relation to America and Japan.) 
Firms may seek to reduce the competitive effect of direct market entry by entering into various 
forms of production or distribution agreements with established producers in other markets. 
The effect is that the entrant essentially defers 'all decisions on the relevant variables (such as 
prices, quantities, retailing format and advertising) to an established firm which is a direct 
competitor in the product market. While there may be efficiency justifications for this course 
of action (exploiting economies of scale in production/distribution, and avoiding duplication 
of networks), where the licensee is a competitor to the entrant the agreement may have a 
collusive purpose. 
Mergers 
Mergers may just be an 'equilibrium response' to integration measures, because stronger 
competition may not allow the same number of firms to remain in the market - even though 
the market size becomes larger. Thus stronger competition should imply a shake-out of firms 
(in the form of takeovers, mergers or outright exit), which means that concentration must tend 
to rise. 
Apart from this selection effect mergers across countries may also be used in an anti-
competitive mode, to eliminate the competition that arises from additional market access. 
Mergers within countries may in some circumstances be detrimental to competition at the EU 
level: this is the case of mergers which are 'defensive', in the sense that firms within a country 
merge to internalize externalities in entry deterrence, in order to be better placed to keep out 
potential foreign entrants. 
Rent-seeking behaviour through lobbying 
Firms might also seek to defend their position through various forms of lobbying. An example 
could be lobbying for specific regulations and standards to be adopted. Established firms in a 
market may exert pressures for certain standards to be set, in the knowledge that they will be 
consulted and may thereby influence the entire process. At the very least, they will then lobby 
for standards which are favourable to themselves, and less so to their competitors. This may be 
especially the case in the context of new developments in environmental protection: while the 
single market programme incorporated the elimination of certain differences in technical 
standards, new standards may be adopted and entry may be rendered more difficult. For 
example, the German recycling system effectively bars from entry certain products which do 
not confirm to strict environmental rules. Other examples include lobbying to obtain state aids. 
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4.5.2. The behaviour of national governments 
The behaviour of firms may also be distorted by national governments which may take actions 
which maintain segmentation. 
State aids and industrial policy 
The economic rationale for granting state aids is the correction of market failures, with 
associated losses in economic efficiency and welfare. The justification for a European 
Community policy controlling state aids is to prevent such subsidies from affecting market 
behaviour and competition in a way which reduces efficiency and welfare. The potential 
problem is compounded by the fact that many EU Member governments have established 
industrial policies based on supporting their national producers - especially state-owned firms 
which in some cases still play a significant economic role. The integration process may have 
made it more difficult for firms that used to be partially protected from foreign competition to 
achieve sufficient levels of profitability. The incentive for these firms to rely on state support 
(and for the government to avoid liquidation and social costs) is certainly increased in a more 
competitive environment. 
Procurement policies 
Public procurement refers to contracts awarded by public authorities, semi-public bodies and 
public utilities for the supply of goods and services and for major works. In 1990 public 
procurement contracts amounted to 8% of the European Union gross domestic product. Their 
significance is such that any serious attempt to lift trade impediments between EU Member 
States must also include rules allowing firms from different countries to bid for public 
procurement contracts (until recently, as a rule, public procurement contracts in most Member 
States have been the exclusive domain of firms with the same nationality as the awarding 
public body). 
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5. Trends in integration and competition 
5.1. Introduction 
How do we measure the progress of integration within the EU? How do we determine whether 
integration has had any significant effect on firm behaviour? Is there a single measure that 
captures integration? Do we need to employ a series of indicators? Are aggregate level 
statistics, on their own, sufficient? Who is realizing any gains from integration - firms or 
consumers? 
In this chapter we address these key issues. It bridges the gap between these theoretical 
concepts of integration and the analysis of competition issues and integration trends in 
selected markets. Our starting point is the concept of integration developed in Chapter 4, 
where we defined integration as the process by which outcomes of economic decisions 
become independent of borders. More specifically, this process is brought about by a reduction 
in the costs of doing business across borders. Market integration should in most cases lead to 
greater similarity of outcomes across countries since economic fundamentals will be similar 
across countries. Notice, however, that this does not, according to our definition of integration, 
necessarily lead to location being unimportant, but rather that nationality should not determine 
outcomes. To the extent that integration leads to economies experiencing more closely 
correlated economic shocks, we may use increasing similarity and increasing correlation of 
economic variables, such as prices etc., as evidence consistent with the progress of integration. 
In particular, as integration progresses, one would expect to see the following developments: 
(a) Shifting trade patterns within the EU and a deepening of intra-EU trade. Trade flows are 
perhaps the most widely used indicator of the degree of economic integration. 
(b) The potential for cross-border arbitrage increase, and a convergence of prices within the 
EU to result. 
(c) The geographical market within which firms operate become wider as barriers to trade 
recede. The likely increase in competitive pressures should result in lower price-cost 
margins. 
(d) Integration lead to tougher product-market competition and hence lower profits for a 
given number of firms at the EU level. Thus we would expect firms to exit as a response 
to this leading to higher concentration. 
(e) Increased possibilities for exploitation of economies of scale - which in turn has 
implications for market structure and for concentration. This gives an additional reason 
why integration is likely to increase concentration. 
In this chapter we trace these effects through a number of empirical studies and original 
research that makes use of selected indicators of integration. The breadth of this empirical 
review is largely determined by the number and by the sectoral coverage of the empirical 
indicators chosen. 
Such studies entail practical difficulties as well as issues of interpretation. With the advent of 
the single market, statistical information about cross-border trade has become much more 
difficult to collect and prepare, which makes the analysis of intra-EU trade after 1992 much 
more arduous. When one turns to the interpretation of such data, some degree of caution is 
called for. Moreover, aggregate-level studies, whilst clearly important, are not on their own 
sufficient; they may obscure the quite significant impact of integration at the product-market 
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level. We consider that the most useful evidence about the effects of integration is in fact 
gathered by looking comparatively at a number of different sectors. 
Section 5.2 discusses how we might expect market integration to impact differently on 
different sectors, and how we might use this to help identify the impact of market integration. 
Sections 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 discuss the impact of integration on trade flows, prices, price-
cost margins and concentration respectively. Section 5.7 pulls together this different evidence 
and concludes. 
A set of annexes to this chapter provide additional information about the data we used in our 
own research, together with some details of the empirical analysis of price-cost margins. 
5.2. The sectoral impact of integration 
The single market programme will clearly impact upon different product markets in different 
ways. In some product markets, the market structure may be such that outcomes are already 
independent of borders - the impact of integration will therefore be negligible. In other 
markets, however, it may be that outcomes will never be independent of borders - for 
example, where transport costs are extremely high, local monopolies may be the only tenable 
market structure. Once more, in markets such as these, integration is likely to have little effect. 
However, in other markets, the effects of integration are likely to be considerable. 
Consideration of aggregate indicators alone will mask the impact of integration in this group 
of product markets. 
As a result, we have carried out a sector-level empirical assessment of those areas where the 
potential gains from integration are considered to be substantial. Where possible, we will look 
for the impact of the single market programme not only using aggregate-level data, but also 
using sectoral data. In order to use sectoral-level data, we must clearly have some prior view 
about which sectors are likely to be most affected by integration and which least affected. Our 
starting point is a wide-ranging study by Buigues et al. [1990]. 
In this study on the likely effects of the single market, Buigues et al. [1990] identified the 40 
industrial sectors most likely to be affected by single market measures. These 40 sectors are 
industries which were most heavily protected by non-tariff barriers, such as frontier 
formalities, and in which these barriers led to persistent price differentials across Member 
States and/or little trade indicated a failure to exploit economies of scale within the EU. The 
study classified these 40 sectors into three sub-groups according to these two sets of criteria, 
namely the degree of price dispersion and the degree to which the sectors were open to intra-
Community trade. The following three groups were identified. 
(a) High technology public procurement sectors (Group 1). This group includes office and 
data processing equipment, telecommunications equipment and medical equipment. 
Non-trade barriers are considered high, but price dispersion is relatively low due to 
substantial extra-EU trade and the presence of large multinationals in Europe. 
(b) Traditional or regulated public procurement sectors (Groups 2 and 3). This group 
covers two types of industries. The first type was, pre-single market, heavily protected 
P. Buigues, F. Ilzkovitz and J.-F. Lebrun, 'The impact of the internal market by industrial sector: the challenge for the 
Member States', European Economy, Social Europe, special edition, 1990. 
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by, for example, national standards, and where as a consequence intra-Community trade 
was weak and price dispersion was considerable. This type of industry includes rolling 
stock and pharmaceutical products. The second type of industry that falls into this sector 
was also, before the launch of the single market programme, subject to significant non-
tariff barriers and, as with the former group, was characterized by weak intra-
Community trade. However, due to the presence of competition from newly 
industrialized countries (NICs), price dispersion within the Community was relatively 
low. This type of industry includes shipbuilding and electrical equipment, 
(c) Sectors with moderate non-trade barriers (Group 4). This group is the largest of the 
three in terms of industrial value added. Before the launch of the single market 
programme, there was already a significant amount of intra-Community trade in these 
industries, but, due to various non-tariff barriers, the degree of price dispersion remained 
relatively high. This group includes a number of basic consumer products (including 
domestic appliances and motor cars). 
Table 5.1 overleaf provides a summary of these three groups and describes their key 
characteristics. A detailed description of the sectors is provided in Appendix C. 
In their study, the authors put forward the following arguments. 
(a) The impact of integration was likely to be greatest for Groups 1 and 2 (high technology 
public procurement sectors and traditional or regulated public procurements sectors 
where price dispersion is high). In Group 1, single market measures could be expected to 
encourage exploitation of economies of scale; in Group 2 sectors, the single market 
programme could be expected to boost intra-Community trade and lead to reductions in 
prices. 
(b) For Group 3 sectors, the impact of integration may be somewhat less significant, but is 
still likely to impact upon technical efficiency. 
(c) For Group 4 sectors, the primary effect of integration is likely to be a reduction in the 
degree of price variation between Member States. 
We now turn to consideration of empirical indicators. In the case of trade flows and price-cost 
margins, we investigate the impact of integration at a sectoral level and use the classification 
of sectors described above. 
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Table 5.1. The industrial sectors most affected by the single market 
Price differences between Member States 
τ ! 
r 
a 
d ! Weak 
e j 
> : 
η 
! * ! 
! e i 
; S ; 
i j Strong 
! * i 
y | 
Weak Strong ! 
Traditional or regulated public procurement markets 
GROUP 3 
Characteristics; 
- sector^ subject to competition from NICs 
- restructuring in progress 
Example: electrical and electronic equipment, 
shipbuilding 
High technology public-procurement sectors 
GROUP 1 
Characteristics.· 
- sectors already partly open to competition 
- degree of openness to extra-EC countries 
- high concentration and economies of scale 
- relatively low European productivity, 
compared with American and Japanese 
producers 
Example: telecommunications, data processing 
GROUP 2 
Characteristics: ! 
- sectors in which competition in intra- and extra-EC i 
imports is weak 
- high concentration and economies of scale j 
- restructuring expected in 1992 I 
Example: energy producing equipment, railway 1 
equipment, pharmaceutical products 
Products with moderate non-tariff barriers 
GROUP 4 
Characteristics: 
- sectors with fragmented distribution and/or 
marketing networks 
- high levels of differentiation 
Example: motor vehicles, textiles, clothing, 
footwear, domestic electrical appliances, television, 
video, toys 
Source: Taken from The impact of the internal market by industrial sector: the challenge for the Member States, Buigues, 
Ilzkovitz and Lebrun [1990], ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
5.3. Trade flows 
In this section*we consider to what extent intra-Europe trade patterns have changed and 
support the assertion that European integration is progressing. 
5.3.1. Aggregate trade flows 
Following the approach of Neven and Roller [1991],31 there are two separate ways in which 
trade flows may be used to analyse trends in European integration. 
(a) Intra-European trade may increase due to trade creation. Trends in trade creation may be 
measured by changes in the share of intra-EU imports in total demand over time. 
See D.J. Neven and L.H. Roller, 'European Integration and trade flows', European Economic Review 35, 1991. 
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(b) Changes in intra-European trade flows may also arise because of trade diversion, i.e. 
intra-EU trade may increase at the expense of trade previously carried out with third 
parties outside the EU. This latter effect is reflected in an increase in the share of intra-
EU imports of total imports. 
Original results of Neven and Roller 
Neven and Roller used these measures to analyse empirically the extent to which EC 
integration had been deepening, and compared trends in integration within the EU with trends 
in integration between the EU and the rest of the world. They used trade and consumption data 
for 29 industries in 4 countries, covering the period 1975-85. Their results are reproduced in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
Table 5.2. Average trade share in the four big EU countries (all sectors except 
foodstuff, wood, paper, mineral products, steel, non-ferrous metals) 
Period 
1975-78 
1979-82 
1983-85 
Source: Table 1 
j EC 
in D.J. 
imports as a % of apparent j 
consumption 
16.00 
17.02 
18.80 
Neven and L.H. Roller, 
Non-EC imports as a % of 
apparent consumption 
European integration 
10.42 
12.00 
13.98 
and trade flows. 
j EC 
: 
imports/total imports 
66.23 
63.95 
63.49 
Table 5.2 shows that, for most sectors, trade flows within the EU increased between 1975 and 
1985. Trade with non-EU countries increased too, but at a faster rate. 
Neven and Roller therefore concluded that: 
(a) European integration had been proceeding along with integration in the rest of the world; 
(b) for most of the sectors analysed, integration between the EU and the rest of the world 
had been happening faster than integration between European countries. 
Update of Neven and Roller for 1980-93 
For the purposes of our study we updated the analysis of Neven and Roller. Instead of 29 
sectors, we used data on 46 NACE categories and calculated an analogous set of indicators. 
These show the evolution of intra-EU trade as a percentage of apparent EU domestic demand, 
the evolution of extra-EU trade as a percentage of the apparent EU domestic demand, and the 
increase in proportion of total imports represented by intra-EU imports. 
Table 5.3 provides summary measures for these three indicators for the three periods 1980-84, 
1985-88 and 1989-93. 
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Table 5.3. 
Period 
1980-84 
1985-88 
1989-93 
Measures of trade penetration for the manufacturing sector 
Intra-EU imports as a % of 1 
demand 
! 17.9 
j 20.8 
j 22.9 
Source: Eurostat VISA database; data covers 
Extra-EU 
46 NACE branches. 
1 imports as a 
demand 
12.0 
12.8 
14.0 
% o f j 
Competition issues 
Intra-EU imports as a % of 
total imports 
57.7 
60.0 
60.8 
The data for the three periods analysed indicate that, as in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 above, EU 
integration is proceeding alongside integration between the EU and the rest of the world. 
However, in contrast to the findings of Neven and Roller, our figures suggest that integration 
within the EU is proceeding faster than integration between the European and the world 
economies (illustrated by the rising share of intra-EU imports in total imports). 
Table 5.3 also shows that changes between 1980 and 1984, and 1985 and 1988, are larger than 
between 1985 and 1988, and 1989 and 1993. The data seems to suggest that integration, as 
indicated by increasing intra-EU import penetration, proceeded at a faster rate immediately 
after the launch of the single market programme. As Neven and Roller note, the evolution of 
trade shares is only indicative of the extent to which integration has proceeded - it is 
impossible to isolate the impact of the single market programme. In addition, the single market 
programme did not occur at a precise point in time, but was gradually introduced over a 
number of years. 
5.3.2. Sectoral trade flows 
We now consider whether there was any difference in how trade flows have changed for 
different sectors. In particular, we consider whether the Buigues sectors defined in Section 5.2 
have a different experience of intra-EU trade deepening to other sectors.32 
Table 5.4. Intra-EU trade creation (intra-EU imports as a percentage of demand) 
Group 1 average 
Group 2 average 
Group 4 average 
14 Buigues sector 
46 sector average 
average 
(Table 5.3) 
1980-84 
I 24.8 
! 4.9 
! 26.1 
! 24.4 
1 1 7 · 9 
1985-88 
25.8 
6.2 
29.9 
27.6 
20.8 
1989-93 
26.0 
7.9 
31.0 
28.7 
22.9 
The trade flow analysis in Section 4.3.2 was carried out for 46 NACE sectors; 14 of these were identified by Buigues et. 
al as most likely to be affected by integration. There were no Buigues Group 3 sectors amongst the 46 sectors in the 
data. 
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Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 illustrate the following trends. 
(a) The 14 sectors identified by Buigues et al. to be most affected by single market measures 
have seen a steady increase in intra-EU imports as a percentage of total demand over the 
last decade or so. 
(b) As with the aggregate analysis presented in Section 5.3.1, the impact on trade flows was 
greatest immediately following the introduction of the single market programme in the 
mid-1980s. 
(c) However, quite surprisingly, on average, trade flows increased less for the 14 Buigues 
sectors than for the 46 NACE sectors taken together. This may be because the majority 
of the Buigues sectors analysed belonged to Group 4, where trade intensity was already 
high, and where the primary impact of the single market was expected to be on price 
levels. 
(d) On average, for the 14 Buigues sectors, trade diversion rose immediately following the 
introduction of single market measures, but has fallen in recent years. This is in contrast 
to the average for the 46 NACE sectors, where trade diversion steadily rose throughout 
the time period. Table 5.4 shows that the share of extra-EU imports in total imports for 
the 14 Buigues sectors has risen relatively quickly over time. This suggests that, for 
these sectors, integration between the world economy and the EU is deepening at a more 
rapid pace than integration within the EU. 
Table 5.5. Trade diversion (intra-EU imports as a percentage of all imports) 
Group 1 average 
Group 2 average 
Group 4 average 
14 Buigues sector 
46 sector average 
Table 5.6. 
Group 1 average 
Group 2 average 
Group 4 average 
14 Buigues sectoi 
46 sector average 
average 
(Table 5.3) 
Extra-EU 
• average 
(Table 5.3) 
1980-*4 
47.5 
79.9 
64.0 ] 
62.8 
57.7 
1985-88 
49.3 j 
84.6 j 
63.9 j 
63.3 j 
60.0 I 
imports as a percentage of total demand 
1980-84 
25.5 
1.3 
14.5 
15.1 
12.0 
1985-88 
24.5 j 
j 1.3 j 
! 1 6 · 7 I 
! 1 6 · 7 ! 
12.8 
1989-93 
47.9 
84.8 
62.5 
62.0 
60.8 
1989-93 
26.4 
1.8 
19.4 
19.2 
14.0 
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5.3.3. Extra-EU and intra-EU trade effects 
The data set of trade patterns across 46 sectors over the period 1980-93 also allows us to 
check for the interaction between intra-EU trade and extra-EU trade across the 46 NACE 
sectors. Are we merely observing that sectors that show high levels of intra-EU trade flows are 
also those that have high levels of extra-EU trade? This question can be analysed by a simple 
correlation analysis of the two variables, EU imports as a percentage of apparent consumption. 
This analysis of trade flows in 46 sectors reveals that these two variables are indeed correlated 
across sectors. 
Table 5.7. Cross-sectoral correlation of trade flows intra-EU and extra-EU (%) 
Variable 
Corr. sector 
j 1980 
J34.9 
j 1981 
j 36.4 
i 1982 
133.6 
11983 
J32.8 
11984 
133.4 
i 1985 
J33.0 
j 1986 
J34.4 
1987 
34.7 
1988 
35.0 
|1989 
j 37.8 
j 1990 
J38.6 
i 1991 
J38.7 
11992 
; 38.5 
1993 
45.2 
Table 5.7 shows the cross-sectoral correlation coefficients for each year. What is immediately 
apparent is that the trend of the coefficient increases over time. 
In 1980, intra and extra trade flows in the 46 sectors showed a correlation coefficient of 35%. 
By 1993 this coefficient had increased to 45%. The increase is particularly steep after 1988. 
What does that statistic tell us? These correlation coefficients are not very high. This suggests 
that, at least in the 1980s, trade within Europe was to a certain degree divorced from that with 
non-EU countries. The changes that can be observed since the late 1980s suggest that intra-
and extra-EU trade increasingly have common drivers. It may be that trade flows in a 
particular sector are now more determined by economic fundamentals such as transport costs 
rather than by trade barriers (internal or external). 
5.4. Price dispersion 
5.4.1. Trends in price convergence 
In this section we briefly review the results presented in the DRI study33 on changes in price 
disparities and assess the degree to which these support the existence of a distinctive trend in 
integration. 
The single market programme carried with it expectations of a narrowing of price differentials 
for products sold across different national markets. As the Cecchini report [1988] put it: 'The 
removal of barriers and the freedom of supply which business will enjoy as a result should 
lead, through increased competitive pressure, to some downward convergence of prices of 
benefit to the customer'. Price convergence is thus one measure of the impact of integration. 
As geographical markets become increasingly independent of national borders, then we would 
expect to see some convergence of prices within these markets. 
DRI, E. de Ghellinck, Horack, Adler & Associates, Study on the emergence of panEuropean markets, draft final report, 
February 1996. 
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To assume, however, that there will be a single European market in which each product is sold 
at a single price is erroneous. Even within national markets we see more than one price quoted 
for a good; there is a distribution of prices rather than a single price. Consumer arbitrage may 
not remove these price differentials due to costs of consumer search. In addition, there are 
many reasons why geographical markets remain smaller than the area defined by the 
boundaries of the European Union, for example transport costs and language barriers. The 
incremental amount of price convergence will also be limited, and, indeed, may well be 
negligible, in those markets where considerable integration has already taken place. For 
example, there are many markets, like foreign exchange markets, whose boundaries transcend 
those of the European Union and are already globally integrated. 
The DRI study, which was commissioned in parallel with this report, has as its central task the 
analysis of changes in price disparities in the EU following the launch of the single market 
programme.34 This study covers a large number of products and services for which price 
indices were collected for four years: 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1993. These indices are then used 
to calculate indicators of price dispersion to test the hypothesis that prices have indeed 
converged across the EU. The study does not address the issue of the level to which prices 
may be converging. The central question for competition policy is, of course, whether prices 
are converging towards cost (which we consider in our analysis of price-cost margins). 
The analysis of price convergence has been undertaken at a relatively detailed level for 174 
goods and services using price dispersion indices provided by Eurostat. The data covers the 12 
Member States for the period 1980-93 and 15 Member States for the period starting from 
1985. 
The DRI report concludes that: 
(a) there has been a general trend towards price convergence in the 12 Member States over 
the period 1980-93; 
(b) this trend has been more pronounced for consumer and equipment goods than for 
energy, services and construction; 
(c) indeed, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, price dispersion has increased over time in energy 
and construction; 
(d) the convergence in consumer products and services has tended to accelerate following 
the launch of the single market programme. 
Figure 5.1 summarizes some key results for the EUR-12. 
We acknowledge that the DRI study [DRI, E. de Ghellinck and Horack, Adler and Associates, Study on the emergence 
of panEuropean markets, draft final report, February 1996] is, as yet, incomplete. 
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Figure 5.1. Coefficients of price variation for the EUR-12 
Coefficients of price variation for the EUR-12 
"■^"Consumer goods 
" ~ Services 
- - - -Energy 
■+ Equipment goods 
O — Construction 
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Source: DRI, E. de Ghellinck and Horack, Adler and Associates, Study on the emergence of panEuropean markets, draft final 
report, February 1996. 
The report also concluded that the tendency for prices to converge has been more pronounced 
for the enlarged EU including the new Member States, Greece, Spain and Portugal, than in the 
EUR-9, as illustrated by Table 5.8 below. This is only to be expected given the initial greater 
differences of prices. Single market measures have sought to remove non-tariff barriers within 
the EUR-9. Within the EUR-12, however, recent years have seen the gradual removal of tariff 
as well as non-tariff barriers - hence, not surprisingly, the greater the degree of convergence 
within the EUR-12 than within the EUR-9. 
These general results are based primarily on an analysis of final consumer prices (including 
tax) in the respective countries. The report states clearly that overall neither the different levels 
of, nor the changes in, VAT rates seem to have distorted general price trends (i.e. there is no 
significant difference in price convergence trends including or excluding VAT). 
The report does underline, however, the important role played in some product categories by 
excise duties, notably for energy products, alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. In fact, 
for these goods, the study finds increasing price divergence compared to the underlying trend 
I f 
in prices net of taxes. 
This divergence has a bearing on our assessment of integration. For personal consumption post-tax prices are relevant. 
If these prices differ significantly across Member States, then this may create arbitrage opportunities. If pre-tax prices 
differ, then this matters for trade at the wholesale level; and raises the issue of the existence of any barriers to arbitrage. 
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Table 5.8. Coefficients of price 
1980 
variation for selected 
1985 
groupings 
1990 
(prices 
53 
incl. taxes) 
1993 
EUR-9 
Consumer goods j 
Services j 
Energy ! 
Equipment goods 1 
Construction j 
19.9 
25.2 
22.1 
13.1 
20.1 
; 19.1 
! 25.6 
j 16.1 
! 12.5 
! 14.4 
20.3 
24.6 
24.7 
12.2 
16.5 
18.0 
23.4 
30.6 
12.9 
22.4 
EUR-12 
Consumer goods 1 
Services j 
Energy ] 
Equipment goods j 
Construction I 
26.0 
33.0 
30.8 
18.0 
24.4 
! 22.5 
j 33.7 
21.1 
14.0 
22.1 
Source: DRI, E. de Ghellinck and Horack, Adler and Associates, Study on 
report, February 1996. 
the 
22.8 
31.8 
28.0 
13.1 
23.5 
19.6 
28.6 
31.7 
14.5 
27.4 
emergence of panEuropean markets, draft final 
5.5. Price-cost margins 
Through increased competition, the single market is expected to benefit consumers. Rather 
than the cost savings resulting from reductions in the cost of trade and exploitation of 
economies of scale being retained by firms, it is hoped that they get passed on to consumers in 
the form of lower prices. 
The measurement of trends in relative prices across Member States is one set of indicators that 
can be used to assess the impact of integration on prices. Another, more direct, assessment is 
to analyse price-cost margins across sectors. The advantage of such a measure of gross 
profitability of an industry is that it can ignore issues of changes in prices that are due to 
changes in costs and identify changes in competitive conditions. This measure is frequently 
used in studies that seek to establish whether market concentration has any impact on 
profitability.36 For the purpose of this study we have undertaken an analysis of price-cost 
margins to complement the analysis of other indicators of integration. We are not aware of any 
other study that has traced the trend in this primary measure of competition conditions. 
If the single market programme has had a pro-competitive effect (bringing firms in different 
Member States into direct competition where previously non-tariff barriers prevented this), 
then we would expect price-cost margins to be reduced. Most theories of firm behaviour in 
oligopolies predict that cost-price margins are negatively related to the number of firms in a 
market; we can interpret market integration as the unification of previously distinct markets 
and so an increase in the number of competing firms, with a consequent reduction in margins. 
5.5.1. Analysis of price-cost margins 
The data for this exercise was drawn from the Eurostat Survey of Industrial Production for the 
EUR-12 for the period 1980-92. This was available at a highly disaggregated level; the 3-digit 
See Geroski [1994] for an overview. 
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NACE classification has 115 sectors. This gave a data set of about 8,000 observations. 
Unfortunately, Spain and Portugal had to be dropped from the analysis due to insufficient data. 
Fuller details of the data and reports of relevant econometric results are given in annexes to 
this chapter. 
Our analysis has been carried out for two definitions of price-cost margins: 
Ml = (value added - labour costs) / value added 
M2 = (value added - labour costs) / sales 
The first definition is often used in empirical studies examining the link between profitability 
and concentration.37 The second definition has also been used in empirical studies but less 
widely. However, it conforms more closely to the theoretical notion of a profit/sales ratio in 
the economic literature: (p-c) / p. In general, our results are not very sensitive to which 
definition is used. 
5.5.2. Average margins 
The average level of margins is shown in Figure 5.2 below. 
Figure 5.2. Average margins 
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A table of summary statistics from which this is drawn is given in Appendix C. It may be seen 
that there appears to be a positive trend for the early 1980s, though average margins have 
37 Dowrick, S., 'Wage pressure, bargaining and price-cost margins in UK manufacturing', Journal of Industrial 
Economics, Vol. 38, No 3, March 1990, pp. 239-67. 
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fallen relative to this trend in the late 1980s. However, margins move in response to the state 
of the economic cycle: there was a major upturn in the mid-1980s, preceded and followed by 
major recessions. We correct for this effect in Section 5.5.3. 
The two different definitions of margins have rather different overall average levels: 44% for 
the measure Ml and 15% for M2. There is also significant cross country variation in average 
margins for the whole sample period. Table A3.1 in Appendix C shows that we can group the 
countries in the following way: 
(a) high margins: 
(b) medium margins: 
(c) low margins: 
Italy, Belgium; 
France, Netherlands, UK, Ireland; 
Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece. 
Interestingly, there is evidence that the cross-country dispersion in margins reduced over the 
sample period. The following figure shows a plot of the cross-country variance in margins 
using the two measures for the period 1980-91. We do not show 1992 due to lack of data. The 
decline in cross-country dispersion happens from 1987. 
Figure 5.3. Cross-country variance of average margins 
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This would be consistent with the single market programme having an equalizing effect. 
Appendix C gives a formal statistical test of this decline in variance, and shows a statistically 
significant fall in variance at the end of the sample period. We take this as evidence of an 
impact of the single market programme (even if slightly lagged), which we would expect to 
lead to more similar economic outcomes across countries. 
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5.5.3. Evolution of margins 
This section presents a summary of the way in which margins have changed over the period 
1980-92 by typed sector. To make sense of the data it is necessary to correct it at least for the 
influence of the economic cycle and for country- and sector-specific effects. This was done 
using a random effects regression using time dummies; the details of this analysis are reported 
in Section C.5 of Appendix C. Separate time dummies were included for each of the Buigues 
sectors, so that the evolution of margins could be charted for each sector separately. The 
results are summarized in the following figures which show deviations from a trend that 
captures the effects of the economic cycle and certain country and sector specific effects. 
Figure 5.4. Evolution of margins (Ml) (controlling for country- and sector-specific 
effects and cycle) 
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Figure 5.5. Buigues sectors relative to other sectors 
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Figure 5.6. Evolution of margins (M2) 
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Figure 5.7. Buigues sectors relative to other sectors 
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This preliminary analysis of the behaviour of margins over time suggests the following 
conclusions. 
(a) There has been a general trend upwards in margins for the non-Buigues sectors over the 
whole sample period, but there has been a decline from 1988 to 1991. 
(b) The behaviour of all sectors in 1992 seems rather anomalous. There is very little data for 
this year compared with previous years, so not too much should be read into this. 
(c) Group 4 (products with moderate non-tariff barriers) have margins which are falling 
relative to the non-Buigues sectors, with this relative decline accelerating since 1988. 
(d) Group 1 (hi-tech public procurement sectors) have margins which are generally falling 
relative to the non-Buigues sectors, but most of this decline occurred before 1987. Since 
1987, margins have risen for this group relative to the non-Buigues sectors, but 
subsequently fallen. 
(e) Groups 2 and 3 (traditional or regulated public procurement sectors) have margins which 
first fell relative to the non-Buigues sectors, but have since risen. 
5.5.4. Measuring the impact of the single market programme 
We now consider whether it is possible to identify any impact of the single market programme 
on margins from the data. This begs the question of how to model the impact of the single 
market programme. Rather than being a 'step' change, the single market programme has been 
a rolling sequence of incremental measures throughout the period 1986-92. Without 
identifying the time at which a particular measure became effective and which sectors it 
affected, we must use a simple proxy. 
We have investigated the use of two alternatives which are illustrated by: 
(a) a ramped policy variable with an impact starting in 1986; 
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(b) a 'delayed impact' policy variable with an impact starting in 1987. 
Figure 5.8. Definition of policy variable 
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These policy variables were included in regressions along with variables for economic cycle, 
country-specific effects and trend. The policy variables were interacted with dummies for each 
Buigues group and for 'non-Buigues' sectors, allowing the total impact of the policy to be 
assessed for each group. Sector spécifie effects were modelled in a number of alternative ways 
as fixed and random effects. The details of these regressions are shown in Section C.8 of 
Appendix C. All the coefficient estimates are reported in the annex. 
We find that we may draw the following conclusions from these regressions: 
(a) There is very significant evidence (from models 1 and 9) of the single market 
programme reducing margins in the non-Buigues sectors and Group 4 even if we assume 
that there was an impact of the policy from 1986. 
(b) There is even stronger evidence of a policy impact on the non-Buigues sectors and 
Group 4 if we suppose, as seems reasonable, that there was a short delay of one year 
before the single market programme affected firm behaviour (from models 5 and 13). 
(c) There is significant evidence that there was a larger policy impact on Group 4 than on 
the non-Bui gues sectors (see the relative effects tables for model 13) using the 
definition of margins Ml, but not using M2. 
(d) We would estimate (using the delayed impact) the overall impact of the single market 
programme to be as given by the following table. 
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Table 5.9. Impact on price-cost margins 
Margin definition 
Ml 
Margin definition 
M2 
Average level of margin 
across EU in sample period 
(%) 
44.1 
15.2 
Policy impact on non-
Buigues sectors 
(% per annum) 
-0.7 
-0.2 
Policy impact on Group 4 
(% per annum) 
-0.9 
-0.2 
(e) The single market programme does not appear to have affected margins in Groups 2 and 
3: they rose at the time of implementation of the programme. This may be 
understandable if the measures affecting these groups were adopted relatively later in the 
sample period. There is significant evidence that there has been less policy impact for 
these sectors than for the non-Buigues sectors (see relative effects tables). 
(f) The evidence for Group 1 is unfortunately lacking. The sign of the policy impact for this 
sector depends on the margin definition and is in neither case significantly different from 
zero. On the other hand there is no evidence that margins evolved differently for this 
group than for the non-Buigues sectors. We cannot determine with confidence what has 
happened to margins for Group 1 on the basis of the available data. 
5.5.5. Analysis of advertising and research intensive industries 
The data allows the application of an alternative industry classification by Davies and Lyons 
[1996] which distinguishes between homogenous goods industries and those that are 
characterized by heavy expenditure on advertising and R&D. The regressions used the 
following dummy variables: 
A = advertising intensive dummy 
R = research intensive dummy 
AR = both advertising and research intensive dummy 
Section C.8.1 of Appendix C shows the results of random effects regressions using this 
classification of sectors. 
These regressions show that advertising intensive sectors have had a significantly smaller 
impact from integration than those sectors which are neither advertising nor R&D intensive. 
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that in enlarged markets for differentiated goods, 
such as branded consumer goods, advertising expenditure is a relatively more important 
strategic variable than in smaller more protected markets. In the sense that advertising 
spending can be considered endogenous sunk costs this requires increased margins. 
Alternatively this finding may indicate that markets served by advertising intensive industries 
have become more concentrated and sustain higher price-cost margins. With both explanations 
integration suggests a differential response in advertising intensive industries which is worth 
taking note of. 
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5.5.6. Summary 
The analysis of price-cost margins presented here shows a significant impact of integration. 
This is of considerable interest since it shows a direct measure of competition being affected 
by integration, rather than looking at indirect measures (such as trade flows, price dispersion, 
etc.). Although we cannot ascribe the fall in margins for some sectors since 1986 to the effects 
of integration with certainty, the timing of this fall strongly suggests that integration measures 
are the cause: the response in margins followed with a short lag after the start of the single 
market programme. 
Interestingly, not all sectors have been affected equally. The Buigues Group 4 sectors have 
been most affected by integration, the non-Buigues sectors have been affected, but somewhat 
less. Buigues Groups 2 and 3 appear not to have been significantly affected by integration. The 
data does not allow us to identify what has happened to the Buigues Group 1 sectors. This 
accords with some, but not all, of the original expectations of Buigues et al. Group 4 includes 
sectors which are traded and had moderate non-tariff barriers, so should have experienced an 
impact from integration. The lack of an impact for Groups 2 and 3 supports that the single 
market programme has not affected public procurement markets, despite the expectations of 
Buigues et al. 
5.6. Concentration 
One set of expectations of the impact of the single market programme centres on the 
opportunities provided by the creation of larger markets and the reduction in trade barriers to 
exploit economies of scale. As discussed in Chapter 4, the realization of economies of scale 
was widely considered to be one of the main gains of the completion of the single market. 
Other things being equal, greater exploitation of economies of scale will lead to increases in 
concentration - whether it be via organic growth or via merger. The other main effect -
independent of economies of scale - is the exit of firms as a response to tougher competition. 
Hence, increases in concentration over time may indicate that single market measures are 
starting to take effect. Increases in concentration do not necessarily imply, however, that 
competition will be lessened. Fewer firms in larger markets may well start to compete more 
vigorously with each other. Shifts in the nature of competition may therefore bring greater 
benefits to European consumers, despite any concentration increases. 
In one of the parallel studies reviewing the impact of single market legislation, the Economists 
Advisory Group in collaboration with the University of East Anglia has evaluated changes m 
concentration for the period 1986-91 across a number of 3-digit NACE sectors. The study 
covers other market structure variables, such as firm size distribution, but also seeks to assess 
the extent to which economies of scale have been realized. 
The E AG study analyses the changes that occurred in firm size (from 1986 to 1991) and 
market concentration (from 1987 to 1993) at both the EU and national level. Basing its 
analysis on Sutton [1991] and Davies and Lyon [1996, forthcoming], the EAG classifies the 
manufacturing sector into four categories. 
European Commission [1997a], 'Economies of scale', Single Market Review, Subseries V: Volume 4. 
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Table 5.10. Changes in size and concentration by industry type 
Type 1 
Type 2a 
Type 2r 
Type 2ar 
All 
Industries 
Homogenous goods 
High advertising 
intensity 
High R&D intensity 
High R&D and 
advertising intensity 
Growth in size 
% growth 1986-91 at national 
level 
Firm 
3.2 
14.3 
-0.7 
-3.9 
Industry 
1.8 
3.5 
0.2 
2.3 
Concentration 
Mean national 
change (C4NÁT) 
1986-92 
-0.3 
1.3 
-1.9 
1.3 
-0.1 
EU level (C4EU) 
1987 
12.3 
21.1 
31.6 
34.8 
19.7 
1993 
16.5 
23.5 
38.9 
37.2 
23.8 
Notes: 
1. All means are simple arithmetic averages. 
2. 'Mean national' refers to the simple means of Belgium, France, Germany and the UK; for France the time period is 1985-
92, for Germany it is 1987-93, and for Belgium it is 1986-91. 
3. Changes in concentration ratios refer to percentage points. 
4. C4NAT = four firm concentration ratio. C4EU = four firm concentration ratio, EU. 
Source: European Commission, 1997a. 
The study confirms that the EU market was not fully integrated at the start of the single market 
programme, and that there was the potential for further achievement of economies of scale. 
Overall, the study claims that the most interesting result is that the early effects of the single 
market programme have shown through in the R&D intensive industries. In these industries, 
firm size was found to be positively related to specialization in Member States with a 
comparative advantage. 
The study further finds important differences between industries. Table 5.10 summarizes the 
main results in changes in the size of firms/industry at the national level and the development 
of concentration at both the EU and national levels. 
(a) Type 1 industries (homogeneous goods). Typical national concentration declined on 
average. However, concentration at the EU level appears to have increased, although 
starting from a relatively low starting point. The implication is that there was either a 
substantial increase in the extent of the intra-EU multinationality and/or an increase in 
international specialization within the EU. Another indicator of the change in 
concentration is provided by the indicators of change in firm size and size of the 
industry. The average size of firms increased (3.2%) by more than the size of the 
industry (1.8%), suggesting an increase in concentration. 
(b) Type 2a industries (high advertising intensity). The typical size of business units within 
Member States increased substantially. Because they easily outstripped the growth in 
overall national industry size, this implies increased national concentration. This finding 
is confirmed by the change in the four-firm concentration ratio at the national level 
(+1.3%) and the changes at the EU level (from 21.1% to 23.5%). 
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(c) Type 2r industries (high R&D intensity). This group of industries had relatively high 
levels of concentration in 1987. In the period 1986-91 the mean business size has tended 
to decline very slightly, while industry size has virtually been static. This contrasts 
strikingly with the very rapid increase in EU concentration. Likely reasons given are 
increasing specialization and substantial increases in intra-EU multinationality. 
(d) Type 2ar industries (high R&D and advertising intensity). This group, like the previous 
group, exhibited relatively high levels of concentration in 1987. Over the period 1986— 
91, mean business size tended to decline, while industry size has slightly increased, 
suggesting a decentralizing trend at the national level. This finding contrasts the change 
in the four-firm concentration ratio at both the EU and national levels. 
5.7. Conclusions 
We have found a variety of independent pieces of evidence which are consistent with the 
hypothesis that integration has had pro-competitive effects. The indicators we have looked at 
show movements consistent with integration. 
(a) Trade patterns have shown trade creation with the EU as well as some degree of trade 
diversion away from external trade since 1985. 
(b) There has been convergence of post-tax prices, particularly for consumer goods. 
(c) Concentration has increased at the EU level (and particularly for advertising intensive 
industries), which is consistent with increased competition across borders and greater 
exploitation of economies of scale. 
(d) Price-cost margins have fallen for a large number of sectors as the single market 
programme has been implemented. The magnitude of this effect is large, in the order of 
0.2% per annum on margins with an average level of 15% (using margin definition M2). 
Over a decade, for example, this is a fall of 2%. 
The pattern of impact of integration is also of interest. Looking at the so-called Buigues 
sectors for which there was a strong prior expectation of an impact of integration we found the 
following. 
(a) Price-cost margins appear to have been most affected by integration in the Buigues 
Group 4 sectors (tradable products with moderate non-tariff barriers). 
(b) Price-cost margins appear not to have been affected by integration in public procurement 
markets. 
(c) There was trade creation in the Buigues sectors, but at a slightly slower rate than other 
sectors. The trade diversion measure fell for these sectors, suggesting that integration 
between the EU and the rest of the world may be proceeding at a faster rate than 
integration within the EU. 
This final point demonstrates an unavoidable difficulty in the analysis: that intra-and extra-EU 
trade liberalization tend to move hand in hand and so separating the effects of the two 
measures is very difficult. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the single market 
programme has in fact caused a change in margins. In particular, the timing of the fall in 
margins matches the single market programme having an effect with a short delay. Also, we 
find that the cross-country variance in margins fell at the same time. Of course, the timing of 
these effects on margins may just be a chance event, but the close association of these effects 
with the onset of the single market programme is in our view more than a coincidence. 
64 Competition issues 
Using the Davies/Lyon classifications of sectors, our main finding was that integration has had 
a significantly smaller impact on advertising intensive sectors. This accords with the economic 
reasoning that advertising intensive industries are likely to produce differentiated goods which 
can exploit economies of scale in larger markets and need to recover higher levels of sunk 
endogenous costs. 
Therefore, we may conclude that integration has not affected all sectors equally, as would be 
expected. The sectors which are comparatively more affected are among those we would 
expect to be most affected by integration. This again provides a confirming check that what is 
being identified econometrically is indeed an integration, or at least a trade, effect. 
There is certainly evidence of a major change in competitive conditions in the EU from 1986 
to 1992, with a trend towards more competitive outcomes and changes in business strategies 
(advertising). This is consistent with the single market programme having a significant pro-
competitive impact, although this positive impact may be restricted to some sectors and 
countries and may not apply throughout all sectors of the EU. Furthermore, these findings may 
mask the scope for anti-competitive responses as well as the lack of progress in implementing 
measures in heavily protected sectors. 
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6. The evolution of competition in selected markets 
6.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 5, we used a series of empirical measures - trade flows, price dispersion, market 
concentration and price-cost margins - to assess whether the statistical picture both at the 
aggregate and at the sectoral level was consistent with deepening integration within the EU. 
We concluded that this was indeed the case, but noted that we had not established causality, 
merely consistency. In other words, our indicators do not prove that integration is occurring, 
but neither do they disprove it. In addition, changes in the nature of competition cannot be 
inferred from such statistics. It is for this reason that, in this chapter, we consider evidence 
from selected market studies to obtain a more informed picture of the evolution of competition 
in the single market. Of course, by being selective we forego the ability to make observations 
that apply more generally throughout the economy. So what we gain in selective insight into 
competitive processes we lose in terms of the general validity of our findings. 
We begin, in Section 6.2, by reviewing changes in statistical indicators for selected market 
studies. In the remainder of the chapter, we turn to market fundamentals in order to explain 
what drives changes in competitive conditions. We focus on the following markets - soda ash, 
beer, cars, air travel, domestic appliances and telecommunications switching equipment39 -
using, in each case, the framework outlined below: 
(a) first, we provide a market overview; 
(b) next we discuss the expected impact of the single market programme on competition and 
industry structure; 
(c) finally, we discuss the interaction between integration and competition. 
Our objective is to establish the key drivers of integration and of changes in the nature of 
competition, from which we can draw some clear-cut implications for competition policy. 
Our market studies constitute a small but reasonably representative selection of sectors, with 
different degrees of exposure to single market measures. Volume II of this report contains 
these studies in full. 
6.2. Trends in integration and competition in selected case studies 
In this section we review changes in two of our statistical indicators discussed in Chapter 5 -
trade flows and measures of price dispersion - for selected market studies. 
6.2.1. Evolution of trade patterns 
In Chapter 5, we updated the analysis of Neven and Roller [1991], which analysed changes in 
trade flows in selected 3-digit NACE sectors, using two measures of deepening EU 
integration: 
See Chapter 1 for selection criteria. 
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(a) the share of intra-EU imports in total demand; this represents the degree of trade 
creation; 
(b) the share of intra-EU imports in all imports; this represents the degree of trade diversion. 
We particularly focused on changes in these measures for the sectors identified by Buigues et 
al. [1990], as most likely to be affected by single market measures. Most of our market studies 
fall into one of these 40 industrial sectors. 
(a) Telecommunications switching equipment belongs to the 'high technology public 
procurement group' (Group 1). Sectors in this group were characterized by high non-
trade barriers, but low price dispersion. Single market measures were expected primarily 
to increase the scope for exploitation of economies of scale. 
(b) Beer may be classified as a 'traditional public procurement or regulated market sector' 
(Group 2). Sectors in Group 2 were, pre-single market measures, heavily protected. 
Intra-Community trade was weak and price dispersion was considerable. Buigues et al. 
argued that the impact of integration was likely to be greatest for sectors in Group 1 and 
Group 2. 
(c) Cars and domestic appliances may be classified as sectors with moderate non-trade 
barriers (Group 4). The key impact of integration on Group 4 sectors was expected to be 
a reduction in the degree of price variation between Member States. 
Air travel is a service sector and therefore is not covered by the Buigues study. But it may be 
classified as a highly regulated sector with substantial non-trade barriers. Soda ash, on the 
other hand, was a priori not expected to be significantly affected by integration measures. 
Table 6.1 below summarizes trends in trade creation for selected market studies.40 
Table 6.1. Intra-EU trade creation (intra-EU imports as a percentage of demand) 
Telecom, equipment (Group 1 ) 
Domestic appliances 
Group 1 average 
Group 2 average 
Group 4 average 
(Group 4) 
1980-84 
! 16° 
! 20.8 
j 24.8 j 
! 4 · 9 
! 2 6 1 
1985-88 
13.4 ] 
25.2 
25.8 
6.2 ] 
29.9 
1989-93 
12.3 
29.4 
26.0 
7.9 
31.0 
Table 6.1 illustrates the following trends. 
(a) For telecommunications equipment, where, as with all Group 1 sectors, expectations 
were quite high, there was a fall in intra-EU trade (as a share of demand). The 
Unfortunately, due to data limitations, sectoral-level analysis was only possible for two of our selected market studies. 
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telecommunications equipment sector was in fact one of only 6 NACE sectors, out of 
the 46 analysed, where trade has weakened over recent years, 
(b) For the domestic appliances sector, there has been a substantial increase in intra-EU 
trade over the last decade or so, indicating deepening European integration. The growth 
in intra-EU imports as a share of demand was in fact significantly in excess of the Group 
4 average. 
Table 6.2 presents trends in trade diversion: 
Table 6.2. Trade diversion (intra-EU imports as a percentage of all imports) 
Telecom, equipment (Group 1) 
Domestic appliances 
Group 1 average 
Group 2 average 
Group 4 average 
(Group 4) 
1980-84 
j 44.2 
! 75.8 
j 47.5 
j 79.9 
j 64.0 
1985-88 
45.8 
! 71.6 1 
! 4 9 · 3 
I 8 4 · 6 
! 63.9 
1989-93 
45.6 
73.8 
47.9 
84.8 
62.5 
Table 6.2 demonstrates the following trends. 
(a) For the telecommunications equipment sector, there has been an increase in trade 
diversion over the period, despite falls in trade creation. This suggests that integration 
between the EU and elsewhere has been weakening, and that this trend is more marked 
than that of weakening integration within the EU. 
(b) Trade diversion has fallen in the domestic appliances sector suggesting that world 
integration has been deepening, and at a faster rate than EU integration. This pattern 
seems to be typical among the Group 4 sectors. 
6.2.2. Trends in price convergence 
The DRI study41 on changes in price convergence provides some detailed information on price 
trends in our selected market studies. In this section we review their findings for the following 
industries: 
(a) beer; 
(b) cars; 
(c) telecommunications equipment; 
(d) white goods. 
DRI, E. de Ghellinck, Horack, Adler & Associates, Study on the emergence of panEuropean markets, draft final report, 
February 1996. 
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For our other case studies, soda ash and air travel, the DRI study does not provide sufficiently 
detailed information. 
Beer 
Beer is classified by DRI as a consumer good with high advertising intensity. Non-tariff 
barriers are considered high, and both intra- and extra-EU trade is low. The trend in price 
dispersion for beer is given in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1. Coefficients of variation for beer 
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Source: DRI, E. de Ghellinck and Horack, Adler and Associates, Study on the emergence of panEuropean markets, draft final 
report, February 1996. 
There is a clear trend towards a reduction of price dispersion from 1985 onwards within both 
the EUR-9 and the EUR-12, but there are considerable fluctuations around this trend. In 
particular, there is an unusual increase in price divergence from 1980 to 1985. Not 
surprisingly, price disparities are lower in the EUR-9 than in the EUR-12. 
Cars (motor vehicles) 
The DRI study classifies motor vehicles as consumer goods with a high intensity of 
advertising and R&D. Non-tariff barriers are considered to be medium, and intra-EU-trade is 
high, but trade with extra-EU countries is low. Trends in price convergence are illustrated in 
Figure 6.2. 
For the EUR-12, there is a clear trend towards price convergence from 1980 onwards. 
However, when we consider price dispersion for the EUR-9, the coefficients of variation show 
a trend towards increasing disparities. This disturbing persistence of price differentials makes 
cars an interesting market study. 
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Figure 6.2. Coefficients of variation for motor vehicles 
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Source: DRI, E. de Ghellinck and Horack, Adler and Associates, Study on the emergence of panEuropean markets, draft final 
report, February 1996. 
Telecommunications equipment 
Another product category analysed by DRI is telecommunications equipment and meters. 
Products in this category are characterized by high R&D costs. Non-tariff barriers are high. 
Intra-EU trade is low, whilst extra-EU trade is high. The coefficients of variation for the EUR-
12 are suggestive of a trend towards price convergence, despite some considerable 
fluctuations, as illustrated below. 
Figure 6.3. Coefficients of variation in the EUR-12 for telecommunications equipment 
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Source: DRI, E. de Ghellinck, Horack, Adler and Associates, 'Analysis of changes in price disparities in the EU following the 
launch of the single market programme', in Study on the emergence of panEuropean markets, draft final report, February 
1996, Vol. 1, Table 4.2.1. 
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Domestic appliances 
In Volume II of their report, DRI et al. provide a number of case studies in price convergence, 
one of which is the white goods sector. Products in this sector had relatively low price 
disparities at the start of the investigation period. The report comments that this sector is 
characterized by the dominance of large multinational producers operating multi-location 
manufacturing and selling under major brand names. Here we summarize the results for 
washing machines and dryers. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the results for washing machines and tumble-dryers. The coefficients of 
variation for both the EUR-12 and the EUR-9 point to a significant reduction in price 
disparities. As is to be expected, price disparities were greater within the EUR-12 than within 
the EUR-9. 
Figure 6.4. Coefficients of variation for washing machines and tumble-dryers 
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Source: DRI, E. de Ghellinck and Horack, Adler and Associates, Study on the emergence of panEuropean markets, draft final 
report, February 1996. 
6.2.3. Summary 
Our statistical indicators suggest that: 
(a) for beer, a Group 2 sector exhibiting considerable price dispersion prior to the advent of 
the single market programme, there has been a marked trend towards price convergence 
over time; 
(b) for cars, a Group 4 sector, substantial EU price differentials pre-single market measures 
have persisted; 
(c) for telecommunications equipment, a Group 1 sector characterized by relatively low 
intra-EU trade flows, there has been a fall in trade creation as single market measures 
have progressed, but a trend towards price convergence; 
(d) for domestic appliances, a Group 4 sector, there appears to have been a marked trend 
towards price convergence. 
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Our statistical indicators suggest that whilst the single market programme has had a significant 
impact on beer and on white goods, quite the contrary is true for cars, while its effect is 
ambiguous for telecommunications equipment. In the remainder of this section, we assess 
whether this is in fact true, and explain the key drivers behind trends in integration and 
competition in our selected case studies (see London Economics [1996] for fuller details of the 
development of competition in these markets). We also review our studies on the air travel and 
soda ash markets. 
6.3. Integration and competition in the European soda ash industry 
Trade in soda ash, a key raw material for the production of glass, has traditionally been subject 
to tariff barriers. Within the Common Market these have been abolished, but for extra-EU 
imports they remain significant. For most of the 1980s, soda ash imports from the US and 
Eastern Europe were subject to anti-dumping duties, and this affected trade flows 
considerably. 
In terms of the single market programme, most of the technical measures that addressed non-
tariff barriers in the chemical sectors concern a series of issues related to dangerous chemical 
substances. No single market measures, either technical or fiscal, directly concerned the soda 
ash sector. The only discernible impact of the single market programme, therefore, would stem 
from the removal of border controls and the reduction in the administrative costs of 
transporting soda ash across Member States. Full integration is not, however, possible in this 
industry, given the importance of transport costs. 
The direct impact of the single market programme on the soda ash industry has been limited. 
Competition and trade policy are the two main policies that have affected the soda ash market. 
The soda ash market provides an example of how a few dominant firms maintained nationally 
partitioned markets through cooperative, non-competitive arrangements. This partitioning was 
challenged by the Commission in 1990 through a series of decisions based on Articles 85 and 
86 of the Treaty of Rome. At the same time, the expiry of anti-dumping duties further 
stimulated competition. As a result, consumers had access to soda ash from a variety of 
suppliers across the EU, and Solvay, for example, faced competition in Continental Europe. 
Stimulated by favourable exchange rate movements, and the liberalization of the EU market, 
US exporters found European markets profitable again and started to export. However, 
following a complaint by the European Chemical Industry Council on behalf of soda ash 
producers, the Commission opened an investigation that led to the imposition of preliminary 
anti-dumping duties on US imports in April 1995.42 These duties were confirmed in October 
1995, after a protracted debate in the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 
Since the 1990 competition decisions, which imposed severe penalties, producers are 
increasingly marketing their product into each other's national markets. Whilst the tonnage 
involved in this new trend in the soda ash market is relatively small, it marks a significant 
change from past behaviour. The break from the cooperation of the past has brought with it the 
possibility of a structural change in competition. Brunner Mond has emerged as a serious 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 823/95, OJ L 83, 13.4.1995, p. 8. 
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alternative supplier, whose plans now clearly involve competing and acquiring market share in 
Continental Europe. Moreover, the evidence presented in the detailed market study seems to 
point to a gradual increase of competition in the soda ash market in the EU since 1990. 
Despite the discrepancies in Eurostat trade data, trade flows seem to show that competition in 
the EU is possibly eroding the position of dominance enjoyed by the local producers in the EU 
Member States. Intra-EU trade in 1993, the last year for which data is available, shows the 
highest level since 1981, with intra-EU trade flows representing more than 13% of EU 
production. This is confirmed by an analysis of the changes in concentration in four large EU 
national markets for the 1986-94 period. Despite the fact that in 1994 the local producers still 
enjoyed extremely large market shares in their domestic markets, new competition has been 
provided by extra-EU imports, and by a modest appearance of EU soda ash producers 
supplying outside their domestic markets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index shows a slight 
decline from the high levels in all the national markets examined43 (see London Economics, 
1996). While the relative quantities shipped may not be substantial, events following the 1990 
decisions reveal a change from the past collusive behaviour of market players. There are 
indications of a movement from local markets defined along national borders, to geographic 
markets defined according to the location of firms, their cost structure and transport costs. 
Interviews with customers have also confirmed that the nature of competition has significantly 
changed over the last decade. Where previously customers were faced with national price lists, 
and had to negotiate on a country by country basis, today large customers can negotiate on an 
EU-wide basis, subject only to regional price differences. 
In sum, all indicators point towards a picture of an EU soda ash market that is slowly moving 
away from the segmented market, which characterized the previous 100 years, towards a 
market integrated along regional lines. The main driver of change has not been the single 
market programme but trade policy and competition policy decisions. However, we need to 
accept that there are economic limits to the level of integration achievable in the soda ash 
market, given the importance of production and transportation costs, notwithstanding the 
policy efforts. 
Even in the absence of collusion and anti-dumping duties, it appears extremely difficult to 
achieve complete market integration in the soda ash market. In other words, an EU-wide 
market for soda ash is unachievable and not economically efficient. The breakdown of 
collusion in the EU, and the removal of anti-dumping duties in 1990, increased the level of 
competition in the EU. EU producers started to compete in markets which were previously the 
exclusive domain of local producers. Together with the inflow of high quality and very 
competitive US soda ash, the increased competition put EU producers under pressure. The 
restructuring process that followed appears likely to have reduced the marginal production 
costs of the EU soda ash suppliers. Moreover, the implementation of the single market 
programme could have slightly reduced transportation costs within the EU. 
The only exception to this trend is the Spanish market, where large inflows of US-produced soda ash explain the sharp 
decline of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in 1992. 
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6.4. Trends in integration and competition in European beer markets 
6..4.1. The basic economic drivers 
The potential size of the market for any individual brewer has grown over the last forty years 
with the fall in transport costs and increase in shelf-life because of new technologies (e.g. 
pasteurization). However, competition is mainly in the dimension of quality: price sensitivity 
is small and brand loyalty is high. Thus entrant brewers can compete only when they have 
large marketing budgets and where there are low quality incumbent products. 
Tying of outlets helps to pre-empt competition, since it allows the brewer to make sure that the 
quality of his product is maintained outside the brewery (an efficiency effect), and by 
restricting the potential market for entrants (a market power effect). In the absence of ties, 
large-scale brewers (with large marketing budgets) will tend to dominate the market. Even 
where a significant proportion of beer is sold for consumption in the home, tying in the on-
licence market may represent an important barrier since a significant proportion of the 
promotion of new brands takes place in the on-licence market. The barrier to entry effect of 
tying is dependent on a concentrated market structure that allows tying to lead to foreclosure. 
6.4.2. Development of competition 
Concentration ratios in all Member States apart from Germany have now reached very high 
levels. Thus expansion is increasingly likely to occur across national boundaries. Entry into 
local markets has been achieved in one of four ways. Physical exports from one Member State 
to another have been an important source of competition where geographical proximity has 
allowed it. This has been particularly marked in the case of brewers from smaller countries 
exporting to larger beer consuming countries: Denmark (e.g. Carlsberg) and the Netherlands 
(e.g. Heineken) to Germany; Belgium (e.g. Stella Artois) to France; and Ireland (Guinness) to 
the UK. Trade flows across national boundaries within the EU are important and have 
increased significantly over the last 20 years. For example, while EU production has grown at 
an average rate of 1.4% per year, imports have grown at 4.3% per year and exports at 5.6% per 
year; 96% of beer imports in Europe come from other Member States while about one- third of 
EU exports leave Europe. The second form of entry has been where brewers have acquired 
production facilities, either through a majority investment (e.g. Guinness owns 88% of 
Cruzcampo in Spain) or a minority investment (Danone owns a minority share in San Miguel 
in Spain). The third form, greenfield entry, is rare, although the recent case of Anheuser 
Busch's acquisition of Mortlake brewery in the UK has a greenfield element, since the 
production facility will be greatly expanded to brew Budweiser. Finally, licensing agreements 
represent an important alternative entry strategy for brewers. 
6.4.3. The interaction of these drivers with competition policy 
Until recently, EU competition policy can be considered almost entirely permissive. Thus 
there have been no significant contested mergers, the EC block exemptions have placed only 
limited restrictions on tying agreements, and licensing agreements have not been regulated. 
Tying agreements have been restricted in terms of duration (five years for all drinks or ten 
years for beer only), but this is a relatively weak restriction. 
This situation may be about to change. Firstly, the EU's intervention in the 
Carlsberg/Interbrew licensing agreement signals a concern with the implications of exclusive 
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distribution agreements in markets where brewers have significant market shares. Secondly, 
the 1989 merger regulations offer the possibility of intervention if a trend toward large cross-
border mergers were to develop. Finally, the 1990 review of the block exemption signalled 
increasing concern with the possible anti-competitive effects of the tie, particularly in relation 
to the UK. The decision as to whether to renew the block exemptions, and if so in what form, 
will probably be the most important competition policy decision over the foreseeable future. 
The Commission will have to decide on the likely effect of complete or partial abolition of the 
tie and the desirability of these effects.44 
The evidence of the growth of cross-border activities, particularly by brewers from smaller 
Member States (Guinness from Ireland, Heineken from the Netherlands, Stella Artois from 
Belgium, and Carlsberg from Denmark), may be taken to suggest that the tie has not restricted 
entry, and therefore there is no pressing need to amend or abolish it in order to promote cross-
border activity. However, if it were believed that tying forced brewers seeking to enter new 
markets to adopt licensing strategies, when direct entry would be feasible in the absence of 
ties, then there would be pressure for change. 
However, even if the Commission believed that the tie was inhibiting cross-border activity, to 
the extent that diminishing the tie would lead to concentration in the industry and therefore a 
narrower range of beers available, then it might still seem on balance desirable to retain the 
block exemptions. In markets where diversity and tradition are prized, it may be seen as 
undesirable to promote concentration, even if this reduces costs to the consumer. Yet the 
relationship between concentration and consumer choice is not a simple one. It may be the 
case that individual consumers face a wider range of choice today than they did 100 years ago 
because, although there are many fewer brewers, each bar serves a larger number of beers. 
Furthermore, effective choice may have increased. Although there were more beers in the past, 
many were of inferior quality, so that increasing competition has driven low quality beers out 
of the market. Finally, large brewers may have the financial resources to develop new products 
which are attractive to consumers (the case of 'lite' beers in the US is an important example), 
so that concentration may promote improvements in the choices available to consumers. 
6.4.4. The interaction of these drivers and the single market programme 
In terms of the areas highlighted by the study on the cost of non-Europe, namely the German 
purity laws, the single market programme does not as yet appear to have had any significant 
effect. German imports of beer appear to have been more affected by reunification than 
anything else in recent years. Thus imports grew by 77% in 1990, reflecting the significance of 
Czech beer in the former East Germany. Since 1991 imports have actually fallen slightly. 
While consolidation inside Germany has continued, there is no evidence that this trend has 
accelerated since 1992. Thus there is also no reason to suppose that cost-efficiency has 
increased dramatically, either through reduction in X-inefficiency or through economies of 
scale. In Denmark the packaging restrictions remain in force. Beer imports constituted 0.7% of 
total consumption in 1994, up from 0.3% in 1993, but still too small a figure to represent a 
significant increase in the degree of competition. 
In the US and Australia, abolishing ties contributed to increased concentration in brewing. In the UK the Beer Orders 
have led to concentration in brewing, closure of on-sales outlets and the creation of new retail chains. 
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However, the single market programme has made an impact, now that consumers face no 
customs duties when buying in one Member State for personal use in another. Where 
significant differences in excise duties exist, arbitrage has flourished. Notably, it is now 
estimated that 5% of the beer consumed in the UK is brought back by consumers from France 
and Belgium, where excise duties are significantly lower. 
In summary, the European Union is best considered as a set of intersecting beer markets based 
on local tastes and traditions. These markets mostly lie within national boundaries and are 
generally not as large as the relevant Member State. Demand is price inelastic, and 
competition between brands through marketing is more significant than price competition. 
Trade flows across national boundaries in the EU have increased significantly over the last 20 
years, but even so the share of imports in domestic consumption is relatively low in the 
principal beer drinking countries of the EU. The degree of competition faced by national beers 
from imported beers is therefore not generally high. Competition from foreign beers is further 
reduced in the numerous cases where large brewers in national markets have been granted 
licences to sell and/or manufacture the beers of leading foreign producers. 
Brewers' strategies in these regional or national markets are centred around expansion to 
exploit economies of scale, maintaining brand image with consumers and influencing the 
distribution and retail networks. The first strategy has led to increasing concentration in all 
markets. Whilst the German industry in particular has remained significantly less concentrated 
than the industry in other Member States, the trend is the same across all Member States. The 
second strategy has led to an increasing focus on marketing and the development of entry 
strategies based primarily on brand licensing and, in some instances, on direct entry with a 
premium brand. The third strategy has led to significant tying of Horeca outlets through direct 
ownership or exclusive dealing agreements based on loans and other inducements. This has 
been a particular feature of the UK market and is also to be found across other Member States. 
Competition policy within the EU has been permissive until quite recently. Trade between 
Member States has grown much faster than overall beer consumption in the past twenty years. 
Trade growth has been particularly strong between adjacent Member States, and brewers in 
smaller Member States appear to have benefited disproportionately from the openness of EU 
markets. This rosy picture does not necessarily imply that markets are completely open, and it 
may be that tying, in particular, has prevented consolidation of specific markets, and that this 
has adversely affected efficient brewers who would otherwise enter neighbouring markets. 
Recently the Commission has shown some concern about the anti-competitive effects of 
exclusive licensing and distribution agreements by brewers. 
6.5. Trends in integration and competition in the European car market 
Fifteen years ago, the EU car market was characterized by three main features: 
(a) markets segmented along national lines, with local producers accounting for the largest 
shares of sales in their domestic markets; 
(b) significant price differentials between EU car markets. 
Despite this market segmentation, intra-EU trade was already significant. The single market 
programme was intended to reduce the price differentials across the EU, by facilitating 
increased trade. The competitive challenge to EU car producers has been severely limited by 
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several external trade policy measures, and the Commission also hoped to reduce these 
external trade barriers to further stimulate pressures to reduce costs. As far as the single 
market programme is concerned, the Commission has singled out several technical measures 
and some fiscal measures as the relevant non-tariff barriers that had to be removed. 
Table 6.3 lists the measures introduced by the Commission. 
Table 6.3. Single market programme - technical measures that directly affected the 
car sector 
Types of technical measures I Reference to the main measures 
Type approvai öf motor vehicles | Dir. 87/358/ËEC; 92/537ËËC 
'Measures 'against air'poiiuïïo'n by gas'es^ fOir"W76/EEC-WW^ 
and on permissible sound level and exhaust system ! 92/97/EEC; 94/12/EEC 
Other technical measures concerning: j Directives: 
• Mechanical coupling devices j · 94/20/EEC 
• Spray suppression systems I · 91/226/EEC 
• Lateral protection (side guards) j · 89/297/EEC 
• Safety glass and glazing materials j · 92/22/EEC 
• Pneumatic tyres j · 92/23/EEC; 89/459/EEC 
• Masses and dimensions of type Ml vehicles j · 92/21/EEC 
• Installation and uses of speed limitation devices i · 92/6/EEC; 92/24/EEC 
• External projections forward of the cab's rear panel ; · 92/114/EEC 
Note: As of April 1995, see European Commission, 'State of Community Law concerning the Internal Market', Doc. No 
XV/530/95/EN. 
The intricate web of national requirements to ensure the safety of users and third parties, and 
to protect the environment, has been replaced by harmonized rules for the whole of the EU. 
EU type approval became optional from the beginning of 1993 for private cars, and 
compulsory from 1 January 1996. 
As far as fiscal measures are concerned, differences in VAT rates are a source of post-tax price 
differences. Between 1987 and 1994 VAT rates charged on cars in Member States have shown 
a significant convergence. 
However, despite the single market measures designed to promote intra-EU trade, quantitative 
restrictions on the volume of Japanese car imports applied in several national markets 
throughout the 1980s. Differences exist between, on the one hand, the larger Member States 
with indigenous car industries, in which restrictive measures were adopted, and, on the other, 
Member States with no domestic car producers, such as Belgium, Holland, Ireland and Greece, 
which were free from quantitative restrictions. 
The predicted effects of VERs run counter to the implicit goals of the single market 
programme, namely: 
(a) an increase in the price of cars subject to the restriction; 
(b) the importers' move upmarket, to maximize the value of their quotas; 
(c) an increase in profits for all firms; 
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(d) removal of competitive pressures on domestic producers; 
(e) the possible entry into the protected market of producers subject to trade restrictions but 
not to restrictions on entry. 
National import restrictions were justified under Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Nevertheless, as part of the single market programme, the Commission has gradually put 
pressure on Member States to phase out national quantitative restrictions. At the same time, 
some informal restrictions were established on the number of Japanese car imports allowed in 
the EU, and an EU VER was formally agreed in 1991, scheduled to expire in 1999. Under the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT, tariffs on cars imported into EU countries, which currently 
exceed 10%, will reduce progressively to that level. 
France and Italy have both been largely closed to Japanese imports and have been dominated 
by domestic producers. Ireland and the Netherlands are open markets, whereas Germany and 
the UK lie somewhere in between. Imports in these six countries now represent almost 55% of 
registrations, of which intra-EU imports account for 75%. The figure for Ireland indicates a 
degree of re-exporting. 
Between 1982 and 1993, intra-EU trade in cars expanded, to 59% of registrations: this 
compares to an average of 37% for 46 manufacturing industries in the period 1989-93. The 
increase was greatest in France, but negligible in the UK, largely because the Japanese 
transplants in the UK increased their production in this period. The market share of intra-EU 
imports of cars did not increase at the expense of extra-EU imports, in the EU as a whole, 
although this did appear to be the case in Italy, France and the UK. 
Borders now matter less, as reflected in producers' diminishing dependence on their domestic 
markets (see London Economics, 1996). This trend has been more marked for the volume 
producers (PSA, Ford UK and Renault) than for specialists such as BMW and Mercedes. 
German unification in 1990 reversed the trend for the German car manufacturers. 
6.5.1. Price differentials between EU markets 
Perhaps the most sensitive test of progress towards European integration in the car market is 
whether the prices charged in national markets for similar products have differed significantly, 
and if so, whether prices are converging. In 1981, according to a study by the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies of car prices in the UK and Belgium,45 discounted VAT-exclusive prices in the 
UK exceeded those in Belgium by an average of 39%. The price differential was higher still 
when allowance was made, using econometric techniques, for quality differences. 
By the 1990s, the situation was not noticeably different. A study by the Bureau Européen des 
Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC) on behalf of DG XI46 found price differentials between 
national markets which ranged from 12% to 50% for UK cars, compared with car prices in 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands. However, the BEUC study was criticized because (unlike the IFS study) it did 
M.H. Ashworth, J.A. Kay and T.A.E. Sharpe, 'Differentials between car prices in the United Kingdom and Belgium' 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, IFS Report Series, No 2, 1982. 
See BEUC, 'EEC study on car prices and progress towards 1992', BEUC/10/89, 15 October 1989. 
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not take into account variations in car specifications from country to country, and understated 
the importance of discounts and other financial benefits to customers. 
When investigating the supply of new cars, the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC)47 compared car prices in the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, for 
models supplied by nine EU-based producers and one Japanese supplier. The comparison 
sought to take account of differences in model specification and used car transactions, rather 
than list prices, in making comparisons. Specification differences were reduced but not 
completely eliminated, as it was difficult to find identical model variants across the six 
countries.48 Moreover, the MMC notes that demand conditions for cars differed in each 
country over the period of study (in 1990 demand was particularly weak in the UK but was 
rising in Belgium and the Netherlands). The MMC report concluded the price differences were 
not in general significant. However, prices for models belonging to the smaller segments 
showed significant differences. 
Another report by LAL in 1991 found large variances in prices for the four models 
investigated, ranging from 13.8 to 35%.49 The UK was taken as the basis for comparison, and 
specifications and equipment items in other markets were adjusted to match the UK. Delivery 
charges were omitted from the study.50 Flam and Nordstrom51 found price differences as high 
as 50% and average price differences of around 12%. 
Table 6.4. Average 
Average for all models 
Price (DM) 
Standard deviation (%) 
Max. price differential (%) 
price dispersion 1989-
Source: H. Flam and H. Nordstrom, 'Why 
Discussion Paper Series, No 1181, May 1995. 
do 
1989 
20,979 
14 
51 
pre-tax car 
-92 
prices 
1990 
21,459 
12 
42 
differ so much 
1991 
23,188 | 
14 ; 
49 
across European 
1992 
24,405 
14 
49 
countries?', CEPR 
Most recently, the European Commission's May 1995 survey of list prices52 reported that 
price differentials for more than 50% of all models offered on EU markets (55% of all 
European manufacturers' models, and 37% of all Japanese) exceeded 20%. 
47 
48 
49 
50 
See MMC, 'New motor cars, a report on the supply of new motor cars within the United Kingdom', 1992, Ch. 8. 
The procedure could be criticized because, unlike the IFS study, the additional features incorporated into UK models 
were valued at manufacturers' prices, rather than hedonically. 
See 'Year 2000 and beyond - the car marketing challenge in Europe', Euromotor Reports, 1991, pp. 183-4. 
For an example on how to examine price differences between various car models in term of variation in individual car 
features within the UK, see J. Murray and N. Sarantis 'Price-quality relations and hedonic price indexes for cars in the 
UK'. 
H. Flam and H. Nordstrom, 'Why do pre-tax car prices differ so much across European countries?', CEPR Discussion 
Paper Series, No 1181, May 1995. 
See European Commission, 'Car price differentials in the European Union on 1 May 1995', Brussels, 24 July 1995, 
IP/95/768. 
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6.5.2. Changes in the structure of supply 
The market opportunity offered by the single market might have been expected to have 
induced an increase in the concentration of ownership. This has not been the case. The market 
shares of the largest producers remained stable between 1982 and 1994; the effects of 
acquisitions and market entry on concentration seem to have roughly balanced. Instead, the 
European producers have looked for alternative structural solutions - notably, joint ventures 
and expansion globally. Joint ventures preserve independence, but at the cost of instability, as 
illustrated by Rover's desertion of Honda for BMW. Cooperation between producers was 
relatively rare before the mid-1970s (although Renault and Peugeot had long-standing 
arrangements for joint manufacturing of engines and transmissions). The 1980s saw the 
Fiat/Saab executive car project, and the agreement between Renault and Volkswagen to design 
and manufacture automatic transmissions. More recently, there has been the VW/ 
Mercedes/BMW venture to produce a fuel-saving diesel engine.53 Cooperation has been very 
common over multi-purpose and off-road vehicles. 
To summarize, the European market has become more integrated, in the sense that there is 
greater interpénétration of markets. However, borders, and nationality, still matter. Such 
integration of the market as has occurred has had few effects on the car industry's ownership 
and physical structure. The pressure to seek economies of scale and scope has provoked few 
significant mergers, or exits. Producers have become more adept at generating options from a 
given number of basic platforms, and have sought to spread their fixed costs over greater 
volumes, by cooperative agreements and by global expansion. Price differentials as high as 
50% were reported in 1995, as was a corresponding loss of domestic shares by dominant local 
producers. There was no apparent convergence in price levels between the EU markets. 
However, the prospects of full liberalization of the EU car market, and the limited market-
opening contribution of Regulation (EC) No 1475/95, is likely to accelerate progress towards a 
truly integrated European car market. The opening of the market to Japanese imports after 
1999 should be an important factor in increasing competition, and stimulating change. 
6.6. Integration and competition in the European air travel markets 
The main characteristic of the airline industry with respect to the single market programme is 
that it is a sector that is moving from a highly regulated environment to a more competitive 
one. The process has been lengthy and uneven, partly as a result of resistance by Member 
States, and appears to require some additional time before being completed on an EU-wide 
basis. 
See L. Barile, 'Opel e Ford criticano il progetto del diesel "tedesco" per il 2000', Artide on II Sole-24 Ore. 15 August 
1995. The fact that the subsidiaries of the American producers, Opel and Ford, have been excluded from the project, 
and the involvement of some German states (Länder), have caused strong criticism. 
Examples are the cooperation between Isuzu and GM to produce the Vauxhall/Opel Frontera (4x4), between Nissan and 
Ford to manufacture a similar vehicle, and between VW and Ford for a Multi-Purpose-Vehicle. On this see Euromotor 
Report, p. 268. 
Several factors in combination give rise to price differences between national markets: VERs on Japanese imports, 
national differences in VAT, movements in European exchange rates, customer preferences for domestic producers. The 
distribution system for cars was not the cause of these price differentials, but it does enable them to be maintained. 
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The single market programme started rather hesitantly with very moderate liberalization 
measures in 1987, but has challenged many regulatory barriers to entry since then. The single 
market measures concerning the airline sector are illustrated in detail in Table 6.5. The three 
packages introduced by the Commission are more far-reaching than the single market 
measures in most other sectors, aiming at liberalizing a sector that was previously highly 
regulated. The third package will, by 1997, establish a regulatory framework where entry to 
any route in Europe will be in principle open to any EU carrier. To the extent that entry by 
non-national carriers on intra-EU and domestic routes takes place, integration of the European 
air travel market will have made some progress. 
Member States' domestic markets will only be fully liberalized from April 1997, whereas 
international routes to non-European countries are still governed by bilateral arrangements 
whose restrictions vary from country to country. 
On the individual international routes, the dominance of the national airlines is therefore still 
strong. Of the 636 international scheduled city pair routes within the Community and EEA 
countries, 411 (65%) were monopoly routes, 187 (29%) were operated by two carriers and 38 
(6%) were operated by more than two carriers (so called multi-carrier routes, (CAA, 1993, p. 
117). As Table 6.6 shows, the proportion of national multi-carrier routes varies between 
countries, with the greatest range in the six large countries. Italy has a very low proportion of 
routes with three or more carriers. 
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Table 6.5. Single market programme policy measures affecting the air transport 
sector 
air carriers 
Scope 
Relevant 
legislation 
Fares 
Designation 
Capacity 
Route access 
Competition 
rules 
Licensing of 
1st Package: from 1 Jan 1988 
Int. sched. passenger transport 
; 1. Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 
j on the application of the 
• competition rules to air transport 
j 2. Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 
| on the application of the treaty to 
I certain categories of agreements 
j and concerted practices 
1 3. Council Directive 87/601/EEC 
I on air fares 
! 4. Council Decision 87/602/EEC on 
j capacity sharing and market 
j access 
j % of Fares approved 
: Fare tvDe ref. Fare bv States 
j Discount 66-90 Automatically 
; Deep discount 45-65 
I Automatically 
j All other Double approval 
1 · Multiple designation by a State 
I allowed if: 
! 250,000 pass (1st year after 
! integration) 
j 200,000 pass or 1,200 round trip 
I flights (2nd year) 
j 180,000 pass or 1,000 round trip 
I flights (3rd year) 
I · Capacity shares between States 
j 45/55% (from Jan. 1988) 
! 40/60% (from Oct. 1989) 
] · 3rd/4th freedom region to hub 
1 routes permitted 
1 · 5th freedom traffic allowed up to 
j 30% of capacity 
| · Additional 5th rights for Irish 
: and Portuguese 
j · Combination of points allowed 
! · Some exemptions 
; Groiyid exemption regarding. 
j · Some capacity coordination 
I · Tariff consultation 
; · Slot allocation 
j · Common computer reservation 
j systems 
: · Ground handling of aircraft, 
I freight, passenger and in-flight 
; catering 
! Some sharing of pool revenues 
2nd Package: from 1 Nov. 1990 i 
Int. sched. passenger transport 
1. Council Regulation (EEC) No j 
2343/90 on market access 
2. Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2342/90 on air fares 
3. Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2344/90 on the application of the 
Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted 
practices 
% of Fares approved 
: Fare tvDe ref. Fare bv States 
; Fully flexible 106+ Unless 
dbl. disapproval 
Normal econ. 95-105 
Automatically 
Discount 80-94 Automatically 
Deep discount 30-79 
Automatically 
': All others If dbl. approval 
• Multiple designation by a State 
allowed if: 
140,000 pass or 800 round trip 
flights (from Jan 1991) 
100,000 pass or 600 round trip 
flights (from Jan 1992) 
i · Capacity shares of a State of up 
| to 60% 
; · Capacity can be increased by 
: 7.5% points per year 
; · 3rd/4th freedom between all 
I airports 
• · 5th freedom traffic allowed up to 
| 50% of capacity 
| · Public service obligations and 
! certain protection for new 
; regional routes 
; · A 3rd/4th freedom service can be 
i matched by an airline from the 
I other State 
I · Scope for traffic distribution 
j rules and restrictions related to 
j congestion and environmental 
j protection 
; Ground exemption regarding: 
j · Some capacity coordination 
j · Tariff consultation 
| · Slot allocation 
! · Common computer reservation 
: systems 
j · Ground handling of aircraft, 
1 freight, passenger and in-flight 
1 catering 
j Not provided for in the 1st and 2nd packages 
3rd Package: from 1 Jan 1993 
Int. & dom., sched. & charter, passenger & 
t freight transport 
1. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 on 
licensing of air carriers 
2. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 on 
market access 
3. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2409/92 on fares 
and rates 
% oí Fares approved 
Fare tvDe ref. Fare bv States 
• However, provisions made for the States and/or the commission to intervene against. 
Excessive basic fares (in relation to long-term 
fully allocated costs) 
Sustained downward development of fares 
No longer applicable 
Unrestricted 
• Full access to international and domestic routes 
within the EU including routes between States 
other than the base of the carrier (exemptions 
for Greek island and Azores) 
• Cabotage is allowed for up to 50% of capacity 
if the domestic sector is combined with a route 
to the home country (cabotage is unrestricted 
from April 1997) 
• More developed public service obligations and 
certain protection for new thin regional routes 
• More developed scope for traffic distribution 
rules and restrictions related to congestion and 
environmental protection 
Ground exemption regarding: 
• Some capacity coordination 
• Tariff consultation 
• Slot allocation 
• Common computer reservation systems 
• Joint operation of new thin routes 
Full freedom to start an airline 
• Uniform conditions across EU 
• Concept of Community ownership and control 
replaces national ownership and control 
• Requirements for financial fitness specified 
Small carriers subject to looser regulatory 
requirements 
Source: European Commission, 77ie Single Market Review, Volume 11:2, Air transport, 1997b. 
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Table 6.6. 
Austria 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
Total 
Competition on scheduled routes 
j Proportion of round trip flights on routes with two 
1 Domestic scheduled routes 
Dec . 1992 
o ¡ 
3 | 
9 
10 \ 
36 ; 
0 | 
0 1 
28 
0 | 
27 | 
47 
0 ! 
47 | 
43 
26 
Dec. 1994 
0 
4 
9 
9 
40 
0 
0 
26 
0 
38 
35 
60 
47 
56 
36 
Competition issues 
or more competitors (%) 
International sched 
Dec. 1992 
12 
8 
7 
26 
10 
0 
36 
7 
20 
0 
14 
14 
12 
40 
19* 
luled routes 
: 
Dec. 1994 
12 
11 
0 
35 
15 
16 
46 
15 
18 
9 
37 
20 
12 
45 
25* 
Source: CAA, 1995, Table 2.2 and 2.3, pp. 91-92. 
* Total includes Belgium and Luxembourg. 
6.6.1. Entry strategies in the new European environment 
Entry by new carriers has been much more limited than expected, but considerable changes in 
industry structure have taken place.56 Some of the carriers which ran into financial difficulties 
in the past have reduced their capacity (Air France, Aer Lingus, Iberia and Air Portugal). Some 
of them, like Iberia, Air France and Alitalia, plan to cut capacity further as part of their 
restructuring arrangements. Their share will therefore continue to decline. On the other hand, 
British Airways has increased its output considerably, partly as a result of its takeover of 
DanAir in November 1992. 
Behind these aggregate figures are considerable changes in network structure. In general, the 
flag carriers have tried to concentrate their operations mainly on their home hub. They have 
withdrawn some international services from non-hub airports (e.g. Air France at Lyon and 
Nice, or Alitalia non-stop services from Genoa, Pisa, Venice and Bologna). Even at the end of 
1994, the flag carriers, together with their subsidiaries, accounted for over 80% of the total 
C O 
scheduled output on routes between or within the EU. 
56 See Table 1.3 in CAA, 1995, p. 71. 
57 On the other hand, Sabena and Olympic, which had financial difficulties, grew by roughly the same factor. 
58 See CAA, 1995, p. 29. 
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The third EU package gives airlines access on routes between and within other Member 
States. However, these fifth freedom and cabotage services accounted for only about 1% of the 
flights offered at the end of 1994. There were increases on some routes, but others were 
discontinued in 1995, so the total share has probably not increased very much. This would 
seem to indicate that entry by flag carriers has had a small competitive effect.59 
However, the assessment differs between routes and regions. Some of the entry has resulted in 
a third carrier on previously duopolistic routes, and there the impact has been significant. 
Other entry has taken place domestically, moving from one to two competitor routes. This too 
has resulted in a significant increase in competition, as shown by lower fares, higher 
frequency, etc. However, one has to assess these developments in the longer term, to see to 
what extent extra carriers can be supported on these routes and if they can be made more 
contestable. 
The competitive entry by flag carriers must be seen in relation to the emerging hub and spoke 
system in Europe. Flag carriers will try to strengthen their position at their home airport, and 
compete only on routes which benefit their network. This allows them to offer certain short-
haul services from these hubs even at a loss, when this can result in feeding more prosperous 
long-haul services. 
The degree to which flag carriers are willing to compete has still not been established. The 
aggressive participation of Β A in the German market remains an exception. In France, B A's 
behaviour is far more subdued, and the other major carriers have also maintained competition 
in acceptable bands. An important opportunity is therefore emerging for the smaller non-flag 
carriers, at least as a competitive check on the entrenched flag carriers. However, for them to 
be effective, barriers to entry need to be reduced further (in terms of runway slots and related 
facilities, and access to the computerized reservation system (CRS)). However, even then they 
will have to overcome other scale disadvantages related to Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFPs), 
special corporate discount agreements, and so on. In other words, they have to compete from a 
much lower cost base in order to be competitively viable. But it is not clear if they will be 
sufficiently profitable to attract the continuing investment needed, to remain as forceful and 
increasingly important competitors. 
6.6.2. Trends in joint ventures and mergers 
Following the gradual decline in scheduling conferences and the use of interlining agreements 
through IATA, airlines have recently developed much more market-specific forms of 
cooperation.61 They range from code sharing to marketing agreements and equity participation, 
all the way to fully-fledged mergers. The picture that emerges is one of increasing cooperation 
among airlines in Europe. Surveys conducted by Airline Business show that in 1985 European 
airlines were involved in a limited number of alliances (20), including non-EU airlines. By 
1990 the number of alliances rose to 59 and by 1995 it had jumped to 71. The question of the 
Examples of entry by national flag carriers in another country are BA's entry in 1994 on the Brussels/Rome route and 
Deutsche BA's (DBA) entry on German domestic routes, as well as TAT's increased competitive activity after its 
takeover by British Airways. 
60 SeeEncaoua, 1991,p.l23. 
61 GAO, 1995. 
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nature of these cooperative agreements is addressed in more detail in the case study report by 
London Economics [1996]. 
Horizontal cooperative joint ventures with feeder airlines are the most natural form in which 
joint ventures have developed. Another kind of cooperative joint venture is 'regional' 
franchising, a practice currently implemented by a number of national carriers. 
Cooperation in the form of code sharing arrangements is now becoming more and more 
frequent among flag carriers, as a typical form of 'horizontal' cooperation. 'Code sharing' 
allows airlines to connect traffic from other carriers to their own network. These agreements 
may also be supplemented by a marketing agreement, which involves such features as blocked 
space arrangements on flights, scheduling coordination and joint marketing and sales. 
While regional joint ventures with feeder airlines and neighbouring carriers have been the 
norm in the past, global alliances have recently increased much more in importance. The GAO 
study reports that the number of global alliances more than tripled between 1992 and 1995 
(from 19 tool).62 
Since the end of the 1980s some concentration has taken place among European airlines. Most 
of them concern the acquisition of smaller regional airlines by the largest flag carriers, either 
attempting to expand in other Member States' domestic markets or reinforcing their position 
in their own domestic market. Table 6.7 shows the full-scale mergers that have also taken 
place in recent years. 
Table 6.7. Important merger cases in European air transport 
Companies involved 
British Airways/British Caledonian 1 
Air France/Airlnter/UTA 
KLM/Transavia 
Air France/Sabena * 
British Airways/DanAir 
British Airways/TAT 
Sabena/Swissair 
* Air France's stake was taken over by Swissair in 1995. 
Year 
1988 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1995 
While some elements of competition were evident in the early 1980s, it was not until the 
Community (and some Member States in their bilateral air transport relations) took more 
decisive action that significantly increased competition began to occur. 
The European air transport market is still dominated by national flag carriers with some 
restructuring as a result of competition. In some cases, airlines may have delayed restructuring 
in the expectation that state aid would be made available. In addition, some defensive mergers 
have helped to strengthen national flag dominance. There has been some reduction in 
aggregate concentration, but the national flag carriers are still dominant, with the largest 
See CAA, 1995, p. 3. 
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national carriers, British Airways, Lufthansa, and Air France, making up over 50% of this 
total. 
However, these are overall concentration measures, which do not reflect what is happening in 
individual city pair markets. An assessment of the most important 'city pair routes in Europe 
shows that there are very few routes which have more than two competing carriers. The role of 
potential competition is, therefore, of crucial importance. But on the busiest routes there is 
congestion at one or both airport ends. This means that entry cannot readily take place, and 
therefore potential competition is inhibited. 
There has been a general improvement in productivity among European carriers. Average fare 
per passenger mile, an indicator of overall productivity, has decreased much faster in the US 
than in Europe. While differences are due to external factors such as infrastructure and fuel 
costs, it is clear that there are still productivity reserves that relate partly to traditional labour 
management practices, non-optimized route structures, monopoly in ground handling, etc. 
Government support through state aid has certainly prevented some structural adjustment. 
Some of the carriers which recently received state aid have high operating costs, while others 
simply have too large a network. 
While the amount of promotional fares currently used by European flag carriers has increased 
compared to the 1980s, IATA fare levels have increased somewhat. The CAA report [1995] 
and the study carried out by Cranfield University for the European Commission under the 
Single Market Review Programme show that fare levels have increased over the last six years. 
'As far as the impact of liberalization is concerned, there is little evidence from these trends 
that EU measures had any significant impact on fully flexible fares' (European Commission, 
1997b). 
The study of European air travel illustrates the transition from highly regulated national 
markets to a competitive European market. This transition has been brought about by overall 
trends of national liberalization, more liberal bilateral policies, but to a large extent by policies 
under the single market programme. As this initiative is still continuing, the forces of 
restructuring and liberalization have not yet been fully implemented. 
However, there is ä considerable amount of evidence to suggest that, as a result of the 
liberalization measures, the airline markets in Europe have become more integrated. But they 
are not yet fully integrated, given the transitional difficulties on the one hand, and structural 
problems such as capacity constraints on routes and airport slots on the other. There is also the 
international dimension of the market, which is still often determined by restrictive bilateral 
arrangements. 
Within this transition framework we see a restructuring of the industry as would be expected 
as a consequence of a move towards deregulation. Competition policy is crucial in this 
connection, by facilitating the lowering of barriers to entry for the necessary restructuring of 
the industry, but also by carefully scrutinizing structural reconfigurations such as mergers and 
joint ventures which might be used to extend and enlarge existing market power. 
This section concludes with a discussion of the case study of air transport for European 
competition policy more generally. Air transport is not a homogeneous product, but 
nevertheless offers some generalizations to other service industries that have similar 
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characteristics (network aspects, non-storability, importance of reputation). The continued 
market segmentation observed in this industry is a direct result of strategic behaviour by 
dominant firms, usually the flag carriers of the national countries, who together with their 
governments have some scope to exclude entrants or to collude with each other or, in the form 
of joint ventures, to increase their market power. 
The nature of production, and the importance of networks and reputation are also typical of 
some other industries such as banking, insurance, etc. In addition, the intervention of the EU 
authorities provides an example of the contradictions that may arise from the different policy 
objectives within the Commission (pursuing liberalization and restructuring towards an 
efficient industry structure, on the one hand, versus state aid and social service obligations that 
maintain the status quo on the other). 
6.7. Domestic appliances 
The development of the domestic appliance industry in Europe shows how a market can 
become integrated at the level of production, but remain segmented in consumer markets. We 
discuss these in turn. 
The process of integration in production in the domestic appliance sector has been driven by 
the search for economies of scale. This began with the technical innovations of predominantly 
Italian firms in the 1950s and 1960s. The 1980s was a period of further concentration in the 
domestic appliances industry. The top ten firms had a combined market share of around 45% 
in 1980. However, by the end of the decade this had risen to 75% and by 1993 to nearly 90%. 
The process of concentration during the 1980s was driven by poor financial performance by 
many firms, following over investment in capacity during periods of weak demand in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, together with a proliferation of models on the market that eroded some 
of the economies of scale. The concentration was marked by some particularly large takeovers, 
including notably those of Zanussi by Electrolux in 198463 and Phillips by Whirlpool of the 
US in 1986.64 
Between 1976 and 1991, Electrolux made around 200 acquisitions and moved from being 
global leader in a marginal segment (vacuum cleaner production), and national leader in a 
peripheral market (Sweden), to world leadership in the entire sector, with a share of nearly 
20%. Electrolux's growth strategy was based on, first, market entry through the acquisition of 
brands and local service and distribution networks and, second, cost competitiveness through 
the integration of production facilities. 
Today, Electrolux operates some 40 household appliance and related component plants in 
Europe. Each is specialized around limited product categories and ships to multiple national 
markets. Thus at the Arthur Martin site in Revin, France, in 1991 more than 40 models of top-
loading washing machines were produced under 9 different brands for 13 countries.65 
63 
64 
Zanussi, in addition to problems of excess capacity, had also run into trouble through some poor diversifications. 
In addition, Merloni acquired Indesit (1987), Thompson formed ajoint venture with Toshiba (1986) and Hotpoint sold 
out to General Electric of the US (1989). 
Allen, C , Stephen, A. and Bove, Suzanne, Electrolux Group, ECCH, Cranfield Ltd, 1991. 
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The support of local brands by advertising both feeds consumer preferences and facilitates 
different pricing strategies, both geographically and in terms of product specification against 
consumer requirements. Intensive advertising, control of local distribution networks, and the 
existence of significant economies of scale, act as entry deterrents to potential competitors. 
However, the multiplicity of brands designed for national markets means that national markets 
defined by consumer tastes have remained to some extent segmented. This segmentation is 
based not just on technical preferences - the English prefer front-loading washing machines 
while the Italians prefer top-loading - but also on brand preferences. These preferences mean 
that the same brands are marketed differently in different countries and that different brands 
are marketed in different countries, irrespective of the underlying technical specification. Thus 
in the UK Zanussi manages to achieve an upmarket position, while in Sweden it is considered 
middle-market, and in Italy Electrolux in 1991 decided to market group appliances under the 
Rex brand name as opposed to Zanussi. 
More recently, the introduction of Euro-brands represents an attempt to reap some economies 
of scale for brands. Thus there is, as far as possible, a common approach to advertising and 
distribution adopted for the Euro-brands of Electrolux and Whirlpool. These Euro-brands aim 
at market segmentation based on consumer taste, as opposed to geography. Thus Electrolux's 
international design centres represent an attempt to coordinate product design around a 
concept of five global lifestyles, characterized by differences in appliance size, energy 
consumption and sophistication of electronic functions.66 However, to date the domestic 
appliance industry is integrated principally at the level of production as opposed to consumer 
markets. 
6.8. Summary 
In this chapter we have reviewed trends in integration and competition in the EU on the basis 
of individual market studies. These trends differ considerably from one market to another. 
This is not surprising, given that the market studies have been deliberately selected to cover 
industries with differing degrees of exposure to single market measures and with different 
product and cost characteristics. A clear-cut result cannot be expected. 
All market studies have shown some important changes in competitive conditions over the 
past decade. Some industries, like domestic appliances and telecommunications switching 
equipment, have seen major restructuring with production and marketing becoming organized 
at a European level. The changes in competition in the former most closely reflect the general 
aim of the single market programme, namely to create larger, more integrated markets across 
Member States. The changes in market conditions in the latter are more directly associated 
with technological changes and the reform and liberalization of a previously heavily regulated 
public procurement sector. Other markets, like soda ash, have changed little, and if they have, 
the result was due more to decisions of the Commission on trade and competition policy than 
to single market measures. 
Three sectors, with a moderate to high degree of exposure to the single market programme, 
have also seen complex interactions between different drivers of competition. 
Refrigerator designer Roberto Pezzetta has argued 'It isn't important whether the customer lives in Munich or Milan. 
What's important is their lifestyle, not their geography. ' Wall Street Journal, 20 August 1990. 
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European beer markets have proved remarkably resistant to European integration, but have 
seen, nevertheless, significant changes in industry structure. Regional and national market 
fragmentation appears to persist, partly due to strong regional preferences for local or national 
brands and partly due to national differences in consumption patterns and distribution 
arrangements. The market study throws up some provocative conclusions regarding the 
interaction of two types of strategic behaviour relatively common throughout the European 
beer industry: (a) cross-country licensing using JVs; (b) selective distribution agreements at 
the national level. In a number of countries we observe that major foreign brands get 
manufactured and distributed by one of the leading national brewers under licence. It is 
arguable that the pricing and marketing policies for these foreign brands would be quite 
different if the foreign brewers were themselves to enter into direct competition with national 
brands. Selective distribution agreements and ties between brewers and tenants of pubs, bars 
and restaurants are common in most countries; but have been subject to several investigations 
by competition authorities. If these types of arrangement exist in markets that are relatively 
highly concentrated, their joint anti-competitive effect needs to be carefully assessed. 
European car markets are similarly characterized by a relatively high degree of concentration 
in national markets that are subject to selective distribution agreements. In contrast to beer, 
however, joint ventures in the car industry play a significant role in production and R&D on 
new cars. And unlike beer, the European car industry has had a long tradition of trade 
protection and other types of government support (state aid). Altogether the European car 
market has been gradually and only slowly moving towards greater integration. This market 
study provides a good example of the effects of national distribution arrangements on the 
potential to maintain price differentials between Member States. The continued debate over 
the persistence of price discrimination, and the lack of price convergence in European car 
markets, reflects the importance of this competition issue. 
The study of European air travel illustrates the transition from highly regulated national 
markets to a more competitive European market. This transition has been brought about by 
overall trends of national liberalization and, to a large extent, by policies under the single 
market programme. As this initiative is still continuing, the forces of restructuring and 
liberalization have not yet been fully implemented. 
There is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that, as a result of liberalization 
measures, the airline markets in Europe are becoming more integrated. But they are not yet 
fully integrated, given the transitional difficulties on the one hand, and structural problems 
such as capacity constraints on routes and airport slots on the other. There is also the 
international dimension of the market, which is still often determined by restrictive bilateral 
arrangements. 
Within this transition framework, we see a restructuring of the industry, and can observe a 
number of responses that raise competition policy concerns. Competition issues relate to 
barriers to entry, but also to structural reconfigurations such as mergers and joint ventures, 
which can be used to extend and enlarge existing market power. 
Table 6.8 summarizes the key features of the selected market studies. All the major 
competition issues that will be systematically dealt with in Part II of the study are represented. 
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Table 6.8. Summary of market studies 
Initial market structure 
Single market measures 
Competition issues 
Integration 
Soda ash 
Oligopolistic 
national markets 
Negligible 
Major collusion 
case 
High, but markets 
limited by 
transport costs 
Beer 
National markets 
often 
oligopolistic 
Technical and 
physical 
Cross-country 
licensing and 
vertical restraints 
Moderate 
Cars 
Oligopolistic 
with national 
champions 
Important 
technical, 
continued block 
exemption for 
distribution 
Distribution 
agreements and 
strategic alliances 
Relatively high at 
manufacturing 
level, low in 
distribution 
Domestic 
appliances 
Fragmented 
Reduction in 
cross-border 
transaction costs 
Mergers 
High with 
remaining market 
segmentation 
limited by taste 
Airlines 
Protected national 
monopolies/ 
international 
cartels 
Major 
liberalization 
pressures being 
implemented by 
1997 
Dominance, 
barriers to entry, 
joint ventures, ■ 
mergers 
Low 
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Part II Competition issues 
Our previous discussion, in Chapter 3, leads us to characterize integration as a process of 
convergence of prices across borders (through arbitrage), increasing access to markets and 
therefore intensifying competition, increasing exploitation of economies of scale, leading to 
outcomes of economic decisions that are independent of national borders. This may lead to the 
exit of less efficient firms and lead to higher levels of concentration. As a consequence, firms can 
expect that the loss of price discrimination possibilities and the intensification of competition 
will tend to reduce profits. 
While some firms will be able to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the single 
market, others will want to resist the competitive threats that this development implies. That is, 
market integration might give firms additional motives to behave in an anti-competitive way, 
where it has the effect of threatening their profits and entrenched positions in the market. 
Over the next six chapters we will examine a number of competition issues that arise from the 
behaviour of firms when they respond to the integration process and the competitive pressures 
that the single market programme seeks to promote. The order in which we discuss these 
issues is significant. We first look at those types of behaviour that are most closely related to 
integration policy and then proceed with a discussion of the more traditional categories. The 
six categories of behaviour are: 
(a) parallel import restrictions and price discrimination, whereby firms seek to maintain the 
segmentation of markets and differentiate the prices of their products across national 
markets; 
(b) access restrictions and entry barriers, whereby firms resist the impact of the single 
market programme on entry of new competitors; 
(c) collusion, as a type of anti-competitive behaviour which is only indirectly affected by 
single market measures; 
(d) other cooperative agreements, where the single market programme can be expected to 
have a significant effect on the motivation of firms to enter into such agreements; 
(e) mergers, which in larger integrated markets may be the consequence of firms desire to 
exploit economies of scale but also can be based on a motivation to achieve dominance 
and market power; 
(f) state aids, which are a response by governments who seek to protect firms from the full 
cost of adjustment that may arise as a consequence of increased competitive pressures in 
the single market. 
These types of behaviour need to be examined on a theoretical basis in terms of their 
economic rationale, but more specifically in terms of their interaction with integration in the 
single market. The rich case history of DG IV provides empirical evidence that is helpful for 
the illustration of the selected issues. Equally, the case studies summarized in Chapter 6 are 
useful for the illustration of certain issues. 
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7. Geographic price discrimination 
7.1. Introduction 
Much of the typical commentary on market integration has focused on the existence of cross-
country price differentials within the EU as an undesirable symptom of market segmentation, 
and on the persistence of such differentials as an indication that the integration process has not 
yet run its course. Following this interpretation, increasing similarity of prices across EU 
economies has been frequently understood as a policy aim in itself. 
In an integrated market, cross-border price differentials should be bid away through arbitrage. 
Thus the ability of firms to sustain different prices for their product in different national 
markets has been regarded as evidence of the presence of restrictions on consumer arbitrage, 
and any practice supporting such an outcome (for example contract clauses restricting parallel 
trade) condemned as illegal. Competition policy has been regularly used to this effect, 
systematically pursuing the elimination of all practices sustaining geographic discrimination. 
The purpose of this chapter is to emphasize that, like all forms of price discrimination, 
geographic price discrimination need not necessarily be welfare-reducing; therefore firm 
practices which lead to geographic price discrimination should not be automatically attacked 
as anti-competitive. We will thus bring into focus a possible tension between integration 
policies which are concerned with removing discrimination per se, and competition policy 
which should pursue efficient economic outcomes and as such should in some cases allow 
price discrimination. Prohibiting price discrimination across the board is unlikely to be 
optimal policy, and rather the economic analysis suggests the appropriateness of a contingent 
response under which the prohibition of price discrimination is made conditional on various 
tests, for example on market structure. 
We begin in Section 7.2 with a brief discussion of the notion of geographic price 
discrimination and its relationship with practices that prevent cross-border arbitrage. The main 
focus is on one type of practice: the use of contractual clauses which restrict parallel trade and 
so prevent arbitrage. Section 7.3 offers an economic discussion of the welfare effects of price 
discrimination, emphasizing that these are ambiguous. This weakens the rationale for 
unconditional opposition to geographic price discrimination, and suggests that the competition 
treatment of practices facilitating price discrimination - such as restrictions on parallel trade -
should be based on a careful economic analysis of the costs and benefits of 'constraining' 
firms to charge a single price across geographical markets. We then consider in Section 7.4 the 
current position of competition law vis-à-vis practices which support geographic price 
discrimination. Parallel trade restrictions have been systematically attacked by the European 
competition authorities under the terms of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, which prohibits 
all agreements between firms which 'may affect trade between Member States and which have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market'. In this section we seek to evaluate, on the basis of the scant information 
available, the evidence on cases where the Commission has intervened to eliminate restrictions 
in parallel trade. We also discuss the case of cars, where price differentials still persist, and 
discuss the evidence on the role of distribution arrangements between car manufacturers and 
dealers in supporting cross-country differentials. Finally, we consider that clauses in 
distribution agreements restricting parallel trade are not the only way of restricting consumer 
94 Competition issues 
arbitrage and so facilitating geographic price discrimination across countries. Firms may be 
able to segment the market geographically through other practices, such as quantity 
discounting, rebates and tying. These are considered briefly, and will be discussed further in 
the next chapter insofar as they may act as entry barriers. 
We proceed in Section 7.5 with an evaluation of the relation between market integration and 
price discrimination, and of the current approach of the EU competition authorities to 
practices which may lead to price discrimination. 
7.2. Geographic price discrimination 
Price discrimination occurs when consumers are charged dissimilar prices, though the costs of 
supplying them are similar.67 There are two important differences in consumer characteristics, 
which may lead to them being charged different prices on a geographic basis. 
(a) Differences in price elasticities of demand. Typically, an unconstrained monopolist will 
set different prices in different markets if it faces differing demand elasticities; the 
market with less elastic demand will be charged higher prices. In the European context, 
differing price elasticities may be either due to differences in underlying preferences 
across countries, or due to different income levels. 
(b) Differences in location, implying a difference in the density of competitors being faced 
by the consumer (given transport costs). Even when consumers are in other respects 
identical, they may face different prices as a result of being located in different places. 
As a result of transportation costs, consumers located in different places may face 
differing degrees of competition between suppliers. For example, consumers located in 
an intermediate position between two producers may be able to purchase from either 
depending on price, whereas consumers located close to just one producer may be facing 
an effective monopoly as supply from distant producers may be prohibitively expensive. 
7.2.1. Restrictions to arbitrage and price discrimination 
In all circumstances, geographic price discrimination is constrained by consumers' 
opportunities to arbitrage across countries. In the extreme case of a perfectly homogeneous 
good which consumers could import costlessly from any country, price discrimination across 
countries would not be possible. Arbitrage may be limited (and thus price discrimination 
sustained) for three main reasons: 
(a) due to the inherent nature of the good - for example because transport costs are high 
relative to its value; 
(b) due to cross-border transaction costs (such as have been the target of the single market 
programme) being high relative to the value of the good; 
(c) because of contractual arrangements between suppliers and sellers, for example 
restricting the extent to which a distributor in any one country can effectively start to 
supply customers in other countries where prices are higher. 
In first degree (or perfect) price discrimination, the seller charges a different price for each unit of the good, equal to the 
maximum willingness to pay for that unit. Second degree price discrimination is non-linear pricing, where prices differ 
according to the number of units bought. Tying and bundling fall into this category. Under third degree discrimination, 
different buyers are charged different prices (but the price for each unit bought is constant for each purchaser). 
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The single market measures should make an impact on price discrimination across countries to 
the extent that such measures are likely to reduce the effective costs of cross-border trading (in 
the sense discussed in Chapter 4). In principle they should facilitate arbitrage, and thus make it 
harder to sustain third-degree price discrimination which is based on differences in preferences 
and income. 
Measures such as territorial exclusivity agreements between manufacturers and distributors 
prevent consumer arbitrage and so facilitate price discrimination. We will approach the 
analysis of such contractual limits to arbitrage in the following way. First we will look at those 
aspects of agreements pertaining to price discrimination. Second, we will consider additional 
effects of such agreements above and beyond the facilitation of price discrimination. 
Vertical agreements may help to sustain geographic price discrimination across markets, even 
after trade barriers have been fully eliminated, if they are effective in preventing arbitrage on a 
significant scale. This happens where vertical arrangements such as the adoption of an 
exclusive distributor in each country may be combined with export ban clauses preventing the 
distributor from selling for export; or with intellectual property restrictions (e.g. the 
assignment of the trademark by the supplier to the distributor, in order to prevent imports). 
In particular, if arbitrage is subject to economies of scale, the imposition of resale restrictions 
on intermediaries may be effective in curbing parallel imports. For example, though it is 
possible for an individual consumer to import a car for personal use and thus benefit from 
price differences, the bureaucratic costs of doing so might mean that parallel importing will 
not be undertaken on a large scale. In other words, if producers can prevent intermediaries 
from undertaking cross-country arbitrage on a large scale, then they may effectively prevent 
arbitrage altogether, since small-scale arbitrage may be inherently uneconomic. Section 7.4 
discusses how EU competition policy currently deals with this tension. 
However, in addition it is well known that the imposition of such restraints on distributors can 
in some cases have efficiency justifications. For certain types of goods (for example, cars or 
hi-fi equipment), the provision of information and pre/after-sale services by retailers is 
particularly important, and there is a concern that unrestricted price competition between 
retailers may lead to suboptimal provision of these services. Thus granting retailers some sort 
of territorial exclusivity may ensure that they have better incentives to provide such services. 
One might think of this as a diminution of price competition between retailers, leading to 
tougher non-price competition. The imposition of vertical restraints, such as contracts granting 
exclusive dealing territories to retailers, may thus enhance the overall efficiency of the 
distribution system for some goods. 
7.2.2. Other practices supporting geographic price discrimination 
Although we will focus primarily on contractual means of limiting consumer arbitrage, a firm 
with market power may in principle achieve geographic price discrimination through a number 
of other practices. For example, quantity discounting by firms may increase the costs of 
consumers meeting their demands from multiple suppliers and so increase the costs of cross-
There is a large literature on the efficiency rationale for vertical restraints. See, among others, Mathewson and Winter 
[1984, 1987], Waterson [1987], Rey and Stiglitz [1988], and, for a summary, Katz [1989]. 
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border arbitrage (at least at the margin). We consider how firms can erect barriers to foreign 
suppliers entering their domestic market in much more detail in Chapter 8. 
7.3. The welfare effects of price discrimination 
In this section we examine in some detail the welfare effects of price discrimination. We aim 
to form a view on whether prohibiting geographic price discrimination, that is constraining 
firms to charge the same price in all countries, is generally economically justifiable. The 
conclusion is ambiguous, in that there are some cases in which prohibiting price 
discrimination is welfare-improving, but others in which allowing price discrimination is 
beneficial. Competition policy towards price discrimination may need to become more attuned 
to these cases insofar as it is possible to discriminate between these cases. Although our 
conclusion will be complicated by this, it will become clear that a policy of per se prohibition 
of price discrimination (for example, as a direct measure to foster integration) is very unlikely 
to be desirable. 
Relative to the first-best scenario in which a policy maker could control all prices directly (and 
so mitigate the market power of suppliers), third-degree price discrimination is always (Pareto) 
inefficient, as consumers with similar costs of supply are facing dissimilar prices. The fact that 
consumers face different prices for the same good means that there are potential gains to trade 
between them which are not realized. (In particular, the consumer facing the lower prices 
could sell a unit of the good to the consumer facing a higher price, and charge some 
intermediate amount between the two prices. Such a trade benefits both and is thus welfare-
improving in the Pareto sense.) 
However, the first-best scenario is not the relevant comparison for the purposes of competition 
policy, given market imperfections and the presence of economies of scale which prevent 
perfect competition. The relevant comparison is then between the conduct of existing 
monopolists and oligopolists, where they are allowed to price discriminate, and where uniform 
prices are required. 
We now discuss the impact of price discrimination on total welfare according to this second-
best notion of efficiency and also considering distributive justice. We identify a number of 
effects. 
7.3.1. Misallocated consumption 
The first effect of price discrimination is that there is an allocative efficiency loss associated 
with the fact that consumers are charged dissimilar prices, though the costs of supplying them 
are similar. For a fixed quantity of a good sold to consumers, this loss means that there is 
always a welfare loss from selling at more than one price (this assuming that there are no 
transport costs of serving consumers).69 We will refer to this as the 'misallocated consumption 
effect' caused by price discrimination. If only this effect were at work, eliminating price 
discrimination would be desirable. 
However, as well as efficiency effects, the elimination of price discrimination always has 
distributive implications. Consider, for example, two markets with different price elasticities 
See Varian [1989]. 
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of demand. In this case, it is profit-maximizing for a price-discriminating monopolist to charge 
a higher price to the market with lower elasticity. If price discrimination across the two 
markets were prohibited, then the monopolist would have to charge a price which was 
intermediate between the previous prices charged to the two markets. Thus, in this second-best 
world, prohibiting price discrimination benefits some consumers and harms others. 
In the context of market integration, if we want to consider the effects of eliminating price 
discrimination over a wide range of goods, the crucial issue is the distribution of winners and 
losers. In many ways, this may be a difficult assessment to make, as it is unlikely that the 
prices of all goods will be systematically lower in particular countries, and this means that a 
particular country may be a 'winner' with respect to the elimination of price discrimination for 
some goods, but it might be a 'loser' for others. However, it is also plausible to assume that 
demand will be more price-elastic in low-income countries, and therefore that there should be 
a systematic pattern of price dispersion with lower prices on a wide set of goods in low-
income countries. 
If this is the case, it is possible that eliminating price discrimination may increase average 
welfare, but at the same time the ensuing losses may be borne disproportionately by low-
income countries. In these circumstances, eliminating price discrimination might be 
inequitable, and might even conflict with the policy objective of promoting greater cohesion 
across Member States. 
We may summarize the argument thus. For a given total quantity of output, selling it by price 
discriminating lowers average welfare relative to setting uniform prices. However, eliminating 
price discrimination in favour of uniform pricing always makes some groups of consumers 
worse off (this is quite apart from any output effect), in that they will be facing higher prices 
than before. Because of systematic patterns in price dispersion, it is likely that a 
disproportionate burden of losses would be imposed on low-income economies, and this is 
obviously not desirable for equity considerations. Thus the absolute change in average welfare 
might not be an appropriate criterion to assess the impact of eliminating price discrimination. 
For example, a more appropriate welfare indicator by which to assess European policy 
intervention might be that of an EU-wide Pareto improvement (i.e. a change where some 
country is better off, but none is actually worse off). 
Thus far we have only considered the case of a fixed stock of output being sold. In general, 
allowing or prohibiting price discrimination may affect the quantity of output produced. This 
gives rise to additional effects which should be taken into account in a full cost-benefit 
analysis of price discrimination. Some are discussed with reference to the case of a price-
discriminating monopolist (which is the most studied in the literature, and the one which is 
best understood). We also consider the effects of price-discriminating oligopolists. 
Of course, in a first-best world, price discrimination could be removed in a way which is Pareto-improving, since (as we 
have seen) gains to trade resulting from consumers facing different prices could be realized in a way which makes all 
better off. In particular, this would require transferring some of the gains from consumers now facing lower prices to 
those now facing higher prices, but this could be done in such a way that makes everybody better off. 
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7.3.2. The output-expansion effect 
We have seen that price discrimination is a source of allocative inefficiency due to the 
'misallocated consumption effect', since consumers with similar (marginal) cost of supply are 
facing dissimilar prices. Prohibiting price discrimination removes this allocative inefficiency. 
However, there is also a basic result that, with fairly general assumptions, price discrimination 
increases static welfare (the sum of consumers' and producers' surpluses) if total output 
increases sufficiently to outweigh the 'misallocated consumption effect'. If allowed to price 
discriminate, a firm's total output may in some circumstances be higher than if not allowed to 
price discriminate; moreover this increase in output may be sufficiently large to outweigh the 
misallocated consumption effect and to increase consumer welfare. However, general 
conclusions on the sign of the welfare change are not possible (see Varían [1985], 
Schmalensee [1981], and Scherer and Ross [1990]). 
Thus a full cost-benefit analysis of the elimination of price discrimination must consider 
whether there are any output-enhancing effects which can overturn this loss of allocative 
efficiency. 
7.3.3. The market-opening effect 
The most dramatic example of the output-expansion effect occurs where allowing price 
discrimination leads to a firm serving more market. It might be optimal (i.e. profit-
maximizing) for a uniform-pricing firm to set a price which excludes a segment of demand. In 
this case, price discrimination might lead to new market opening, which implies a Pareto 
welfare improvement (see again Schmalensee [1981]). 
In summary, when new markets can be served, the probability of a welfare increase is greater. 
In addition, most of the literature concerning this issue has considered the case of constant 
returns to scale. Where marginal costs are falling, this market-opening effect could lead to 
lower prices for all consumers due to the lower costs resulting from the increase in output if 
price discrimination is allowed (see Hausman and MacKie-Mason [1988]). 
It is interesting to note that a consequence of the market-opening effect is that even if market 
integration is adopted as a direct objective in itself, regardless of its effects on economic 
welfare, then it is not clear that price discrimination should be prevented in order to obtain 
similar outcomes in different countries. Similarity of prices across countries - strictly in the 
sense of Chapter 3 - is just one aspect of market integration. More fundamentally, we might 
ask that firms serve all geographical markets. However, firms may choose not to serve 
particular markets if they cannot price discriminate. Thus it is possible that preventing price 
discrimination could actually lead to a less integrated outcome, namely that only some 
geographical markets are served. 
7.3.4. The potential pro-competitive effect in oligopolies 
Although most of the theory of price discrimination concerns firms with monopoly power, and 
Article 86 proscribes price discrimination by a dominant firm, it is possible for firms in an 
oligopoly to price discriminate; all that is required is that firms have some degree of market 
power. For example, Neven and Phlips [1985] show that price discrimination might also be 
chosen by competing duopolists, when demand has different price elasticities in the different 
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sub-markets in which they operate. In this case, discrimination is shown to emerge as the non-
cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium (provided that arbitrage is not operative for some 
reason). 
An interesting argument in favour of price discrimination in an oligopolistic context is that it 
might have potentially beneficial pro-competitive effects. We must emphasize that while 
market segmentation and price discrimination have already been identified as possible 
outcomes of collusion, the occurrence of price discrimination can also be associated with more 
competitive situations. 
This is particularly the case, as we shall see, in the context of spatial price discrimination 
models. Discrimination based on differing elasticities and income levels tends to reflect 
market power; with more firms in competition with each other, the price differentials between 
markets should gradually decline (even without arbitrage) as prices become more reflective of 
underlying common costs. However, price discrimination can also arise as a result of vigorous 
competition for particular sub-markets. 
The basic intuition for the possible pro-competitive effect of price discrimination is that if 
firms can set individual prices for each geographical sub-market, then they have a richer set of 
instruments with which to compete with their rivals than if all firms are constrained to charge 
a single price in all markets. As a result, competition may be tougher if price discrimination is 
allowed. 
In other words, where firms are competing on price, they might face stronger incentives to 
undercut their rivals' prices where price discrimination is allowed. To see this, suppose first 
that price discrimination is prohibited. If a firm lowers its price, then it loses revenue on infra-
marginal consumers in all geographical markets. However, if price discrimination is allowed, 
then a firm which cuts its price in one geographical market will lose revenue just in that 
market. Roughly speaking, price discrimination leads to more consumers being 'marginal'. An 
extreme, but very clear example of this phenomenon would be where firms could set 
individualized prices for every consumer, i.e. where there was maximal price discrimination. 
In this extreme case, every consumer becomes marginal and is competed for by firms. 
The 'pro-competitive' effects of price discrimination are clearly demonstrated in the economic 
literature on spatial pricing policies. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [1989] consider the 
pricing policy adopted by duopolists who are located at different geographic points, and incur 
transport costs jn serving consumers. So-called 'mill pricing' involves the following scheme: 
each duopolist sets a price; consumers decide which producer to purchase from and pay the 
quoted 'mill price' plus the transport cost. Anderson et al. show that profits are lower and 
consumer surplus higher under a spatially discriminatory pricing regime in which rather than 
quoting a single mill price, the producers specify entire price schedules giving the price paid 
by a consumer at a particular location. The reason is that under mill pricing, the duopolists are 
competing only over the marginal consumers who are indifferent as to which firm they 
As mentioned, we consider this effect in terms of models of spatial pricing policies. These models have a sufficiently 
rich structure to capture this idea that price discrimination results in 'more consumers being marginal'. It is worth 
noting that in both the homogeneous good Cournot model and the differentiated good Bertrand model dividing up a 
market into a number of sub-markets and allowing different prices for each sub-market does not change the outcome 
(prices and total quantities) of the Nash equilibrium. 
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purchase from. In contrast, spatially discriminatory pricing allows firms to compete for each 
individual consumer. Thus this formal result captures our earlier intuition that price 
discrimination might give rise to tougher competition. 
A similar point is made by Thisse and Vives [1988]. They present similar results in which 
spatial price discrimination leads to firms earning lower profits than under mill pricing. They 
show that the choice of spatial discriminatory pricing regimes has similarities to a prisoners' 
dilemma game, in that given the pricing policy of the other firm, each firm prefers to use a 
spatially discriminatory pricing policy. However, profits would be higher for both firms if they 
could commit to mill pricing and forego the opportunity to price discriminate spatially. Further 
theoretical examples of the pro-competitive effects of price discrimination can be found in 
Anderson and Thisse [1988] and in Matutes and Regibeau [1989]. 
Phlips [1983] finds some empirical justification for this view that price discrimination could 
have pro-competitive effects. He cites the example of French cement producers who 
successfully lobbied for legislation enforcing mill pricing. This accords with Thisse and 
Vives' view of spatial price discrimination as a coordination problem: firms would like to 
escape the tougher competition resulting from price discrimination, but have a private 
incentive to adopt it. The imposition of a legal requirement not to price discriminate spatially 
removes this private incentive to price discriminate, but leads to higher profits for firms and 
lower consumer surplus. 
Nevertheless, we should not assume that the argument that 'allowing price discrimination 
yields pro-competitive effects' is a universal one. For example, in the standard Cournot model 
of oligopoly, there is no such pro-competitive effect and output may not increase. We have 
already seen from our analysis of the price-discriminating monopoly that price discrimination 
is only welfare-improving when output is increased sufficiently to outweigh the distributive 
loss effect identified above. 
In summary, in an oligopoly there is a potential additional output-enhancing effect above and 
beyond the market-opening effect identified in the previous subsection. Although there are 
some cases in which this pro-competitive effect is absent (e.g. Cournot competition), it is 
never overturned. 
7.3.5. The effect on entry 
Allowing price discrimination may have effects on the entry of new firms. First, allowing 
firms to price discriminate may allow them to take predatory actions against potential entrants 
who are threatening at least some of the geographical sub-markets in which the incumbent is 
present. Typically, prices would be lowered on those markets facing potential entry. This 
argument suggests that allowing price discrimination provides firms with an additional way to 
deter entry. Indeed, predatory pricing is an extreme form of price discrimination and may be 
The simplest example is given by taking a Cournot model and dividing the market into two sub-markets, to which firms 
supply specific quantities and in consequence prices may be different. Division of the market into two sub-markets does 
not affect the outcome of the Cournot-Nash game. The total quantity supplied to the entire market remains the same. 
Also, Neven and Phlips [1985] consider the case of price-discriminating Cournot duopoly and show that allowing price 
discrimination produces a welfare loss. The reason here is that there is no output expansion effect, and price 
discrimination only leads to an allocative efficiency loss. 
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used by dominant firms to induce exit ofrivals. The classic case is AKZO (1986). However, 
the analysis of prédation and entry deterrence is deferred to the next chapter. 
For completeness, it is worth mentioning that price discrimination may also have some 
positive effects on entry. This is the case if allowing price discrimination means that firms 
may enter new markets, which they would not enter if they could not price discriminate. We 
can identify the following effects. 
Entry encouraged by increased profitability under price discrimination 
Consider an oligopoly in which there is potential entry by new firms. In such a situation, if 
price discrimination is allowed, firms might make higher profits (taking the number of firms 
as fixed). Therefore, if price discrimination results in higher profits for a given number of 
firms, it may encourage entry by new firms; this ultimately gives rise to more competitive 
outcomes, and it makes it more likely that the total quantity sold will be higher under price 
discrimination (output-expansion effect).73 
Effects of price discrimination on entry deterring strategies 
Matutes and Regibeau [1989] show how if a firm can commit to charge a single price in all 
sub-markets, then this can lead to effective entry deterrence from at least some sub-markets. 
This is because the incumbent's commitment not to price discriminate means that the entrant 
faces tougher competition the more sub-markets that are entered. By doing this, the incumbent 
induces the entrant to enter a smaller number of sub-markets than would be the case if the 
incumbent price discriminated. Thus, in this situation, it is conceivable that a prohibition of 
price discrimination may discourage entry. 
However the empirical significance of these theoretical possibilities is not yet clear. 
7.3.6. The effect on the sustainability of collusion 
Finally, whether firms set a single EU-wide price, or else set country-specific prices, may 
affect firms' abilities to sustain collusion. In particular, it would seem likely that setting a 
single EU-wide price would facilitate collusion by making monitoring of compliance with the 
collusive agreement easier. If prices are country-specific, as when the price schedule is a 
complex one, then there are certainly many more prices which need to be observed when 
determining whether firms have deviated from a collusive outcome. This might make 
monitoring more difficult, and undermine collusion (see Chapter 9). 
7.3.7. Summary 
In summary, we have identified in this section a number of effects of geographic price 
discrimination on economic welfare: 
(a) an allocative efficiency loss due to consumers with similar costs of supply facing 
dissimilar prices; 
See Borenstein [1985]. 
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(b) an output-expansion effect in which allowing price discrimination can in some cases 
increase total output and overturn the loss identified in (a); 
(c) a market-opening effect (which can be reinforced by economies of scale) in that more 
markets are served if price discrimination is allowed that if it is prohibited; 
(d) pro-competitive effect of price discrimination due to competition for marginal 
consumers; 
(e) effects on entry, which are generally difficult to forecast; 
(f) a reduction in the sustainability of collusion by rendering monitoring more difficult. 
Of these, effect (a) is negative (though it might not be very important due to the equity and 
cohesion considerations discussed in 7.3.1). Effect (e) is difficult to assess, while the other 
effects are positive. The total welfare effect is thus difficult to sign. 
In addition to these issues of economic efficiency, we have also noted that the prohibition of 
price discrimination has implications for distributive justice since prohibiting price 
discrimination causes prices to rise in some sub-markets and fall in others. If prohibition of 
price discrimination leads to price increases across a range of goods being concentrated in 
particular countries (for example, comparatively low-income ones), then there will be an 
adverse effect on distributive justice. 
However, we may offer the following preliminary considerations. 
Price discrimination is likely to be symptomatic of market power. Thus if a firm price 
discriminates, there may be a prima facie case that the firm has some market power. It may be 
more appropriate for the competition authorities to address the issue of market power directly 
rather than prohibiting price discrimination which is itself a symptom of market power. 
In many cases competition authorities are limited in what they can do about market power due 
to absolute entry barriers or economies of scale. In such circumstances the question is that of 
whether prohibiting or allowing price discrimination is more desirable. If the market is 
relatively competitive and price differentials are relatively small, then we can assume that the 
welfare loss from the 'misallocated consumption effect' is relatively small (in fact of second 
order in the size of the price differentials), and in any case may be outweighed by other 
positive effects. Thus in this case it seems reasonable to allow price discrimination since there 
is no demonstrable case that price discrimination is leading to significant welfare losses. 
Hence we conclude that a necessary condition for the prohibition of price discrimination 
should be significant market power of the price-discriminating firm. 
This leaves us with the case of a price-discriminating firm with market power to consider. 
Should price discrimination be allowed or prohibited in this case? There is no easy general 
rule due to the existence of the countervailing effects listed above. Again we may argue that if 
price differentials across countries are small, then welfare losses are likely to be very small 
and so are unlikely to be sufficiently large to justify the costs of intervention. But what if firms 
have significant market power and price differentials are large? In such a case it is quite 
possible that price discrimination is producing significant welfare losses and so prohibition is 
justified. However, we would ideally like to allow some scope for the price-discriminating 
firm to argue that setting different prices is justified as it allows new markets to be served. 
Although we would like to allow a firm with market power to price discriminate under such 
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circumstances, this may be difficult to capture in a policy rule, and we should maybe have a 
general presumption of prohibition in such cases. 
7.4. Competition treatment of restrictions to arbitrage 
Given its commitment to integration, which is often taken to mean price convergence across 
the different parts of the EU, the Commission generally takes a very severe view of geographic 
price discrimination. This is prohibited both under Art. 85(1), when it derives from 
agreements between, firms (e.g. vertical restraints), and under Art. 86, when it results from a 
firm's dominant position. Article 86 does not allow exemptions, whereas Art 85(1) does. 
In this section we consider first the case of restrictions to parallel trade. The Commission takes 
a very severe view of firms which try to prevent cross-country arbitrage through clauses 
restricting arbitrage. Recognizing on the one hand the existence of efficiency justifications for 
territorial exclusivity in distribution, and seeking on the other hand to promote the elimination 
of price differentials, the Commission is treading a difficult path: 
'Community competition policy has always recognized as a vital part of many 
distribution or licensing systems the allocation of exclusive territories to distributors or 
licensees, and generally accepts not only exclusivity clauses in such agreements, but 
also obligations on the distributor or licensee not to advertise or otherwise to actively 
solicit customers outside its allotted territory. However, the Commission and the 
European Courts have consistently maintained that agreements restricting parallel 
trade are illegal and will attract high fines. Such agreements, which have the effect of 
resealing borders that have been opened by the single market programme, prevent 
citizens living in countries where prices are high from benefiting from low price 
imports' (XXIVth Report on Competition Policy 1994, p. 11). 
Thus the Commission's position is that while it allows restrictions in distribution for 
efficiency reasons ('it favours the establishment of efficient distribution systems'), this should 
not translate into geographic price discrimination: 'these systems should be operated in such a 
way as to ensure that parallel imports remain possible' (XVIth Report on Competition Policy 
1986, p. 63). And 
'... barriers to exports resulting from agreements or concerted practices between 
companies have consistently been considered, in the case law of the Commission and 
the EC J, a serious infringement of Art. 85(1), as they challenge the free movement of 
goods and consequently the objective of economic integration pursued by the Treaty' 
(XXIInd Report on Competition Policy 1992, p. 112). 
Thus for the efficiency considerations outlined above (to do with issues of efficient 
distribution), the Commission generally holds a fairly benign view of contracts such as 
bilateral exclusive distribution agreements conferring some territorial protection. This is 
demonstrated by the Block Exemption Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83, which establishes a set 
of general rules under which exclusive distribution agreements for goods do not infringe Art. 
85(1); and the concession of individual exemptions from Art. 85(1) for services (or where the 
agreement is in some respects more restrictive than the Regulation permits). Analogously, in 
the case of selective distribution agreements EU competition law recognizes the importance of 
brand image and level of service (i.e. non-price competition) in a manufacturer's choice of 
downstream outlets. In a number of cases, the efficiency rationale for exclusivity ('provided 
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that resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature relating to 
technical qualifications (...) and the suitability of the trading premises...' Metro case) is 
deemed sufficiently high for the agreements not to infringe Art. 85(1).74 
At the same time, absolute territorial protection on a distributor (as conferred by export bans 
on distributors) is not deemed permissible, if it has the effect of isolating national markets 
from one another: an exclusive distributor can only be required not to solicit orders from 
outside its territory, but cannot be forbidden to sell outside its territory. In other words, an 
obligation on a supplier to protect a distributor from indirect competition from parallel imports 
is not permitted under EU law.75 
The Commission (and the courts) have dealt harshly with a very large number of cases in this 
area. Any export ban contained in these agreements (directly or indirectly - such as refusal of 
customer guarantees if the good was not purchased from the appointed distributor in the 
Member State, or withdrawal of discounts to dealers exporting to other Member States) is held 
to infringe Art. 85(1). 
Cases include: 
(a) the action against Sperry New Holland (1985) for the 'illegal barriers to intra-
Community trade' contained in the distribution system for its combine harvester; 
(b) Tipp-Ex (1987), where the Commission ended the agreements between the German firm 
Tipp-Ex and its exclusive distributors in four countries because these were 'aimed at 
preventing parallel imports or exports of correction products', and 'these market 
partitioning practices were a serious infringement of Art. 85(1)' (XVIIth Report on 
Competition Policy 1987); 
(c) Sandoz Italia (1987), which was fined for displaying the words 'export prohibited' over 
a number of years on its sales invoices for pharmaceutical products, a clause whose 
'purpose is to insulate the national market, thus affecting trade between Member States 
and preventing the completion of a single market' {XVIIth Report on Competition Policy 
1987); 
(d) Fisher Price (1987), where parallel imports of Fisher Price toys from the UK into Ireland 
had been prevented; 
(e) Konica (1987), where parallel imports of film from the UK into the higher-priced 
German market were prevented; 
Industries which have benefited from this position include cameras, electronic equipment, consumer durables, clocks 
and watches, computers, perfumes and luxury cosmetic products and jewellery. 
Art. 3 of Regulation (EEC) 1983/83 specifically deals with circumstances in which the benefit of the block exemption 
will be lost. These are: 
(a) when there are horizontal reciprocal distribution agreements, which in practice amount to market sharing (e.g. 
Siemens/Fanuc, 1985); or non-reciprocal unless one of the distribution systems is small enough; 
(b) when there is no alternative source of supply from outside the territory (i.e. there must always be the possibility of 
parallel importing); 
(c) when one or both parties make it difficult for intermediaries or users to obtain the goods from other dealers inside 
(or outside) the common market, in particular through (i) the exercise of intellectual property rights (e.g. the 
supplier assigns its trademark to the distributor so that it can prevent imports); and (ii) other measures to prevent 
dealers or users from obtaining the goods from outside the territory, or from selling in it. Again this is concerned 
with parallel imports. 
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(f) AKZO Coatings (1989), where the Commission obtained undertakings from AKZO in 
relation to the finding that the prices of car refinish products were persistently higher in 
the UK than in other Member States; 
(g) Toshiba (1991), where Toshiba was fined for having included an export ban in its 
exclusive distribution agreements for its photocopiers; 
(h) Gosme/Martell (1991), where Martell was fined for having prevented parallel exports of 
Martell cognac to Italy; 
(i) Newitt/Dunlop Slazenger International (1992), which had used various means to block 
exports of tennis balls by its British traders to countries where it had sole distributors; 
(j) Parker Pens (1992): Parker Pen and its distributor in Germany were fined for having 
included an export ban in an agreement concluded between them: 'The Commission 
took the view that the infringement was such as to obstruct the achievement of a 
fundamental objective of the Treaty, namely the integration of the common market' 
(XXII Report on Competition Policy 1992); 
(k) Tretorn (1994), where a tennis ball producer prohibited its exclusive distributors from 
selling for exports. 
These are discussed below. 
7.4.1. Discussion of available evidence 
The Commission's record on price discrimination clearly demonstrates its systematic 
opposition to practices preventing arbitrage. While it is accepted that a manufacturer can 
provide dealers with exclusive territories, these cannot be absolute. In practice, this means that 
distribution contracts can only specify that appointed dealers will not actively seek customers 
outside their allocated area, but cannot refuse to supply them outside that area when 
approached. This applies also where territorial agreements are protected by a special block 
exemption, as in the case of cars (as shown by the two cases involving restrictions placed by 
car manufacturer Peugeot on dealers' ability to engage in parallel trade - see Peugeot-Talbot 
(1986), and Eco System/Peugeot (1991)). 
The Commission's stance appears quite independent of whether the manufacturer holds a 
dominant position (reflected in its market share), and the degree of sophistication of the 
products (in terms of the product characteristics: Peugeot cars, Ford trucks, and cameras 
received essentially the same treatment as tennis balls, toys or Tipp-Ex correction fluid). 
No contingency on market structure 
Our earlier analysis suggested that it would be desirable to adopt some dominance criterion in 
the treatment of price discrimination and to make the holding of a dominant (or jointly 
dominant) position a necessary condition for prohibition of price discrimination. That holding 
a dominant position is not a crucial factor in the Commission's assessment is clear for 
example from the two recent cases concerning tennis balls manufacturers - Dunlop Slazenger 
International (1992), and Tretorn (1994). 
While the British manufacturer Dunlop may have market power with a share of 39% of the EU 
market, the Swedish firm Tretorn was only the fourth largest firm with 11% of the Community 
market (1986 estimates). The Dunlop investigation was initiated by a complaint on the part of 
British sports goods wholesaler/retailer Newitt (and others) that Dunlop had prevented exports 
of tennis and squash balls in order to protect its exclusive distribution system. Dunlop had a 
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system of exclusive distributors on the Continent, while in the UK it sold directly to retailers 
and to some wholesalers. It also had two price lists, one for the UK market and a (generally) 
lower one for the export market. Its exclusive distributors were charged the export price minus 
a discount which officially was 20%, but generally was much larger and reached 50%. Dunlop 
was found to have used a variety of practices to erect barriers to trade within the Community 
(in collaboration with its distributors): these included export bans, specific refusals to fill 
orders, pricing measures against UK wholesalers to prevent them from exporting at 
competitive prices, marking products, and buying back parallel imports. Newitt in particular 
saw its supplies halted, and faced price increases up to 54% for some types of balls. In 1994 a 
similar investigation was launched against Tretorn, and documentary evidence was uncovered 
that it had been actively erecting barriers against parallel imports within the Community -
through practices very similar to those used by Dunlop (including export ban clauses in 
contracts and measures to enforce them). Tretorn even stopped supplying the US market 
because it was unable to prevent tennis balls shipped to the US from reappearing as imports in 
the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
The Commission concluded that the distribution contracts between both tennis ball 
manufacturers and their dealers were aimed at absolute territorial protection and exclusion of 
parallel trade. Both Dunlop and Tretorn were fined, though the fine imposed on Dunlop was 
significantly larger, reflecting its larger sales. Dealers who collaborated in the prevention of 
trade were also fined. 
Limited and contradictory consideration of efficiency in distribution 
The distinction between absolute protection and partial protection deserves particular 
attention. There is an inherent contradiction in the notion of 'partial protection' as pursued by 
the Commission. The reason why an exclusive distribution system may be 'optimal' is that, 
because of the characteristics of the product, it is efficient that the retailer has monopoly 
power over a territory for the specific brand. Allowing arbitrage simply eliminates this 
monopoly power. It is therefore not a consistent position for the Commission to allow 
exclusive dealing contracts on the one hand, while at the same time condemning 
manufacturers' practices to enforce such exclusivity. Hence, at least when block exemptions 
apply, efficiency considerations should be taken into account openly in considering restrictions 
to parallel trade. In the case of non-sophisticated products, with little need to support pre- and 
after-sales services, it is not clear that there is an efficiency rationale for allowing exclusivity, 
and for the same reasons there is no efficiency rationale for territorial protection. It is thus 
appropriate that in the case of Tretorn, the Commission makes it explicit that its distribution 
system would not have qualified for an individual exemption even if Tretorn had applied for 
one, because the agreements were not indispensable to the efficiency of Tretorn's distribution 
system. However the case appears to be different for example for car manufacturers. 
The 1991 Peugeot-Eco System case was initiated by a complaint lodged by Eco System 
against Peugeot, after Peugeot sent a circular to all its dealers in Belgium, Luxembourg and 
France requesting that they suspend supplies to Eco System on the grounds that it was acting 
as a reseller. Eco System is a specialist intermediary for import purchases of cars by French 
final consumers, whose services included looking for favourable purchasing terms, and 
concluding purchases for its customers. Because it was merely collecting orders from final 
consumers, and never acquired ownership of the imported cars, the Commission decided that 
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Eco System never acted as a reseller (it did not incur the usual risk that a reseller incurs -
storage risk, credit risk, financial risk). 
Most importantly, the Commission made explicit that the existence of a block exemption 
cannot result in a prevention of parallel trade: 'It is apparent that an agreement designed to 
prevent parallel imports between Member States does not satisfy the criteria for applying 
article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty' (OJ L 66, 11.3.1992, p. 7). It is also made explicit that block 
exemptions cannot completely eliminate intra-brand competition. Thus, the Commission 
accepts that efficiency considerations may recommend a distribution system organized around 
exclusivity. The distribution system itself is not challenged. However, when it results in price 
differences such that it encourages arbitrageurs to undertake parallel imports, and 
manufacturers and appointed dealers to try to prevent these imports, this is taken as evidence 
that the purpose of exclusivity is to price discriminate, and this is considered unlawful. 
Occasionally there is some evidence that consideration is implicitly given to issues of 
efficiency of the distribution network: for example in the Martell case (1991, where cognac 
producer Martell withdrew the usual discounts to French wholesaler Gosme because it had 
resold cognac to Italy, where prices were higher), the Commission stated explicitly that there 
was no significant issue of efficiency in distribution to justify exclusivity. And in cars, where 
an exemption exists, the efficiency considerations which justified the exemption appear to be 
have been taken indirectly into account in deciding the size of fines (for restricting parallel 
trade). For instance, no fine was imposed on Peugeot in 1991, as the Commission considered 
this case a clarification of the block exemptions.76 Yet in other cases, the decisions of the 
Commission do not appear consistent with considerations of efficient distribution. For 
instance, a significant fine was imposed on Toshiba (1991) for protecting the exclusive 
territories of its appointed distributors, even though the product sold (photocopiers, lap-tops, 
printers, and fax machines) was sophisticated (like cars). 
All this strongly suggests that efficiency considerations should be taken into account explicitly 
and openly, especially when block exemptions apply, to make the process more transparent. 
The current approach to the competition treatment of arbitrage restrictions very much confirms 
that, for all practical purposes, the Commission regards competition policy as another tool to 
achieve market integration. In this sense, its application is intended to have the same effects as 
tax harmonization, or agreements on common standards: making it hard for producers to 
segment the market along national boundaries. This area is a prime example where 
competition policy has been pushed beyond its usual goals, and has aimed at integration itself 
(which is understood as a sort of 'law of one price').77 
Similarly in the earlier Peugeot case [1986] the fine was extremely low (ECU 4,000), not intended to punish these 
actions but the incorrect and/or negligent information deliberately furnished by Peugeot to the Commission. (The case 
concerned obstacles put by Peugeot to purchases of right-hand-drive vehicles on the Continent, with the aim of 
protecting is exclusive distributors in the UK.) 
The only caveat is that the size of fines has been historically so small that it can hardly be argued that they are a 
deterrent at all (indeed it is very likely that in many instances the profits from discrimination exceed the foreseeable 
fine). Furthermore, the length of the litigation process may discourage potential arbitrageurs who incur costs of 
advertising and promotion, only to find that wholesalers halt their supplies. 
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General welfare implications (apart from efficient distribution) 
We have argued in Section 7.3 that a per se prohibition of price discrimination is not 
economically justified, even when efficiency considerations regarding optimal network 
distribution are not present. Indeed, we have argued that the welfare implications of price 
discrimination are ambiguous, because the welfare loss which this creates may be more than 
outweighed by increases in total supply, possibly enhanced by competitive effects and new 
entry. 
To what extent is it possible to assess whether any of these positive effects of discrimination 
had been 'at work' in the cases actually investigated by the Commission? Some tentative 
deductions are as follows. 
(a) Firstly, it appears that in most cases the manufacturers tried to track the origins of grey 
imports, halted their supplies to arbitrageurs and/or requested all dealers to stop 
supplying these agents. This suggests that the 'competitive effect' was not present in 
these cases: discrimination did not force strong competition. 
(b) It would also appear that in preventing parallel trade manufacturers have kept total 
quantity down - though this statement should be interpreted with great caution. What it 
says is that at the prices set by the manufacturer in trying to discriminate, arbitrageurs 
find it profitable to sell more in the high-price countries than they have been allowed to; 
it does not say that the quantity sold when arbitrage is prevented is lower than the 
quantity that would have been sold had a single price prevailed. For this an investigation 
of the evolution of prices and quantities after the cases should be carried out. This 
certainly goes beyond the scope of this report, but the Commission should consider a 
study which revisits some of the past decisions and seeks to establish in a more 
structured way (using company data) the welfare implications of forcing arbitrage. 
A final issue is whether there are systematic losers. Price differentials may reflect different 
demand elasticities for the product across countries. Price elasticities for a product may differ 
for various reasons. For instance, if French consumers have a preference for French cars, 
Peugeot will be in a position to set higher prices in France than elsewhere (except in the 
presence of arbitrageurs). Similarly, Dunlop may be able to sell at higher prices in the UK be 
because of strong brand loyalty. Generally speaking, to the extent that consumers in one 
country are loyal to one brand, they can be induced to pay more for it (if arbitrage can be 
prevented). Another reason why consumers in a country may face higher prices is that 
competition might have been historically weak in that country for that type of product. This 
may be the reason why toy manufacturer Fisher Price (1987), with divisions in all Member 
States, sold toys at prices even 30% higher in Ireland than in the UK, before this practice was 
found illegal. A final reason why consumers in one country may pay higher prices is if they are 
(on average) wealthier: in this case firms may not need to compete intensely, and will set 
higher prices. This could be the explanation behind the Konica case (1987: the Japanese 
manufacturer of photographic goods sought to prevent parallel trade arising from higher prices 
being set for film in Germany than in the UK). 
It is very difficult, however, to identify from the available case material any systematic pattern 
of 'winners' and 'losers'. Nevertheless, we should be cautious about blanket prohibitions of 
price discrimination if only for the reason that some countries may then face systematically 
higher prices across a range of goods. 
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7.4.2. The case of cars 
The car industry remains a rather unusual case. The car dealership system which is common to 
the whole of the EU is characterized by exclusive and selective distribution agreements which 
enjoy a block exemption (Regulation (EC) No 1475/95). This is justified by the Commission 
on grounds that motor vehicles are a complex product, for which after-sales service is 
important and there are efficiency gains in combining car distribution with repair and 
provision of spare parts. Though the Commission has been involved in a few decisions against 
the most obvious restrictions to parallel trade,78 parallel imports on a large scale are effectively 
discouraged by car manufacturers; and this regime has been quite effective in retaining a 
partitioning of markets along national lines. Parallel imports of cars remain small. 
The case of cars is interesting because it is one where - in spite of the Commission's general 
opposition to geographic price discrimination - markets remain to a significant extent 
segmented along national borders, with sizeable price differentials being sustained.79 
While on the one hand the Commission is worried about price differentials (Regulation (EC) 
No 1475/95 has a general promise that the benefits of the block exemption would be 
withdrawn where prices in different Member States display 'substantial differences' for a 
considerable period; and indeed a biannual report on Car Price Differentials has been 
produced since 1992), on the other hand it has designed a block exemption which contributes 
to supporting the differentials. 
The practical implication is that while it is possible for individual citizens to purchase a car in 
a different Member State, it is likely that the transaction costs of doing so will deter many; it 
may be that dealers are prevented from selling to intermediaries for fear of the manufacturer's 
reaction although this is difficult to substantiate. This frustration of large-scale arbitrage, 
especially given the economies of scale involved in this activity, means it is unlikely that price 
differentials will be eliminated (up to a limit defined by transport costs). 
The interesting question is whether there are positive welfare effects which derive from 
allowing price discrimination. Davidson et al. [1989], after examining price discrimination in 
an oligopolistic setting, also seek to draw some conclusions on the car market in the European 
Community. They consider first the case of symmetric duopolistic competition in two 
countries, and show that reducing price discrimination through imposing constraints on cross-
country price differentials may reduce output for both countries, as well as social welfare. 
They further consider the distributive consequences of applying constraints on prices. This is 
done in a model of symmetric duopolistic competition in three countries, with one country 
having no home producer and lowest prices. In this case, the imposition of constraints on price 
See for example Peugeot-Talbot [1986], and Eco System/Peugeot (1991). 
Empirical studies have shown substantial differences across national markets both for prices of individual models and 
for average prices (the maximum difference has been found to be as much as nearly 50% of the average pre-tax price -
though these measures are generally controversial because it is difficult to account properly for example for model 
specifications). A comparison of country price indices also seems to suggest that differences tend to be stable over time 
and size class. See among others BEUC, 'EEC study on car prices and progress towards 1992', 1989; MMC, 'New 
motor cars, a report on the supply of new motor cars within the United Kingdom', 1992, Ch. 8; 'Year 2000 and beyond 
- the car marketing challenge in Europe', Euromotor Reports, 1991, pp. 183-4: Mertens and Ginsburgh [1985]; Guai 
[1993]. Flam and Nordstrom [1995], the most recent study, found average price differences of around 12%. 
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discrimination unambiguously increases prices and reduces welfare in the third country, while 
the effect on total welfare is indeterminate (though consumers are better off in the other two 
countries). This is taken as a possible explanation of why Belgium (little domestic production 
of cars, relatively cheap prices) might not be in favour of any regulation directed at reducing 
price discrimination across countries. 
In terms of the effects we have listed above, it may be argued that the 'market-opening' effect 
does not appear very important in the case of cars, because demand conditions in most EU 
markets are rather similar. This is debatable, but we suspect that even if geographic price 
discrimination were outlawed, then producers would still serve most markets. 
Thus in terms of welfare analysis the important question is whether the output-enhancing, pro-
competitive effects of price discrimination are present, and are sufficiently large to overturn 
any distributional losses. For this purpose, we would need to develop an empirically 
formulated hypothesis concerning the pro-competitive effect of price discrimination, i.e. the 
idea that where geographic price discrimination is allowed (with significant price differentials) 
competition is intense. For example, we could test to see whether smaller price differentials 
(proxying easier consumer arbitrage) are associated with higher industry profit, or with entry 
due to weaker product-market competition. 
However, testing such a hypothesis would require appropriate data, and in particular we would 
need to see sufficient variations in the ease of consumer arbitrage to be able to test this 
hypothesis with any power. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to find examples of 
industries in which such variation has occurred in consumer arbitrage possibilities, due to the 
single market programme or indeed for any other reason. 
In other words: according to our discussion it is possible that in the car industry prevention of 
arbitrage and price discrimination are actually welfare-enhancing. However, proving this 
would require evidence which is simply not available: because we have never seen any 
significant variation in arbitrage possibilities, we cannot compare industry profits across 
regimes of different arbitrage possibilities. 
7.4.3. Competition treatment of other practices supporting geographic price discrimination 
Price discrimination is also condemned as anti-competitive under European competition law 
for firms that have been found to occupy a dominant position. Art. 86(c) explicitly mentions 
price discrimination as an example of an abuse of a dominant position. The main reason is that 
it has a foreclosing effect on competition.80 Examples of price discrimination include loyalty 
rebates (Hoffman-La Roche, 1985), target discounts (Michelin, 1981), predatory price cutting 
(ECS/AKZO, 1986) top-slice rebates (soda ash cases involving Solvay and ICI, 1991). 
In most of these cases, price discrimination was exercised on a territorial basis. In the AKZO 
case the predatory practices were targeted at a UK based company that wanted to expand into 
more lucrative Continental markets.81 In the soda ash cases, Solvay and ICI were accused of 
maintaining market segmentation along national boundaries. 
80 See Whish [1993] for a discussion of the approach taken by the Commission and the ECJ on a number of cases. 
81 See Harbord and Hoehn [1994] and Phlips and Moras [1993] for a discussion of this case. 
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The best-known case of geographic price discrimination by a dominant firm is undoubtedly 
United Brands (1978), where the major supplier of branded bananas into the EC was held to 
have abused its dominant position by charging different prices according to the destination of 
the product. West Germany had the highest prices whereas Ireland had the lowest prices in the 
Community, but this was not justified by the actual cost differences in supplying these 
different markets. The case was brought by a Danish distributor who was refused supply of 
bananas by United Brands because he did not participate in UBC's advertising campaign and 
had earlier supported a rival brand. The Commission found UBC guilty of four abuses of 
Article 86: (i) prohibiting its distributors/ripeners from reselling of green (unripened) bananas, 
(ii) charging discriminatory prices, (iii) charging excessive prices in some EC Member States, 
and (iv) refusing to supply a Danish distributor. 
The ECJ determined that for UBC it was not permissible to charge according to local market 
conditions whereas this was permissible for local distributors. In other words there was not an 
obligation to charge similar retail prices, only an obligation for competition/arbitrage to bring 
about convergence of prices with costs of supply at the wholesale level. 
The ECJ also condemned geographic price discrimination in the second Tetra Pak case (1992). 
The company was accused of engaging in a number of exclusionary practices with the effect 
that the market became segmented with higher prices being charged in some Member States 
then others. 
We deal with these issues more fully in Chapter 8. 
7.5. The interaction between market integration and price discrimination 
The existence of significant price differences across markets is often taken as direct evidence 
of the lack of integration of markets. Thus price discrimination is in a sense the competition 
issue most directly connected with integration policy. The view has also been advanced in 
some quarters that price discrimination should be directly prevented as an integration objective 
per se. However, we have seen that this is an overly simplistic view. 
If we ask whether market integration is likely to lead to a reduction in price differentials and 
so to less geographic price discrimination, then the conclusion is fairly clear. Market 
integration facilitates cross-border arbitrage and so should reduce the scope for geographic 
price discrimination. Moreover, to the extent that market integration should lead to demand 
characteristics being more similar across economies (for example as a result of 
macroeconomic shocks being less idiosyncratic to individual economies), then the underlying 
incentives for firms to price discriminate should be reduced. Market integration should also 
lead to tougher product competition, since firms in different countries may be brought into 
competition with each other. Such a reduction in market power should again lead to reduced 
price differentials, since prices will more closely reflect common costs. 
Where firms manage to maintain market segmentation despite the progress of market 
integration, for example due to contracts, the erection of entry barriers or by collusion, then 
price discrimination may persist, but in all cases only as far as cross-border arbitrage 
possibilities allow. The case law listed above demonstrates a significant number of examples 
in which such behaviour has occurred. Moreover, these cases show that the pressure of cross-
border arbitrage can often be very weak even for consumer goods, and as a result firms can in 
some cases sustain significant price differences in different geographical markets. 
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Despite there being a very strong case that market integration should lead to less geographic 
price discrimination, this does not imply that it is desirable directly to prohibit price 
discrimination as an object of integration. In some cases price discrimination may be desirable. 
An important reason for allowing price discrimination is that (even for a monopolist) 
constraining firms to charge a single price in all markets may lead them to exit some markets. 
In the context of integration, the presence of a supplier in all geographical markets may be a 
more important objective than requiring similar prices in all markets. However, this 'market-
opening effect' does require sufficient asymmetries between markets. If geographical markets 
become more similar, then the force of this argument becomes less, since it becomes less 
likely that prohibiting price discrimination will induce firms to exit from some markets. 
The second important reason for allowing price discrimination is what was called the 
'competitive effect'. If firms have the ability to make price cuts targeted towards selected 
groups of consumers (for example a particular geographical area) then this can lead to more 
competitive outcomes. Prohibiting price discrimination would prevent such potential price 
cuts and lead to less competitive outcomes. It is very important to note that even if, in 
equilibrium, firms in fact set similar prices across geographical markets due to these markets 
having similar characteristics, then it is having the potential to charge different prices that is 
pro-competitive even if in equilibrium such prices are not set. In markets in which this pro-
competitive effect is important, then it is crucial that integration is achieved by making 
economic fundamentals more similar across countries and reducing border costs, thus leading 
to firms choosing similar prices in different geographical markets. Directly constraining prices 
in different geographical markets to be the same would be counter-productive. 
This suggests strongly that we should see reductions in price differentials as a consequence of 
market integration changing the incentives for firms and reducing the incentive to price 
discriminate. We should in no way consider price homogenization to be a direct objective of 
policy. 
7.6. Conclusions 
Measures taken by firms to support geographic price discrimination usually require arbitrage 
restrictions that are incorporated in territorial distribution agreements. Distribution agreements 
which grant territorial protection and are thus effective in segmenting EU markets along 
national borders are deemed to be in conflict with the integration objective. At the same time, 
EU competition policy has accepted the view that vertical agreements granting some form of 
territorial protection might be desirable, for they may be efficient where non-price competition 
is enhanced. In effect, EU competition policy seeks to strike a balance between efficiency 
considerations and integration objectives. A similar balance should be struck with respect to 
price discrimination and measures supporting price discrimination. This is the main 
conclusion drawn from this chapter which explores some of the positive and negative effects 
of geographic price discrimination. We have concentrated on the pure welfare effects of price 
discrimination and tried to isolate these from other efficiency effects of vertical restraints that 
are typically found in territorial distribution agreements. 
First we recognize that where price discrimination is a symptom of collusion and market 
power, the latter should be addressed directly. In other words, price discrimination is likely to 
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be symptomatic of market power, and in this case intervention is justified - though attacking 
the discrimination directly may not be the best response. 
We have focused particularly on other cases, where price discrimination results for example 
from differences in location. This area is certainly more controversial, and deserving of a 
wider debate. We have particularly emphasized that although the theoretical literature is 
worried about the impact of allowing geographic price discrimination on total welfare, this 
approach may not be wholly desirable for policy. This is because there may be inequitable 
consequences from forcing prices to be uniform, if it means that the low-income countries 
bear a disproportionate share of the losses. 
These considerations appear to weigh against any interpretation of the integration objective 
purely as convergence of prices in absolute terms, and against any absolute presumption 
against price discrimination. Indeed there are circumstances where price discrimination 
through vertical arrangements or other means may be welfare-enhancing, i.e. it may be good 
per se (over and above the well-known argument of the efficiency of distribution networks). 
In the light of the analysis in this chapter, there should be no presumption that geographic 
price discrimination is always welfare-reducing, and intervention against it should not be 
automatic. 
There are cases in which we can presume that the welfare losses due to price discrimination 
are at most small and possibly non-existent. If firms have little market power or if price 
differentials are small then the 'consumption misallocation loss' is small. In such cases it 
would be sensible to have a presumption of non-intervention. 
Where price discrimination is a symptom of market power and price differentials are large, 
there is more reason to be concerned and prohibition can be warranted. However, even in this 
case it is possible that price discrimination is welfare-improving and care must be taken that 
prohibition does not lead to adverse consequences such as exit from some markets. 
In addition, the practical difficulties of identifying price discrimination should not be 
underestimated. Cross-country price comparisons are difficult for most goods, as graphically 
demonstrated by various studies on car price differentials. This implies that unless a good is 
internationally traded, with a clear world price, the evidence for price discrimination may not 
be satisfactory. Detecting price discrimination may be difficult if not impossible for firms who 
'tweak' their products slightly for sale in another country at a different price. 
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8. Barriers to entry and access restrictions in integrating 
markets 
8.1. Introduction 
An evaluation of the ability of firms to cross national borders and enter into hitherto distinct 
national markets is crucial to assess the competitive impact of market integration. If entry can 
be prevented by incumbent firms, market integration measures may have very small effects. 
The task of dealing with entry barriers erected by firms falls to the Commission's competition 
authorities, chiefly by force of Articles 85, 86 and 90 of the Treaty of Rome. As stated for 
example in the 1994 Report on Competition Policy: 
'One of the Commission's main tasks in enforcing competition rules is to ensure that 
companies do not conclude agreements, or, where they hold a dominant position, engage 
in unilateral practices, which have the effect of limiting the ability of other firms -
usually those from other Member States - taking advantage of the possibilities offered by 
the Single Market to compete. Under Art. 85, such agreements may typically consist of 
networks of distribution agreements whereby incumbent producers tie up all available 
distributors. Under Art. 86, a dominant firm may, for example, attempt to prevent its 
customers from using different suppliers by means of loyalty rebates, or attempt to 
remove an existing competitor by predatory pricing.' (p. 12) 
The main focus of this chapter is on strategic barriers, i.e. barriers to (cross-border) entry 
created by incumbent firms to protect their position, in response to the elimination of 
institutional barriers through the integration process.82 To the extent that the single market 
programme has been successful in removing institutional barriers protecting incumbents in 
certain markets, the incentive for the incumbents is to replace such barriers with strategic 
behaviour. Similarly, there is an incentive for strategic behaviour where public policy has 
lifted previous restrictions to entry into legally protected monopolies, and may have forced the 
incumbent to open access to an asset which is a necessary complement for supplying the final 
market. In these circumstances, an integrated incumbent may seek to protect its advantage 
over new entrants by setting terms of access which are disadvantageous to competitors. 
We identify two main classes of strategic behaviour by firms which are aimed at excluding 
actual or potential competitors from the market: creating restrictions of access to a 
complementary asset, and pursuing exclusion through pricing strategies. These are discussed 
below in Sections 8.3 and 8.4 respectively. In Section 8.5 we emphasize how, even in cases 
where entry appears prevented by institutional factors, the exclusionary effect may be actually 
due to a combination of such institutional factors and the behaviour of the incumbent(s). In 
such cases, competition intervention may remain the appropriate policy instrument. Empirical 
material and case law will be used where appropriate. Section 8.6 evaluates the treatment of 
entry barriers under EU competition policy, and Section 8.7 concludes with a summary of the 
Our general concept of 'barriers to entry', encompasses the classic definition by Stigler [1968, p. 67] as 'a cost of 
producing...which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the 
industry'. 
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main areas of concern for the competition authorities in addressing strategic behaviour which 
prevents entry. 
8.2. Barriers to cross-border entry erected by firms 
While a variety of strategic entry barriers have been identified in the economic literature, we 
will here confine ourselves only to those which are most relevant from the perspective of 
market integration. To the extent that integration measures have lifted previous legal and 
institutional restrictions to entry into a national market, the incumbent firm(s) in that market 
will have an incentive to replace them with strategic behaviour. This predatory behaviour 
(induced by integration) towards potential competitors - both de novo entrants and firms 
already operating in another geographical market - may take essentially two forms. 
(a) Restriction of access to a complementary asset: the incumbent in a market may control 
an input which is essential for the final supply of the end product to consumers, and 
most importantly cannot be (realistically) replicated - either because it is in scarce 
supply, or because there are natural monopoly characteristics on the cost-side. As 
integration policies remove some of the institutional obstacles to cross-border entry, the 
incumbent controlling an essential complementary asset in each geographical market 
will have an incentive to prevent the entry of foreign rivals by strategically setting the 
terms of access to the asset. This may include the following methods. 
(i) Refusal to supply, where access to the complementary input is refused by the 
incumbent which owns or controls it. 
(ii) Setting access charges in a way which discriminates against new entrants. This is 
particularly important in the context of the deregulation and liberalization process 
affecting the network-bound industries, which used to enjoy statutory monopolies 
at the national level. As trade is opened up with these established monopolies, 
access terms to inputs with natural monopoly characteristics are crucial. 
(iii) Use of vertical restraints (e.g. exclusive dealing agreements between 
manufacturers and distributors) for purposes of foreclosure: this may occur if the 
incumbent is able to tie up a complementary asset at a different level of the 
market, to stop entry at its same level of the market. 
(b) Exclusionary pricing: an incumbent firm may preclude the entry of rivals into the market 
directly through its pricing behaviour, by setting its effective price below the level at 
which it is worthwhile for an outsider to compete. This includes predatory pricing, 
where the incumbent adopts an aggressive pricing strategy as a response to entry. 
Another barrier arising from pricing on markets are non-linear pricing structures such as 
selective discounts and 'fidelity rebates' (which reward customers in exchange for not 
purchasing from new entrants).85 
For a review see, among others, Harbord and Hoehn [1994]. 
Limit pricing is a way for the incumbent to signal instead to the potential rival that its post-entry behaviour would be 
aggressive, and thus prevent entry. 
We will not consider in detail here entry barriers such as sunk costs in R&D, or advertising, which have been identified 
in the literature as endogenous determinants of market structure (these are costs which are deliberately sunk by 
incumbent firms in a way that increases their first-mover advantage, and thereby makes rivals' entry unprofitable; see 
for example Sutton [1991], Lyons and Matraves [1995], and Davies and Lyons [1996]). While this is reasonable as a 
theory of long-run market structure, it appears less plausible as a response to integration (and to any sudden threat of 
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8.3. Restrictions of access to a complementary asset 
Access to a complementary input which is essential for supplying the final product market 
may be controlled by the incumbent, because the latter is vertically integrated or holds a 
special long-term right to the input. There is a barrier to entry when the potential entrant's 
access to the complementary input is restricted, while at the same time the input cannot be 
duplicated - for instance because it is physically scarce, or there are elements of natural 
monopoly in its cost structure. This means that entry will be hampered if the incumbent 
controls access to a complementary asset, which either cannot be duplicated or is too costly for 
the entrant to duplicate. Competition policy should ensure that restrictions are not strategically 
placed by incumbents on access to such complementary inputs. 
8.3.1. Refusal to supply 
Supplying a final market generally requires the combination of complementary inputs in 
production and distribution. 'Refusal to supply' is characterized as a situation where access to 
a complementary input is denied by the (integrated) incumbent which owns or controls it, 
while it is not feasible for the entrant to replicate the same input. In its effort to favour 
integration and eliminate barriers to entry (especially cross-border entry), the Commission has 
developed in recent years the 'essential facilities doctrine' (see below Section 8.6), whereby an 
incumbent 'refusing to supply' an essential complementary input to a rival (and in particular to 
new entrants) abuses its dominant position. 
A number of points must be made on refusal to supply a complementary asset. 
Firstly, it is crucial that the input is non-replicable. If the new entrant could set up an 
equivalent facility, or could use an alternative complement without incurring a significant 
disadvantage, then this could not be described as a barrier to entry. The relevant criterion here 
must be whether the new entrant could enter at minimum efficient scale. All activities have a 
certain amount of fixed and sunk costs; therefore the relevant criterion is whether the 
investment which the new entrant must make to replicate the complementary input has 
relatively low cost in relation to the value of what he wants to sell. Secondly, dominant firms 
have given various efficiency defences for refusing access to an essential input. We will now 
look at these two points in more detail. 
The first important point to establish is always to what extent the refusal of access is really a 
matter of exclusion, i.e. it effectively impairs the viability of the entrant. As mentioned, an 
exclusionary effect can be claimed only where there are no alternative Complementary inputs 
which could be used. This appears to be so, for example, in the case of access by a smaller 
airline to a flag carrier's computer reservation system (CRS), if this is the only way in which 
travel agent bookings are effectively made. Initially, each Community flag carrier had its own 
(unsophisticated) CRS, and to the extent that travel agent reservations are made through this 
CRS a small carrier which is denied access to it will not be able to enter. The Commission 
intervened both by introducing 'fair access rules' (similar to the policy of the US DoJ), and 
also, in one case, by taking direct action against the incumbent. In 1987, the small UK carrier 
London European Airways had sought access to the CRS managed by the Belgian airline 
entry: there is a timing problem). In addition, there is not much that competition policy can actually do about these 
types of sunk costs. 
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Sabena (Saphir) for the Brussels/Luton route, so that it would be listed on the terminals of 
Belgian travel agencies. The system was operated, where possible, on the basis of 'reciprocity' 
(i.e. Sabena would give access to other companies free of charge, provided that they did the 
same); when this was not possible, a fee was charged by Sabena to the company using the 
system. In LEA's case, access was refused altogether on grounds that 'it was not in Sabena's 
commercial and positive interest to collaborate': LEA's low air fares were for Sabena 'a 
potential threat to traffic from Belgium', its limited timetable 'virtually ruled out any 
possibility of interlining connections via Brussels', and LEA's refusal to grant Sabena the 
contract for ground servicing of its aircrafts meant that Sabena could not 'offset' in this way 
the lost income from 'possible passenger losses'. In cases such as this, particularly as the 
incumbent had not incurred a substantial investment to develop the facility (Saphir was an 
adaptation of the Alpha-3 system developed by Air France), the loss of income from the entry 
of a rival is clearly not an efficiency defence. The Commission correctly decided against 
Sabena, because it considered that unless LEA had access to the CRS there was no other way 
for its flights to appear on the terminal of Belgian travel agents, and this would not allow it to 
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operate. 
Refusal of access to port facilities has also been a cause of complaints. In 1993, a complaint 
was lodged by the cargo carrier Sea Containers against the British ferry operator Stena Sealink 
- which runs ferry services between the UK, Ireland and France and is also the port authority 
at Holyhead (Wales). The port of Holyhead was the only port on the British side serving on the 
central corridor route between the UK and Ireland. Sea Containers had been refused access to 
Holyhead for commencing a high-speed ferry service through the central corridor between the 
UK and Ireland. The Commission found there was a prima facie case that Sealink was thereby 
protecting its own ferry service from competition; and, once the complaint had been lodged, 
Sealink offered suitable berths to Sea Containers (Sea Containers/Stena Sealink, 'Holyhead 
II', 1993). 
As mentioned, the case for defining an asset as an 'essential facility' may not be sustainable 
when there would have been - at least in principle - alternative complementary inputs which 
the rival/new entrant could have used. In Morlaix (1995), the Commission dealt with the 
refusal of the Morlaix Chamber of Commerce, in its capacity of port authority for the Brittany 
port of Roscoff, to give Irish Ferries access to the port, and ordered Morlaix that access should 
be granted for the 1995 season. In fact, Morlaix was Irish Ferries' second-best choice, having 
originally applied to the port of Brest in Brittany. This fell through when the authorization for 
86 Less clear-cut appears 'refusal to interline' (Lufthansa/Air Europe (1990), regarding interline facilities on the London-
Munich and London-Düsseldorf routes, and Aer Lingus/British Midlands (1992)). Interlining has been seen by the 
Commission as a way to facilitate entry on some routes, on the principle that 'sufficient interlining should exist to allow 
a newcomer to compete on equal terms' (Lufthansa/Air Europe). The Irish carrier Aer Lingus, which is the dominant 
firm on the London-Dublin route, terminated its interline relationship with British Midland (BM), after the latter 
announced the start of its own service on that route in 1989. BM's claim was that the withdrawal of interline facilities 
made its flights less attractive to travellers, especially the business ones, and to travel agents. The Commission decided 
that the incumbent's behaviour amounted to refusal to supply and Aer Lingus was ordered to resume its interline 
relationship. However, the Commission also stated that new entrants should not be able to rely indefinitely on 
frequencies and services provided by their competitors, but must be encouraged to develop their own frequencies and 
services. Accordingly, the duration of Aer Lingus' duty to interline was limited to two years. 
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the construction of a new jetty at Brest was turned down by the French authorities, at which 
point Irish Ferries turned to the port of Roscoff.87 
Claims by the parties of capacity constraints must also be evaluated carefully. The incumbent 
may argue that access cannot be granted because the capacity of the asset is already fully used. 
What must be considered in these cases is the opportunity cost of creating new facilities, 
including the cost which would have to be incurred to increase capacity (in particular, in the 
case of a port, whether it would be easier for the incumbent to build new mooring facilities 
etc.). Where capacity is effectively limited, a regulatory approach may be appropriate. 
Refusal to supply and intellectual property rights 
In contrast to the cases discussed above, it,is not desirable to apply 'refusal to supply' 
arguments (and the 'essential facilities doctrine') in the case of intellectual property rights. 
This possibility has received much attention after the Magill case88 (see also below Section 
8.6). In particular, the Magill decision has adopted the position that IPRs - which by definition 
confer dominance in one market - may be used strategically to foreclose rivals' entry in a 
different but related market (notion of 'leveraging' power from a market where the firm is 
dominant to another). 
Given the special role which is played by IPRs, this approach does not seem appropriate. The 
very function of IPRs is to confer exclusivity to the holder, in order to provide sufficient 
incentives for innovation. IPRs therefore confer by design an absolute advantage to the holder. 
While IPRs can be used strategically (for example where firms take out sleeping patents), it is 
Up to that point, the only operator at Roscoff was Brittany Ferries. After a preliminary agreement with Irish Ferries for 
the 1995 summer season, Morlaix argued that it would not make the required investment without assurances that Irish 
Ferries would use Roscoff also in 1996 - rather than move to Brest. It appears that a contract existed between Brittany 
Ferries and Morlaix, whereby the latter was guaranteed certain revenues for a number of years - thus justifying its 
development of the Roscoff port - in return for priority in use of the port (it also appears that Morlaix was a shareholder 
in Brittany Ferries). 
In 1986 the BBC, ITV and the Irish broadcaster RTE held copyrights in their respective TV listings, and provided 
weekly TV listings magazines each of which featured solely their own programmes (that is, each channel published a 
guide covering exclusively its own programmes and claimed copyright protection for its weekly programme listings). 
As no comprehensive weekly guide existed on the Irish market, the small Irish publisher Magill saw an opportunity; 
however it was unable to meet this demand because the copyright holders refused to grant it licences to use their 
listings. Magill challenged the right of the copyright holders to behave in this way under Art. 86. The Commission's 
position, which was later upheld both by the CFI and finally (April 1995) by the Court of Justice, was that the three 
broadcasters held legal and factual monopolies of the 'basic information' produced as a result of their broadcasting 
activities, which was required to produce a derivative product (television guides). The court confirmed that the abusive 
conduct was the reliance on copyright covered by national law to prevent Magill from publishing. The broadcasters had 
abused their dominant positions in order to give themselves an unfair advantage in the derivative market - thereby 
preventing the emergence of a new, competing product (the comprehensive guide). The Commission ordered the 
broadcasters to supply third parties with advance weekly programme listings on a non-discriminatory basis. This 
decision (subsequently confirmed by the courts) raised concerns that, under certain circumstances, IPR owners may be 
effectively required to grant compulsory licences. 
The Commission in fact sees a clear difference between the Magill case and the protection which IPRs must confer to 
their owner on the specific market to which they refer. The use of competition policy to attack dominant positions 
conferred by IPRs in the market to which they refer is not deemed acceptable, as stated for example in the recent 
vaccine case Lederle-Praxis Biological (1994): 'at the current stage of EU competition law, it is highly doubtful 
whether one could impose an obligation upon a dominant firm (...) as a remedy to ensure the maintenance of effective 
competition (...) to share its IPRs with third parties, to allow them to develop, produce and market the same products 
which the dominant firm is seeking to develop, produce and market ...' (XXIVth Report on Competition Policy 1994, 
p. 410). 
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not desirable that their incentive function should be undermined by claims that they confer a 
dominant position in one market which can be leveraged into separate markets. 
A more appropriate approach is the careful definition of the scope of a patent (length, breadth 
and field of use, see for example Klemperer [1990]). Indeed an issue which is put into sharp 
relief by the Magill case is that the problem in many cases is the scope of copyright and patent 
protection. In Magill, the TV networks had been able to copyright their TV schedule: while it 
is appropriate that the single programmes which are part of the schedule are covered by 
copyright (to reward the creative effort involved), there is no such rationale for TV schedules 
(which simply 'fall out' of the decisions on the day's programming) - and essentially for 
obtaining a copyright twice. 
In principle there is of course an interaction between patent law and competition law, as the 
two are to some extent jointly determined. However, one must be careful that application of 
competition law in this delicate area does not lead to a reduction of the benefits conferred by 
patent law. Competition law should respects the limits of a patent, though patent rights should 
only be conferred where there is a creative or innovative effort to be rewarded and protected. 
8.3.2. Access pricing 
'Refusal to supply' is a special case of setting access terms. Even if there is a legal 
requirement that access be granted to competitors, incumbents may reproduce the effect of 
refusal to supply through very high access prices. Again an important test should be whether 
the new entrant could enter at minimum efficient scale, i.e. whether the investment which 
would have to be incurred to replicate a complementary input would exceed the value of the 
new entrant's sales. 
The issue of access pricing and foreclosure has acquired great practical relevance following 
the gradual deregulation and liberalization of network-bound industries which used to be legal 
monopolies (gas, télécoms, electricity, water), where there are elements of natural monopoly 
(e.g. the local loop in telephony) and therefore reproduction of the input by the new entrant 
may not be feasible or desirable.90 Access pricing is also the focus of much recent economic 
literature on regulation, in particular on how access charges should be optimally set while 
letting the former monopoly compete.91 
A full review of progress in the liberalization process is outside the scope of this study. The 
question which we will address is the economic and policy question of whether access pricing 
issues - which have been traditionally dealt with by regulators - should be tackled in future by 
the competition authorities, as former statutory monopolies are being gradually opened up and 
competition develops. It is important to emphasize that competition and regulation have very 
distinct characteristics: regulation involves the ongoing monitoring of firms' activities, the 
collection of information about costs, for the purpose of setting prices. Competition policy is 
An alternative approach, followed in the US, is to prevent the owner of the network to supply the final market. For 
example, 'the local network monopolies in the telephone industry have been prevented from entering the value added 
markets, as well as the long-distance markets, because of the DoJ's belief that [given the asymmetries of information 
involved] it is impossible to define access to the network which creates fair competition in these markets' (Laffont and 
Tiróle [1994]). 
See, among others, Armstrong and Vickers [1993, 1995], Armstrong and Doyle [1994], Baumöl and Sidak [1994, 
1995], Laffont and Tiróle [1994]. 
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instead a specific, selective intervention often on the basis of a complaint, and it is not aimed 
at directly setting prices. Because of their monitoring role, regulators have much more 
information on market and cost conditions than a competition authority (though as 
competition develops in these industries, specific complaints will tend to be brought by 
informed players, and the competition authorities may thus be able to rely on more detailed 
information). 
This does not mean that it is not possible - in principle - to design a competition policy 
approach which includes price controls, effectively based on a regulatory-type intervention. 
However, any competition policy which relies on setting prices becomes effectively a form of 
price-cap regulation. The setting of prices presupposes a regulatory context. Thus in spite of 
the drawbacks of a regulatory approach (permanent monitoring is costly, and the effectiveness 
of regulation may be undermined by regulatory capture), a switch to a policy instrument which 
is less finely tuned to specific industry conditions is undesirable. This issue will be discussed 
further below in Section 8.7, and in our policy conclusions (Chapter 13). 
8.3.3. Foreclosure through vertical restraints 
The traditional concerns of competition policy in relation to vertical restraints are that in an 
oligopolistic setting (multiple manufacturers in competition with each other) such restraints 
may lead to distortions of interbrand competition, facilitating horizontal collusion; and that 
they may affect the ease of entry in a market (foreclosure effect). The treatment of vertical 
restraints in antitrust has been widely debated since the 'Chicago school' (especially Bork 
[1978] and Posner [1981]) took the non-interventionist position that they should be per se 
legal. The view that vertical restraints are harmless, as long as they do not have exclusionary 
effects, has since made its way also into the policy approach (see Section 8.6 below), and is 
being advocated today by most practitioners and commentators. 
Over the past 15 years, a large body of economic analysis has challenged the traditional view 
of vertical restraints as restrictions of competition. This body of research has emphasized first 
of all the efficiency-enhancing role of vertical restraints in correcting externalities and 
distortions in the retailer's decisions on downstream pricing and provision of effort, as well as 
contractual opportunism.92 Though some of this work is based on restrictive assumptions (it 
often takes the form of a simple principal/agent analysis of the manufacturer/retailer 
relationship, with a monopolist manufacturer and a competitive retail sector), it has made the 
important contribution of identifying rather compelling efficiency reasons for vertical 
restraints.93 While some models have yielded ambiguous results, there are many cases where 
the private and social effects of vertical restraints have been found to go in the same direction; 
See, among others, Mathewson and Winter [1984, 1985, 1987], Rey and Tiróle [1986], and Waterson [1987]. They 
have shown how the externalities in the manufacturer-retailer relationship can be internalized by various combinations 
of quantity-dependent pricing (including franchise fees), quantity forcing, retail price maintenance, and territorial 
exclusivity. These may achieve the same result as full vertical merger. 
Vertical restraints may correct free-rider effects also between manufacturers. The classic example is the case of 
sophisticated technical training provided by the manufacturer to the retailer (i.e. pre-sales services), which may work to 
the benefit of other manufacturers if the retailer also carries rival brands. This free-riding effect may lead to suboptimal 
investment by the manufacturer in dealers (and investments that create customer-drawing power). Exclusive dealing 
may correct this, as emphasized particularly by Marvel [1982], Steuer [1983] and Ornstein [1989]. However, exclusive 
dealing also corrects the 'competition externality', i.e. the tendency for firms to set lower prices because they are 
concerned not to confer a benefit to rival brands. Thus exclusive dealing should also lead to higher prices, and while 
this is privately optimal for the manufacturer, the welfare implications are ambiguous. 
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that is, vertical restraints may not only be privately optimal, but also increase total welfare. For 
example, if there is excess entry at the downstream stage, vertical mergers or restraints which 
reduce variety (as well as eliminate double marginalization) may be Pareto-improving under 
rather general assumptions on preferences (see Kühn and Vives [1994]). 
Other reasons for a cautious policy approach to vertical restraints include the fact that attempts 
made to model their exclusionary effects have not produced very robust results. This is 
because for the exclusionary effect to operate, there are two essential features which a model 
must incorporate: the incumbent's incentive to deny access, and a complementary input which 
is non-replicable by the new entrant. Building a model which satisfactorily incorporates these 
two conditions is not trivial.94 
Overall, the contribution of the economic literature on vertical restraints has been to establish 
that there should be no competition policy intervention, except where they are used 
strategically by the incumbent to foreclose the market to a new entrant, essentially by reducing 
rival manufacturers' access to downstream distributors. 
The foreclosure argument here is analogous to the case of access restrictions examined above 
(under 'refusal to supply' and 'access pricing'). A long-term exclusivity arrangement which 
prevents retailers from dealing with another supplier may mean that such a supplier is denied 
access to the downstream market (if there are constraints on the supply of retail outlets). 
Indeed, models of exclusive dealing tend to obtain the foreclosure effects only when assuming 
that the retailing sector is not perfectly competitive, i.e. there are economies of scale in 
retailing:95 this implies that there is a constraint on the availability of a complementary input 
(downstream distribution), and that to replicate such an input (i.e. establish an independent 
network) may be infeasible. The analogy with the case of access to network or essential 
facilities is clear. 
Alternatively, if the incumbent ties up all high-quality retailers (or retail locations), these 
arrangements may force rivals to use less efficient marketing channels. Exclusivity agreements 
may thus affect rivals' entry on two levels: firstly, there may be an outright exclusionary effect 
if they effectively mean that access to the downstream market is denied; secondly, purchasing 
exclusive rights to particular retailers is a variation of the 'raising rivals' costs' strategy (Salop 
and Scheffman [1986]). Also the entry cost of a new rival could be increased if distribution 
were to involve significant economies of scope (in which case setting up a parallel distribution 
network may be wasteful). 
For example, Comanor and Freeh [1985] and Mathewson and Winter [1987] showed that exclusive dealing can indeed 
have foreclosing effects, provided that the retailing sector is not perfectly competitive, and there is some asymmetry 
between incumbent and entrant, e.g. in consumer preferences or production costs. That is, in both of these model 
complete foreclosure is possible as a result of entry barriers in retailing which protect incumbent retailers from 
competition, and an asymmetry between manufacturers. In the absence of either an asymmetry between manufacturers, 
or retailing barriers, attempts to foreclose entry completely may not be profitable. 
For example, Comanor and Freeh [1985] and Mathewson and Winter [1987]. Dobson and Waterson [1994a, 1994b] 
and Besanko and Perry [1994] also show that with differentiated retailers and differentiated producers, exclusive 
dealing allows manufacturers to set higher margins due to the absence of in-store interbrand competition, and the fixed 
costs of retailing which limit the number of retailers of each brand which can be supported in the market. Social welfare 
is reduced. 
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Therefore - as in the case of refusal to supply - the crucial question for the competition 
authorities in assessing vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing is whether these 
arrangements effectively prevent entry at minimum efficient scale. If not, they cannot be 
considered exclusionary. In practice, this means that the potential for exclusive dealing to 
foreclose a market will depend on the proportion of the retail sector which is thus tied up and 
inaccessible, and the residual opportunities for competing manufacturers to find an outlet for 
their goods. 
We consider below the issue of vertical restraints and foreclosure in the case of ice cream. 
8.3.4. The case of ice cream 
The use of exclusivity agreements between dominant local producers and retailers in the 
market for 'impulse' (single-wrapped) ice cream has been the focus of major competition 
investigations (at both the Commission and national levels), on grounds that such agreements 
foreclosed retail outlets to new entrants. 
In 1992, the US manufacturer Mars complained to the Commission that it was being excluded 
from the Irish and German markets as a result of the exclusivity agreements put in place by the 
local ice cream manufacturers (HB Icecream in Ireland, a Unilever subsidiary; Langnese-Iglo 
GmbH - also a subsidiary of Unilever - and Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH in Germany). HB 
has been dominant in the Irish ice cream market since the late 1960s, and in 1989 it estimated its 
share of the Irish market to be 78% (in volume terms). Langnese-Iglo is the dominant brand of 
ice cream in Germany, accounting in 1991 for almost 50% of all the ice cream sold in Germany 
through the grocery trade (where about 35% of all impulse ice cream sales are made); Schöller 
was the only other producer to occupy a dominant position in the market, with approximately a 
20% share of the grocery trade. Mars claimed that the exclusive dealing arrangements resulted in 
partial or total foreclosure of the Irish and German markets to new competition. 
Single-wrapped ice cream is mostly sold through relatively small retail outlets, and some larger 
food stores. The product market is highly differentiated, with firms competing over price, quality 
and product range. There are no significant entry barriers in production (local dairies find it fairly 
easy to enter into production on a small scale). There are significant barriers in marketing and 
distribution, as brand name and product recognition (and therefore advertising and promotion) 
are very important in this market. But a company like Mars, with a 'transferable' brand name, 
was in a more favourable position than any de novo entrant. 
According to Mars, the most important barrier to entry in this market was the availability of retail 
space (freezer space) in small outlets. Mars claimed its ability to penetrate the market for impulse 
ice cream was being harmed by HB's practice (as Schöller and Langnese in Germany) of 
providing freezers on loan (i.e. 'free') to a large proportion of retailers (71% in Ireland), which 
were to be used to stock and sell exclusively HB ice cream. Mars identified the entry options 
facing any new entrant as: 
(a) renting existing freezer space in retail outlets; 
(b) supplying freezers to retailers in addition to the freezers they already had; 
(c) encouraging retailers to swap their HB freezers for the entrant's freezers; 
(d) creating new retail outlets. 
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Of these options, (a) was not feasible for the large proportion of retailers to whom freezers were 
supplied by the incumbent with exclusivity restrictions (80% of outlets in Ireland); (b) was 
limited by retailers' ability and willingness to take an additional ice cream freezer (according to a 
survey presented by Mars, 65% of retailers with an exclusive freezer agreement said they did not 
have space available to take another manufacturer's freezer - though this survey-based evidence 
was contested by HB); (c) was considered by Mars to involve significant transaction costs and 
costs of financial inducements, especially for new, untested product ranges; and (d) was argued 
to involve very high sunk costs of entry. 
Mars' conclusion was that in a situation where retail space was scarce, exclusivity arrangements 
amounted to foreclosure of entry. As a result of these arrangements, 61% of retail outlets in 
Ireland (53% of the market) were entirely foreclosed to new entrants, because an entrant would 
have to displace the incumbent's freezer to get retail space; and 19% (26% of the market) were 
'partially foreclosed' in that, while they had exclusive freezer agreements, they might take an 
additional freezer. Only 20% of outlets had retailer-owned freezers, or manufacturer-owned 
freezers which were not exclusive, and therefore available for small-scale ('niche') entry. To 
gain access to the other 80% of outlets, a new entrant would have to invest in freezers, as well as 
inducements to retailers, which would necessitate entry on a large scale, and with an entire 
product range, and mean large fixed (largely sunk) costs. That is, where retailers already had 
space allocated to ice cream, and total retail space was scarce, they will either be unwilling to 
take another freezer, or require substantial financial inducements (i.e. very high margins) in order 
to do so. Mars concluded that either the entrant will need to be much more efficient than the 
incumbent (i.e. sell more attractive products at very competitive prices), or will need to expend 
substantial resources to induce retailers to take the product. Thus the dominant firm's strategy of 
vertical exclusivity arrangements in exchange for the free freezer frustrated entry by new brands, 
because it increased the cost of entry to the point of excluding it altogether. 
In fact, Mars' arguments must also be evaluated carefully. In this case, the duration of the 
exclusive contracts is an essential factor, and where exclusivity is only established for a limited 
period, the foreclosure effects will be less severe. In addition, the argument that offering a 
replacement freezer involves costs of financial inducement, especially for new untested product 
ranges, is not convincing. It may only hold if the new freezer also comes with an exclusivity 
clause. Without exclusivity restrictions, there is no need for the supplier to give financial 
inducements (in a market with competing brands, the retailer will select the 'strongest' products). 
Most importantly, it should be considered that if it would be worthwhile for Mars to offer an 
additional exclusive freezer, then it should be even more profitable to provide a non-exclusive 
replacement freezer (and extract the retailers' profit through a rental fee). Therefore claims by 
Mars that freezer exclusivity by the incumbent did not leave any viable alternative for entry (i.e. 
that there was no way of entering at minimum efficient scale) required cautious assessment. 
Eventually the Commission accepted the legality of freezer exclusivity, in exchange for some 
undertakings from HB (essentially selling off some 1,750 'front-of-shop' freezers - 10% of 
HB's stock - in 1995-96, and introducing an optional 'hire purchase' scheme for freezers 
being supplied, though exclusivity is retained for at least five years). In the German cases 
(Langnese-Iglo and Schöller-Lebensmittel), the Commission also ultimately found in favour of 
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Mars, because the dominant firms were not able to provide convincing efficiency justification for 
their conduct.96 
Exclusion effects of tying 
Tying is a specific type of vertical restraint between the manufacturer and the final user. It 
describes the case where the manufacturer makes the sale (or price) of a particular product (the 
'tied' product) conditional on the customer also purchasing another - often complementary -
product (the 'tying' product). The concern is that this type of practice may be used by the firm 
to modify the structure of the market for the tied product. In particular, where the firm has 
power in one product market, tying the sale of this product to another one in which it has no 
power may produce an exclusionary effect. Rivals may not be viable in that market, which can 
thus be monopolized, and market power is 'leveraged' across markets. 
The feasibility of 'leverage' has been contentious since the Chicago school challenged the 
traditional opposition of the competition authorities to tying, and argued that such a strategy is 
not profitable for the firm. As there is only one monopoly profit to be earned in a chain of 
supply, it cannot be rational nor possible to 'leverage' power from one market into another. 
More recently, it has been shown that tying can have an exclusionary effect, provided that there 
are scale economies in the tied good. In this case, tying can reduce the sales of rival producers of 
the tied good below the point at which it is viable for them to remain in the market. Exit will 
OR 
occur, and the market can be monopolized (Whinston [1990]). 
Overall, the implications of a tying strategy for market structure are quite sensitive to the 
degree of complementarity between the tying and the tied product, and the distribution of 
consumers' preferences for the tied good (and therefore their valuation). Whinston [1990] 
showed that the firm has no incentive to exclude rivals through tying in the case of 
complementary products which are used in 'fixed proportions' (i.e. when the products are 
essentially 'components parts' of a 'system'). In this case tying is not profitable: the firm 
actually makes greater profits when there is a rival supplier of one component in the market, 
because greater sales of the component supplied competitively increase sales of the component 
which is monopolized. 
As a result, the benefits of the exclusive purchasing block exemption were withdrawn from certain Langnese 
agreements, and Schöller was denied individual exemption; in addition, the market leaders were prohibited from 
entering into exclusive purchasing agreements altogether in Germany for five years after the decision. This last point 
was overturned in 1995 by the Court of First Instance (CFI), which argued that in prohibiting these companies from 
concluding exclusive purchasing agreements in future, the Commission exceeded its powers. Such agreements can still 
be signed, either under the term of the block exemption (provided they do not make access by other suppliers to the 
various sales outlets difficult to a significant extent), or if they meet the terms for an individual exemption. 
Consumers' purchases depend only on the sum of the prices of tying and tied product, and the 'bundle' will be purchased 
only if its overall price does not exceed the consumer's valuation of the monopolized product, plus the price of the other 
product. Hence the firm cannot earn more than the monopoly profit it would get if it sold the first product independently. 
Whinston also finds the overall effects for consumers and for aggregate efficiency to be ambiguous. There is a loss for 
consumers if tied market rivals exit, because prices may rise and the level of variety in the market necessarily falls; in 
some cases there may be a uniform increase in all prices, making consumers uniformly worse off; but more generally -
as in models of price discrimination - some consumers may be made better off by the introduction of tying. The effect 
on aggregate welfare is uncertain because of both this ambiguous 'price discrimination' effect, and the inefficiencies of 
entry in the presence of scale economies. 
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The best-known case in Europe in recent years is the Hilti (1987) case, where the firm's tying 
practices were condemned as exclusionary and anti-competitive. Hilti is the dominant 
European producer of power-activated nail guns for the construction industry. Hilti tied the 
supply of nails and cartridge strips for the gun, by only selling its cartridge strips (where it was 
dominant) together with the corresponding number of nails (which could have been supplied 
competitively). Two small producers of compatible nails (Eurofix and Bauco) complained that 
this had exclusionary effects for potential suppliers of nails, and the Commission upheld the 
small rivals' claim that this practice was abusive - leveraging market power from cartridges to 
nails. 
Given that cartridge strips and nails can only be used together in fixed proportions, it is not 
clear, however, that the decision was justified. If Hilti had market power in cartridges, it could 
have set the cartridge price at the monopoly level regardless of the tie; then sales of rivals' 
nails at the competitive price would have only increased sales of cartridges (at the monopoly 
price), and Hilti would have thus benefited from the presence of rivals. (The question is rather 
why rival nail producers were not able to find an alternative supplier of cartridges, which 
together with their nails could have provided a nail/cartridge 'bundle' in competition with 
Hilti's own. The evidence suggests that Hilti had been able to prevent this by tying with long-
term exclusive contracts the only other three producers of cartridges in Europe.) 
Tying and aftermarkets 
An interesting variety of the tying problem arises with aftermarkets, i.e. markets for 
complementary products which are bought subsequently to an original durable good purchase. 
Empirical observation shows that suppliers of a durable good often face little competition in 
the supply of subsequent complementary products. However, the fact that manufacturers of 
primary products have large market shares in related aftermarkets should not lead to the 
conclusion that aggressive competition intervention is warranted. The general principle 
remains that the manufacturer's ability to raise prices in the tied product will be constrained by 
the consumer's possibility of purchasing an alternative tying product from another 
manufacturer (i.e. on the effective degree of market power in the tying product). Thus what 
matters is competition in the primary ex ante market for the supply of the durable good, and 
consumers will choose between competing goods by taking account of the likely costs of the 
product over its entire operating life.9 
What makes the analysis of aftermarkets different from that of a firm jointly producing a 
number of complementary products is the issue of timing and imperfect information: it can be 
argued that consumers lack the necessary information to perform the lifetime-cost calculation, 
and thus the producer might be able to raise prices in its aftermarkets (i.e. engage in 'installed-
Consider the example of two photocopier manufacturers who compete with each other in the supply of photocopiers, 
but who each have a monopoly on the maintenance of installed machines they have manufactured. Here consumers 
should look at the likely lifetime costs of the two producers' machines, taking account of maintenance costs, and 
purchase the machine with the smaller lifetime costs. Even if a manufacturer raises the price of maintenance services, it 
can only do this at the expense of lowsring the initial purchase price of the photocopier. 
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base opportunism' for example by increasing maintenance charges) without necessarily a 
significant effect on new demand in its primary market.100 
However, the theoretical possibility of such behaviour must be distinguished from it being 
plausible in practice. Whether a strategy of installed-base opportunism will be in the private 
interests of a manufacturer will depend on whether the benefit to be gained from exploiting the 
current installed base exceeds the resultant loss of future demand for the primary good. 
Shapiro [1995] has shown that even if consumers are not rational and forward-looking (which 
makes them potentially liable to installed-base exploitation), it is still possible that they may 
be protected by primary market competition. If competition in the primary market is vigorous, 
then any profits that manufacturers expect to make through high prices in their aftermarkets 
will be competed away in the primary market, with prices in this market being set below costs. 
Thus, if there is vigorous competition in the primary market, then the potential for installed-
base opportunism due to consumers' inability correctly to forecast aftermarket prices should 
not be of concern to competition authorities. 
In addition, even if we take objections to the lifetime cost argument seriously, this does not 
necessarily lead us to the conclusion that aftermarkets need tough antitrust intervention if 
consumers are to be protected. Rather, this may be an argument in favour of encouraging firms 
to offer contracts which bundle the purchase of a durable good with aftermarket services for a 
single price. Informational problems are thereby avoided, since there is an explicit contract 
giving the terms on which aftermarket services will be available. Under such conditions, 
manufacturers of the primary good should engage in competition in the contracts which they 
offer. Provided the ex ante market is competitive, interbrand competition in the primary 
market should be sufficient to protect consumers and we need not worry about aftermarket 
power.101 
To summarize. 
(a) If primary market competition is strong, and firms offer contracts bundling the purchase 
of a good with aftermarket services for a single price, then the fact that a manufacturer 
has a high share of its own aftermarket should not worry the competition authorities 
(provided that contracts for aftermarket services are sufficiently transparent): this much 
reduces the need to worry about aftermarket power whether or not consumers are 
rational and forward-looking. 
(b) If there is market power in the primary market it is no longer obvious that profits earned 
in aftermarkets will be dissipated by primary-market competition. That is, prices in 
primary markets will not be low enough to compensate consumers fully for higher 
aftermarket prices. In this case direct competition action against the primary market 
100 This is the reason why this 'lifetime costs' argument was rejected by US Supreme Court in the Kodak (1994) case. The 
Court argued that consumers were in fact not able to calculate lifetime cost with any accuracy, either because necessary 
information was not available to them or because of 'bounded rationality'. In particular, forecasting future costs 
requires consumers to anticipate when, if at all, manufacturers might exploit an installed base by raising maintenance 
costs. 
What is more, intervention may not even be necessary to encourage firms to offer such contracts. If consumers face 
large informational problems in calculating lifetime costs, firms will have strong incentives to offer contracts which fix 
the terms of future aftermarket services in advance, and so remove this informational burden on consumers. For 
example, laser printers are often advertised stating the low price of the toner cartridges. 
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power tends to be most desirable, but there may be a limit to how much primary market 
concentration can be reduced. 
The recent Commission decision on the Pelikan-Kyocera case suggests a contrast between the 
current US position (as established by the Kodak case), which appears to be dismissing the 
possibility that primary market competition is sufficient to protect consumers from abuse in 
aftermarkets, and the EU position, which appears rather more economically justified. In 1995, 
Pelikan, a German manufacturer of toner cartridges for printers and photocopiers, made a 
complaint against Kyocera, a Japanese manufacturer of computer printers. Pelikan alleged that 
Kyocera had engaged in various practices intended to drive it out of the toner cartridge market. 
The Commission found that Kyocera was subject to intense competition in the primary market 
for laser printers, and that this restrained its behaviour in the secondary market. The costs of 
switching to a different printer if the cost of consumables rose too much was felt to be low, 
and consumers were thought to be well informed. 
8.4. Foreclosure through exclusionary pricing 
In principle, incumbent firms in a (geographical) market may seek to prevent new entry (both 
de novo and cross-border) through conduct which is meant to signal unequivocally that entry 
would be met with aggressive retaliation, or that its advantage is such (e.g. level of costs) that 
the rival would not be able to compete effectively, were it to enter. The main focus for these 
types of signalling strategies is the incumbent's direct pricing behaviour in the market. The 
important economic issue is when and under what circumstances these strategies may be 
deemed credible. 
From the perspective of the single market programme, to the extent that this removed some 
artificial barriers to cross-border entry, the incentive for incumbent firms to engage in these 
types of predatory strategies to protect themselves from foreign entry will have increased. 
Unlike investment in capacity, R&D or advertising, which may provide the incumbent with a 
credible advantage but require time, pricing is a strategic weapon which lends itself to use as a 
rapid response. At the same time, there are reasons why market integration might in fact 
undermine the efficacy of some of these strategies, for example if the new entrant is an 
incumbent in another market and would have the resources to sustain retaliation, or if the 
information asymmetries which support certain types of signalling are reduced. 
8.4.1. Predatory pricing 
Predatory pricing by the incumbent in a market essentially describes the response of the 
incumbent to actual entry, in order to induce exit ex post. Here the incumbent incurs a short-
run cost in order to achieve a longer-term gain - the exit of a rival which allows prices to be 
raised again. 
Various doubts have been expressed as to whether this strategy is a rational and credible 
course of action, as it is costly to the incumbent as well as to rivals and may not be sustainable 
for long (even more so if the incumbent is larger than the entrant and cannot cut prices 
selectively where it is challenged). 
Two main categories of arguments have been developed to justify prédation as a rational and 
credible strategy. The first is some variant of the 'long purse' (or 'deep pocket') story, 
whereby an incumbent with substantial funds can outlast rivals in any price war that induces 
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losses. The other has to do with asymmetric information - the signal jamming and reputation 
effects, which are in fact closer to limit pricing because they will deter new entry before it 
102 
occurs. 
The 'long purse' story (originally due to Telser [1966], and later formalized particularly by 
Bolton and Scharfstein [1990]) emphasizes imperfections in capital markets and therefore in 
firms' financial constraints. This story depends crucially on financial market imperfections. 
Prédation may lead to a tightening of the financial constraint for liquidity-constrained firms, 
while it is difficult for a bank to assess the prospects of the firm; in this context the long purse 
story makes sense. 
In the context of integration, the 'long purse' story is likely to be empirically more relevant, as 
it describes how firms with greater financial resources might be successful in expelling from 
the market rivals with greater financial constraints (indeed there is empirical evidence on the 
negative relationship between effective cost of capital and the size of a firm). This means that 
entry may not occur in national markets dominated by a strong established incumbent with 
substantial resources. In an integrating market, this may also provide an additional incentive to 
merge, if the parties feel that merging will strengthen their financial resources - thereby 
allowing them to deter entry successfully. 
The main problem with prédation from the point of view of the competition authorities is 
detection. If entrants could be sure that predatory behaviour could be detected and punished, 
then such strategy would not be used. However, the detection problems are very serious, and 
there is no single satisfactory test or technique to prove that a firm is predating. 
The traditional approaches all consider evidence derived from the pattern of pricing over time. 
The best-known test is the Areeda-Turner rule, whereby prices which are below marginal costs 
- as proxied by average costs - are deemed to be predatory. In fact, there are situations in 
which pricing below marginal cost is legitimate, and therefore this test may not be considered 
safe. Baumöl [1979] suggested considering in addition whether firms return to higher prices 
after a period of aggressive pricing. The approach which is most likely to be helpful is a 
composite criterion as suggested by Baumol et al., which includes: 
(a) an analysis of market structure (prédation is more likely in a market where firm sizes are 
very asymmetric, e.g. there is one large firms and a few fringe players), and evaluation 
of the financial strength of the firm (to see how sustainable prédation is); 
(b) considering the pattern of prices over time. 
Overall, the record on successfully proving predatory behaviour in the courts has been poor: 
few cases have been brought, and even less have led to a decision that prédation was 
occurring. 
The 'signal jamming' story (Fudenberg and Tiróle [1986] and Roberts [1986]) emphasizes inferences from prices. The 
'reputation' story (Kreps and Wilson [1982], Milgrom and Roberts, [1982]) postulates that firms may obtain a 
reputation for prédation - though it is not really observed empirically. 
In view of these types of effects, in fact, in German competition law conglomerate mergers may be prevented if firms 
acquire too much financial power relative to competitors in some markets in which they are active. On the merits and 
problems of this approach, see Kühn [1994]. 
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A crucial problem is the need to identify an appropriate measure of the firm's costs - to be 
compared with prices. This is always a contentious issue in prédation cases, where there is a 
sort of 'indistinguishability problem' (the incumbent will always argue that its pricing conduct 
is in fact compatible with keen competition), and therefore much hinges on the level of costs. 
These types of difficulties are well exemplified by the case of AKZO (the largest European 
supplier of bleaching agents), which was investigated following a complaint that its conduct 
threatened to force out of business a smaller UK competitor, Engineering and Chemical 
Supplies Ltd (ECS).104 
In 1982 ECS complained to the Commission that AKZO UK had systematically attempted to 
drive it from the market by offering 'unreasonably low prices' to its main customers. The 
Commission considered evidence largely based upon AKZO UK's internal management 
accounts, which showed that from 1981 to 1983 AKZO UK's flour additives business was being 
operated at a loss, and argued that some products were being offered 'below cost'. The 
Commission also rejected AKZO's argument that it needed to 'compete vigorously' in the UK 
flour additives market in order to recoup profits lost from being undercut by ECS on the 
chemical additives market. The Commission argued that as AKZO UK was selling flour 
additives at a loss, it could hardly be recouping lost profits. 
The difficult issue of the case was the definition of 'pricing below costs'. AKZO argued that it 
always included a profit margin in its prices, which the Commission understood to mean a 
margin over average variable costs (AVC). The dispute centred on what should be included in 
variable costs. AKZO included only the costs of raw materials, energy, packaging and transport. 
The Commission noted that items such as labour, maintenance, warehousing and dispatching 
were being treated as 'fixed' costs, whereas they are usually treated as 'variable' in standard 
accounting systems. Under AKZO's definition, its prices were probably between AVC and ATC 
(average total costs). Under the Commission's definition, AKZO's prices on a number of items 
'fell well short of covering variable costs'.105 
Benzoyl peroxide is a bleaching agent used in the plastics industry, and the only one which may be used for flour in the 
UK and Ireland. AKZO UK (a wholly owned subsidiary of the Dutch group AKZO Chemie BV) was one of only three 
suppliers of benzoyl peroxide for flour in the UK, the others being ECS and Diaflex. In 1983 AKZO was dominant in 
the UK with a 52% market share, followed by ECS with 35%, and Diaflex with 13%. The AKZO group accounted for 
50-55% of European sales of organic peroxides for the plastics industry. 
Before 1977, ECS purchased benzoyl peroxide in bulk from AKZO and blended it for sale. In 1977, after a series of 
price rises from AKZO, ECS began to manufacture its own benzoyl peroxide, and by 1979 it was supplying one-third of 
the UK market for flour additives. In 1979, ECS began to produce benzoyl peroxide also in a form suitable for the 
plastics industry, which is a more lucrative sector. This was initially sold only in the UK, but later in the same year ECS 
made its first shipment to the continent, supplying BASF (one of AKZO's major customers) at 15-20% below AKZO's 
then price. ECS then claimed that in response to this, AKZO UK ended their previous 'swapping' arrangements 
('assistory' or 'co-producer' deliveries between producers were the norm in this business); moreover it threatened to price 
flour additives (ECS's main market) below cost in the UK, and to direct its price cuts particularly at ECS customers, if ECS 
did not exit the plastics market ECS obtained a court injunction on AKZO not to reduce its normal selling prices for 
benzoyl peroxide additives 'with the intention of eliminating ECS as competitors'. In fact, after 1980 there were various 
rounds of price cuts in the UK market for bleaching agents, with all three suppliers cutting their prices significantly. 
AKZO approached ECS's customers with very low prices, while attempting to keep its prices high for its traditional 
customers. Later, in response to price cuts from ECS, AKZO also substantially lowered its prices to them. By 1983 
AKZO had won from ECS several of its key customers, and between 1980 and 1984, ECS's sales were halved in real 
terms. 
The ECJ ruled on 3.7.1991 (case C-62/86) that no costs are fixed or variable per se. On the basis of AKZO's accounts, 
the court deemed that labour costs were fixed in this case and that AKZO's prices were therefore between AVC and 
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Predatory behaviour may also be adopted jointly by the members of a collusive organization, 
in order to eliminate competition from a new player. This has recently been the case with 
predatory behaviour by a marine shipping conference. Following complaints from the Danish 
Government and several shipowners, the Commission initiated proceedings in 1991 against 11 
shipowners' committees, and 4 liner conferences (CEWAL, MEWAC, COWAC and 
UKWAL) for practices adopted in traffic between Europe and West-Central Africa. In 
particular the members of CEWAL (a grouping of several shipping companies to provide a 
regular service between North-West Europe and Zaire/Angola) were found to have engaged in 
a variety of practices to eliminate their chief competitor G&C (a common service between 
Belgian Cobelfret and Italian Grimaldi). Their predatory practices included in particular the 
'fighting ship' method: if a competitor offered a cheaper rate than those set by CEWAL, the 
conference would hold a meeting to undercut him, and ensure that CEWAL members 
scheduled their sailings at or around the same time as those of the competitor in order to win 
over its customers. Charges equivalent to the losses incurred by the competitor would then be 
shared out among CEWAL members.106 
8.4.2. Non-linear pricing 
The incumbent in a market may seek to deter entry by offering to customers discounts which 
effectively amount to penalties for purchasing from a competitor. Discounts and rebates are 
essentially equivalent to making it more expensive for the customer to buy from a variety of 
sources, and in this sense there is an analogy with exclusivity requirements. In fact, it is 
important to distinguish between straight quantity discounting for a single purchase, and 
discounting which is based on aggregate purchases over time. 
Quantity discounting for a single purchase is a price discrimination scheme which tends to be 
pro-competitive, in that it implies more competition for customers 'at the margin'. The case is 
different for discounts on aggregate purchases over time. These include various fidelity 
discounts and explicit loyalty rebate schemes to customers, such as the concession of special 
discounts on condition that the customer does not deal with the rival. An example is the 
distribution agreements concluded by Coke's Italian subsidiary (Coca-Cola) with a number of 
Italian firms, under which a fidelity rebate was granted to large distributors who did not sell 
cola-flavoured drinks other than Coca-Cola (Coca-Cola, 1987). Other schemes directly 'bribe' 
the customer for not dealing with rivals: for example British Gypsum (the UK subsidiary of 
British Plasterboard Industries, the dominant plasterboard producer in the EU) responded to 
import competition from Spain and France into the UK by offering regular lump payments 
(and priority treatment) to UK builders' merchants who agreed to procure all of their needs 
from it (British Plasterboard, 1988). In other cases the rebate may take the form of selective 
price discrimination: for example the system of 'top-slice' rebates put in place by Solvay and 
ICI (dominant soda ash producers on the Continent and the UK) was a two-tier pricing 
structure by which the tonnage the customer would have bought 'in any event' was charged at 
normal prices, while the remaining tonnage which the customer would have bought from the 
alternative supplier was charged at a substantial (and secret) discount. The special discount 
ATC. Nevertheless, the prices were predatory because there was no evidence that they were necessary in order to match 
competitors' offers and there was evidence of an intention to drive ECS out of the market. 
A heavy fine was imposed primarily on CEWAL in 1992 for infringing Articles 85 and 86. This was the first decision 
against a liner conference, which benefits from a block exemption from EU competition rules under certain 
circumstances (Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86). 
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depended on customers buying most, if not all, of their requirements from Solvay. The system 
was implicitly a way of committing to match every discount offered by rivals. 
Loyalty effects may be achieved in principle (though there is no case history as yet) through 
pricing schemes which raise customers' switching costs, i.e. the transaction or learning costs 
which are incurred in switching between different brands - thereby effectively reducing the 
elasticity of demand faced by the firm. Klemperer [1987] showed that in markets where 
consumers have switching costs, new entry may be deterred either by a large customer base or 
by large switching costs, which deny customers to an entrant. 
Discount and rebate schemes which are based on aggregate purchases over time may be 
effective in foreclosing entry, if they imply an effective 'penalty' for customers in dealing with 
other suppliers, and this makes alternative sourcing unattractive to them. The effect here is 
similar to exclusive distribution, as the discounts may effectively 'tie' customers to the 
incumbent, with the result that the rival may not be able to enter at minimum efficient scale.108 
The relevant question to be asked by the competition authorities in cases of complaints against 
an incumbent's discounts is therefore the same as in exclusive distribution: namely whether 
new entry at minimum efficient scale would feasible. 
As we shall see in Section 8.6, this approach does not appear to be followed consistently by 
the Commission. The presumption seems to be that discounts are 'bad' whenever they are 
offered by dominant firms, but the effective scope for entry at minimum scale is not explored. 
In the Coca-Cola (1987) case, for example, the view was that as Coca-Cola held a dominant 
position on the Italian market for cola-flavoured soft drinks, and the effect of the rebates was 
to get distributors to sell only Coca-Cola, competing producers were prevented from having 
access to a substantial part of the Italian market for cola-flavoured soft drinks. However it is 
not clear to what extent rivals' entry at minimum scale was prevented. 
In this perspective there appears also to be some asymmetry between the competition policy 
treatment of exclusive distribution, which benefits from an exemption under Article 85(3), and 
discounts by dominant firms, which are treated quite severely under Article 86. In fact, 
discounts may not be as 'bad' as exclusive dealing in foreclosing entry, because while 
exclusivity tends to be supported by long-term contracts, in the cases of discounts there is 
nearly always the possibility of 'opting out' (and the possibility that the new entrant could 
offer to supply the customer at a price which is lower than the incumbent's discounted price). 
8.5. Institutional entry barriers and incumbents' behaviour 
Cross-border entry into a market may be hampered - or slowed down - by various 
'institutional' barriers: rules and regulations introduced by national governments (or local 
However Caminal and Matutes [1990] have shown that when there are endogenous switching costs, the effect depends 
crucially on the precise form of the discounting scheme. 
Coordination problems between customers may mean that the incumbent can foreclose entry even if the benefit of 
fidelity for the individual customer is small. Rasmusen et al. [1991] consider the case of a monopolist asking customers 
to sign agreements not to deal with potential competitors. Although the benefit of buying from one supplier is small, if 
each customer believes that the others will sign, each also believes that no rival seller will enter; hence an individual 
customer loses nothing by signing the exclusionary agreement, and will indeed sign. Thus if there are 100 customers 
and the minimum efficient scale requires serving 15, the monopoly need only lock up 86 customers to forestall entry 
('naked exclusion'). 
Barriers to entry and access restrictions in integrating markets 133 
authorities) which effectively increase an outsider's cost in supplying that market and put it at 
a permanent disadvantage relative to the incumbent(s). An example may be differences in 
technical standards across borders: while these may reflect differences in local preferences, the 
need to conform to different requirements also increases firms' costs of supplying foreign 
markets.1 Lengthy and complex border procedures will add to the cost of shipping goods 
across national frontiers, and these barriers to trade will also tend to reduce a firm's ability to 
supply a market from another national market. Insofar as these factors imply that the 
incumbent enjoys an absolute cost advantage over the potential rival, which persists post-
entry, they are absolute barriers to entry. 
The single market programme set out to eliminate several categories of these (non-tariff) 
barriers which were found to restrict artificially cross-border trade and entry - by increasing 
either the variable cost of supplying a market or the set-up cost of direct entry (see Chapter 2). 
In parallel, the Commission has been supporting the slow process of liberalization and 
deregulation which has been initiated by national governments in some network industries 
(such as, for example, the utilities), in the deliberate effort to promote a competitive and 
integrated market in such sectors. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that in some cases the institutional features of a market 
can be strategically exploited by the incumbent for the purpose of excluding rivals. In these 
cases, entry into the market is prevented by a combination of legal rules and restrictions, and 
the strategic behaviour of the incumbent(s). In these circumstances, the most appropriate 
policy response is often not a change in the regulation, but again a challenge to the behaviour 
of the incumbent(s) through competition policy. We consider some examples below. 
8.5.1. Dominance through regulation 
A possible example of regulations being used in this way is the case of the beer market in the 
UK Licensing restrictions on opening a retail outlet (which imply that there is, supposedly, a 
'fixed' stock of pubs), combined with exclusive purchasing agreements between brewers and 
pubs and typically the 'bundling' of finance and beer sales, have been claimed by new brewers 
to be a significant entry barrier. Indeed, European brewers have claimed that the tying system 
for British pubs has not allowed them entry into the UK market at minimum efficient scale, 
and has required them to adopt production licensing arrangements instead. 
The strategic exploitation of local regulation for foreclosure purposes is well illustrated, for 
example, by the case of bottled mineral water in Germany. In 1990, an environmental rule was 
introduced in Germany promoting the use of recyclable glass bottles for mineral water. Multi-
way glass bottles are manufactured by a monopoly, the GDB (Genossenschaft Deutscher 
Brunnen, German Cooperative for Spring Water). After the rule was introduced most 
supermarkets and wholesalers refused to accept bottles other than those manufactured by 
GDB. European mineral water producers complained to the Commission that access to GDB's 
standardized packaging pool was reserved for German mineral water producers. Supply to 
producers from the rest of the Community was refused - thereby raising their costs of entry 
into the German mineral water market. The Commission took the view that the combination of 
GDB's monopoly and the environmental legislation constituted an effective entry barrier from 
Which is the reason why incumbent firms may in some cases play a part in erecting such barriers, e.g. lobbying the 
authorities for the introduction of national standards. 
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other Member States. This was deemed to be an abuse of dominant position, and the GDB had 
to grant all European producers access to its pool. 
A very different outcome was obtained on a similar complaint to the Commission in 1987, i.e. 
before the introduction of the environmental legislation. The Chambre Syndicale des Eaux de 
Source ou Minérales (Belgium) also complained that the GDB refused to grant foreign mineral 
water producers access to its pool, compelling them to use only non-standard returnable or 
disposable bottles and thereby restricting their access to the German market. The Commission 
rejected the complaint on grounds that no evidence was provided of restricted access to the 
German market, and at the same time it was established that German distributors generally did 
not object to mineral water in containers different from those in use in the GDB. That is, up to 
the point when it was still feasible to sell water in Germany in containers other than the special 
glass bottles, there was no exclusionary effect, and no reason for the competition authorities to 
intervene. By restricting the available technology, the new regulation essentially conferred a 
dominant position on the GDB; and in the new circumstances, the behaviour of the GDB was 
in fact exclusionary and competition policy intervention appropriate. 
8.5.2. Airport slots and traffic distribution rules 
The airline industry offers a variety of examples of 'institutional' restrictions of entry. 
Traditionally, bilateral agreements between government agencies (and/or flag carriers) decided 
on capacity and number of carriers per route (the two flag carriers in most cases). Slot 
allocation was a secondary concern. Airport slots were generally allocated by governments (or 
an employee of the flag carrier) on the basis of 'the principle of self-regulation and consensus'. 
Another established principle of slot allocation was the concept of 'grandfather rights', 
whereby an airline which used a slot in one season was entitled to use the same slot in the 
same season the following year. Once slots had been allocated, trading was not possible. 
Since the mid-1980s the industry has been the focus of a wide-ranging liberalization 
programme, aimed at increasing competition between carriers and at encouraging new entry on 
most routes. Given the severe physical capacity constraints at several European airports, which 
are likely to persist for some time, the system through which slots are allocated becomes 
crucially important. 
As part of the liberalization programme, the issue of slots has been addressed by assigning de 
facto property rights over them to airlines. Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 ('on common rules for 
the allocation of slots at Community airports', July 1993) stipulates that 50% of slots which 
are unused are to be requisitioned and allocated to new entrants. However there are a number 
of issues which remain open. First of all, as full tradability of slots has not yet been 
established, the nature of the property rights recognized to the airlines remains unclear. 
Secondly, even if such property rights were fully transferable, it is not clear that a pure trading 
system would necessarily lead to an efficient allocation of slots.110 Thus, attributing property 
rights to the current incumbent carriers may not be a solution, and allocating them for example 
to the airport may be more reasonable. 
In the extreme, given that the monopoly profit exceeds the (joint) duopoly profit, a bid for monopoly would always be 
greater than a bid for duopoly - which suggests that in a fully tradable system, the incentive for the incumbent airline to 
bid for all the slots would be strong (unless, for example, the airline also operates all the airport catering services, in 
which cases it will want to maximize'the throughput of passengers). 
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In any case, the bureaucratic procedures for allocation appear to be still strategically exploited 
by the incumbents to foreclose the entry of new carriers. Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 
emphasized the legal obligation of Member States to play an active role in slot allocation, and 
to create institutional arrangements for such allocation, with legally binding rules. Member 
States are specifically required to appoint a coordinator whose task is to allocate slots, monitor 
slot usage and withdraw slots in the event of non-usage. But while the coordinator is required 
to carry out its duties in a 'neutral, non-discriminatory, and transparent way' (and an 
obligation is imposed on Member States to ensure that it acts according to these principles), in 
practice in most cases the coordinator is an employee of the domestic flag carrier. 11 A recent 
survey of the implementation of the regulation found that 'the rights of incumbent carriers are 
well established at most airports. [...] In contrast, it appears that the rights of new entrants are 
rather less well protected. [...] It appears possible for incumbents to pre-empt the access of 
i n 
new entrants to new capacity' (Coopers and Lybrand [1995, p. 63]). 
Another way in which flag carriers have sought to reduce their exposure to competition has 
been to lobby their national governments for the adoption of favourable traffic distribution 
rules (these are the rules according to which airlines are distributed between different airports 
located in a same 'catchment' area). Suppose that national flights only leave from one airport, 
and an airline is restricted to the other. Then the latter would not be able to obtain feeder 
traffic from the national market, which may make the potential rival unviable. 
This has been well exemplified by the traffic distribution rules in the Paris area, where the 
French Government tried to protect its national carrier from intra-European competition by 
reserving Orly airport for it (and leaving the rest for Charles de Gaulle)113. Frustrated entry 
attempts by Viva Air, the Iberia subsidiary, by TAT, Lauda Air, KLM and Lufthansa led to a 
number of complaints. The Commission took formal action in the cases of Viva Air and TAT, 
as a result of which Orly is more accessible. A similar exclusionary effect of traffic 
distribution rules was contemplated in Italy in the Milan area, as the Italian administration 
planned to move other airlines to Malpensa, while leaving the flag carrier Alitalia at Linate. 
This would have hampered other airlines' ability to interline with Italian domestic traffic. 
Finally, member governments have sometimes sought to favour carriers by granting them 
exclusive route concessions on domestic routes on grounds of public service obligations. 
That is, a certain route would be reserved for a particular carrier on grounds that traffic on that 
111 
112 
And even if the coordinator were a civil servant, its independence would be put in doubt by the fact that - with the 
exception of British Airways, KLM and Luxair - all flag carriers are state-owned. 
The case of two small new entrants in Italy is a useful illustration of the incentives that flag carriers still have for 
exploiting their control of the coordinator to disadvantage the operation of new competitors (or induce their exit). In 
March 1996, the Italian coordinator - who is an employee of the flag carrier Alitalia - assigned the slots for the summer 
season of 1996. Two small companies that entered the domestic market in the second half of 1995 (by obtaining 
'unused' slots from Alitalia) saw their slots reduced for the following summer season (Noman from 122 in the winter 
1995/96 to 52, 12 of which were at 'impossible hours', against the 104 it had demanded; Air One from 168 to 126, 
against 172 demanded). The reason was the application of the 'grandfather rights' principle, which means that the 
coordinator took as a basis the summer season of 1995 (when they were not in the market). Alitalia, on the other hand, 
was assigned 43 slots more than it had the previous summer, plus 42 assigned to its subsidiary Eurofly. After the Italian 
competition authority threatened to intervene, the parties appear to have come to an agreement. However this episode 
reflected the residual powers of the flag carriers to influence slot allocation and thereby disadvantage new entrants. 
CAA, 1995, pp. 42 ff. 
While domestic routes (cabotage) will be liberalized only in 1997, consecutive cabotage rights were already permitted 
under the First Package (1987). 
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route was thin and would not support competing airlines, but at the same time there are public 
service obligations which require that the route is served. 
Institutional factors often create the scope for anti-competitive behaviour on the part of the 
incumbent. This may be the case where institutional restrictions to entry are introduced by 
governments under pressure from the incumbents in their national markets; where the 
incumbents exploit rules and regulations to their advantage and to the detriment of 
competitors; and generally in all cases where exclusionary effects are due not to standards and 
regulations alone, but to a combination of these and the behaviour of the incumbent. 
8.6. EU competition treatment of barriers to entry 
In the previous sections, we have argued that the elimination of artificial barriers to entry and 
the institutional liberalization of certain sectors will increase the scope for exclusionary 
behaviour by firms already in the market. We have then identified the forms of exclusionary 
behaviour which are most relevant in the context of integration. In this section, we consider 
how these classes of entry barriers are dealt with in European competition policy. We begin 
with some preliminary consideration on jurisdictional/procedural matters, and on the use of 
the concept of leverage. 
8.6.1. Jurisdiction and procedure 
From a jurisdictional point of view, entry barriers erected by the dominant incumbent in a 
market are mostly caught under Article 86. As described in the previous chapter, this generally 
prohibits all abuses of a dominant position, and lists some specific instances of such abuse: 
setting 'unfair prices', 'limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers', price discriminating between 'equivalent transactions', and imposing 
unjustified onerous conditions in contracts. The list is clearly not exhaustive, and has been 
applied to a variety of practices which are not specifically mentioned. 
The procedure requires first that the firm is found to be dominant (a process which relies on a 
preliminary market definition and has led at times to controversial outcomes). Once 
dominance has been established, abuse must be shown: holding a dominant position is 
obviously not an offence per se. This does not mean, however, that there is a burden on the 
Commission to prove that a dominant firm did in fact act with exclusionary intent. Rather, the 
Commission's inquiry is to be limited to the foreclosing effects of the practice in question. 
Article 86 should also cover abuses of a dominant position held by more than one firm (joint 
dominance), and may thus be used to attack entry barriers arising from the strategic conduct of 
the incumbent firms in the market. However, where barriers to entry result from agreements 
between firms (e.g. in the case of foreclosure through vertical agreements or joint ventures), 
then Article 85 applies. As certain practices can only have serious anti-competitive effects in a 
concentrated market, an important point is that the approach of Article 86 is generally 
In the ECJ's decision on Hoffman-La Roche (1976), it is made explicit that an abuse is any practice hindering 
competition 'in a market where, as a result of the very presence ofthat undertaking competition is weakened'. There is 
also a view that firms which are dominant should be charged, by virtue of this fact, with a 'special responsibility' not to 
engage in practices which would be legitimate for non-dominant companies (for example the ECJ declared in 1983 that 
a firm in a dominant position has a 'special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair undistorted competition on 
the Common market' - ruling on the Michelin case). 
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preferable: in conditioning competition intervention on dominance, it makes it contingent on 
market structure (though there are problems with the current definition of relevant market and 
dominance). Article 85, on the contrary, does not have such contingency provisions. Although 
the de minimis provision requires there to be significant effects for Article 85 to be applicable, 
in practice this excludes only a very small number of cases of firms with tiny market shares 
and so cannot be considered to be an effective market structure contingent rule. 
8.6.2. The use of the 'leverage' 
There is a rather long line of Court jurisprudence and Commission practice on foreclosure 
which relies on the notion of 'leveraging market power'. Abuses under Article 86 have often 
been found in markets where the firm is not dominant, but which are in some way related to 
markets where it is dominant. The condition is that there is some form of 'associative' link 
between those markets: for example these 'secondary' (or 'derivative') markets can be 
'vertically linked' to a 'principal market' through the control of an essential input (e.g. 
Commercial Solvents, 1984; Telemarketing, 1985; London European/Sabena, 1987). 
Predatory pricing and loyalty rebates have also been identified as abusive practices by firms 
holding a dominant position in a related market (e.g. AKZO, 1991 and Tetra Pak II, 1994). In 
all these cases where the firm is accused of 'extending dominance into neighbouring markets', 
or 'abuse in associated markets', it is important to be clear what the 'association' is based on. 
For example, in Tetra Pak II (1994 - Case C-333/94), the CFI upheld the Commission's earlier 
finding that Tetra Pak had abused its dominance in the market for aseptic packaging machines 
and cartons by operating a predatory pricing policy and other practices in another market 
(described as 'adjacent and indeed associated') in which it was not dominant - namely the 
market for non-aseptic packaging machines and cartons. In the view of the Court, 'the fact that 
Tetra Pak had nearly 90% of the markets in the aseptic sector meant that [...] it was not only 
an inevitable supplier of aseptic systems but also a favoured supplier of non-aseptic systems'. 
As aseptic and non-aseptic packaging are not complements, and the customers are not the 
same, it is difficult to see a reason for this. The Court went on to say that '(m)oreover, by 
virtue of its technological lead and its quasi-monopoly in the aseptic sector, Tetra Pak was 
able to focus its competitive effort on the neighbouring non-aseptic markets, without fear of 
retaliation in the aseptic sector [...]', and on this basis 'Tetra Pak's practices in the non-aseptic 
market [where Tetra Pak was not dominant] are liable to be caught by Art. 86 without being 
necessary to establish the existence of a dominant position in those markets taken in isolation, 
since (Tetra Pak's) leading position on the non-aseptic markets, combined with the close 
associative links between those markets and the aseptic markets, gave it freedom of conduct 
compared with other economic operators on the non-aseptic markets, such as to impose on it a 
special responsibility under Art. 86 to maintain a genuine undistorted competition in these 
markets' (para. 122). 
This judgement appears hard to justify. More generally, this framework (and in particular the 
distinction between 'principal' market and 'secondary' market) does not appear to be 
particularly helpful. More helpful would be to use the notion of 'complementarity' of assets 
and inputs. 
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8.6.3. Access to complementary assets 
Refusal to supply and the 'essential facilities doctrine ' 
Refusal to supply is dealt with under Article 86, as an instance of abusive behaviour on the 
part of a dominant firm. As explicitly stated in Polaroid/SSI (1983), 'as a general principle an 
objectively unjustifiable refusal to supply by an undertaking holding a dominant position on a 
market constitutes an infringement of Article 86'. 
Since the late 1980s, the focus on the integration objective has meant the Commission has 
tackled an increasing number of cases in which 'refusal to supply' concerned access to an 
infrastructural input (such as a port, or an airline facility), which was claimed to be 'essential' 
for operating a particular service, and without access to which potential rivals were prevented 
from supplying the final market. Thus Article 86 has been used in a number of recent 
decisions to require the owner/operator of an infrastructural facility to grant access to 
competitors. These have been described as 'essential facility cases' to indicate that, without 
access to the facility, competitors could not provide services to customers. ' 
The nature of the abuse in these cases tends to be viewed by the Commission again in terms of 
'leverage', i.e. as the use of monopoly in one market (the 'essential' complementary asset) to 
exclude competitors in a related market (the final market which can only be supplied if access 
is obtained to the complementary asset). For example, in London European/Sabena (1988), the 
Commission held that by refusing LE Airlines access to its CRS, Sabena had abused its 
dominant position 'in the market for computerized flight reservation systems' in Belgium. 
Sabena's CRS was deemed an essential facility in the Belgian market for any company to 
compete actively on this route. 
The first important issue for the competition authorities is to establish the extent to which a 
particular access can be actually considered an 'essential facility'. Thus, in all cases, it is 
essential to evaluate carefully whether alternative entry can be achieved at minimum efficient 
scale (e.g. in the case of a port, whether there are alternative ports which could be used to run 
a ferry service);117 and the cost (including the opportunity cost) of creating a new facility. 
Having established that a facility is truly essential in the sense just described, it is appropriate 
that access should be ordered. However the doctrine is not very helpful when it comes to the 
conditions at which access should be granted. In 'Holyhead Γ (1991), the Commission 
enunciated the principle that a company which both owns and uses an essential facility 'should 
not grant its competitors access on terms less favourable than those which it gives its own 
This has most often concerned airline and port facilities, though in 1995 the Commission also adopted a notice applying 
the essential facility principle to cross-border credit transfer systems (where a cross-border credit transfer system 
constitutes an 'essential facility', it must be open for further membership, provided that the candidates meet appropriate, 
objectively justified criteria). 
There are cases in which this is not very clear. For example, as seen in Section 7.3, in Morlaix (1995) the Commission 
applied the 'essential facility doctrine' to force access by Irish Ferries to the port of Roscoff for ferry services between 
Ireland and Brittany - though in fact there was a variety of other ports in Brittany to which Irish Ferries could have 
potentially turned (indeed Roscoff was a second choice for Irish ferries, after an application had been turned down by 
the port of Brest). The Commission found that Morlaix was dominant because it was 'the only port providing port 
facilities under acceptable conditions between Ireland and Brittany' (though the qualification 'under acceptable 
conditions' is unclear). The refusal of the port authority (Morlaix) to allow access to Irish Ferries, thereby preventing 
competition with the incumbent Brittany Ferries, was deemed an abuse ofthat dominant position. Morlaix was ordered 
to allow Irish Ferries 'reasonable, non-discriminatory access' to Roscoff for the 1995 season (pending final resolution). 
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services'. In 'Holyhead II', the principle was formally declared to apply also to new 
entrants.1 ' It is important to emphasize that non-discriminatory access is not the issue here: an 
integrated company can charge a high access price both to its downstream subsidiary using the 
facility and to rivals, and then recoup its own losses through the access charges paid by the 
rivals. Thus when it comes to issues of access conditions (i.e. price), an obligation of'fairness' 
to rivals will not be sufficient to exclude strategic behaviour by the incumbent. 
In truth, setting the conditions of access is a regulatory rather than a competition issue, 
because (as seen in Section 8.3) it requires adequate cost data. Indeed the 'essential facilities 
doctrine' has been used to date only to require access, but not to deal with refusals of access 
based on excessive or discriminatory pricing. While it is possible that this may change as 
competition increases, and more comparative data gradually becomes available, it also 
highlights the difficulties of using competition law to define specific access conditions. As 
discussed below, this is particularly relevant in the case of network industries. 
Access pricing 
The process of deregulation and liberalization of the former statutory monopolies has raised 
the question of whether access pricing problems should be addressed in future by the EU 
competition authorities under Article 86, rather than by regulators. In this approach, the 
'essential facilities doctrine' is viewed as a point of departure for the application of 
competition policy to industries where there is still dominance at least in an important segment 
of the market (due for example to bottlenecks on particular portions of the network 
infrastructure - e.g. the local loop in telephony). 
The application of Article 86 in particular to network industries has been advocated on 
occasion, on the grounds that there is already a general obligation under this Article on 
dominant firms to deal 'fairly' with customers and competitors. In Holyhead I (1992) the 
Commission made this explicit by arguing firstly that 'a port, an airport or any other facility, 
even if it is not in itself a substantial part of the common market, may be considered as such 
insofar as reasonable access to the facility is indispensable for the exploitation of a transport 
route which is substantial'; then recognizing that this argument can be extended to any 
infrastructure, and not merely to transport routes; and finally acknowledging that 'this 
consequence of Article 86 is of essential importance in the context of deregulation' (XXIInd 
Report on Competition Policy). 
In practice, in the sector where the liberalization process is most advanced -
telecommunications - the Commission has so far pursued the introduction of competitive 
market conditions through a combination of Article 85 and regulatory measures, rather than by 
bringing a series of Article 86 cases.119 In its 1987 Green Paper on télécoms, the Commission 
118 Already there was a body of Article 86 cases where a general duty is imposed on the incumbent of 'acting fairly towards 
competitors' who are dependent on supplies of a particular material (Commercial Solvents, 1985), or on access to 
essential services (Telemarketing, 1984). 
A variety of Article 85 cases in the télécoms sector (joint ventures and cooperative agreements) have also dealt with 
entry issues. In this area, the attitude of the Commission has been to grant negative clearance or individual exemption 
subject to the provision of undertakings to grant access to third parties to the facilities in question, and that the price of 
access be 'fair and reasonable' (e.g. BT/MCI (1993), BS/BT (1994), Nordic (1995), and, early on, Eirpage (1991), a 
joint venture between the Irish TO and Motorola to establish and operate a paging system. The operating agreement 
reached between the two partners regulated access to infrastructural facilities which would have effectively excluded 
third parties from competition. The Commission therefore obtained undertakings from the Irish TO that it would make 
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explicitly took the view that a strategy based on bringing cases against Member States and 
TOs would be too cumbersome and slow. The regulatory route was chosen instead, in 
particular the development of a series of 'Article 90 Directives' aimed at removing the 
exclusive rights of TOs to provide equipment and services. 
However there is some evidence that competition rules may be used more in the future. For 
example, in the Green Paper on the Liberalization of Telecom Infrastructure (January 1995), 
while still choosing a regulatory approach in preference to case-by-case application of the 
competition rules, the Commission recommended the use of Art. 86 to deal with 
interconnection disputes - in particular with regard to access to the local loop. Thus as 
competition develops in these industries, it is conceivable that more use will be made of 
Article 86 to deal with cases of abuse by the incumbent. 
Foreclosure through vertical restraints 
European competition policy has largely adopted the notion that vertical restraints between 
manufacturers and distributors, or manufacturers and licensees, can be welfare-enhancing. At 
present vertical restraints benefit from a system of block exemptions which exempt certain 
categories of vertical agreements from the prohibition of interfirm agreements contained in 
Art. 85(1). There is in particular a block exemption on exclusive distribution (Regulation 
(EEC) No 1983/83), and one on exclusive purchasing (Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83, with 
special rules for beer and petrol). Both of these are due to expire at end-1997. Individual 
exemptions may be given for selective distribution, and there is a specific block exemption on 
car distribution and servicing agreements (Regulation (EEC) No 123/85, replaced by 
Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 in 1995). Special rules also exist on franchising. 
As well as traditional considerations of efficiency in distribution, the favourable treatment of 
vertical arrangements in EU competition law has also been supported by the view that 
appointing a local distributor may facilitate the penetration of foreign markets, and stimulate 
cross-frontier trade, thereby favouring integration. At the same time, as seen in the previous 
chapter, there is a rather uneasy balance between the position that agreements conferring 
territorial exclusivity have efficiency justifications, and should be allowed, and at the same 
time that this should not translate into market segmentation. 
However, there are also concerns about the possible market monopolization and foreclosure 
effects of certain agreements. For example, the Commission's position that exclusive 
purchasing agreements should not hamper entry is apparent in the refusal to exempt such 
agreements in the case of German ice cream manufacturers Langnese and Schöller. It was 
stated that 'In general, the Commission considers these agreements to be beneficial to 
competition in normal market conditions because they strengthen the position of the 
undertaking which has concluded the exclusivity agreement. If, however, access by other 
suppliers to the relevant market is impeded as a result of the market structure and other 
significant barriers to entry to this market, any further strengthening of that position by 
exclusivity agreements cannot be accepted. Such a situation arises in the present case, where 
Langnese and Schöller operate a duopoly and where access to the market is made particularly 
difficult as a result of freezer exclusivity arrangements'. 
the infrastructural facilities available to third parties on the same conditions as applied to Eirpage. The Commission also 
insisted on the possibility of 'fair access for third parties' even if the facilities were not strictly 'essential'). 
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More generally, the block exemptions contain a number of conditions and criteria which make 
the agreement eligible for exemption. The length of the agreements is an important 
consideration (exemption is granted only for limited periods), and indeed long-term exclusive 
arrangements between a dominant firm and its customers may be considered an abuse in the 
sense of Article 86, because they preclude customers from switching to alternative suppliers, 
and they may foreclose competing suppliers. 
While at this stage the Commission's future orientation on vertical agreements is not known (a 
Green Paper is expected), it would be appropriate if this incorporated a market structure test, 
with intervention being conditional on such a test. In this approach, the competition authority 
would only intervene if, having regard to the structure of the market, it appears that 
competition is being effectively impaired. Under this 'structural approach' only restraints by 
firms with market power would fall within Art. 85(1). 
This is also an opportunity for the Commission to address the criticism that its current system 
of block exemptions puts too much emphasis on the legal form of arrangements. 
In the meantime, the block exemption for motor vehicle distribution has been renewed, though 
only for another seven years (Regulation (EC) No 1475/95), and there are views that it will not 
be renewed again. A new position has emerged on multi-make dealers: individual exemptions 
may be granted to a dealer which represents two makes, as long the showrooms are in separate 
premises.120 The Commission appears to be gradually warming to the position that sales and 
servicing need not be carried out in the same premises or by the same dealer; and the 
established efficiency defence for exclusivity/selectivity mostly applies to service. Hence the 
traditional approach - where clearance of exclusive rights is linked for new car sales, and 
exclusive servicing rights - may be outdated, especially if market practices develop which 
show that such a link may not be indispensable. The current evidence appears in favour of this 
approach, as it increasingly shows manufacturers owning or appointing dealers with large 
showrooms for sales, and separately franchising service centres in different locations (this is 
for example the entry strategy followed by the Korean company Daewoo). 
8.6.4. Exclusionary pricing on markets 
Prédation 
Predatory pricing falls under the category of abusive conducts which are caught in EU 
competition law under Article 86. 
As we have seen, the classic prédation case is AKZO (1986): it abused its dominant position 
in the EU organic peroxides market by implementing a strategy of selective below-cost pricing 
in the flour segment ofthat market, when its threat to a small rival to deter it from entering the 
market was ignored. Apart from this, there are very few examples of cases being brought 
specifically on prédation charges. More often, prédation is accessory to a wider set of 
complaints made against a dominant firm, mostly to do with issues of refusai to supply (e.g. in 
Tetra Pak II (1991), the main issue was the 'tying' of a durable good with the supply of 
complementary inputs by the dominant firm, however predatory pricing was also identified by 
Though it was later stated that those premises can be in the same building. 
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the Commission in the fact that one type of carton (the non-aseptic type) had been 'sold at a 
loss' in seven states). 
Non-linear pricing 
It has been a long-standing policy of the Commission to prohibit under Art. 86 the practice by 
dominant firms of offering, as a means of supporting their dominant position, loyalty/fidelity 
rebates (Hoffman-La Roche, British Gypsum); rebates related to sales targets (Michelin, Coca-
Cola) or 'top-slice' rebates (Solvay and ICI). 
In all these cases, the Commission view (upheld by the CFI in 1993) was that although 
'promotional payments are standard practice in a normal competitive environment', this is 
indeed an abusive conduct when pursued by a dominant firm. According to Court 
jurisprudence and Commission practices, rebates offered by dominant firms are excusable 
only if 'they are based on objective cost-based criteria, and therefore produce actual cost 
savings'; their terms are transparent; and they are non-discriminatory. Conversely, rebates are 
abusive if they are discriminatory, i.e. 'based on estimates of customers' capacity to absorb 
additional expenditure' (e.g. Hoffman-La Roche); if they are aimed at attaining the entire 
requirements of a customer (HLR); if they are based on the decision of a customer whether or 
not to buy a competitor's product (Hilti); if they are totally discretionary; if they are 
accompanied by 'pressure' on customers to sell the supplier's products. 
Recent Commission administrative practices indicate, however, that the Commission may be 
willing to enter into a settlement with a dominant firm if it can be assured that a sufficient 
degree of competition is not foreclosed through that firm's rebate and pricing policies. Indeed, 
more recently the Commission has gone further, allowing dominant companies the possibility 
to benefit from an Art. 85(3) exemption for their various distribution practices. Also, the 
Commission appears willing to treat some rebate schemes favourably if they satisfy certain 
conditions, even if the firm is dominant (e.g. application by BPB for four rebate schemes). In a 
series of Notices published in 1992, the Commission stated that rebates which are transparent, 
non-discriminatory, based on objective cost-based criteria, linked to actual savings or 
'intended to facilitate market entry' will be judged favourably (even when the firm has a 
significant market share) because they are 'capable of promoting competition'. 
Overall, the competition policy rules in this area are not really coherent and consistent. For 
example, while loyalty bonuses are regarded as infringements of Art. 86, frequent flier 
programmes are not objected to. However, this also reflects the fact that in this area there are 
as yet no clear guiding economic principles as to what should be objected to. 
8.7. Conclusions 
To the extent that the single market programme has been effective in removing institutional 
factors preventing entry into markets, we would expect that firms' incentives to replace these 
barriers with strategic behaviour have increased. 
In this chapter, we have discussed a variety of ways in which this may have occurred. 
(a) First, we have emphasized how even where barriers to entry are of an institutional 
nature, the exclusionary effect can be determined by a combination of these factors and 
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the behaviour of the incumbents, which makes competition policy intervention the 
appropriate instrument. 
(b) We have identified two main categories of exclusionary behaviour which is likely to 
prevent entry (both de novo and cross-border), and thereby hamper integration, retaining 
artificial market segmentation along national borders. The first is restricting access to a 
complementary asset, the second is pricing on markets. 
(c) On access issues: 
(i) We have identified the basic conditions under which access restrictions placed by 
the incumbent can be considered exclusionary (that the asset is essential and non-
replicable by the entrant, so that entry at minimum efficient scale is not possible). 
We have reviewed the 'essential facilities doctrine' in this light. 
(ii) We have discussed access pricing as a special case of refusal to supply, and argued 
that wide application of Art. 86 to these cases may not be desirable, given the 
intrinsically different nature of competition policy and regulation, which makes 
the latter more suitable for the task. 
(iii) We have considered the conditions under which vertical restraints may have 
exclusionary effects and conclude that they should be treated conceptually the 
same as other access restrictions. 
(d) On pricing on markets: 
(i) Predatory strategies based on the 'long-purse' story are the most relevant in the 
context of integration, though detection remains a difficult issue. In these cases, a 
composite tests which considers market structure and the firm's financial strength, 
as well as the pattern of prices over time, appears the most appropriate. 
(ii) In considering 'non-linear pricing' we have emphasized the analogy between 
various instances of discounts and rebates for aggregate purchases over time, and 
exclusivity in distribution. We have also noted the asymmetry in EU competition 
law between the harsh treatment of discounts, and the benevolent treatment of 
exclusive dealing. 
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9. Market integration and collusion 
9.1. Introduction 
Firms would typically prefer to achieve and support some form of 'joint action' in place of 
direct rivalry. Collusion is a general term which includes 'all types of conduct or forms of 
behaviour whereby decision-takers agree to coordinate their actions' (Rees [1993a, p. 27]). 
Collusive agreements include direct price-fixing, whereby firms agree on a mechanism to 
determine and adjust prices; arrangements on quantities supplied to the market; or mutual 
'stand-off agreements, whereby firms commit themselves not to enter each other's markets. In 
addition to prices and production levels - which are the focus of standard analysis of collusion 
- firms choose other strategic variables, such as investments in physical capital and R&D, and 
may also collude in these.121 Collusion also includes cases where outcomes are effectively 
coordinated, but in fact there is no explicit agreement between firms to achieve that outcome -
'tacit' collusion. 
Collusion in setting prices or quantities leads to adverse allocative efficiency effects, as it enables 
prices to be sustained significantly above costs. It may also imply productive efficiency, losses, if 
it blunts firms' incentives to remove slack. For these reasons, it is a major focus of competition 
policy under all jurisdictions. 
In EU competition law, the prohibition of collusion has a further dimension. Art. 85(1) of the 
Treaty of Rome, under which collusion is captured, explicitly prohibits agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices between firms 'which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the common market'. As a result, the practice of the European courts on collusion has 
been characterized by the pursuit of a dual objective: collusive agreements should be eliminated 
because they increase market power and reduce economic efficiency, but also because they 
undermine the process of integration as such. Evidence for this dual objective may be found for 
example in the Cement case (1994), where the Commission explicitly stated that 'the practice 
of cement producers not to sell in one another's home markets [...] has the sole objective of 
limiting competition between companies from the different Member States, and frustrates the 
fundamental EU aim of the creation of the single market' (XXIVth Report on Competition 
Policy 1994). 
Given the emphasis on collusive agreements affecting trade, the Commission has typically 
focused on two types of collusive agreements: cross-border agreements through which firms 
effectively share markets on a geographic basis (i.e. mutual 'stand-offs'), and agreements 
between domestic firms which might prevent the entry of a rival into a national market. 
This chapter addresses the nature of the relationship between the process of integration and the 
incentive for firms to collude and sustain cooperation. In particular, we consider how the 
achievement of integration might be hindered by existing or new collusive agreements between 
121 Indeed the overall evaluation of collusion on prices and quantities should take into account its effects on the 
competitive interaction in these other dimensions. The economic literature has shown for example that collusion on 
prices and quantities may yield lower overall profits (compared with not colluding at all) if it intensifies competition in 
an earlier stage of the game in variables such as capacity investment or R&D. 
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firms. We also consider whether measures to remove artificial barriers to trade may be expected 
to undermine existing collusive practices; or whether they might provide instead an incentive for 
firms to seek renewed or new forms of cooperation. 
We would expect the single market to affect collusion firstly through its direct impact on some 
devices which made collusion sustainable. For example, the promotion of market integration 
measures might undermine some of the intangibles which helped firms sustain collusion in the 
past. The achievement of a collusive outcome is generally facilitated if firms share a common 
history, or know each other well from their past experience of interacting in the market place. In 
such a case, the entry of new rivals spurred by market integration measures might undermine 
collusion, as achieving coordination is more difficult without mutual knowledge between firms. 
Further, where single market measures achieve the harmonization of rules and standards across 
Member States, they reduce the importance of national regulations and thereby should reduce the 
importance of regulatory capture for sustaining collusion at the national level. That is, firms 
within each country might be able to 'capture' their regulators, and obtain the imposition of 
standards or rules which effectively discriminate against foreign firms (by making their entry too 
costly). Where these rules were superseded by common rules (or at least by the recognition of 
each other's standards), then within-country collusion through this device might be undermined. 
This may be particularly important in the case of services, such as in banking (see Vives [1991]). 
More generally, two essential concepts must be identified at the start which determine whether 
collusion might be achieved and sustained, and which must be adopted as an organizing 
principle in the analysis of collusion. These are the incentive to collude and the incentive to 
cheat. The 'incentive to collude' is measured by a firm's longer-term gain from complying with 
the agreement, which means getting a share in the (joint) monopoly profit instead of the profit of 
short-run competition. The 'incentive to cheat' is the firm's short-term private gain from not 
abiding with the agreement, which means reducing prices to gain market share from rivals in the 
short term, but which might also mean foregoing the collusive profit in the long term. 
In this chapter we will seek to assess the effects of measures to promote the single market on 
these two incentives. For example, the removal of artificial barriers to trade should imply an 
opportunity for more firms to enter a market. This might make collusion harder because each 
firm's share in the collusive profit is smaller, and therefore the incentive to collude may be 
smaller. In addition, the incentive to deviate from the agreement might be greater because 
'cheating' may become less expensive, and therefore existing cooperative agreements might not 
be sustainable. 
The Cecchini report [1988] emphasized the expected benefits of '...increased trade and sharper 
competition triggered by market integration', which (will) 'lower profit margins to the extent that 
they have been artificially sustained above competitive levels' (p. 78). It predicted a 'narrowing 
of the gap between prices and costs in the wake of the curtailment of monopoly power' (p. 83). 
However the Cecchini report also makes a brief reference to the possibility that increased market 
openness might give firms renewed incentives to collude: 'in this new and blustery climate, there 
is a good chance that some of the economy's players will seek various forms of shelter from 
competitive reinvigoration. This happened following the removal of tariff barriers, and it is to be 
expected that the Community's authorities will face multiple stratagems developed by private 
and public actors to cushion the competitive impact on them' (p. 90). 
Market integration and collusion 147 
Overall we find that as far as market entry is facilitated by the process of market integration, and 
some 'focal points' for collusion are removed, we should see less collusion occurring. At the 
same time, it is possible that the single market measures will not diminish the incentive for 
cross-border collusive practices centred on national boundaries. 
We begin in Section 9.2 with a brief summary of selected collusion cases dealt with by the 
Commission over the past decade. This provides an empirical context for the discussion in the 
rest of this chapter. We begin the analysis in Section 9.3, by defining the notion of collusion, and 
discussing how the incentive for firms to collude and to cheat might vary across product markets. 
In Section 9.4 we consider what effects might be expected from the single market programme. 
Section 9.5 considers a few examples which reinforce the general arguments of the preceding 
sections. 
In Section 9.6 we address competition policies against collusion. We discuss in particular the 
detection problem, and then evaluate the possible merits of a more 'structural' approach to the 
fight against collusion: i.e. to attack directly secondary agreements which are likely to have 
been entered into for the purpose of sustaining collusion. We discuss in particular the weight 
to be given to information exchanges (the most frequent form of communication between 
rivals). 
9.2. Selection of some relevant collusion cases since 1985 
A variety of markets and industries have attracted the attention of the EU competition 
authorities under Art. 85(1) ('horizontal agreements'). These include agreements to fix prices, 
quantities or divide markets in various ways. 
Agreements to fix prices and/or other variables, either directly between firms or indirectly 
through a trade association which sets 'list prices' include the following. 
(a) Polypropylene (1986): 15 major petrochemical producers were found to have operated a 
market-sharing and price-fixing cartel between 1977 and 1983. Documentary evidence 
was found of regular meetings held to set target prices, decide how to concert efforts to 
raise prices, and implement and monitor a system of quotas. Users within the 
Community were argued to be adversely affected by the manipulation of the selling 
price. 
(b) Meldoc (1986): five Dutch diaries were found to have operated a cartel involving market 
sharing through quotas, and the protection of the home market against imports (in 
particular by dropping the price of UHT milk after imports were started from Germany, 
or dumping milk on the Belgian market). Trade was argued to be affected between 
Member States, as penetration of the Dutch market was made more difficult. 
(c) Belasco (1986): seven Belgian producers of roofing felt were found to have operated a 
cartel between 1978 and 1984. Through general meetings of their trade association 
(Belasco), they sought to organize the Belgian market and protect it from external 
competition. A common price list was adopted with minimum prices, the allocation of 
quotas, and joint action to deal with any disturbance to the collective interest arising out 
of new entrants into the market, increased competition or the development of substitute 
products. 
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(d) Italian flat glass (1988): a number of flat glass producers in Italy were found to have 
adopted agreements and concerted practices which isolated the Italian flat glass market 
(including price-fixing, quotas, market sharing). 
(e) PVC and LPDE (1988): two decisions were taken by the Commission concerning cartels 
involving the majority of EU thermoplastics producers. Collusive practices (which 
included fixing target prices, planning concerted initiatives, sharing the market and 
'exchanging detailed operational information in order to obtain better coordination') 
were agreed to by producers at regular secret meetings. 
(f) Welded steel mesh (1989): 14 undertakings were fined for having engaged in 1981-85 
in a series of agreements or concerted practices designed to fix prices, quotas, and share 
markets. 
(g) Soda ash (1990): Solvay and ICI were found to be involved in long-term concerted 
practices to share the EU market between'them (supported by 'swaps' of products). 
(h) VOTOB (association of undertakings offering tank storage facilities in the Netherlands, 
1992): six undertakings decided to increase prices as of April 1990 by a uniform, fixed 
amount by means of an 'environmental charge'. This was considered incompatible with 
Art. 85 by the Commission. 
(i) SPO (federation of construction industry associations, Netherlands, 1992, first case in 
the construction sector): 28 construction associations in the Netherlands were found to 
have operated a cartel in the Dutch building and construction industry through their joint 
federation SPO: this consisted of a set of complex and detailed regulations adopted to 
coordinate the competitive conduct of building firms when engaged in competitive 
tenders. The Commission found that these rules severely restricted competition between 
participants, by prohibiting each bidder from freely setting the price and other conditions 
of his offer. These rules were deemed to affect intra-Community trade appreciably. 
(j) CNSD (customs agents association, Italy, 1993): Italian customs agents were found to 
have fixed prices in the form of joint tariffs set by their association CNSD. This was the 
first time that this principle was applied to a service. 
(k) NVL (lift industry association, Netherlands, 1993): members of the association were 
operating through it a system allowing price-fixing and market sharing. 
(1) Steel beams (1994): a cartel was found to operate since 1984 between 17 companies, 
implemented via Eurofer (the European steel industry association). These companies had 
agreed to fix prices and quotas, 'and regularly exchanged a wide variety of what would 
be normally considered highly confidential information in order to ensure that the cartel 
was operated effectively'. 
(m) Cement (1994): 23 cement producers were found to operate a 'home market' cartel, i.e. 
agreed - via their national cement associations - not to sell in each other's home market. 
A widespread exchange ofinformation 'that would normally be considered confidential' 
also took place. 
(n) Cartonboard (1994): a cartel was found to be operating involving 19 companies. It 
consisted of periodic 'price initiatives', and an agreement on market shares. 
In a few cases the fact that information was exchanged, again directly between firms or 
through a trade association, has been interpreted as evidence in favour of collusion. 
(a) Fatty acids (1986) was the first case in which fines were imposed with respect to an 
information exchange agreement. Three major EU producers of fatty acids were found to 
have operated such an agreement to exchange confidential information about their sales, 
after having established their respective market shares in the previous three years. The 
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Commission's decision was justified on grounds that the agreement set up means of 
monitoring the firms' future performance, and thus had 'an inherent restrictive effect 
upon competition'. The agreement 'made for artificially increased transparency between 
the parties, ... enabling them to react more rapidly and efficiently to one another's 
actions'. Trade between Member States was thus affected, 
(b) UK agricultural tractor registration exchange (1992): prohibition of a system (set up in 
1975) for exchanging information on retail sales and market shares for agricultural 
tractors sold in the UK. The Commission's view was that 'exchanges of information 
identifying the sales of each competitor in a highly concentrated market with no 
significant competition from outside the EU restricted competition'. The agreement 
poses the risk of 'eliminating any hidden competition through the creation of an artificial 
and undesirable degree of transparency in a highly concentrated market'. It was also 
considered a barrier to entry. 
9.3. Factors affecting the likelihood of collusion 
An interesting stylized fact which emerges from the list in the previous section is that a high 
proportion of collusion cases tried by the Commission have concerned markets for 
homogeneous products (often intermediate inputs), with high capital costs and significant 
excess capacity: from Woodpulp (1984) to Polypropylene (1986), Fatty acids (1986), PVC and 
LPDE (thermoplastics) (1988), Welded steel mesh (1989), Soda ash (1991), Steel beams 
(1994), Cartonboard (1994), and Cement (1994). This list of cases appears to suggest that 
there may be some common features to industries where collusion is more likely, in which 
case-specific identification of these features may assist the targeting of competition 
interventions against collusion. 
In order to explain these empirical regularities it is appropriate to consider in some more detail 
the notion of collusion, and the lessons to be drawn from economic theory on how collusion 
might be sustained. 
9.3.1. Sustainability of collusion 
Collusion may consist of some form of explicit agreement between the parties. It may also be 
tacit, which describes the idea that firms recognize their mutual interdependence, and therefore 
'could agree to coordinate their actions without explicit communication and discussion' (Rees 
[1993a, p. 28]). Technically, in this case the collusive outcome is obtained as the equilibrium 
solution of repeated interactions over time in a non-cooperative dynamic game (as opposed to 
astatic setting).122 
Tacit collusion has been the subject of a large economic literature which explores how firms 
can resist their incentive to gain privately at their rivals' expense, and thus achieve an outcome 
which is better for all competitors. The argument is that even if firms do not communicate 
with each other, they may realize that their actions are interdependent, and it could be privately 
optimal for them to make choices leading to the 'cooperative' outcome (i.e. closer to the joint 
monopoly profit) even if there is no explicit agreement between them. 
In 'repeated' games, firms repeatedly set prices or outputs, and can respond to rivals' choices. The idea behind 
repetition is thus to formalize in some way the notion of action-reaction, and play over time, which makes it possible for 
firms to sustain tacit collusion by anticipating rivals' reactions to their actions. 
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To be effective, any agreement must be sustainable. As anticipated, this will depend on the 
balance between the 'incentive to collude' and the 'incentive to cheat': a firm will have a 
short-run incentive to 'cheat' (i.e. pursue its own immediate interest through secret price cuts, 
or other forms of 'business stealing'), and will comply with a collusive agreement only if its 
long-term gain from doing so is greater than the short-term profit from cheating. 
A further essential factor for the stability of collusion is the possibility of imposing sufficiently 
severe punishments on the deviators. If a firm deviates it must expect a response from its 
rivals, in the form of lower prices or increased output: this is generally interpreted as a 
'punishment' inflicted on the cheater. Moreover, punishments must be credible, so that a 
deviating firm will believe that its rivals will go through with the punishment. 
In the light of this, we would expect the likelihood of collusion to be affected by factors such 
as the number of firms in the market, and the frequency of interaction. A larger number of 
firms in the market should make it more difficult for them to collude effectively (see among 
others Selten [1973]). This is because even though the intensity of punishment might be the 
same, there is more redistribution from cheating, and therefore a greater incentive for firms to 
deviate. Collusion should also be easier to sustain when firms interact more frequently, 
because this affects their ability to grant secret price cuts. Although it is possible to identify 
the circumstances likely to lead to collusion being less sustainable, we should not expect to be 
able to quantify these effects, e.g. to know how many firms are required for collusion to break 
down. 
Further, collusion should be easier to sustain when monitoring is more accurate. After Stigler 
[1964], the ability to monitor rivals' actions has become central to the analysis of collusion, 
given the prevalence of information imperfections: anything that makes it easier for firms to 
know what others are doing facilitates monitoring, and makes collusion more sustainable. The 
availability of more disaggregated information on the market, for example, should help to 
sustain collusion. 
With information imperfections' and demand/cost uncertainties, it is obviously not easy to tell 
whether a certain observed outcome (e.g. lower prices) depends for example on a demand 
shock or on deviation(s) from the agreement. The economic literature has suggested that the 
only way to support coordination in these circumstances might be to adopt a 'punishment' 
(e.g. to revert to competitive pricing) in all cases where the observed outcome is consistent 
with the possibility of one member having deviated. This might imply of course that the 
punishment is inflicted on all firms even when none of them has deviated. It is precisely the 
credibility of the threat of future punishments which provides the discipline that supports non-
cooperative 'collusive' outcomes. Price wars may thus be a necessary part of optimal collusive 
arrangements.123 
This result is obtained among others by Green and Porter [1984]. In their repeated market game, it is optimal for firms 
to produce at the collusive output level, and therefore any observed price war occurs after an unexpected drop in 
demand, rather than after actual cheating. Price wars are thus the occasional equilibrium outcome of the repeated non-
cooperative market game, as a fall in price below a certain threshold 'triggers' the punishment (reversion to Cournot 
behaviour). A degree of collusion is sustained via 'trigger' strategies that involve switches between periods of collusion 
and price wars. 
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Interpretation of stylized facts 
Economic theory thus offers some helpful insights into the effects of basic industry and market 
characteristics on collusion. On this basis, we might be able to propose some explanations for 
the stylized facts observed above (see also Scherer and Ross [1990]). 
A rough measure of firms' incentives to collude is the difference between total profits without 
coordination, and joint monopoly profits. The more competitive the market is in the absence 
of collusion, the more there is to be gained by firms from coordinating. This might explain 
why we could expect to see more collusion in industries where there is excess capacity. 
In particular: the incentive to deviate is based on the profitability of deviation, the likelihood 
of being caught, and the cost of being caught. Features which increase the profitability of 
deviation may often make it less costly to punish deviations. For example, if firms have 
significant capacity constraints then this both reduces the incentive to deviate (since firms who 
undercut the collusive price may not be able to meet extra demand), but also implies a loss of 
punishment possibilities (since firms are more limited in their ability to increase output and 
lower price to punish a deviating firm). In such situations, the overall effect on the 
sustainability of collusion may be ambiguous, but the latter effect may prevail in some 
circumstances. Both Rey et al. [1995] and Padilla [forthcoming, 1996] have shown in different 
contexts that the loss of punishment possibilities might ultimately prevail, and hence collusion 
is more difficult to sustain with capacity constraints; this confirms the converse notion of 
excess capacity generally favouring collusion. 
A similar analysis applies to product homogeneity: on the one hand, in the absence of 
collusion, competition in prices is tougher in homogeneous goods markets, and this should 
increase the incentive to collude. Detection should also be easier, and the punishment more 
severe (though of course homogeneity increases the gain to cheating, making collusion less 
difficult to sustain). For the idea that product differentiation may better support collusion, see 
Ross [1992], and Hackner [1994]. 
Ease of monitoring will also be affected by industry conditions. Firstly, collusion is generally 
thought to be easier in more concentrated industries, since fewer firms are involved, and 
therefore monitoring should be easier. Moreover, with homogeneous products it might be 
easier to observe prices, and therefore to detect deviations. Another important factor is the 
prevalence of posted prices, as opposed to individually negotiated prices. With individually 
negotiated pricing, there is greater scope for secret price cuts and monitoring might be more 
difficult (as well as the incentive to cheat being greater). 
Thus although theoretical results about conditions favouring collusion are often ambiguous, it 
is possible to make sense of the empirical observation that many of the Commission's 
collusion cases involve industries with common characteristics. Collusion might be observed 
more often in industries with: 
(a) excess capacity, because while the incentive to deviate is greater, the ability to punish is 
also credible; 
(b) high fixed and sunk costs, because these lead to higher concentration, which in turn 
reduces the incentive to cheat, and allows easier monitoring of the agreement; sunk costs 
also prevent hit-and-run entry if incumbent firms raise prices by colluding; 
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(c) product homogeneity, because monitoring is easier, and it is harder for a firm to retain 
its market share if there is severe punishment (threats against new entrants are also more 
credible); 
(d) open price lists, as opposed to individually negotiated prices, because they make secret 
price cutting more difficult; 
(e) repeated attempts by firms to communicate with each other in some way (indeed in 
virtually all the collusion cases mentioned above, the Commission found evidence of 
information exchanges in some form, for example through a trade association). 
These features should be kept in mind by the competition authorities as generally increasing 
the likelihood of collusion. For policy purposes, the most important point is the last one on 
information exchanges, because it is one where specific policy recommendations on how to 
tackle collusion can be made. These will be discussed in Section 9.6.2 below. 
Market entry 
One factor which we have not yet considered, but is essential given our focus on market 
integration, is the effect of entry on collusion. A necessary condition for the stability of a 
collusive outcome is that it is not undermined by the entry of new firms which undercut the 
colluding incumbent firms. Entry barriers therefore assist incumbent firms in sustaining 
collusion, and so industries with significant sunk costs may be particularly susceptible to 
collusive behaviour.124 Strategies employed by firms in collusion might in fact have as a 
secondary effect the discouragement of entry: for example, with imperfect information, entry 
of a new firm may be misinterpreted as cheating by existing firms, and lead to a punishing 
price war with the consequent effect of reducing the profitability of entry (Friedman and 
Thisse [1994]. 
These issues are explored in greater detail in Section 9.4 below, where we consider directly the 
relationship between collusion and the single market. 
9.4. The impact of the single market on collusion 
As was argued in Chapters 3 and 4, the mechanism through which single market measures 
may affect collusion is through their impact on cross-border selling and market entry costs. In 
this section we consider how firms' incentives to collude and their ability to sustain collusion 
may be affected by the integration process, and in particular by the single market programme. 
We must distinguish two different cases. 
Firstly, there is the case where the overall impact of single market measures on firms may not 
be very significant: for example, if transport costs are high in relation to the value of the 
product, the effect of reducing artificial barriers to trade might be comparatively small. In this 
case, the single market programme may not significantly affect firms' incentives to enter new 
markets (a case in point is soda ash, which will be discussed in the next section). As a result, 
we should not expect existing (collusive) market-sharing arrangements to be affected by the 
single market programme; indeed firms will seek to maintain an allocation of markets 
according to national boundaries even if borders have been formally eliminated. 
124 However, we may distinguish here between the threat of entry, and effective entry which is a direct result of market 
integration (i.e. removal of barriers). This will be explored in greater detail in Section 9.4.1 below. 
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The second case is where single market measures might significantly ease entry or market 
access. This is the case where the single market has in principle a pro-competitive effect: as 
the size of the market is increased, more firms should be sustainable in equilibrium (even with 
barriers to entry). In this case we need to investigate how this will affect collusion. 
The issue is whether product-market integration - and integration measures - may have 
affected the way in which rival firms compete, and in particular their willingness to coordinate 
their actions and their ability to sustain cooperation. 
As noted already (Section 9.1), measures to promote the single market might act directly upon 
firms' ability to sustain existing collusive practices, by affecting intangibles upon which 
coordination might be based. For example, integration might remove some Sfocai points' 
which served as collusive devices in the past; or - where it encourages new entry of firms - it 
might lead to the breakdown of coordination based on mutual knowledge, and shared 
experience of a market. Where they lead to a reduction in the importance of national rules and 
regulations, in favour of supranational standards, integration measures might also undermine 
collusion which is sustained by means of regulatory capture by firms in their home markets. 
When considering the incentives to collude and to cheat in more detail, a useful distinction to 
make is between collusive agreements within a country, and cross-border collusive 
agreements. We would expect single market measures to undermine - at least to some degree 
- within-country collusion, since domestic markets would be opened to entry by foreign firms. 
However, there is perhaps less reason to believe that single market measures will necessarily 
reduce cross-border collusion. 
We consider each of these two types of collusion in greater detail. 
9.4.1. Pro-competitive effects: within-country collusion 
The issue here is how easy is it to sustain collusion in the face of market entry. It is useful at 
the start to distinguish between two concepts of entry which might impact on the sustainability 
of a collusive agreement. One is potential entry, or threat of new entry. The other is entry 
because of market integration. This is the notion that the single market programme, by 
widening the boundaries of the market and reducing effective transport costs, implies that 
more firms (which were previously segregated within their national frontiers) are now in 
competition with each other. 
There is a (limited) economic literature on the sustainability of collusion in the face of free 
market entry. The general intuition is that collusion might indeed be sustained in the absence 
of entry barriers if the expected 'harshness of punishment' in the post-entry market is 
sufficient to deter potential entrants. For example, Harrington [1989] investigates the degree of 
cooperation that firms can support with free entry, and finds that if the discount factor is 
sufficiently high (i.e. firms are not too 'short-termist') there exists a free entry equilibrium in 
which they sustain some cooperation. This is because the incumbent firms credibly threaten to 
respond to entry with a period of very aggressive competition. Stanbacke [1994] treats 
collusion in a market with free entry as analogous to collusion with asymmetric market shares, 
and shows that when the expected competitive response is very harsh (i.e. with very severe 
punishments) collusion is actually sustainable in equilibrium provided that firms again have a 
sufficiently high discount factor. In all these cases, entry threats depend on how strong the 
punishment is; and they might actually be very small given the harshness of the competitive 
154 Competition issues 
response to entry. Empirically, there is some support for the notion that the threat of entry may 
have very small effects (despite contestability theory): see for example, Borenstein's [1989] 
study on US airlines. 
There is however another aspect to consider: to the extent that the single market programme 
extends the boundaries of the market, or reduces effective transport costs, more firms can be 
sustained in equilibrium for any degree of competition. Thus, even if firms expect some 
punishment, then some degree of entry at the margin will actually occur, because firms expect 
to be able to survive in the larger market. 
The extent to which actual entry as a response to market integration will limit competition will 
also depend on the characteristics of the market. For example, entry might be greater with 
product differentiation, because in a differentiated good market an entrant can sometimes 
survive by serving only a market niche. Thus entry will not be effectively deterred, that is, the 
incumbents cannot easily induce exit of an entrant in the case of differentiated products. The 
case is different with homogeneous good markets, where if incumbent firms respond very 
aggressively, the entrant may not be able to cover its entry costs. 
In the context of the EU, where countries have rather similar characteristics and therefore we 
would expect more intra-industry trade, it is possible that entry might occur in markets for 
differentiated products (i.e. firms decide to enter a market with a product which is 'niche', or 
rather specialized). This suggests that entry might take place to a significant degree, and thus 
the 'limiting' effect of entry on collusion might be large. In homogeneous good markets - such 
as those where most EU cases on collusion have been identified - we might not on the other 
hand expect as much cross-border entry. 
In summary: economic analysis suggests that within-country collusion might be effective in 
discouraging potential entry (and thus sustain itself). However, if market integration widens 
the market and reduces transport and market access costs, then foreign firms on the margin of 
entering should enter and might be able to survive. 
It is less clear what the consequences of entry by foreign firms might be for domestic 
collusion. Potentially, foreign entrants might simply join a new larger collusive agreement; 
however, monitoring is likely to be more difficult with more firms who do not know each 
other from past experience of interacting in the market, and thus we would have a presumption 
that market integration is overall likely to undermine domestic collusion. 
9.4.2. New incentives to collude: cross-border collusion 
The effect of market integration on EU-wide collusion is not clear-cut. Market integration affects 
the sustainability of cross-border collusion in subtle ways, and there is no necessary reason why 
such collusion should be undermined by integration. Rather, there are at least some arguments 
that market integration might provide new opportunities for firms to sustain a 'stand-off with 
their potential foreign rivals, e.g. implicitly agreeing to segment the market geographically; or 
- where they are already present in each other's markets - not to undercut prices. 
First of all, even if national borders were effectively eliminated by integration, a market-sharing 
agreement according to national boundaries might still be feasible, because the parties can 
probably still monitor compliance quite easily. This is because: 
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(a) national boundaries may act as 'focal points' for the agreement; 
(b) market sharing according to national boundaries gives rise to better monitoring. 
Let us now consider the sustainability of collusion. We have argued that the potential for any 
agreement (old or new) to be sustained is a function of the participants' pay-offs (short-term 
returns from cheating vs. longer-terms returns from compliance). Market integration may be 
expected to have a number of effects on implicit agreements - some of which potentially 
conflict with each other. 
Firstly, there is a direct effect: 'cheating' on an existing agreement (e.g. selling outside one's 
'allocated' geographical market) may become cheaper with market integration (lower transport 
costs etc.). At the same time, reduced transport costs should make punishment cheaper and 
1 9^ 
easier, and could thereby support collusion; overall, the result is ambiguous. 
In addition there might be a market size effect: if integration means that the geographical 
market which a firm could economically supply becomes larger (because transport and 
transaction costs in general decline), then the gains from cheating become larger, and therefore 
the agreement becomes more difficult to sustain; i.e. there is a 'market size' effect which may 
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increase the short-term gain from cheating. 
Sustaining collusive outcomes also requires firms to monitor the compliance of rivals with the 
implicit or explicit agreement. A number of effects are possible here. 
(a) The most obvious point is that monitoring problems are presumably more complex 
where there are more firms. Thus if integration leads to an increase in the number of 
firms, monitoring might be less effective. 
(b) On the other hand, if integration effectively implies greater convergence of economic 
conditions (see Chapter 3), then demand in different geographical markets may become 
more closely correlated. This may make monitoring easier (and therefore collusion more 
likely to be sustained) with imperfect information, because a deviation could be more 
easily distinguished from a downturn in demand (effectively there is less noise). 
This is the same point illustrated in Rotemberg and Saloner [1986], who show in a dynamic model that the imposition 
of an import quota by one country can lead to increased international competition, reducing the price in the country that 
imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. The reason is that a quota reduces the ability of foreign firms to punish 
a deviating domestic firm, and therefore the amount of collusion that can be sustained is correspondingly lessened (this 
is especially true with prices as the strategic variables). These results would seem to suggest that trade liberalization -
by increasing firms' ability to punish deviations - may support a degree of collusion. 
This conclusion is obvious in the case of a market in which the non-cooperative behaviour is Bertrand competition 
without capacity constraints. In this case, market integration should lead to greater incentives to deviate from the 
collusive agreement. However, punishment possibilities are not toughened by market integration since the potential to 
drive profits to zero always exists, whatever the size of the market. Therefore in this special case we would 
unambiguously expect market integration to lead to less collusion. 
One of the few studies of the effect of the single market on the sustainability of collusion is van Wegberg et al. [1994], 
which suggests an application of the theory of multimarket contact (Bernheim and Whinston [1990]) to European 
integration. Firms which meet in multiple product markets may thus have an additional incentive to comply with the 
agreement if they fear that deviation may be punished in more than one market. In fact, this effect is debatable. 
Multimarket contact theories assume that markets are not linked on the demand-side, therefore multimarket contact 
increases the opportunity to punish deviations without creating more incentives to deviate. However, this model seems 
relevant only where transport costs remain high, but market access is easier. If integration coincides with a fall in 
transport costs, then we are in a potentially ambiguous scenario: lower transport costs imply that punishment is easier, 
but at the same time the incentive to deviate is also stronger. 
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(c) Another way in which collusion may be made easier by integration is through the effects 
of consumer arbitrage: if greater arbitrage reduces price dispersion - and in the extreme, 
if it leads to a single price - defection may be easier to monitor. 
While general conclusions are difficult to draw, we argue that on balance, we cannot expect 
integration measures always to undermine collusive behaviour. It is therefore appropriate for 
the EU competition authorities to retain vigilance. 
9.5. The case of soda ash: an illustrative example of cross-border collusion 
In its decision of 19 December 1990,129 the Commission found that Solvay and ICI, 'the two 
major producers of soda ash in the Community, participated in a concerted practice contrary to 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty by knowingly continuing in concert and complicity to observe 
and apply the essential terms of... a restrictive market sharing agreement dating from 1945 or 
earlier and which they had purported to terminate in 1972, by coordinating their respective 
commercial activities, by avoiding all competition with each other and by confining their soda 
ash activities in the Community to their traditional home markets namely continental Western 
Europe for Solvay and the United Kingdom for ICI'. (OJ L 152,15.6.1991). 
The collusion case against Solvay and ICI, the claim that markets were separated was based on 
the following evidence: 
(a) up to about 1980, ICI's list prices in the UK were lower than list prices in neighbouring 
markets; 
(b) since then, prices in the UK have risen relative to those charged in adjacent markets, 
price premiums in the UK being sometimes as high as 20%; 
(c) despite these price differences, there has been no significant trade in the product in either 
direction,130 although final prices (accounting for transport costs) to UK customers for 
imports from Continental Europe would for some time have been lower than the prices 
charged by ICI; 
(d) ICI supplied soda ash only to the Scandinavian market where no domestic producer 
existed and where price levels, despite the transport costs that have to be incurred for 
imports, were lower than in countries with an indigenous producer; 
(e) ICI bought soda ash from Solvay as 'purchase for resale' in order to meet its medium-
and long-term commitments in its traditional markets, where customers were not aware 
of the origin of the material.131 
Some of this evidence, however, does not give a conclusive proof of collusive behaviour. In 
particular, price differentials and the absence of actual trade does not per se give evidence of 
collusion. Competition may involve Nash equilibrium prices which are limit prices deterring 
imports, and which may differ according to asymmetries in production costs, transport costs 
See Case Study 1 in London Economics (1996) for a fuller description of the soda ash industry. 
The Commission dealt with the soda ash market in a number of cases. Here we focus on the collusion case which was 
complemented by separate action brought against ICI and Solvay under Art. 86 on abuse of their dominant position. 
The only movement of soda ash were 'co-producer' shipments from Solvay to ICI. 
Following the closure of one ICI plant in 1984, production capacity was not sufficient to meet the whole domestic 
demand. Furthermore, all of ICI's sales to South Africa were made with material purchased from Solvay. 
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and different volumes of demand by those customers located closest to each competitor (see 
Phlips [1995, p. 136 ff.]). 
Spatial price discrimination may alleviate this problem of indistinguishability between 
collusive and competitive outcomes. However, in the presence of a transport cost supplement 
for serving foreign markets (a discontinuity in the transport cost function) which would result 
from cross-border trading costs (before market integration), the absence of actual trade flows 
does not imply collusive market-sharing agreements. Although such costs should have been 
reduced by market integration, in the case of the UK and Continental Europe, the discontinuity 
in transport cost will remain due to cross-Channel transport. 
Therefore, it may be difficult to detect and identify collusion without more specific 
information about demand and cost conditions. In the ICI-Solvay case, however, the additional 
evidence (in particular the purchase-for-resale arrangement) leaves little doubt on the assertion 
that the observed market segmentation was indeed the result of collusive behaviour. 
It is difficult to gauge the impact of the collusion case brought against ICI and Solvay on the 
competitive outcomes in the European market because, at the same time, the anti-dumping 
duties which had protected the soda ash market from external competition since 1983 were 
also eliminated after a request for review from the US producers and the glass industry.1 It is 
arguable (from evidence of prices and statements by major purchasers) that competitive 
conditions changed significantly once a more liberal external trade policy was pursued. Up to 
the 1980s purchasers bought soda ash from national suppliers facing different price lists from 
country to country. Today major purchasers can negotiate on a European-wide basis and agree 
single purchasing deals across markets that are determined by economic boundaries rather 
than by national borders. 
As a result of these actions and the effects of the recession in the early 1990s, prices decreased 
and small changes appear to have emerged in trade patterns. This is illustrated in Table 9.1 
which shows the evolution of market shares in four major national markets. 
It is well known that anti-dumping measures may have anti-competitive effects as they reinforce collusion between 
domestic producers. 
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Table 9.1. Soda ash - evolution of market shares in selected European markets (%) 
France 
Solvay 
ICI/Brunner Mond 
Rhone Poulenc 
AKZO 
Lars Christensen 
E. European Producers 
Turkey 
USA 
Total ('000 MT) 
Italy 
Solvay 
ICI/Brunner Mond 
AKZO 
Lars Christensen 
E. European Producers 
Turkey 
USA 
Total ('000 MT) 
Spain 
Solvay 
E. European Producers 
Turkey 
USA 
Total ('000 MT) 
UK 
Solvay 
ICI/Brunner Mond 
Rhone Poulenc 
AKZO 
Lars Christensen 
E. European Producers 
USA 
Total ('000 MT) 
1986 
55.1 
0 
42.9 
0.2 
0 
1.8 
0 
0 
1,165 
97.3 
0 
0.3 
0 
2.5 
0 
0 
773 
100 
0 
0 
0 
555 
0.8 
94.4 
0.6 
0 
0 
0.2 
4 
850 
1989 
0 
57.3 
0 
40.2 
0.2 
0 
1.2 
0.8 
0.4 
1,295 
95.5 
1.2 
0 
0 
2.4 
0.9 
0 
849 
99.8 
0 
0.2 
0 
602 
0.2 
94.8 
0 
0.5 
0 
I.I 
3.3 
910 
1992 
47.8 
0.2 
40.7 
0.7 
0 
2.3 
0 
8.4 
1,315 
86.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
2.0 
2.9 
5.3 
850 
69.4 
0.3 
0.6 
29.7 
680 
0.5 
92.6 
0 
0.5 
0.2 
2.3 
3.8 
940 
1994 
47.5 
1.6 
34.2 
4.0 
1.5 
6.4 
0 
4.9 
1,316 
84.1 
1.7 
0 
2.3 
3.4 
0.7 
7.7 
870 
98.1 
0 
0 
1.9 
690 
4.7 
89.1 
0.2 
3.1 
0.2 
2.5 
0.2 
965 
Source: Harriman Chemsult. 
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There are thus a number of implications to be drawn from the soda ash case. 
(a) The single market programme, by means of reducing the cost of cross-border trade, may 
not be expected to achieve more competition in markets where the collusion is likely to 
be sustainable and where the incentives to collude are strong. 
(b) The only effective way to break up existing market-sharing agreements appears to be 
policy intervention: the Art. 85 (and 86) cases brought by the Commission against soda 
ash producers in 1990 seem to have stimulated some internal trade and led to major 
changes in purchasing behaviour for major customers who now can satisfy their 
requirements within single European-wide purchasing agreements. 
(c) Trade policy with the outside world is also essential: competition from extra-EU 
countries started to emerge when anti-dumping duties were eliminated in 1990, and their 
provisional reintroduction in 1995 (after lobbying from soda ash producers) certainly 
runs counter - and may even undermine - the impact of the competition investigations. 
The relationship - and the tensions - between competition policy and trade policy will 
be addressed in the final chapter on policy conclusions. 
9.6. Competition policy against collusion 
An important aim of competition policy is to punish collusive behaviour, though this is hard to 
detect and to prove in practice: documentary evidence of cartelization is not often easy to find. 
A more conceptual problem in dealing with collusion from an antitrust perspective is the notion 
that collusion may be tacit: a large body of theory, as we have seen, is dedicated to show that 
collusive outcomes may be sustained as equilibria of repeated interactions in a non-cooperative 
dynamic game. The equilibrium collusive outcome does not in this case result from an explicit 
agreement, but from the 'rational pursuit of individual self-interest in a situation of perceived 
mutual interdependence' (Rees [1993a, p. 38]). 
The application of this notion poses obvious problems to antitrust systems, such as the EU's, 
which are based on a prohibition of collusion (and therefore on a behavioural notion). It is 
true, however, that recent developments in the interpretation of Art. 85 suggest that the 
European courts have become more sensitive to the notion that collusive behaviour would be 
likely to occur when there is significant scope for it; in which case 'restrictions of competition' 
come to encompass any activity which significantly increases the scope for collusive behaviour. 
This is graphically illustrated by the ECJ's interpretation of Art. 85(1) as given in the UK 
Tractor Exchange (1992) case: '... Art. 85(1) of the Treaty prohibits both actual anti-
competitive effects and purely potential effects, provided that they are sufficiently 
appreciable ...'. 
Our discussion of appropriate competition policy actions against collusion starts from the 
premise that there are two possible approaches (obviously not mutually exclusive) to combat 
collusion: one consisting of directly attacking collusive agreements (i.e. agreements through 
However this difficulty should not be overstated: there are cases where substantial evidence has been found, as in the 
case of Polypropylene (1986). Fifteen major petrochemical producers (thirteen within the EU) were found to have 
operated a market-sharing and price-fixing cartel between 1977 and 1983, and direct documentary evidence was found 
of regular meetings held to set target prices, decide how to coordinate efforts to raise prices, and implement and monitor 
a system of quotas. Another case is Steel beams ( 1994). 
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which firms fix prices or quantities). The other is to attack those agreements which indirectly 
facilitate collusion ('secondary' agreements), i.e. to eliminate the conditions that make it easier 
for firms to sustain it. 
In the rest of this section we consider the problems raised by these approaches. First, the 
necessary condition for being able to attack collusive agreements directly is for the competition 
authorities to detect collusion, and this may present formidable difficulties. Secondly, the 
secondary agreements which may be singled out for their role in sustaining collusion must be 
carefully identified. 
In particular, Section 9.6.1 considers the extent to which it might be possible to make inferences 
on collusion from observed outcomes (price and quantity data). This is a particularly difficult 
topic. The notion that bouts of price wars indicate cartel disciplining, and therefore reveal 
coordination, appears quite robust. What can we infer, however, in the absence of a price war? 
Without detailed information on demand and costs, how can a competition authority tell whether 
the observed price path describes a cooperative or a non-cooperative equilibrium? 
This question has been put into sharp relief by the Woodpulp case: the 1989 Commission 
decision that firms were colluding was rejected in 1993 by the ECJ, essentially on grounds that 
the same price path could have been explained by an alternative non-collusive model, i.e. it 
could equally have been the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. This may have set a 
precedent to the effect that if any alternative explanation for price data other than collusion can 
be found, then the competition action might fail. While it may be in principle correct to try and 
'discriminate' between a collusive and a non-collusive outcome by direct testing of a calibrated 
game-theoretic model, this requires extreme care because of the 'indistinguishability theorem'. 
Section 9.6.2 focuses on information sharing as the main category of secondary agreements 
which might be used by firms to sustain collusion, because it makes monitoring easy. We 
consider in detail which types of information sharing between rivals may actually sustain 
collusion, and should thus be directly eliminated. 
9.6.1. The problem of detection 
When collusion cannot be proven through documentary evidence, the antitrust authorities are left 
with the option of seeking to infer collusion from price and quantity data. Indeed the approach 
adopted by the EU competition authorities has been to '... spend a lot of time trying to collect 
evidence of direct communication between competitors, threats of punishment or actual 
punishments of deviators', Phlips [1995, p.8]. 
This is in general a quite formidable task. More conclusive results could be derived where there 
was sufficiently firm evidence of a price war, or (even better) alternate periods of price stability 
and conflict (this could be supported for example by tests showing a 'structural break' in the 
price path between the two periods). Of course interpretation would have to be careful, and 
would have to consider such factors as the possible impact of the business cycle etc. In practice, 
however, few cases appear to have actually used this type of argument. 
However, the most serious problems from a methodological point of view arise when no 
punishment phase can be observed, in which case there is a clear difficulty in distinguishing tacit 
collusion from parallel price movements resulting from non-cooperative strategic interaction 
between firms. The question is: in the absence of any evidence of price wars or other 
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punishments, and without knowing costs, how is it possible to tell at all whether the observed 
prices are in fact the product of tacit collusion? Given that apparently collusive outcomes might 
be achieved without there being anti-competitive conduct, how can we tell whether behaviour is 
collusive or non-collusive?134 
This is the recognized 'indistinguishability problem' between two different equilibria, which 
captures the difficulty presented by MacLeod [1985] in his work on 'conscious parallelism': as 
long as the profit functions are not known, there are no systematic differences between the size 
of price responses to exogenous shocks at the collusive and non-collusive equilibria. Hence 
looking, for example, at evidence of price parallelism between firms in a market may not tell us 
anything on whether they are engaged in collusion. 
For the practice of competition policy, this raises a host of problems. Ultimately, the firms under 
investigation will always try to argue that observed sales, prices and profits are typical for a non-
collusive equilibrium sustained in a repeated non-cooperative game; while the antitrust authority 
will seek to show that the same indicators are typical of a collusive equilibrium. Information 
i l e 
asymmetries between the parties in the judgement would be decisive here. 
The empirical literature has also recently produced a stark example of the kind of problems 
which are encountered in making inferences on collusion from market data. Ellison [1994] re-
examined the experience of the Joint Executive Committee (the 1880s US railroad cartel), to 
assess the applicability of the Green and Porter [1984] and Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] 
models of price wars. The main point is that while Green and Porter had found evidence of little 
collusion (the outcome was close to Cournot), Ellison obtains virtually perfect collusion by 
introducing in his model the assumption that demand is serially correlated. Thus model 
specification greatly affects the collusions that are drawn. 
Thus two good econometric analyses, based on a very good data set, generate rather different 
results.136 This suggests the following points: 
(a) it is difficult to make reliable inferences even with a rich data set on prices, quantities, 
costs, etc.; 
(b) in order to identify trigger strategies correctly, one would need several years of detailed 
data, which present a formidable information requirement (quite simply these are often 
not available); 
(c) there is also a need for strong assumptions on functional forms. 
The 'Folk Theorem' shows that several more or less collusive equilibria can result from repeated non-cooperative play 
when deviations can be punished in a credible way. 
As anticipated, the potential for conflicting interpretation has been put in sharp relief by the Woodpulp case (1984). Fines 
were imposed on several extra-EU producers for having imported woodpulp into Europe in a regime of announced and 
enforced parallel price changes. The absence of deviations from the parallel time path (together with information exchanges, 
see above) was used as evidence of collusion. However the decision was annulled by the ECJ in 1993. Though it was not 
used in the final reasoning of the Court, the concept of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium was mentioned, by the Advocate 
General - i.e. the notion that the observed result could be compatible with a non-collusive equilibrium in quantities. 
Another example is Rees [1993a], who used data presented to the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report on 
White Salt - a homogeneous market, with a price-setting duopoly where firms are subject to capacity constraints. He 
finds that the possible explanations of the collusive equilibrium in terms of joint profit maximization are not supported 
by the data; the equilibrium outcome can be rather explained by threat strategies of the type of Abreu's 'simple penal 
codes'. However the explanation of the equilibrium remains an open question. 
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If these conditions are satisfied, then in principle it would be possible to estimate demand, cost 
and reaction functions and compare collusive and non-collusive outcomes of the game with the 
actual observed outcome (as in Slade [1987]). One should not underestimate, however, the 
exceptional informational requirements of these techniques. Most importantly, in most 
circumstances it does not seem sensible to make inferences only from observed outcomes, 
because of the indistinguishability problem - i.e. the lack of an agreed-upon benchmark that can 
be used by the Courts to identify collusion from price and quantity data. 
9.6.2. Agreements facilitating collusion137 
Given the above discussion on the difficulties of detecting collusion, and making inferences from 
market data, it might be advisable to adopt an approach based on the notion that firms will tend 
to collude whenever there is scope for them to do so. 
Thus competition policy could put more emphasis on 'structural' measures, in particular 
focusing directly on secondary agreements which increase the scope for collusion. In this sense 
the current legal setting, which relies on showing that there has been some contact/negotiation 
between firms, corresponds quite well to the lessons from the theoretical economic analysis of 
collusion. 
The most important form of secondary agreement which firms might enter into, and which might 
facilitate collusion through greater ease of monitoring, is information exchanges. 
The European courts have devoted much attention to information exchanges between firms, as 
this is often the only form of communication between rival firms which can be substantiated in 
any way (i.e. of which there is any evidence). Indeed virtually all the cartel cases which have 
survived the proceedings of the EU courts have been based on some evidence like protocols of 
meetings within trade associations, which were taken to document the existence of a price 
agreement. 
The Commission's understanding of information exchanges in relation to collusion is 
summarized effectively in the Suiker Unie & Ors (1975) decision, where such exchanges are 
seen as conflicting with a notion of 'competition' interpreted as 'independent decision making' 
by firms, or 'absence of market coordination'.138 In a few cases, this has been taken by the courts 
to mean that an information agreement by itself can be an infringement of Art. 85(1). 
While it is self-evident that information sharing can help sustain collusion through improving 
monitoring possibilities, it is manifestly true that not all forms of information sharing can do so 
in the same way, and to the same degree. In this section, we will briefly review which types of 
information sharing should be considered more effective in increasing the scope for tacit 
This section draws heavily on Kühn and Vives [1995]. 
'The criteria of coordination and cooperation ... must be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the 
provisions of the Treaty relating to competition that each economic operator must determine independently the policy 
which he intends to adopt on the Common Market... Although it is correct to say that this requirement of independence 
does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated 
conduct of their competitors, it does, however, strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between such operators, 
the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual competitor, or to disclose to 
such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the 
market', ECR 1663). 
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collusion; we will then argue as a desirable policy development that these types of information 
sharing should be treated as infringements per se of Art. 85(1). 
The most important point is to what extent does an information-sharing agreement facilitate 
monitoring. When monitoring is not effective, then we should expect collusion to break down 
frequently, while if monitoring is good, then firms can sustain near-perfect collusion (or at any 
rate longer collusive periods). 
Secondly, the degree of aggregation of the data also matters (both at the industry vs. firm level, 
and in geographical terms). The Commission already distinguishes sharply between exchange of 
aggregate industry data and individual firm data, with only the latter presenting a real problem. 
Though it may not be appropriate to draw such a sharp distinction in terms of their effects, this is 
broadly justified as individualized data clearly facilitates punishment strategies that single out a 
deviating firm. 
Other important features include the frequency of information exchange, as exchange of yearly 
data hardly seems to increase the scope of collusion. 
Also who is made party to the information matters, i.e. whether it is shared only among 
producers, or whether consumers are also included. In Woodpulp, the Commission argued that 
the increased market transparency provided by information exchanges is detrimental to 
competition, because it discourages 'secret price cuts' which are the essence of competition. 
There are two effects here: on the one hand, consumers benefit from increased transparency, 
because it reduces their search costs; on the other hand it may be true that in a dynamic context, 
increased 'transparency' may support collusion by making secret price cuts more readily 
detectable (it improves monitoring of collusive arrangements). The result is therefore ambiguous, 
which suggests as a possible rule that information exchange may be objectionable if it is limited 
to producers at the same level in the production chain (e.g. internal trade association statistics); 
however it may not be unambiguously negative when it extends to downstream consumers (e.g. 
announcements in the trade press). That is, overall we should be suspicious of information-
sharing agreements where there is no market transparency benefit for consumers. 
In conclusion: if competition authorities could directly attack collusion on prices, there is no 
reason why information exchanges should be a worry for competition policy. However, it is 
difficult in most cases to prove effectively infringements of Art. 85(1) in the form of price-fixing 
agreements; at the same time, it is the case that these agreements can only be sustained if firms 
have access to sufficient information about the actions of their competitors. Thus the competition 
authorities should consider acting directly on those contacts which might be motivated by an 
attempt to facilitate collusion. This might mean regarding certain types of information exchanges 
(mainly direct exchanges of price and quantity information) as a restriction of competition in 
themselves, as direct infringements of Art. 85(1). 
Another reason why this course of action would be desirable is that acting on information 
exchanges is also powerful in cases where no agreements to collude exist in the real sense, but 
firms are able to obtain collusive outcomes through their understanding of interaction in the 
market: i.e. tacit collusion. 
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9.7. Conclusion 
Most collusion cases which fall under the jurisdiction of the European courts fall into two 
categories: 'stand-off agreements, and within-country collusion to keep potential entrants out. 
We expect the process of integration to affect these in a different way. 
In particular, we expect some entry to occur into the various national markets as a result of 
market integration - especially where products are differentiated - and this could undermine the 
internal collusive agreement between incumbent firms to some degree. 
Conversely, we do not expect geographical market-sharing agreements to be much affected by 
the single market, as the incentive to use national boundaries as focal points for these agreements 
is not reduced. On the contrary, if the cost of trade is reduced, then it might be even easier to ship 
goods to a market - and thus punish deviators. 
Our main conclusion is thus that market integration measures may not reduce the incidence of 
collusion. Although within-country collusion is likely to be discouraged to some degree, the 
effect is more ambiguous for cross-border collusion. 
There is therefore no reason for the competition authorities to relax vigilance on collusion, 
though pursuing actions against colluding firms remains difficult (though there are some 
principles which might be followed, e.g. looking more carefully at certain types of markets 
where collusion is more likely; looking for evidence of price wars). 
In particular, the 'indistinguishability problem' poses serious problems to anyone seeking to infer 
collusion from market data. Soda ash (1991) is another good example. Several cartel 
agreements spanning various decades had shared the market between the two main producers, 
with UK/Ireland assigned to ICI, and Continental Europe to Solvay. When these were terminated 
in 1972, both firms continued to serve their former markets. In the 1980s, when UK prices 
increased by 15-20% above those of the Continent, there was no attempt by Solvay to enter into 
the UK. The Commission interpreted the fact that neither ICI nor Solvay entered each other's 
market as evidence of tacit collusion. However Phlips [1995a, p. 13] argues that 'the absence of 
market penetration can be rationalized as a feature of the non-collusive Nash equilibrium in a 
repeated game' (see also Boehnlein [1994]). 
As no robust inferences can be made at all in some cases, our view is that competition policy 
should adopt some more 'structural' measures, i.e. measures which reduce the likelihood that 
collusion might be achieved. Thus we believe that more attention should be paid to secondary 
agreements with a potential for favouring collusion. One important instance is the elimination 
of various types of contracts that make it easier to sustain collusion, possibly by making them 
independent infringements of Art. 85; another possibility is further trade liberalization. 
The latter comes from the observation that the main worry remains cross-border collusive 
agreements to share markets by national boundaries. These kinds of collusive agreements are 
potentially difficult to attack, since it is obviously not possible to 'force' a producer in one 
country to enter another country's market. However, since we have concluded that market 
integration may reduce the opportunity for within-country collusion, by the same argument 
opening the external borders of the EU is a possible policy response to reduce cross-border 
collusion within the EU. Thus one additional option might be to fürther liberalize trade policy 
with the rest of the world. 
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10. Efficiency defences for cooperative agreements 
10.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we discussed the treatment of collusion on prices and production in 
European competition policy, exploring in particular the effects of market integration on 
firms' incentives to enter into new agreements, and their ability to sustain collusion in a more 
integrated market. 
It is possible however that 'collusive agreements' on dimensions other than prices and 
quantities may also have efficiency-enhancing effects. Various efficiency defences are 
routinely used by firms to argue that an agreement produces benefits far outweighing the 
potential harm to competition. Emphasizing the expected efficiency gains, such agreements 
are generally described as 'cooperative', and are treated with indulgence in EU competition 
policy. In particular, the general prohibition of interfirm agreements contained in Art. 85(1) is 
weakened in this area by a variety of exceptions under Art. 85(3), in the form of block 
1 ^Q 
exemptions and individual exemptions. 
In this chapter we examine the credibility of these efficiency defences, and the adequacy of the 
current EU competition rules in finding an appropriate trade-off between the potential social 
benefits of cooperation, and its social harms. We also critically evaluate the economic 
rationale for the widely held belief that in an integrated market collaborative agreements 
should be entered into more frequently between EU firms. The launch of the single market 
programme was accompanied by hopes for more intense competition between firms across 
Europe, and at the same time by great enthusiasm on the part of the Commission for an 
expected increase in cross-border collaboration between enterprises. More intense cooperation 
was expected to accelerate integration, and thus unlock substantial unexploited efficiency 
gains.140 Indeed, the White Paper Completing the Internal Market [1985] identified intra-EU 
industrial cooperation as a major policy aim for the Commission: 
'Community action must [...] create an environment or conditions likely to favour the 
development of cooperation between undertakings' (p. 34), 
and promised to deploy 'all means available to the Commission' for the purpose of facilitating 
cross-border cooperation, including competition policy: 
'The Commission will also continue to deploy competition rules by authorizing 
cooperation between undertakings which can promote technical or economic progress 
within the framework of a unified market' (ibid.). '41 
EU competition policy draws a distinction between 'cooperative' and 'concentrative' joint ventures, the former being 
dealt with (as any interfirm agreement) under Art. 85, the latter under the Merger Regulation. The rationale for this 
distinction is discussed further below. This chapter is however concerned mainly with agreements falling under Art. 85. 
Though some have argued vigorously against this hypothesis: see for example Kay [1991]. 
Other instruments were to be technology policy (subsidies to joint R&D programme), and regional policies ('The 
Commission will also seek to ensure that Community budgetary and financial facilities make their full contribution to 
the development of greater cooperation between firms in different Member States. [...] The Regional Fund must also be 
enabled to contribute to greater cooperation between firms' (White Paper, pp. 34-5)). 
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After examining how firms' incentives to cooperate relate to market integration, we emphasize 
that in fact market integration should remove some of the incentives for these agreements 
(such as overcoming artificial barriers to entry in a discrete geographical market). In an 
integrated market, many cross-border agreements - particularly those joining together firms 
with substitute assets - simply have anti-competitive aims. 
We start in Section 10.2 with some empirical evidence on recent trends in cross-border 
cooperation, which may shed some light on the motivation for firms' actions in this area. In 
Section 10.3 we consider the economic foundations of the 'efficiency defence' for cooperative 
agreements. While there may be efficiency motives for cooperation, which imply they may be 
socially beneficial (for example through increased variety for the consumer), firms seeking to 
enter into an agreement will always overemphasize its prospective benefits to the competition 
authorities, and their claims should be evaluated with great care. We are generally sceptical of 
the true size of the gains being claimed. Our assessment is different for R&D, where we 
believe that the potential efficiency gains are of a different order of magnitude and there is 
therefore a more clear-cut case for preferential competition treatment. In Section 10.4 we 
consider some examples of agreements which have received approval from the Commission 
over the past decade, and seek to evaluate the significance of the efficiency defences in each 
case. The impact of integration is considered in Section 10.5, where we evaluate the 
expectation that a more integrated market should be characterized by greater incidence of 
cooperation. Finally, in Section 10.6 we discuss the current EU competition policy approach 
towards cooperation. We conclude in Section 10.7. 
10.2. Empirical evidence on trends in cooperation 
Under the broad heading of 'cooperation', we consider in this chapter a variety of agreements 
between firms (involving both equity participation in a new entity, or long-term contracts) 
whereby the parties commit assets and skills (inputs) to a certain task. This includes the case 
of agreements whereby a firm grants another firm exclusive use of an input, which may consist 
of a physical input or derive from an intellectual property right. 
The range of possible collaborative arrangements includes joint ventures (which encompass a 
variety of ownership arrangements, from equity participation in a separate undertaking, to 
other financial arrangements142); various agreements between partners, for example research 
partnerships and co-production agreements; and some forms of licensing (of a know-how, a 
distinctive product, or a trademark) between (potential) rivals. 
Empirical research on cooperation between firms tends to be limited to a number of firm-level 
case studies in the business literature. Systematic information on cooperative agreements is 
not collected in official statistics, and most of the available data is put together by tracking 
announcements in the financial press.143 For this reason, different sources tend not to be 
Traditional joint ventures are created when two or more partners join forces to create a newly incorporated company in 
which each has an equity position, thereby each expecting a proportional share of dividends. They thus involve two or 
more legally distinct organizations, each of which invests in the venture and actively participates in the decision-making 
activities of the jointly owned entity. Other financial arrangements are possible however (see Bresnahan and Salop 
[1986] for a discussion of their incentive properties). 
This has implications: in particular, in many cases the source of the information is likely to be press releases by the 
firms involved, which may be biased accounts of their purpose: e.g. participating firms may seek to mislead competitors 
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consistent or easily comparable, and firm conclusions are not easy to draw. However, while 
the absolute number of agreements which is reported may not be accurate, it is still possible to 
piece together a picture by considering the proportion of agreements in different categories, 
and how these relative numbers evolve over time. 
Some insight into the evolution of interfirm cooperation can be gleaned from a database of 
collaborative agreements collated at INSEAD (from announcements in the specialist press) 
since 1975. We compare below the picture for the decade 1975-85 (as given in Hergert and 
Morris [1988]), and for the period 1986-93.144 A few stylized facts are worth noticing: 
(a) Firstly, there has been a decline in the proportion of intra-EU agreements since 1986. 
below, on origins of the partners, shows a percentage decline in within-Europe 
agreements after 1986, from around 30% over the period 1975-85 to 24% in 1986 and to 
only 17% in 1993. Conversely, EU firms appear to have entered into more agreements 
with the 'rest of the world' (especially Eastern Europe) over the same period, as did US 
firms - which suggests that these ventures are frequently used to circumvent obstacles to 
direct entry. 
(b) Secondly, the incidence of cooperation with rivals in the same product market remains 
very high, relative to cooperation with 'complementary' firms. Both in the 1975-85 and 
the 1986-93 periods, according to the INSEAD database, collaboration with 'rivals' 
accounted for around 70% of all agreements. This may support the notion of cooperation 
being sought for its effects on competition. 
(c) Thirdly, there has been a shift from agreements on R&D to agreements having as their 
purpose joint production and joint marketing: i.e. cooperation has become 'closer' to the 
product market. 
Table 10.2 below considers the purposes of the collaboration, for the three main trading 
blocs, and compares patterns across time. Over the period 1975-85, the majority of all 
cooperative ventures in the INSEAD database were formed to engage in joint product 
development (39%), followed by production (22%) and - at some distance - by 
marketing (8%). The breakdown by origin of the partners shows that in the early period, 
collaborative ventures within the EU were even more likely to concern R&D than the 
total (this is also true for the US, suggesting that agreements between different blocs are 
often formed for the purposes of reaching a market). Over the next period, the 
proportion of all agreements concerning R&D declines to a third, while marketing 
increases to 21%. In Europe, the proportion of R&D agreements declines from 42% to 
31%, while agreements on marketing increase to 23%. 
over their motive and activities by misrepresenting themselves. In some cases, joint ventures may go unreported 
because the parents maintain strict confidentiality. 
The interpretation must be cautious, however, because of the variety of other factors which might have affected the 
prevalence of cooperation, in addition to EU market integration. For example, the rate of technological change and the 
emergence of world-scale competition in some sectors are both powerful incentives for entering into joint ventures, and 
their relationship with internal EU integration may not be easily disentangled. 
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Table 10.1. Origin of the partners (%) 
j Intra-EU j EU-US 
1975-85 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Source. 
; 30.8; 25.8 
| 24.1 j 24.1 
| 27.0; 12.6 
! 32.6; 17.8 
¡ 29.4; 16.5 
j 21.0 j 19.8 
; 18.7; 12.9 
| 13.8 j 14.4 
; 17.41 14.5 
INSEAD database. 
EU-Jap 
10.1 ; 
10.5 | 
11.71 
12.91 
6.6 | 
13.9 ( 
7.1 | 
2.5 j 
4.2 | 
EU-Row ; 
7.0 j 
7.0; 
12.61 
10.2 I 
11.8 | 
14.7 | 
18.7 | 
22.0; 
22.2 j 
US-US I US 
8.4; 
11.8; 
10.0; 
11.0; 
8.8; 
8.8; 
8.7 | 
8.6 j 
7.1; 
■Jap 
8.4; 
9.2 | 
7.4 j 
6.4; 
10.3 j 
5.01 
11.6 | 
12.2 | 
6.4; 
US-Row ; Row 
4.2; 
3.5 j 
7.0 ! 
3.8; 
6.6; 
8.8 j 
12.0; 
11.9; 
14.2; 
5.4. 
9.7 
7.4 
5.3 
9.9 
8.0 
11.6 
14.7 
14.5 
All blocs 
(absolute 
numbers) 
228 
230 
264 
272 
238 
241 
327 
311 
Table 10.2. Purposes of collaboration by economic bloc (%) 
| Dev. ; Prod. I Mk 
Intra-EU 
1975-85 42.1 I 18.0 j 
1986-93 31.2 j 21.6 j 
EU-US j ; j 
1975-85 40.0 j 21.3 j 
1986-93 31.9 | 14.3 j 
EU-Jap 
1975-85 29.0 j 31.9 j 
...1986-93 { 17.5 j 38.3 [ 
Intra-US j ; ; 
1975-85 57.1 j 21.4 j 
1986-93 | 54.4 j 15.4 j 
US-Jap 
1975-85 11.6 ; 21.7 j 
. . . 1 9 8 6 - 9 3 { 32.5 j 23.4 ; 
Total 
ι ι ι 
1975-85 39 ; 22 I 
1986-93 33 ; 21 ; 
* does not include rest of the world (ROW) 
Source: INSEAD database. 
1986-93 
1975-85 39 22 
tg 
5.1 
23.4 
8.3 
24.8 
11.6 
20.8 
3.6 
14.2 
14.5 
14.3 
8 
21 
Dev.& 
Prod. 
! 
24.1 
10.9 
14.8 ] 
9.8 
11.6 
12.3 ; 
3.6 
4.7 
16.0 
12.3 
17 
10 
Dev.& 
Mktg 
1.5 
1.8 
3.0 
2.6 
4.4 
2.6 
5.4 
5.3 
20.3 
1.0 
3 
2 
Prod.& 
Mktg 
2.6 
5.3 
5.3 
9.5 
7.3 
5.8 
3.6 
2.4 
13.0 
8.4 
5 
7 
Dev.& 
Prod. 
&Mktg 
6.7 
5.8 
7.7 
7.2 
4.4 
2.6 
5.4 
3.6 
2.9 
8.4 
6 
6 
Total* 
(absolute 
numbers) 
195 
394 
169 
307 
69 
154 
56 
169 
68 
154 
562 
1,211 
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Table 10.3 below describes in more detail the decline in R&D and the increase in joint 
production agreements within the EU over the period 1986-93, particularly towards the end of 
the period. 
Table 10.3. 
1986 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
I Dev. 
Purposes of collaboration within Europe, by year 
1 Prod. 
18 j 
24 ; 
24 | 
20 j 
12 ; 
13 | 
8 ] 
4 ! 
7 j 
8 j 
9 j 
7 j 
13 I 
14 j 
12 j 
15 j 
Mktg 
8 
10 
22 
19 
3 
1 
4 
25 
Dev.& 
Prod. 
9 
5 
7 
4 
9 
5 
3 
1 
Dev.& 
Mktg 
0 j 
o i 
3 j 
2 ; 
0 ; 
0 j 
1 i 
1 I 
Prod.& 
Mktg 
0 | 
4 ; 
0 | 
4 | 
1 ; 
1 I 
7 j 
4 j 
Dev.&Prod. 1 Total* 
&Mktg 
0 j 
6 ; 
4 ; 
7 j 
4 j 
0 | 
1 j 
0 ; 
55 
62 
86 
80 
50 
45 
45 
53 
* includes 'other' 
Source: INSEAD database. 
Supplementary information may be obtained from a few empirical studies of the UK. 
Glaister and Buckley [1994] examine joint ventures entered into by UK companies over the 
period 1980-89 (the database of over 500 ventures was collated from announcements in the 
press1 5). Joint ventures between UK firms and other European partners were found to be less 
likely to be marketing-related than joint ventures with US or Japanese partners (45% of 
agreements with US and Japanese partners involved marketing146). This is taken to indicate 
that market entry is a powerful motivation for joint ventures ('... joint ventures with more 
geographically remote partners such as the US and Japan may be used as market entry 
mechanisms and thus have to involve marketing activities. This is not the case as often in 
Europe to the extent that UK firms are already in the market'). However it must be noted that 
this evidence would also be compatible with an anti-competitive motive, if more intense 
competition was coming (in the relevant sectors) from the US and Japan. It is difficult to draw 
firm conclusions without more information on what proportion of joint ventures involved a 
combination of assets and skills which are genuinely complementary (e.g. manufacturing and 
distribution), rather than an alliance between firms with similar capabilities, which is aimed at 
neutralizing rivalry between them in the product market. 
The study of Millington and Bayliss [1995], on transnational joint ventures between UK and 
EU-based partners, is based on a survey of 812 UK manufacturing (quoted) PLCs, 100 of 
which (around 17%) were found to have one or more cross-frontier joint ventures with a 
The industries with the greatest incidence of joint ventures were found to be télécoms, aerospace, financial services, and 
to a lesser extent automobiles - though the pattern differs somewhat depending on the origin of the partner. Joint 
ventures with other European partners more often concern aerospace and financial services; with US partners télécoms 
and financial services; with Japan financial services, electrical and automobiles. 
There are, of course, important sectoral differences: pure R&D is found to be the purpose most often for aerospace, 
telecommunications, and other electrical; production for chemicals, and automobiles; development and production for 
aerospace, automobiles and télécoms; and marketing for food and drink, télécoms, distribution, and other services. 
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European partner. Almost 80% of these joint ventures involved companies operating in two 
very different types of industries: either mature industries, fairly open to import penetration, 
using established technologies with limited or exploited economies of scale; or growth 
industries, with high incidence of R&D, also open to international trade, with strong 
competition from other trading blocs. 
A significant difference is found between large and smaller firms both in terms of propensity 
to cooperate, and in motives for cooperation. Firms with a turnover in excess of UKL 100 
million are over 3.5 times more likely to enter into a joint venture with a European partner 
than firms with a turnover of below UKL 20 million. Firms in the lower size class also tend to 
form joint ventures mainly in order to 'penetrate markets in which they do not yet operate', 
while large firms identify as the main cause for cooperation the 'increase in competitive 
pressures stemming both from an increasingly unified EU market, and increasing global 
competition (especially in mature and high-technology sectors)'. Again an important criterion 
for assessing the claim that an agreement is necessary to 'achieve market entry' is the extent to 
which the joint venture effectively combines complementary capabilities, rather than pools 
similar assets and skills. Of 46 joint ventures studied in depth, 32 (70%) gave as their reason 
'circumventing national barriers and achieving market penetration'. However, of these only 
less than half (14) had a vertical element, involving for example a producer and a distributor. 
The rest were between firms producing similar goods. 
Overall, the available empirical evidence indicates that firms setting up a joint venture or 
another form of partnership tend to mention three main motives: to combine their resources or 
assets in a way that is somehow more efficient, to enter a market where they are not present, 
and to carry out joint R&D. In the next section, we discuss the economic rationale for these 
efficiency defences of cooperation. 
10.3. An economic analysis of efficiency defences 
Our main tool of analysis in the evaluation of efficiency defences is the distinction between 
complementary and substitute assets and skills. 
'Complementarity' refers to the fact that the production of a good (or service) requires the 
combination of different inputs and assets. All factors of production which are needed to 
manufacture a good, or supply it to the market, are therefore in this specific sense 
complementary (for that particular purpose). Conversely, 'substitutability' refers to assets and 
inputs which have effectively the same function in the production or supply of a particular 
good. In this framework, an agreement between firms may be described as bringing together 
complementary assets where the partners contribute distinct skills and inputs which can be 
combined either for producing an entirely new good (for example a telecom operator and a 
publisher offering an on-line news service), or for supplying a product to the market (for 
example an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor for the sale of the good in a 
different geographical market, where there is an element of selective vertical integration). The 
agreement brings together substitute assets where it joins together firms which have at least 
the capability of manufacturing similar products. 
The more recent economic theory of the firm provides some insights into the efficiency effects 
of (selective) asset integration, which may be helpful when assessing efficiency defences for 
cooperation. The traditional view of the firm is that of a combination of assets, in a way that 
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makes it possible to produce (and sell) more efficiently than its constituent parts separately. 
That is, assets are integrated in a single entity because this is the efficient (cost-minimizing) 
organization. Some more useful insights are offered by the 'incomplete-contracting' theory of 
the firm. This develops the earlier 'transaction cost' approach, which argued that vertical 
integration of assets may be preferable to market transaction when there are dangers of 
inefficient investments. The 'incomplete-contracting' theory addresses the concern that agents 
may underinvest (relative to what would be socially optimal) because some of the benefits of 
their investment are dissipated in future bargaining over the stream of profit from an asset. 
Hence efficient investments by agents depends on the control structure over the assets; and 
assets are efficiently assigned when they mitigate this underinvestment. 
The concept that a control structure is optimal when it provides the agents with (second-) best 
incentives to invest is used to understand the boundaries of the firm. In particular, it is shown 
that common ownership of assets is likely to increase overall efficiency when the assets are 
complementary. That is, integration of complementary assets has particularly strong efficiency 
reasons. 
There are of course also 'non-efficiency' reasons why assets may be integrated into a firm, 
rather than acquired through market transactions, in particular the exercise of monopoly power 
on the product market. However, the dangers of market monopolization may be more 
significant where the firm brings under its control substitute assets. 
In the context of interfirm cooperation, an agreement which brings together firms with 
substitute assets has thus greater potential for collusion - provided of course that the structure 
of the market is sufficiently concentrated (where concentration is low, the anti-competitive 
effect will be negligible and there is no real reason for concern). In a concentrated market, a 
cooperative agreement between firms with substitute assets provides an explicit framework for 
coordinating behaviour (e.g. through the discussion of pricing policies, and the sharing of cost 
information). There are also clear commitment and credibility effects (the parties commit 
resources explicitly, or make an investment in a joint asset), and the ability to monitor a rival 
is increased, all of which makes collusion sustainable. A common subsidiary may also be the 
vehicle for the side payments which may be necessary to redistribute the rents from 
collusion. 
Conversely, an agreement joining together firms with complementary skills and assets may be 
expected ex ante to have greater potential for net efficiency gains. This may also allow 
deployment of inputs and assets in new ways which may not have been achievable by one firm 
alone.149 
See in particular Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart and Moore [1990] and Moore [1992]. 
Bresnahan and Salop [1986]. among others, showed how collaborative links between firms affect the parties' incentives 
to compete. As the nature of joint ventures implies financial interests among competitors, the parties will not compete 
vigorously with the venture - or indeed with each other. In particular, the sharing of the joint venture profits between 
the parents/stockholders reduces their incentive to expand output and thereby lower prices. A related feature is that the 
parents have a private incentive to structure the agreement in a way that removes the discretion of the venture's 
management over prices and output, and replaces it either with direct control by the parents or with a formula. 
However, even in this case there may be anti-competitive horizontal effects, for example if the agreement effectively 
forecloses access to a particular input, which is scarce or not replicable. 
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We apply this general framework to discuss the main efficiency defences invoked by firms 
when entering into cooperative agreements, which fall under the following categories: 
(a) cooperative agreements may generate cost reductions and rationalization of capacity 
through the sharing of existing assets; 
(b) cooperation may generate efficiency gains by bringing under joint control assets with 
strong complementarities (vertical integration effects); 
(c) they may allow access to a new geographical market when entry without a partner would 
be difficult or may not occur at all; 
(d) they may lead to the development of a new product or process (R&D) which the partners 
could not have achieved individually. 
10.3.1. Efficiency gains from sharing or coordinating existing assets 
Firms often claim that they entered into a cooperative agreement with each other because of 
cost savings to joint operation, for example in production. The argument that efficiency gains 
may be realized through sharing an asset or input, and achieving more efficient organization of 
production, is often used by firms with substitute assets. It is, however, doubtful that 
cooperative agreements may be indispensable to generate the claimed efficiency gains, and 
that alternative arrangements would not produce comparable results. The case is different 
where the efficiency gains to the agreement are expected to come from coordination of 
complementary assets, in which case the agreement has characteristics of selective vertical 
integration. We review these efficiency defences briefly below. 
(a) Capacity sharing: in the presence of demand uncertainty, firms may need to keep a 
certain amount of spare capacity to cope with positive shocks. An agreement which 
enables firms to share capacity also allows them to rationalize the amount of excess 
capacity in the market, because they can essentially 'swap' their constraints. However, in 
order for this argument to be valid, a convincing case would have to be made 
demonstrating why effective capacity sharing could not be achieved through the market. 
(b) Economies of specialization: firms may mutually agree to focus on a smaller range of 
products (i.e. effectively to share the manufacture of a product line between them), and 
then distribute each other's goods in their respective markets. One argument which is 
sometimes made is that 'a firm is at a disadvantage if it does not offer a full range of 
products'; this may however overstate the significance of consumer search costs. A very 
common argument is that this type of agreement is beneficial because it allows firms to 
realize economies of scale, as well as learning economies. As these economies of 
specialization could be achieved by firms on their own, it is not clear why a cooperative 
agreement is necessary. Where returns to scale are significant, firms should have an 
independent incentive to specialize, and inefficient under-specialization in production 
could be eliminated without the need for an agreement. On the other hand, if the 
argument is that by agreeing to specialize production and to distribute the full range, 
each firm gains access to a new geographical market, a case would have to be made that 
there are very strong asymmetries in accessing each other's market (agreements which 
have as their object entry into a new geographical market are considered in more detail 
in Section 10.4.2). 
(c) Economies of scale are also often claimed as a justification for cooperation. In fact, 
economies of scale in production are difficult to achieve if there is no integration of 
production facilities and production continues to be managed at the plant level. Cost 
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efficiencies may be obtained, however, through multiplant organization, firstly through 
managerial economies, but also though a selection effect, i.e. if production is 
reorganized to reflect the relative technical efficiency of different plants, or if capacity is 
better utilized. Whether these effects may outweigh the anti-competitive effects of a 
reduction in competition is ultimately an empirical issue. Overall, the evidence of actual 
cost savings achieved through joint operations in mergers is mixed (see Chapter 11 
below). It is difficult to imagine that a cooperative agreement - where management 
remains in principle separate - may achieve significantly better results than a complete 
integration of assets, 
(d) Vertical integration: efficiency gains from coordination of assets should be expected to 
be substantial where the agreement joins together complementary assets - as where it 
has characteristics of selective vertical integration. An aspect which must be considered 
in this case, however, is the effect of the agreement on assets which are substitute to the 
complements. Where the agreement ties assets together to the exclusion of rivals, there 
may be a horizontal foreclosure effect which needs to be explored. 
10.3.2. Expansion into new geographical markets 
An oft-quoted reason for cross-border cooperation between enterprises is that it makes 
possible the penetration of new geographical markets by firms lacking local knowledge or 
expertise. The essence of the agreement in this case is the transfer of an existing product or 
technology to the partner, in exchange for local information and marketing skills. This is 
clearly a vertical issue: a firm manufacturing a product in one market requires complementary 
skills for selling into another market, and may achieve informational benefits from cooperating 
with a local firm with superior knowledge of local market conditions. Forming an alliance 
with a local partner also enables firms to circumvent certain absolute or artificial barriers to 
entry - including artificial restrictions to trade (high tariffs and quotas) and discriminatory 
public procurement barriers. 
This type of cooperation should be seen as efficiency-enhancing, if it involves the combination 
of manufacturing skills in one market with distribution expertise in another geographical 
market: that is, if the agreement joins together firms with truly complementary assets. 
The assessment must be much more cautious when the agreement for entering into a new 
market joins together firms with substitute assets. In several cases a firm has licensed the 
manufacture of its product, or its trademark, to a firm which produces similar goods in other 
geographical markets. This has been justified on grounds that new market entry typically 
requires costs to be sunk, while the profitability of entry is ex ante very uncertain; a licensing 
arrangement thus provides a way of 'experimenting' with a new market, without necessarily 
incurring the large sunk costs of full-scale entry, and reducing the exposure to risk. 
While this is true, the key issue remains the extent to which entry through this means is in fact 
a way of removing the competitive effect of entry, or foreclosing the market to rivals. Market 
entry through licensing (of know-how or trademarks) essentially removes competition between 
partners with substitute assets. Indeed this form of entry is effectively a commitment not to 
enter the market directly. In these cases, while there is a positive welfare effect in the form of 
increased variety for the consumer, it is also important to evaluate whether there was any other 
possibility of achieving direct entry at minimum efficient scale. If there was, there are strong 
reasons to be suspicious of the licensing agreement. 
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10.3.3. Joint development of a product or process 
Firms may enter into cooperative agreements (of various forms) for jointly developing a new 
product or process - rather than undertaking the necessary research and development in-house, 
or purchasing the relevant inputs and assets on the market. In particular, the reasons most 
often given for cooperation in R&D include: 
(a) synergies in collaborators' existing assets or skills; 
(b) cost savings made possible by sharing fixed assets and sunk costs, and thus generating 
economies of scale; 
(c) prevention of waste, if cooperation pre-empts rival firms from simultaneously carrying 
out research which is duplicative; 
(d) capital market imperfections leading to limited financial resources, and consequent 
inability of firms to acquire relevant assets independently; 
(e) sharing of risk across the collaborating partners, which makes it possible to undertake 
more risky projects, as well as expand the number of projects being carried out (this may 
be especially the case when associated with investments that serve uncertain demand or 
involve uncertain technology).150 
Cooperation in R&D has some characteristics of joint production, and may join together firms 
with both substitute and complementary assets. For example, firms manufacturing and 
supplying a similar good (substitute assets) may combine their R&D effort to develop a new 
technique, or a new version of the product; while firms with complementary assets may 
combine their skills to develop an entirely new product (the scope for complementarities is 
large in new product development). 
As in the previous efficiency defences, there may be reason to be more suspicious of 
cooperation when it brings together firms which own or control substitute assets, because in 
these circumstances any agreement is more likely to affect the intensity of product-market 
rivalry. However this may have different relevance for the cases of product innovation and 
process innovation. In product innovation the potentially anti-competitive effects of joint R&D 
for rivalry in the product market are more significant than in process innovation, because in 
the former the partners will either jointly or separately produce the same good; in the latter it 
may be easier to enforce some separation of R&D from the production of goods incorporating 
the new technique. 
Innovation has, however, very distinct characteristics, which increase the size of the efficiency 
gains to be expected from joint R&D - relative to cooperation in production. 
Firstly, the protection conferred on research findings through intellectual property rights is not 
perfect, and as a result there may be technological spillovers: successful research results by 
one firm also benefit its competitors. The existence of spillovers is an externality which 
dampens a firm's incentives to carry out R&D, if it fears that rivals will at least partially free-
This may be confirmed by the empirical evidence on the type of industries which are most often interested in R&D joint 
ventures: in the US, the traditional focus is on computers, electronic components, medical equipment and financial 
services: all high-tech industries requiring large high-risk investments. It is also confirmed by the high incidence of 
collaborative links in the European aerospace and defence industry, and heavy engineering industries in general, such as 
rail transport. Common characteristics are heavy investments in technology, and long lead times, plus shrinking market 
and global competition. 
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ride on its effort. The incentives for R&D may thus be suboptimal and there may be 
undersupply of R&D. Joint research can internalize the problem by allowing the potential 
users to take account of these spillover effects. Cooperation should thus correct the externality 
and reinstate the incentives for R&D. The increase in R&D following the elimination of the 
externality should be particularly significant at least in sectors where these spillovers are 
large.151 
In addition, economic analysis has also identified another reason why joint R&D may be 
efficiency-enhancing. While the incentive for each firm to undertake research may be 
suboptimal in the presence of spillovers, the overall volume of R&D carried out may be 
excessive from a social welfare point of view, if firms duplicate each other's effort. A joint 
R&D programme should enhance efficiency by preventing needless duplication of R&D 
expenditures. 
Overall, there appears to be more convincing efficiency justifications for cooperation in R&D 
than for other forms of interfirm cooperation, and this has informed public policy towards 
design R&D. Joint R&D activities have been a natural candidate for preferential treatment in 
competition policy, and a more lenient treatment is reserved to them both in US competition 
law (National Cooperative Research Act 1984, which put joint R&D under a 'rule of reason'), 
and in Europe (Block Exemption 1985).152 
However it is important to consider the impact of joint R&D not only on product market 
competition, but also on competition in R&D itself. The concern is that cooperative R&D 
ventures may end up doing less research, if cooperation eliminates the incentive of 
independent firms to innovate before their rivals, i.e. to beat their rivals in the 'race' to 
produce an innovation and appropriate the benefits. This results from the fact that the market 
rewards only those who are first in the innovation race (rather than rewarding them on the 
basis of their R&D inputs).153 Especially in concentrated industries, joint research may 
effectively be a way for rivals to avoid R&D competition, and may slow down the pace of 
research (relative to what would be socially desirable). 
This is an important aspect which is often underestimated, as discussions of the efficiency of 
joint R&D tend to give more weight to the benefits of eliminating needless duplication, and 
'excessive' R&D. In fact, the notion that R&D may be socially wasteful because there is 'too 
much' of it may be of relevance only to the (not very plausible) case in which independent 
firms would undertake exactly the same R&D programme. In practice, R&D programmes are 
There is a significant empirical literature seeking to assess the existence of technological spillovers, which suggests that 
these are important particularly in sectors such as computers, communication equipment, electronic components and 
aircraft, where the productivity of R&D is high. However their importance should not be overestimated. In particular 
Geroski [1993] emphasizes that the transmission ofinformation is not costless, and indeed imitation costs and time tend 
to vary with the amount of basic research done by the imitator. Spillover effects may also be different for basic research 
and for development activities embodying innovation into a product (the latter is often too specific to spill over; more 
costly; has more competitive feedbacks from output markets), and may change systematically over the life of a 
collaborative programme. Technological spillovers are likely to be larger in the case of basic research than for 
development activities: hence cooperative research is likely to increase innovation more than cooperative development. 
Evidence suggests that the NCRA in the US encouraged joint research: as reported by Shapiro and Willig [1990], 
reports of joint venture formation rose markedly at the time the NCRA was being considered by the US Congress. 
Both Ordover and Willig [1985] and Grossman and Shapiro [1986] argue that by replacing competitive decision-
making with joint decision-making, joint research may prevent a patent race and thus decrease the pace of R&D. 
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easy to differentiate, and the parallel development of similar strands of research may be 
socially beneficial. 
In summary, joint R&D may create concerns for competition in two dimensions: in the 
product market, and in the R&D market. At the product-market level, joint R&D may affect 
the ease of collusion (especially where firms with substitute assets are involved). Anti-
competitive outcomes are particularly likely where cooperation is allowed to extend to further 
stages (such as production, or even marketing).154 However there are special efficiency 
reasons - to do with the special characteristics of innovation - for allowing interfirm 
cooperation in R&D programmes. In the market for R&D, however, it is possible that 
competition in R&D may be stifled by cooperation. This aspect is often underestimated, and 
should be evaluated carefully when assessing the efficiency defence for cooperation in R&D. 
10.3.4. Summary 
Economic analysis suggests that there may be social benefits from joint operation between 
firms. However, agreements can only be justified when the efficiency defences for such 
behaviour are significant. Claims of efficiency gains from collaboration should thus be 
considered very carefully. An essential distinction must be drawn between agreements which 
join firms with substitute or complementary assets. We must also distinguish collaborative 
agreements in terms of whether their effect is merely that of horizontal concentration, or 
includes elements of vertical integration. 
A more robust ease can be produced in favour of joint R&D, though the distinction between 
substitute and complementary assets for inventing new products/services remains important -
both for competition in the product market and competition in R&D (the dynamic process of 
innovation). In this sense it is important to consider the extent to which cooperation removes 
from the market assets which could give rise to competition in R&D (as well as in the product 
market). 
10.4. Case evidence for the efficiency defences 
In this section, we discuss some of the available evidence on efficiency defences for 
cooperation, as may be derived from a selection of cases approved by the Commission. It is 
worth noting at the outset that, as the evaluation of the efficiency gains is inevitably difficult, 
much effort appears to be spent by the Commission and the courts in deciding whether the 
parties to an agreement are at all competitors in the relevant product and geographical market. 
Where it is concluded that they are not, obviously the restrictive effect on competition is 
negligible. The analysis of the efficiency effects does not appear very systematic. 
10.4.1. Sharing and coordinating existing assets 
In a number of cases, agreements have received individual exemption by the Commission 
from Art. 85(1) on grounds that the expected productive efficiency gains from sharing an 
asset, or joining together complementary assets, outweighed the restrictive effects on 
EU competition policy often has a difficult job in trading off incentives for innovation against reduced product-market 
competition. As discussed below in Section 8.6, the EU approach of allowing collaboration further down the chain of 
production is potentially likely to lead to less product-market competition than the US regime of allowing collaboration 
only at the R&D stage, though it may have positive effects on incentives to innovate. 
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competition. A review of these cases suggests, however, that the empirical evidence in support 
of this efficiency defence is not always very convincing, particularly where the declared aim of 
the agreement is to rationalize the deployment of assets owned/controlled by firms which are 
product-market rivals (substitute assets). The first-order effect on the intensity of direct rivalry 
appears difficult to overturn. 
Joint production/distribution by competitors 
For example, in 1986 Ford UK and the Italian company Iveco set up a joint venture (Iveco-
Ford Truck Ltd) for the joint production and distribution of heavy vehicles in the UK. Both 
companies were already producing and selling heavy vehicles in the UK and the rest of the 
EU, Ford UK above 6 tonnes gross weight (the 'Cargo' line), and Iveco above 3.5 tonnes. Ford 
was thus offering a more limited range, and as a result of this - it argued - its sales had 
declined. The joint venture had a dual purpose: to take over the production and sale of the 
'Cargo' line of heavy vehicles previously manufactured and marketed by Ford UK (for this 
purpose Ford UK sold and transferred to the joint venture the necessary equipment and 
personnel); and to market in the UK the heavy vehicles produced by Iveco which 
complemented the Cargo line (i.e. heavy vehicles above 4 tonnes). In the UK, the joint venture 
was to combine the two specialized Ford and Iveco dealer networks, and distribute the Iveco 
products under the combined Iveco/Ford trademark. 
As a consequence of the agreement, Ford UK agreed not to manufacture heavy vehicles in 
Europe (so did Ford USA); while Iveco agreed not to compete directly with the joint venture 
in the UK with its heavy vehicles above 6 tonnes, and to market its 'complementary' products 
between 4 and 6 tonnes in the UK only through the joint venture (neither party included in the 
joint venture lighter transport vehicles, below 4 tonnes). 
This was clearly an agreement between two major producers, direct competitors in a market 
which is fairly concentrated both at the European and at the UK level. In the market for heavy 
vehicles above 4 tonnes, Ford was the leader in the UK with a 19% market share (1985), and 
the 4-firm concentration ratio (C4) was 58% (including Ford, Leyland, Daimler Benz and 
GM); Iveco was in eighth place with 4%. In Europe, however, Iveco was the second largest 
producer after Daimler Benz. It is difficult to imagine that a company like Ford would not 
have the ability and resources independently to develop and supply a complementary range 
(between 4 and 6 tonnes) to the UK market, where it was the leader with a wide and efficient 
distribution and assistance network; indeed it did produce other heavy vehicles outside 
Europe. The main aim of the agreement appears to be the coordination of operation between 
two rivals, one of which is leader in the UK market, and the other a major player in Europe 
and potentially in the UK. 
In Ford/Iveco (1988), the Commission acknowledged that '(t)he joint venture is a business 
formation between competitors. It cannot be considered to be an independent new competitor 
in the heavy vehicles sector (because) the transfer of its previous heavy vehicles production by 
Ford UK to the joint venture does not preclude Ford from producing heavy vehicles elsewhere 
overseas. Ford remains an important supplier there, and one which could export to Europe', 
iveco also remains a competitor, because 'it continues to produce heavy vehicles which in 
principle compete with the joint venture's (though not in the UK)'. 
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The Commission then noted that '(a)s a result of the agreement, Iveco is required to sell its 
heavy vehicles in the UK only through the joint venture, and in conjunction with the Cargo 
line. Iveco is also required not to supply certain heavy vehicles to the UK insofar as they are in 
direct competition with Ford's Cargo. Competition between the two parties' various heavy 
vehicles ranges is thus restricted and consumer choice in the UK reduced' (para. 25). 
Similarly: 'The production and supply ban imposed on Ford UK from producing heavy 
vehicles above 4 tonnes in Europe or from supplying them to Europe reduces the number of 
suppliers in this sector' (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, the Commission granted an individual exemption under Art. 85(3) on grounds 
that the agreement 'improves the distribution of goods, while allowing consumers a fair share 
of the resulting benefit, without (a) imposing on the undertakings restrictions which are not 
indispensable, and (b) eliminating competition' (para. 30). The Commission goes on to say 
that 'the joint venture makes it possible to achieve rationalization effects' (para. 31): 
complementing the Cargo line is 'good' for consumers with large heavy vehicles fleets, as they 
can take advantage of uniform maintenance and spare parts systems ('the addition of the 
complementary Iveco models will improve Ford dealers' competitiveness'). It also 'allows 
Iveco to penetrate the UK market (of which it had only a small share) by filling the existing 
gaps in Ford UK's range'. Moreover, the joint venture and the attached restrictions were 
regarded as 'indispensable' because they allowed 'the rationalized and smooth transition from 
the old range of models to a new generation of vehicles. This could not be achieved with the 
same prospects of success in any other way' (para. 34). 
Most importantly, 'the agreement does not result in competition being eliminated ... It is to be 
assumed that effective competition exists in the common market in the heavy vehicles sector' 
(para. 37). The only support for this argument is a notion of 'relevant market' which is taken 
to include all heavy vehicles (not only those covered by the joint venture). Thus while Ford 
had in 1985 a 37% market share of sales of 6-16 tonnes vehicles in the UK, when all heavy 
vehicles are considered the combined total of Ford and Iveco was only 24%. The Commission 
concludes: 'Given this market structure, it may be assumed that effective competition 
exists...'. Similarly, 'competition is not affected in other areas of the common market' (Ford 
and Iveco together accounted for only 20% of total sales of all heavy vehicles in the EU in 
1985 - and the actual range of the joint venture accounted for a mere 5%). 
Overall, 'the advantages to be expected from the agreement on the whole outweigh the 
disadvantages associated with the restriction of competition' (para. 42): consumers are to 
enjoy a 'fair share of the resulting benefit' because they now can purchase complementary 
vehicles to the Cargo, and 'can now look forward to a new and complete range of vehicles 
produced by the joint venture'. Joint production also means a reduction of costs through 
economies of scale, and 'given the intense competitive pressures from other manufacturers, 
the cost reductions will be passed on to the consumers' (para. 43). 
In fact, it would appear that the achievement of efficiency gains in production and distribution 
from this agreement may be of a second order of magnitude, relative to the inhibiting effects 
on competition between the partners in the UK market for heavy vehicles. 
155 Another case of a joint venture to 'pool' the operations of two competitors in a market is Apollinaris/Schweppes 
(1991): Cadbury Schweppes (UK) and Brau und Brunner (Germany) pooled their Austrian and German operations into 
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Coordinating the selection of plants 
In a few cases, agreements have been deliberately approved as ways of cooperatively 
achieving selection of plants. This has happened most often in 'ailing' sectors, in preference to 
more drastic solutions: in particular, various agreements received individual exemption from 
the Commission in the 1980s concerning the European chemical industry, which was plagued 
by structural overcapacity and was making large losses. These included ENI/Montedison 
(1986), ICI/Enichem (1987), PRB/Shell (1987), EMC/DSM (1988), and Bayer/BP Chemicals 
(1988). 
However there have been other cases where rationalization of production has been sought 
through agreement. For example, in Philips/Osram (1994), competing firms have recently 
entered into an agreement for the joint production of an input. 
Agreements incorporating licences to use/manufacture an input 
Productive efficiency gains are also claimed by firms in agreements where one partner obtains 
from the other access to a product/technology which is an input in the manufacture of a final 
good. Again substitutability or complementarity of assets between licensor and licensee plays 
a crucial part for the competition assessment. Where the parties originally supply a (similar) 
final product to different geographical markets (i.e. have substitutable assets), the agreement 
may be a way of effectively sharing the market along national boundaries. That is, where one 
firm obtains from another the exclusive use of a certain know-how on a certain territory, but 
their assets are in fact fully substitutable, the anti-competitive effects of eliminating rivalry in 
each other's territory may be strong. 
An example is the case of Mitchell Cotts and Sofiltra. A joint venture was set up in 1984 in 
the UK between Mitchell Cotts Engineering, a UK producer of (among other things) air filters, 
and Sofiltra, a French manufacturer of various glass-based products (including filters). The 
aim of the joint venture (Mitchell Cotts Air Filtration Ltd) was to manufacture and market 
high-efficiency air filters using a type of small pleated paper made of superfine glass fibres, 
produced by Sofiltra. This paper is the major cost component and the key technological 
element in the finished product. Mitchell Cotts did not possess either the relevant technology 
or the R&D to manufacture this independently, and since 1975 it had purchased it from 
Sofiltra. 
The joint venture essentially took over Mitchell Cotts' manufacture and sale of air filtration 
equipment, while Sofiltra conferred its technical know-how ('secret data and other information 
relating to the design and manufacture of high-efficiency filters using small pleated paper'), in 
exchange for a royalty. As a result, there was no need for Mitchell Cotts to import the pleated 
glass fibre paper. The licence was exclusive: Sofiltra was not to grant further licences in the 
UK and could not sell directly in the UK, while the joint venture could not manufacture and 
sell competing products, and was prohibited from establishing any commercial sales 
branch/agency outside its allocated territory (UK, Ireland, and a few non-EU countries -
though passive sales were permitted). Before the agreement, sales of Mitchell Cotts filters 
a partnership for the manufacture, distribution and sale of water and soft drinks in Austria, Germany and export 
markets. While acknowledging that the joint venture was likely 'to give rise to a division of markets between the 
parents and the joint venture', the Commission found that it also 'enabled the parties to improve the distribution of their 
products outside their home market, and to intensify competition with producers of soft drinks'. 
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accounted for approximately 10% of the UK market (the share was negligible in Europe), 
while Sofiltra had around 15% of the whole European market and was dominant in various 
national markets (e.g. 54% in France). 
In Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra (1987), the Commission argued (correctly) that the relevant product 
market was that for the finished product; however Mitchell Cotts and Sofiltra 'could not be 
considered competitors at the manufacturing level' because 'Mitchell Cotts was marketing a 
finished product incorporating an input purchased from Sofiltra, whereas Sofiltra produced the 
finished product without recourse to outside assistance'.15 Further below, it is however 
acknowledged that Mitchell Cotts and Sofiltra are in fact competitors in the 'sales and 
distribution of the final product'. 
The Commission then puts forward that the joint venture 'enables both parties to become more 
competitive within the UK': MC could develop its manufacturing activities, while 'Sofiltra 
expands its activities to other parts of the Common Market' (though the terms of the exclusive 
licence actually restricted Sofiltra from selling in the UK), where 'Sofiltra would not have set 
up its own manufacturing facility in the UK without substantial uneconomic expenditure'. 
Therefore 'this obligation cannot be considered to constitute an appreciable restriction of 
competition within the meaning of Art 85(1)...' (para. 22). 
In the end, the Commission recognizes that the 'mutual ban on active sales' (i.e. the fact that 
the joint venture is prohibited to sell 'actively' in territories reserved for Sofiltra, and Sofiltra 
is prohibited to sell 'actively' in the UK does fall within Art. 85(1), 'since such restrictions 
result in the sharing of markets between Sofiltra and the joint venture which have become 
competitors and are offering competing products' (para. 24). 
However, an exemption was granted, because 'to enable the joint venture to establish itself 
and develop, it should not be subject to competition from other production units established by 
Sofiltra or other licensees'. Furthermore, 'it is in the interest of the joint venture not to be 
distracted from developing the market in its exclusive territory by attempting to sell outside it. 
Such a restriction should enable the joint venture to concentrate its efforts on its exclusive 
territory, building on the experience of MC's sales network. The territory can therefore be 
easily supervised with the result that there is better market knowledge based on closer contact 
with consumers. Accordingly, the agreements contribute to an improvement in production and 
distribution' (para. 25). Furthermore: 'As a result of the agreements, the products are 
manufactured by an integrated production process and technological improvements are made 
more widely and rapidly available to consumers and users' (para. 26). 
In the light of the restrictions included in the agreement, these claimed efficiency gains appear 
unconvincing. 
'As regards manufacture, MC was not an actual or potential competitor of Sofiltra since (it) lacked the requisite know-
how and R&D facilities for the production of pleated fibreglass paper, the crucial component in the finished product 
and the subject of the technology transfer in this case. The mere availability of purchases or licences from other sources 
does not alter this analysis: MC had evident economic and commercial interests in developing its own technology in 
this field and has not been able to do so, resorting first to purchases from Sofiltra and later to a joint-venture coupled 
with a know-how licence. Therefore, MC and Sofiltra were neither actual nor potential competitors for the manufacture 
of the complete finished product incorporating the essential technical component which is also the major cost 
component' (para. 19). 
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10.4.2. Entry into a new market 
There is a rather rich body of case material on cooperative agreements which are entered into 
for the declared purpose of achieving entry into a new geographical market. The issue is in 
what circumstances may this type of entry be considered beneficial, and when is it aimed 
instead at eliminating the competitive effects of entry (outweighing the benefits of increased 
variety for the consumers). 
A useful example to illustrate possibly different (expected) effects of cooperative agreements 
on entry is the recent history of the European telecommunications sector. This has been 
significantly transformed over the past decade by two main events: first, the Commission's 
1987 Green Paper which encouraged deregulation and liberalization (still largely ongoing); 
secondly, the technology-driven phenomenon of 'convergence' of télécoms and information 
technologies. As a result, national telecom operators (TOs), which had hitherto operated as 
monopolists within their national boundaries, were faced for the first time with the prospect of 
having to accommodate competing suppliers of telephony services. In addition, new local TOs 
emerged and gained market share, while established operators from other national markets 
(within and outside Europe) now had the opportunity to enter any EU national télécoms 
market. A wave of agreements and strategic alliances followed. In particular, a number of 
alliances have been formed between foreign TOs and local companies not yet active in 
télécoms, for the purpose of providing télécoms services in competition with the incumbent. 
In these cases there are clear elements of complementarity and selective integration. 
Other agreements have been formed between foreign operators and minority groups in 
individual countries (usually companies owning an alternative network), aimed at establishing 
a presence in these markets for their future opening to competition. In a network industry like 
télécoms, where direct entry is not possible without access to the network, teaming up with a 
local operator controlling an alternative network may be the effective way of achieving entry 
and bringing competition to the incumbent. However, as the parties have (in principle) 
substitute skills and assets, the question must be carefully considered of whether direct entry 
was not possible by the foreign TO, and/or effective competition could not have been waged 
on the incumbent by the local TO alone. 
The concern of horizontal concentration is very much present in all cases where the joint 
venture includes already dominant TOs: for example, a case like BT-MCI (1994) raises in 
principle more concerns than IPSP (1994). 
Entry into a new geographical market can also be achieved through licensing of know-how 
and trademarks. There are indeed several examples of firms granting licences to a firm in 
another geographical market for the manufacture of their product, or the use of their 
trademark. The agreement often includes exclusive production and distribution rights for the 
licensee at least in one part of the common market. Again in this case, where the licensee has 
substitute assets and is already supplying similar products, the licence may be an effective 
device for sharing markets between the parties, and avoiding the competitive effects of entry. 
Examples include: in Germany BT-VIAG; Tyssen-Bell South; Vabecom (an alliance of Cable & Wireless and Veba); 
and RWE plus six small electric utilities. Similar coalitions are being formed in France, Italy (Albacom: BT-Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro), Sweden (Telenordic: BT, Teledenmark and Telenor in Sweden) and Spain (Megared: BT and 
Banco de Santander). 
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In the European beer industry, for example, brewers have in some cases adopted the practice 
of licensing a rival brewer in the destination market for the production, distribution and 
marketing of a brand (as well as its on-premises retailing, in some cases). Thus, for example, 
Heineken licensed their name to Whitbread in the UK (even though Whitbread have altered 
Heineken's recipe); Löwenbrau was originally licensed to UK brewer Allied Lyons, while 
Courage brews Foster's lager. The practice has also developed in other EU Member States: for 
example Interbrew brews Carlsberg in Belgium and Holsten brews Foster's in Germany. 
The brewers have inevitably claimed significant efficiency gains from this entry strategy, 
emphasizing that licensing an incumbent brewer makes it possible for them to achieve niche 
entry at low risk and relatively small cost (especially where the existence of ties makes direct 
entry difficult); and this can be a springboard for full-scale entry once the brand name is 
established. However, these are ultimately 'horizontal' arrangements which must be viewed 
with serious concern. Licensing to an upstream rival in the destination market essentially 
implies the delegation of all relevant decisions on a brand (price, advertising, market 
positioning, distribution, etc.) to the upstream competitor, in exchange for a licence fee. This 
will not lead to fierce interbrand competition, but the licensee will price and position the 
'entrant's' beer in a way which does not compete with its own brands. Also, licensing 
arrangements tend to be of relatively long duration, which casts doubts on brewers' claims that 
this may be only a prelude to full-scale entry. 
For example, UK brewer Whitbread was granted the exclusive right to brew and market 
Canadian Moosehead beer in the UK. The Commission approved of the agreement 
(Moosehead/Whitbread, 1990) on grounds that given that most of the on-licensed premises in 
the UK are owned by brewers and tied to them, 'it is essential for a foreign firm to gain 
assistance of a British brewer in order to enter the UK market'. According to the Commission 
the agreement was likely to contribute to the improvement of production and distribution of 
Moosehead in the UK and to 'promote economic progress', while consumers would benefit 
from a wider choice. 
A less favourable stance was taken when the Danish beer producer Carlsberg and Courage 
(second largest brewer in the UK) entered into an agreement whereby Courage acquired the 
right to brew some Carlsberg beer under licence in the UK for 10 years, and also received 
exclusive distribution rights for Carlsberg beer to the off-premises trade (5 years) and non-
exclusive rights to the on-premises trade (10 years). In Carlsberg-Courage (1992), the 
Commission argued that it could not accept the exclusive distribution rights for Courage, since 
there was no justification for granting such rights to a competitor. The parties then had to limit 
their arrangements for the on-trade to the supply of Carlsberg beers to the pubs that were tied 
to Courage. 
Thus the Moosehead example was one in which a JV was thought to aid the entry of a new 
product. The rationale for the Carlsberg/Courage JV was presumably that this JV was not 
necessary to facilitate entry, but was rather about coordinating the pricing and marketing of 
competing products; Carlsberg had another means of maintaining its presence in the UK 
through a deal with Allied Lyons. 
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10.4.3. Research and development of new products/processes 
In EU competition law, pure R&D agreements benefit from a specific block exemption (see 
below Section 10.6). Other types of cooperative agreements which have as their object the 
development of a new product or technology may receive individual exemption under Art. 
85(3). 
The phenomenon of 'convergence' in the telecoms/media/IT sectors provides some good 
recent examples of agreements joining together firms with complementary assets and skills for 
the purposes of developing a new product. In particular the emergence of cable operators, 
often with their independent infrastructure for the delivery of TV programmes to the home, 
has created the opportunity for new complementarities and synergies, for example with input 
providers (e.g. of programmes and movies). As new possibilities have arisen for combining 
complementary assets and developing new products, there has been an increase in joint 
ventures and strategic alliances for the provision of the new services created by convergence. 
Examples of complementary skills being joined together include alliances between TOs and 
publishers (e.g. Europe Online, a joint venture of AT&T and a number of European 
publishers); other TOs have sought to extend into cable-TV networks (e.g. Telefonica-Prisa, 
Telecom Eireann-Cablelink, Telecom Italia). 
Alliances between partners with complementary skills are more likely to be socially beneficial, 
as they may speed up the development of a new product or service - thus delivering 
technological progress and lower prices to consumers. Another case is BP/MW Kellogg 
(1985). 
The issue is - as usual - more problematic in the case of R&D which is carried out jointly by 
firms with substitute assets. In this case, an important question is whether cooperation is in 
fact essential for carrying out a particular research or development programme, or whether 
firms could have proceeded alone. There is also the question of whether cooperation does not 
in fact dampen the incentives for competition in R&D, effectively slowing down the pace of 
research. 
In many cases, especially where large multinational firms are involved, it is very difficult to 
believe that they are doing research together because they did not have sufficient resources 
individually. Indeed, in the majority of cases, the Commission reaches the conclusion that the 
parties to the agreement would have the means of carrying out the research or development 
individually, but then it also argues that a result would be achieved 'more rapidly' by pooling 
resources. 
Examples of research joint ventures set up between large multinationals (which are also 
competitors in the product market) include the cases of Continental-Michelin (1988) and more 
recently Asahi-Saint Gobain (1994). 
The world tyre market is rather concentrated (84% of all sales accounted for by 10 groups). 
The French manufacturer Michelin is the second largest in the world (after Goodyear) with an 
18% market share (1987), while the German Continental Gummiwerke AG is the fourth 
largest, with a 4% market share. In the EU, Michelin is the largest and Continental the second 
largest supplier. In 1986, Michelin and Continental applied to the Commission for individual 
exemption of a cooperation agreement commenced in 1983 for the development of a new run-
flat tyre/wheel system for passenger car tyres (the block exemption does not apply because the 
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tyres manufactured by the parties amount to more than 20% of all tyres manufactured in the 
EU). 
Continental had been working on the development of a new tyre/wheel system (known as the 
'reverse hooking tyre' system or RHT) since 1979. The objective was to develop a tyre/wheel 
system such that, in case of a puncture, the car can be driven for several hundred miles at 
reduced speed with a flat tyre (this potentially makes it possible to dispense with the spare 
wheel, which in turn has various advantages). The purpose of the agreement was first to assess 
the RHT system developed by Continental, and then to develop RHT tyres further. 
Continental and Michelin argued that the agreement was justified by (a) the need for further 
development of Continental's prototype to the manufacturing stage (there were various 
technical problems) and (b) the fact that an individual tyre manufacturer cannot on its own 
introduce a new system like RHT into the market, since 'the motor industry strictly avoids 
becoming dependent on a single tyre manufacturer' (para. 9). They also emphasized that their 
cooperation is 'restricted to areas which are directly connected with the development of the 
new tyre/wheel system' but they will otherwise remain competitors (i.e. they will differ in 
terms of compounds, profile and non-system related structures).158 
From the notified agreement, the Commission inferred that although Michelin had for years 
been working independently on the development of a flat tyre system, but no results from this 
effort were included in the agreement, its attempts had not been successful. The parties 
therefore agreed to concentrate on a joint development. This restricted competition 'insofar as 
the agreement will not lead to the development of competing systems' (i.e. cooperation may 
eliminate the benefits of competition in R&D). 
The Commission also commented on some restrictions on the parties' freedom to market the 
product in the initial stage, but eventually it granted the exemption on grounds that the 
agreement generally led to 'improved production of goods and promotion of technical 
progress', and the 'consumers' share of the advantages resulting from the agreement' was 
significant. In principle, the JV was to grant non-exclusive production licences, including to 
third parties, thus ensuring competition in production and the passing of benefits to 
consumers. Continental was unable on its own to resolve the numerous technical problems 
involved, and there were safety advantages from a dual set of safety tests. In addition, the 
Commission agreed with the 'need to avoid supply bottlenecks in the motor vehicle industry' 
(dubious argument). 
Technology transfer and other agendas 
In several cases, agreements on joint product development have received exemption from the 
Commission on grounds that they make possible a degree of technology transfer from an 
extra-EU firm to a European partner. The agenda here is clearly one of industrial policy, as it 
is hoped that access to outside technology will enable EU firms to compete effectively with 
large multinationals. On a few occasions, the competition authorities have stated that they will 
not allow any restriction of competition within the EU 'for the sake of helping EU 
undertakings in the world market: competition "at home" can be beneficial in making 
It should also be noted that the joint venture set up by Continental and Michelin was to grant non-exclusive licences, 
i.e., third parties could, in principle, have access to the new technology. 
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companies more effective on a global scale' (XXIst Report on Competition Policy, point 45). 
However this commitment is not firmly upheld in practice. 
The case of Olivetti and Canon is quite typical. In 1987, Olivetti and Canon formed a joint 
venture (Olivetti-Canon Industriale) for the purpose of 'developing, designing and 
manufacturing copying machines, laser printers and facsimiles'. In fact, in the first phase the 
joint venture was to take over (on licences from Olivetti and Canon) only the manufacture of 
certain models of Olivetti and Canon copying machines in the speed range of 10-20 copies per 
minute (cpm). The joint venture had exclusive manufacturing rights for Europe. In a second 
phase - to start in 1989 - 'the parties may decide to produce other office automation products 
such as laser printers and fax machines. They may also consider the production of higher-
speed copiers.' 
In 1987, the low-end range of the plain-paper copier market in Europe (which includes the 10-
20 cpm range) was dominated by Canon, with a 24% market share and a strong innovation 
record. Of the nine largest brands in Europe at the time, seven were Japanese: this reflected the 
difficulty of European copier manufacturers since the 1970s to keep pace with the 
technological developments of Japanese manufacturers. 5 Japanese companies also 
progressively set up a manufacturing base in Europe, while an anti-dumping duty was imposed 
in 1986 on their sales of imports from outside the EU (a 20% duty was imposed on Canon). 
60% of Olivetti's sales of copiers in 1986 were Japanese machines sold under its brand name 
(OEM arrangement); the rest were manufactured by Olivetti, in the low range only. Canon was 
also a major name in fax machines, with a full product range (at 20% it had the second largest 
market share in Europe in 1986 after Panasonic), while Olivetti's sales, limited to Italy and 
Spain, were all on an OEM basis from Sharp and accounted for 2.5% of the EU market. In 
laser printers, Canon was one of the two most significant manufacturers in the world, and in 
1985 accounted for 18% of sales in Western Europe (as well as supplying the engines for the 
market leader Hewlett Packard). Olivetti only sold a few units in 1984/85, procured from 
Hitachi. 
Olivetti was to transfer to the joint venture its copier research and production activities, while 
Canon was to make a substantial investment in 1987-88 and to transfer technology to the joint 
company. In addition, Canon was under obligation to 'expose its product plans to the joint 
venture from time to time' (Commission Decision OJ L 052 26.2.1988, para. 24). Also, each 
party was under the obligation of 'promptly disclosing to the other any improvement made by 
it to the licensed products'. 
The Commission judged that 'the joint venture had been formed between actual competitors 
for copying machines of low-speed range, and for fax machines (of which Olivetti was an 
important OEM seller in Italy); and between potential competitors in copying machines of the 
medium range.160 The parties were non-competitors in the markets for high-range copiers 
The main remaining EU producers are Rank Xerox (UK, full range) and Océ (Netherlands, upper range), but most of 
the smaller companies converted (totally or partially) to 'Original Equipment Manufacturers' (OEM) distribution of 
Japanese machines, i.e. distribution under their own brand name of Japanese products. 
'Olivetti's skills and technology for copying machines could be extended to higher-range models: the input products are 
largely the same, demand is sufficient to support such business and these machines sell at larger margin, Olivetti is a 
profitable and healthy group. It could therefore bear alone the technical and financial risks associated with production 
of mid-range machines' (para. 39). 
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(Canon's share negligible, Olivetti none) and laser printers (Canon major competitor, Olivetti 
not active). As a result, the Commission found that the joint venture restricted competition 
between the parents in the low-range copiers market, and in future possibly also for mid-range 
copiers and fax machines. The argument rested on the (dubious) notion that joint production 
'will result in identical production costs for both, with an inevitable influence at the sales 
stage. The products will be substantially the same (and) each party will have less autonomy in 
determining its sales prices than it would have if its production costs were different. The scope 
for competition at the sales stage is thus limited'. Moreover, 'the joint venture restricts 
competition in terms of development and designing of the relevant products' (para. 42). 
These arguments were ultimately offset by the consideration that the agreements 'offer 
benefits for the Community which outweigh the restrictive effects on competition' (para. 53). 
In particular, the joint venture was seen as 'improving technical and economic progress' in a 
field where the technology is fast moving. An attempt was made to emphasize the productive 
efficiency gains from the joint R&D, as 'the expansion of production in the EEC which results 
from the joint venture enables the parties to spread the cost of these investments over a larger 
number of products; otherwise the cost of those products would be too high for producers to 
be able to sell them at a competitive price. The joint venture is therefore apt to avoid 
duplication in costs of development' (para. 54). However, in the same breath the Commission 
recognized that 'research does not fall directly within the scope of the joint venture' (ibid.). 
The decisive factor was the acknowledgement that the joint venture 'enables a transfer of the 
benefits of advanced technology to Olivetti (...) from Canon which is a leader of innovation 
and whose policy is R&D oriented' (ibid.) - while 'the granting of a licence would not have 
allowed the transfer of a technology to the same extent as allowed in a joint venture: the major 
involvements of the partners in a manufacturing joint venture permits a permanent and intense 
flow of technology' (para. 56). 
As in this case, also in other cases agreements which are branded 'joint product development' 
concern in fact joint manufacturing of a product by firms which are effectively competitors on 
the product market (substitute assets). Even in these cases, the Commission has tended to 
grant exemptions when the agreement was perceived as 'desirable' from an industrial policy 
perspective. A rather obvious example is that of the joint venture formed in 1992 between 
Ford (US) and Volkswagen for the joint development and production of multi-purpose 
vehicles (MPVs) in Portugal. It is easy to see how the Commission did not turn down an 
agreement which was large, relatively high-tech, and included production from a greenfield 
site in a less developed region of Europe. The agreement was exempted under Art. 85(3), 
though it was made subject to some conditions 'given the high degree of cooperation in the car 
industry'. 
10.5. Cooperation and market integration 
In this section, we address the expectation that European market integration should be 
associated with an increase in the number of cross-border alliances between enterprises. In 
particular, we discuss how market integration relates to firms' overall incentives to enter into 
cooperative agreements, as well as on the form of such cooperation. 
The main expected contribution of the 1992 programme to cooperation was the removal of 
barriers such as disparities in company law, tax law, and rules on capital movements, which 
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were perceived as a major obstacle to the formation and survival of cooperative agreements in 
the past: 
'... Cooperation between undertakings of different Member States is still hampered by 
excessive legal, fiscal and administrative problems, to which are added occasional 
obstacles which are more a reflection of different mental attitudes and habits. The 
absence of a Community legal framework for cross-border activities by enterprises and 
for cooperation between enterprises of different Member States has led [...] to 
numerous potential joint projects failing to get off the ground. As and when the 
internal market is developed further, enterprises [...] will become more and more 
involved in all manners of intra-Community operations, resulting in an ever-increasing 
number of links with associated enterprises, creditors and other parties outside the 
country' (White Paper, Completing the Internal Market, pp. 34-6). 
Emerson et al. [1988] also identified a number of obstacles to cooperation in Europe, and 
speculated that the 1992 programme would eliminate 'the paradox (...) that cooperation with 
Community partners has so far been less frequent than cooperation with partners in non-
Member countries' (p. 175). 
Undoubtedly much of the enthusiasm for cooperation and alliances was associated with the 
view that these would strengthen European capabilities especially in high-technology sectors, 
and thus support European 'competitiveness' on the world scene. This position was echoed by 
the Cecchini report ('Market integration brings with it a number of factors giving European 
firms the chance to regain technological leadership [through] the rapid development of cross-
frontier business cooperation for R&D', p. 75). To substantiate its commitment to encouraging 
collaborative links between enterprises, the Commission also set up a variety of specific 
programmes to stimulate and even fund cross-frontier R&D cooperation, and much effort has 
been spent on developing a European dimension to industrial research work. These 
programmes were explicitly conceived also as one way of furthering European integration. As 
argued by the Cecchini report, 'EC-sponsored R&D programmes like ESPRIT, way beyond 
their monetary significance, are a crucial focus for fusing cross-frontier innovation and 
business' (p. 89). 
The questions to be addressed are whether these expectations are justified from an economic 
point of view, and what interpretation should be given to changes in cross-border cooperation 
as a response to market integration. 
As was argued above, when markets are geographically segmented (e.g. along national 
boundaries) by differences in regulation and standards, or in the legal framework, firms may 
seek to overcome these artificial restrictions and gain entry through cooperative agreements 
This followed the example of large-scale interventionist programmes in the US or Japan. The majority of the 
programmes set up by the Commission involve the provision of funds, while others (such as BC-NET) aim at helping 
firms find possible partners in the EU. For example, the ESPRIT programme was aimed at promoting pre-competitive 
collaborative research (i.e. applied research between basic research and the product development stage) by linking 
together the largest electronics firms. Several other programmes were implemented by the Commission under the 
umbrella of the Framework Programme: ESPRIT and RACE (now ACTS) were specifically tailored to information 
technology; MAST, BIOTECH and AIR to the biotechnology and agriculture sectors. Various other programmes cut 
across sectors to promote new manufacturing technologies (BRITE), technology transfers (SPRINT), regional 
technological initiatives (STRIDE), or to avoid duplication of basic R&D programmes in the EU (EUREKA). 
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with a local partner. Firms' propensity to enter into such agreements should be increased by 
uncertainty on the characteristics of the local market and issues of idiosyncratic risk. 
In addition, differences in the institutional environment may be expected to affect also the 
choice of the particular form of collaboration, and in particular the choice of contracts versus 
equity. Where the ability to form contractual relations is limited, for example due to issues of 
contractual incompleteness and hold-up problems, firms might favour equity participation. If 
writing contingent contracts is not feasible, ownership may have preferable incentive 
properties: giving an independent firm adequate financial incentives for the optimal allocation 
of its time and effort among relevant activities may be costly, especially where it is difficult to 
measure performance. Equity participation may thus reduce the need for strong performance 
incentives. Also, where investments are specific and have sunk cost character, equity 
participation may create a more irreversible cbmmitment to a market, and thus reduce the 
mutual hold-up problem. This may find some support in the fact that joint ventures are more 
frequently adopted between firms in dissimilar economic blocs. If we view joint ventures as a 
response to contractual incompleteness, this is easily explained: for example, transactions 
which might be market-mediated or contractual between two EU firms may not be feasible 
between an EU firm and an Eastern European firm, as a result of the greater difficulty of 
writing contingent contracts in the second case. This is also the situation in which there is 
more likely to be tariffs and quotas, and joint ventures may well be a response to these 
restrictions. 
If artificial barriers to trade and direct entry are removed, three possible effects could be 
expected. 
(a) Increased opportunities for direct entry 
We have argued that in some cases the cooperation of a local firm is sought for gaining 
access to a market which is protected by artificial or absolute barriers to direct entry. To 
the extent that market integration reduces artificial obstacles to direct entry into a 
market, this incentive for entering into cooperative agreements might be weakened. 
Some support for this hypothesis may be inferred from the case of the US, which is an 
example of an integrated market: there are fewer joint ventures between domestic firms, 
relative to those involving US firms and an outside partner (see Tables 10.2 and 10.3, 
Section 10.2). 
(b) Anti-competitive responses to integration 
In an integrated market, firms may enter into cooperative agreements in order to reduce 
the intensity of competition from firms which are now able to supply their market: for 
example, in order to avoid the competitive effects of entry. As was discussed in the case 
of beer, licensing arrangements when the licensee has fully substitute assets might be an 
anti-competitive alternative to direct market entry, in order to eliminate competition 
between the licensor's product and the incumbent/licensee's product. The pecuniary 
externality (business-stealing effect) that the entering product would have on the 
incumbent product is internalized. 
More generally, cooperation may provide a framework for coordination with rivals, 
which might be felt as necessary by firms in an integrating market. 
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(c) Reduction in information asymmetries (monitoring and enforcement costs) 
To the extent that the single market programme may reduce information asymmetries in 
identifying a suitable partner in another country, and eliminates certain obstacles to the 
establishment of an agreement, it is possible that cooperation may be facilitated. For 
example, where market integration implies less idiosyncratic shocks across countries, it 
is possible that monitoring of a partner's actions improves and cooperation becomes 
more feasible. Also, to the extent that a more uniform legal and institutional framework 
develops across the Community (e.g. company law, auditing standards, rules on 
taxation, issues which were given significant weight by the Commission in all its 
pronouncements on the subject), there should be less uncertainty on the true position of 
the prospective partner (for example on its financial position, or the resources which it 
can credibly dedicate to the venture), and this could stimulate agreements. This 
expectation was echoed by various commentators, who saw significant potential for 
some measures to encourage cross-border cooperation.162 This may be particularly true 
for contractual agreements, as differences in legal frameworks were never a very 
significant obstacle for firms to enter into joint ventures. To the extent that market 
integration improves monitoring and enforcement possibilities, and reduces idiosyncratic 
differences between countries, firms might find it easier to enter into contracts, rather 
than equity participation. Integration may thus enhance contracting possibilities relative 
to ownership. 
To summarize: to the extent that cooperation is motivated by firms' efforts to overcome 
regulatory and other barriers to market access, it is conceivable that integration would reduce 
the incentive to cooperate; however the strategic motive for cooperation may become stronger 
for the same reasons (as competitive pressures increase both inside the EU and from rivals in 
other trading blocs). Paradoxically, integration may make these agreements easier, if it 
eliminates information asymmetries and artificial barriers (differences in institutional and legal 
framework) and reduces these disparities. 
10.6. Interfirm cooperation in EU competition law 
The task of competition policy in this area should be to differentiate effectively between 
cooperation which has socially beneficial aspects, and should therefore be allowed, and 
agreements which effectively support anti-competitive outcomes, and should be rejected. In 
practice, in order to avoid altogether the problem of having to quantify the significance of the 
efficiency defences, much effort is spent by the Commission and the courts to show that the 
undertakings which are part of the agreement do not in effect compete in the product market, 
and therefore there is no appreciable restriction on competition. As indicated in Section 10.4, 
this has led in some cases to rather paradoxical descriptions of competition in a market. 
See for example Buigues and Jacquemin [1989]: '...there are several obstacles to the conclusion of a cooperation 
agreement. In addition to the difficulties of finding a partner able to make a balanced contribution, setting up a 
management structure to minimize the running costs of cooperation, and ensuring a full and fair use of the proceeds, 
there is also a set of regulatory and political obstacles to cooperation in Europe. Differences in company law and tax 
systems, for example, are often considerable. This raises the problem of Community-level consolidation for tax 
purposes and financial transfers between companies within the group. Barriers to the mobility of human resources 
arising out of social legislation [...] are also important. Completion of the single market will remove a number of 
obstacles to cooperation, whether discrimination in the shape of national industrial policy measures or disparities in the 
standards, rules and regulations governing products.' (pp. 63^1). 
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Apart from the way it is applied, Community competition law accords a privileged status to 
many cooperative agreements, and appears to have been effectively informed by the 
persuasion that the potential social benefits from interfirm cooperation are likely to be large. 
On the one hand, it is acknowledged that cooperative agreements may in practice have effects 
which are very similar to mergers: joint ventures which respond to certain criteria are deemed 
''concentrative' and must be notified to the Merger Task Force, to be dealt with under the 
Merger Regulation. However, the criteria for distinguishing between 'concentrative' and 
'cooperative' joint ventures163 remain dubious and most unsatisfactory. All 'cooperative' joint 
ventures are dealt with under Art. 85, together with all other forms of cooperation between 
enterprises. This implies significant procedural differences, and also leaves room for 
manipulation of the system through strategic choice of jurisdiction (see for example Neven, 
Nuttall and Seabright [1993]).164 
The law's favourable attitude towards cooperation finds expression in a substantial body of 
special rules, which define a set of exceptions - or exemptions - to the prohibition of Art. 
85(1). The exemption is the main legal instrument for allowing interfirm linkages when 
efficiency gains are believed to ensue. In addition to the possibility for individual exemptions, 
the Commission has issued a variety of block exemptions, to avoid having to deal with a flood 
of applications for individual exemption even for relatively straightforward cases. These grant 
immunity from prosecution, for a certain length of time, to agreements conforming to a given 
set of criteria.165 
For cooperative joint ventures there are specific guidelines detailing the circumstances under 
which an agreement may be individually exempted, or it may be given negative clearance (i.e. 
is deemed to fall outside of Art. 85(1) altogether). From a procedural point of view, the 
position is that there is no necessary notification requirement for these joint ventures; the 
parties may decide to notify them only if they fear that the Commission might question their 
validity at a later stage, because of effects on competition or EU internal trade. Most 
notifications are dealt with through informal non-binding 'comfort letters' (the Commission 
has committed itself to come to a decision within two months), and do not give rise to any 
final decision (they are not binding for national courts). 
There is a consensus that the Commission's attitude towards (cooperative) joint ventures has 
softened over time. After an 'interventionist' earlier phase with wide application of Art. 85(1), 
the Commission became more lenient after 1983 (Xlllth Report on Competition Policy); in 
1993, a special Notice on Cooperative Joint Ventures was issued, identifying some agreements 
as falling outside of Art. 85(1) altogether, and allowing a variety of ancillary restrictions (e.g. 
restrictions specifying the product range of the joint venture, restrictions on field of use, and 
restrictions on the parents in competing initially with the joint venture). The Notice also 
Formally, a joint venture is deemed 'concentrative' if two conditions are fulfilled: that the joint venture is an 
'autonomous' entity, and that 'it has not for its purpose the coordination of the activities of the parent companies'. 
For example, it is well known that firms generally tend to structure a joint venture as concentrative whenever they can, 
because of the advantages of doing so in terms of procedures (the MTF must respond within one month) and the greater 
certainty associated with an MTF pronouncement (see below). See for example Bensaid et al. [1994]. 
While this approach has obvious advantages in terms of transparency and is economical from an administrative point of 
view, it is also criticized for its rigidity, and exposure to manipulation on the part of firms - which can ensure 
exemption by carefully tailoring the terms of their agreement. 
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defines the 'checklist' of criteria to be applied for granting an individual exemption, including 
whether the agreement restricts competition between the parents; between the parents and the 
joint venture ('this typically manifests itself in the division of geographical markets, product 
markets or customers'); whether it establishes a network of joint ventures that could restrict 
competition; and whether it affects third parties 'excluding them from economic opportunities' 
especially in oligopolistic markets, or erecting a barrier to entry by pooling the parents' market 
power. The effect on competition must also be appreciable. As we have seen, the case history 
on cooperative joint ventures suggests, however, a rather lenient application of these criteria 
(see Section 10.4). 
Special block exemptions exist for other categories of collaborative agreements, including 
R&D agreements (block exemption Regulation (EEC) No 418/85, amended by Regulation 
(EEC) No 151/93); specialization agreements (block exemption originally issued in 1972, 
subsequently replaced by Regulation (EEC) No 3604/82, then Regulation (EEC) No 417/85, 
and amended by Regulation (EEC) No 151/93); and various forms of intellectual property 
licences (block exemption on patent licences Regulation (EEC) No 2349/1984, and on know-
how licensing Regulation (EEC) No 556/1989; these are being replaced by a single block 
exemption, to provide a unified approach in this area).166 
The Commission's favourable stance on R&D agreements also reflects in part - as we have 
seen - considerations of industrial policy, sectoral policy, and integration aims. Initially, the 
agreements originally eligible for block exemption were 'pure' R&D agreements, those 
extending to joint exploitation (including manufacturing and licensing), and joint exploitation 
flowing from an earlier R&D agreement. The only condition was that joint exploitation was 
limited to goods and services resulting from the research; and if the parties were competing 
manufacturers, their combined market share should not exceed 20% of the EU market for the 
products in which they compete. 
An important restriction was the prohibition of joint selling, which meant that R&D 
agreements which extended to the marketing stage were not to benefit from the block 
exemption. However this condition was deleted in 1993, as Regulation (EEC) No 151/93 
extended the scope of the exemption to the joint distribution of products resulting from joint 
R&D - on condition that the parties' joint market share does not exceed 10% of the relevant 
market.167 
Another ad hoc block exemption exists for specialization agreements, whereby firms agree to 
specialize only in manufacturing certain goods, and to distribute each other's products. The 
Commission tends to look favourably on these agreements, '... since in (this case) each firm 
Of course for all agreements which do not qualify for block exemption remains the option of the individual exemption, 
which will be granted on the basis of the usual requirements of Art. 85(3): (a) that the agreement implies an 
improvement in economic and technical progress; (b) that consumers receive a fair share of the benefit; (c) that the 
restrictions included in the agreement are indispensable for its operation; and (d) that there should not be a substantial 
elimination of competition. 
This development undoubtedly raises a number of concerns on the effects of joint R&D on competition in the product 
market. Indeed this formal development had been anticipated by some Commission decisions, which gave signs of 
increased flexibility: e.g. in Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik (1990), a 10-year exemption was granted (under 
Art. 85(3)) to a cooperation agreement on R&D, production and marketing of certain electric components for satellites 
between Alcatel and ANT. The justification was that 'in this field the nature of demand means that the benefits of joint 
research and development and manufacturing can be obtained only if they are combined with some degree of joint 
marketing' {XXth Report on Competition Policy 1990). 
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continues as an independent producer' (Whish [1993]). Only in a few cases has the 
Commission worried that these agreements may be used in practice by firms to fix quotas and 
divide the market. 
Finally, a number of exemptions have been issued in relation to licensing of intellectual 
property rights. The Commission tends to be more guarded towards cross-licensing 
(agreements whereby competing firms license each other to use a technology), being 
concerned that firms will 'use them to effectively pool their patents and agree not to license to 
third parties, while at the same time fixing quotas and prices' (Whish [1993]). However, the 
attitude is more lenient towards 'vertical' licensing, for example where the producer of 
patented goods (or goods embodying valuable know-how) grants manufacturing licences to 
third parties. 
The Commission tends to view these types of agreements (including the case where the 
licence contains restrictions on the quantity of goods produced by the licensee or their price) 
essentially as restrictions on intra-brand competition, on grounds that 'these restrictions relate 
to the patentee's own product'. There may be, however, serious effects on interbrand 
competition - especially when the licensee is also a potential competitor in the product 
market. Non-competition clauses are also mostly allowed, forbidding the licensee from 
handling goods which compete with the licensor's, or 'field of use restrictions', whereby the 
licensor limits the licensee's authority to produce goods for a particular purpose. The rationale 
here is that the law should not be too rigid on these restrictions, to the extent that they 
encourage the patentee to license a new technology and the licensee to invest, which means the 
technology is disseminated; and again the restrictions mostly affect intra-brand competition, 
while interbrand competition may be increased by introducing a new licensee onto the market. 
The main anti-competitive concern is that 'licences of intellectual property (...) may be used in 
a way that compartmentalizes the market' (Whish [1993, p. 625]). Though territorial restraints 
are allowed, the Commission employs its usual compromise criterion that 'passive sales 
should not be restricted'. 
10.7. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have considered the economic rationale for a variety of efficiency defences 
applied to cooperative agreements between enterprises. The critical issue for the competition 
authorities is to evaluate when the restrictive effects of an agreement on competition 
(coordination in the product market, elimination of the competitive effects of entry, and so on) 
may be overturned by certain efficiency gains from joint operation. 
There were two main reasons for discussing these agreements separately. 
First, in spite of its occasional claims to the contrary (see XXIst Report on Competition 
Policy), EU competition policy is informed in various places by an overall agenda in which 
industrial and integration policies occupy a prominent place. Though cooperation is often 
suspicious on competition grounds, the policy approach has been to look at it rather favourably 
when it allows EU firms to remain 'competitive' with the rest of the world, or when it furthers 
the 'integration' objective. As a result, EU competition law contains a plethora of ad hoc 
exceptions to the general prohibition of Art. 85(1), generally issued on grounds that interfirm 
cooperation may deliver important 'efficiency gains'. (In addition, the Commission and the 
courts often go to great lengths to argue that an agreement should be exempted because the 
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two partners are not in any significant way 'competitors' in the product market, and therefore 
competition is not affected.) Secondly, the launch of the single market programme was 
accompanied by expectations that EU firms would enter into cooperative agreements much 
more freely and frequently in an integrating market, and that this would in turn contribute to 
the completion of integration. 
In this chapter we have argued two main points: 
(a) In order to establish which agreements are most likely to generate efficiency gains of 
significant magnitude, it is important to consider the degree of asset substitutability or 
complementarity of the firms which are joined together in the agreement. We would 
expect ex ante the size of the efficiency gains to be larger where the agreement combines 
firms with complementary assets (e.g. where there is an element of selective vertical 
integration); while where the partners have substitute assets, there is greater potential for 
horizontal concentration - subject to the condition that the market is sufficiently 
concentrated. 
(b) A more robust case exists for cooperation in R&D, where we expect the size of the 
efficiency gains to be more substantial. 
It is not clear that the current approach of EU competition policy effectively differentiates 
between agreements which are socially harmful and those which are welfare-enhancing. 
Claims by the partners of large efficiency gains to be generated by the cooperation are 
inevitable, and should not be overestimated. 
As for the impact of market integration on cooperation, we have emphasized that cooperation 
with local partners is often used by firms as a way to access a market and circumvent absolute 
and regulatory barriers. To the extent that markets become more integrated, the incentive to 
enter into such arrangements may become weaker. In such a case, the main reason for an 
increase in the prevalence of cooperative activities would be the anti-competitive motive, 
whereby firms seek mutual agreements to defuse the impact of increased competition or entry 
into their national market. 
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11. Mergers 
11.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have described cooperative agreements between firms as a selective 
combination of the parties' assets and skills (for a given purpose). Mergers are instead a 
complete combination of the assets and control of the firms involved - which may have 
competed beforehand in the same market (horizontal mergers), or may own or produce 
complementary assets and inputs. Joint ventures which are legally defined as concentrative 
may in practice have effects close to that of a merger; although a JV may be a selective 
combination of the parties' assets, it may be a complete combination of those assets relevant to 
serving a particular market. Such concentrative JVs we include in our understanding of the 
term 'merger'. This notion of a complete combination of assets is equivalent to stating that the 
JV has functional autonomy from its parents and represents a long-lasting commitment which 
is one of the conditions that the Commission uses when deciding on the applicability of the 
Merger Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89.168 
The distinction in the previous chapter between complementary and substitute assets in the 
evaluation of efficiency defences thus remains highly relevant also to the analysis of 
mergers.1 And as in the case of cooperative agreements, the competition assessment of 
mergers raises greater concerns when the merging parties' assets are substitutes. With 
complementary assets the presumption of benefits (efficiency gains) from common ownership 
can be stronger (see the 'incomplete contract' literature in Chapter 10). Conversely, the danger 
of market monopolization is greater where the merging firms own substitute assets (provided 
that the structure of the market is sufficiently concentrated). 
There is, however, an important difference between mergers and cooperative agreements: this 
is in the respective degree of commitment which is taken on by the parties. Cooperative 
agreements tend to be limited to a given time horizon, while mergers entail a much more 
permanent change in the firms' ownership. Even if in principle demergers are always possible, 
they are much more costly than for example interrupting a cooperation agreement; hence 
changes to market structure which result from a merger are significantly more permanent and 
costly to reverse. It is therefore worthwhile for any competition authority to devote significant 
effort and resources to the evaluation of a merger. 
The main focus of this chapter is on horizontal mergers, which raise the greatest concerns as 
they describe the combination of assets and activities between former competitors in the 
product market. We begin in Section 11.2 by mentioning various factors which may affect 
merger activity, and the occurrence of merger waves. This suggests that it is generally difficult 
to isolate the possible effects of integration on mergers activity in Europe from all other 
factors which might have had an impact on firms' behaviour over the same period. The 
The Commission published a Notice on Cooperative and Concentrative Joint Ventures (OJ[1990] (C-203/6)) which 
seeks to clarify under what circumstances the Merger Regulation applies and when a JV is to be treated as cooperative 
under Art. 85. See also Whish [1993, p. 711]. 
A merger brings together complementary assets if the merging parties contribute clearly distinct assets which can be 
combined to produce a new product, or supply it to the market. It brings together substitute assets where the parties 
would have the capability of manufacturing similar products individually. 
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available data indicates that merger activity has followed rather closely the economic cycle. In 
Section 11.3 we discuss firms' private incentives to merge, in particular market power and the 
realization of efficiency gains, and in Section 11.4 we evaluate how the market integration 
process should be expected to have affected these incentives. In Section 11.5 we discuss the 
Commission's current approach to merger analysis, and consider how this could be affected by 
market integration. Finally, in Section 11.6 we emphasize the impact of integration on the 
incentives to modify the institutions of merger analysis. We conclude in 11.7. 
11.2. Patterns of merger activity 
A variety of reasons have been identified in the literature for firms merging: from enhancing 
market power, to achieving cost reductions and other efficiency gains in combining the 
parties' assets,170 to managerial and financial motives (the last two focus on managerial labour 
and financial market aspects, rather than the product market). 
The characteristic feature of mergers is that they have historically occurred in waves. Such 
waves are very clearly defined in the US and the UK: for example, the US has experienced 
four distinct merger waves over the past century, in 1887-1904 ('great merger wave'), 1916-
ι τ 1 
29 ('merger movement'), late 1960s ('conglomerate merger wave'), and in the 1980s; these 
have been echoed in the UK by virtually synchronous waves in the 1920s (mass production 
and economies of scale), the 1960s (as a response to internationalization), and the 1980s (in 
parallel to the evolution of the market for corporate control).172 In countries other than the US 
and the UK, a history of merger waves is less clearly discernible, partly also because the 
existence of a market for corporate control is a largely Anglo-Saxon phenomenon. 
Various reasons have been put forward for the existence of merger waves. For example, 
Stigler [1950] argued that 'merger waves are the result of exogenous changes in the 
environment leading to an increase in the potential benefit of certain types of acquisitions. 
Thus each merger wave should be associated with a specific change in the regulatory, financial 
or other relevant environments'. Thus the reasons may be: 
(a) institutional (e.g. changes in rules on tradability of shares); 
(b) financial (for example merger activity in the UK and the US tends to coincide with 
peaks in the stock market cycle - except for the 1980s wave which coincided with a 
stock market slump; see Bishop and Kay [1993]). It has also been shown that merger 
and takeover activity tends to follows an improvement in financial balances, with a lag 
of about two years (Comment and Schwert [1995]); 
(c) economic (as noted by Scherer and Ross [1990], the beginning of US merger waves in 
1925, 1932 and 1967 coincided with booming economies); 
(d) a 'bandwagon effect', as mergers may become a fashionable activity (Hay and Morris, 
1991). This may help to explain economy-wide merger waves when business cycles only 
This includes, for example, the pursuit of economies of scale and scope by exploiting one of the parties' brand name 
and know-how in several product markets, which is a powerful driver of'diversifying' mergers. 
See Scherer and Ross [1990]. 
Town [1992] went further by seeking to establish statistically whether mergers are a 'structural event'. He found that 
'the underlying pattern in the M&A data can be characterized by dichotomous shifts between high and low levels of 
activity'. Considering in particular data for the US between 1895 and 1989, Town identifies nine merger waves - of 
which three major ones: 1889-1902 ; 1925-32 ; and 1967-69. 
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affect industries with cyclical demand: there may be a multi-market bandwagon effect 
from the cyclical industries to the others. 
Others (e.g. Town [1992]; van Wegberg [1994]) have proposed instead a more 'structural' 
approach, whereby merger waves are a structural phenomenon which depends on such factors 
as cyclical changes of capacity constraints, and growth in firms' intangible assets. 
Against this background, 'stripping out' the effect of market integration on merger activity 
over the past few years is not an easy task. While we can observe actual trends in merger 
activity, causality remains difficult to establish. 
Merger activity at the European level has been traditionally dominated by mergers and 
acquisitions in the UK. The pattern of merger activity in the Community since 1986 is 
illustrated in Table 11.1. In the number of deals, UK firms have, since 1990, been more active 
as purchasers than other EU firms in respect of non-cross-border deals and acquisitions of 
non-EU companies (see Table 11.2). However, Germany has become the leading target 
country for cross-border acquisitions in general, while French companies have taken the lead 
as acquirers of other Community enterprises. 
Table 11.1. 
1987 j 
1988 j 
1989 ! 
1990 j 
1991 I 
1992 ! 
1993 j 
1994 j 
1995 j 
Merger activity 
National* 
1308 
1928 
2604 
4344 
4225 
4292 
3792 
3543 
3764 
3492 
in the EU (number of transactions) 
| Community** 
162 
262 
548 
1330 
1479 
1160 
968 
875 
913 
989 
j International with 
EU bidder*** 
j 316 
j 401 
j 675 
! 698 
! 691 
501 
j 476 
j 538 
| 588 
j 706 
International with 
EU target*** 
96 j 
116 j 
181 j 
523 j 
552 
498 
573 ! 
608 j 
729 
693 j 
Total 
1882 
2707 
4008 
6895 
6947 
6451 
5809 
5564 
5994 
5880 
Source: AMDATA. 
* Deals between EU firms of the same nationality. 
** Cross-border deals between EU firms. 
*** Deals between EU and non-EU firms. 
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Table 11.2. 
Country 
Β 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
Ρ 
FIN 
S 
UK 
Multiple 
Total 
Breakdown by Member State of EU merger activity, 1990-95 
National 
; 417 I 
i 920 ! 
5316 
! 19 ! 
; 607 I 
; 3415 
! 162 I 
j 1444 
; 2 j 
1185 
; 47 j 
; 24 j 
! 1405 j 
; 1027 
! 7118 
i 23108 j 
Bidder 
221 
302 
821 
5 
86 
1270 
215 
276 
87 
624 
138 
13 
257 
532 
1243 
294 
6384 
Community 
Target 
418 
271 
1395 
29 
599 
900 
61 
482 
52 
523 
99 
101 
183 
285 
835 
151 
6384 
Competition issues 
International 
Bidder 
55 | 
151 
548 ; 
2 j 
57 ! 
493 j 
62 ! 
! 136 ! 
I 12 j 
; 239 
25 i 
! ° ! 
! 122 I 
j 248 j 
1280 I 
j 70 j 
j 3500 j 
Target 
69 
114 
1116 
13 
195 
453 
23 
194 
7 
210 
28 
13 
124 
155 
888 
51 
3653 
Source: AMDATA. 
Aggregate figures (source AMDATA) for the EU as a whole show an increase in cross-border 
merger activity in 1994 compared to 1993 (from a value of ECU 43.2 bn to ECU 66.5 bn, an 
increase of 54%). In 1994/95 the number of European cross-border deals rose 7%, from 2,230 
to 2,388, but the increase in value terms was 37%, to a peak of ECU 91.3 bn (concentrated 
especially in particular sectors: media, banking, télécoms and pharmaceuticals accounted for 
30% of all M&A deals in 1994). This recovery follows the drop in 1991-93, and overall the 
economic cycle appears to play an important part in the intensity of merger activity. 
11.3. Private incentives for merger 
In this section we focus on the product market incentives for firms to merge (as opposed to 
managerial labour market and financial market incentives). We consider in particular two 
kinds of motivations for horizontal merger: increasing market power, and achieving cost 
reductions and more generally efficiency gains. We also discuss the empirical evidence on the 
significance of these motivations for merger. 
11.3.1. Market power incentives 
Market power is the ability to raise price profitably and sustainably above marginal cost. The 
extent to which a firm can exercise market power depends on the demand responses of 
consumers, and on the supply responses of actual and potential competitors. Merger can 
enhance market power in the following ways. 
Firstly, merger may enhance market power directly by 'internalizing' the price externalities 
between firms competing in the same market. Firms tend to be constrained in their incentive to 
raise prices by the fact that some of the benefits will accrue to competitors (who will increase 
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sales as a result). Merger may reduce this problem, and thus on the whole improve the 
incentive to raise prices. As a result, a market with fewer firms and significant barriers to entry 
is more likely to see higher prices, post-merger. 
Secondly, it is possible that merger may enhance market power by facilitating collusion 
between rivals in the product market. With a reduction in the number of independent firms, 
bargaining costs are lower. Merger can also affect the balance of benefits and costs to a firm of 
deviating from the collusive strategy, and therefore the ease with which tacit collusion can be 
sustained. With fewer firms, the profits per firm in the collusive equilibrium are higher and 
thus the incentive to deviate should be reduced. In addition, when there is a smaller number of 
firms it will be generally easier to observe individual deviations from the collusive strategy, 
and thus to punish the deviating firm. Thus merger may facilitate tacit collusion. In addition, if 
there is a free-rider problem in the provision of entry deterrence through pricing, that is if the 
incumbent firms in a market cannot successfully coordinate their actions to exclude a new 
entrant, a merger may reduce this externality.173 
It is also possible that horizontal merger could facilitate exclusionary behaviour (and thus 
enhance market power) if there are scale benefits to such behaviour: for example, under the 
assumption of imperfect capital markets, a large firm may have access to financial resources 
that enable it to sustain temporary losses in order to drive out rivals (the 'deep pocket' 
story).174 Large firms can also coordinate and deploy lobbying activities more effectively. 
11.3.2. Efficiency gains from mergers 
A frequent justification for mergers is that these achieve cost reductions, for example 
rationalization of capacity through the sharing of assets between the parties, or the 
achievement of more efficient organization of production. In particular, mergers may induce 
efficiency gains and reduce industry average costs through rationalization, selection effects 
and/or synergies. 
Rationalization occurs when the total output of the merging firms is allocated more efficiently 
across existing plants, due, for example, to economies of scale. If a firm's average cost is 
decreasing in output over some range, the acquisition of a new plant could reduce average 
production costs. In addition to rationalization between plants, industry average costs can also 
be reduced through rationalization between firms: these are the selection effects whereby 
industry output is shifted from high-cost firms to low-cost firms.175 Finally, synergies occur 
through the combination of complementary assets, and operate by shifting downward the 
marginal cost curve. Examples of synergies may include managerial restructuring, marketing 
gains and complementary patents. 
In this area, many of the arguments seen in the previous chapter on efficiency defences for 
cooperation apply. For assets which are complementary (i.e. for which the marginal returns 
from deploying them together are higher than deploying them separately), there are significant 
173 See Gilbert and Vives [1986] for an analysis of the conditions under which there is a free-rider problem in entry 
deterrence. 
174 In view of these types of effects, in German competition law conglomerate mergers may be prevented if firms acquire 
too much financial power relative to competitors in some markets in which they are active. 
175 The selection benefits of mergers are emphasized in the Cournot analysis of Farrell and Shapiro [1990]. 
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advantages of common ownership.176 However, for substitute assets the benefits are less clear-
cut. In particular, economies of scale in production may be limited given the existing plants 
and production facilities. More significant efficiency gains may be induced through multiplant 
organization, in the form of managerial economies and selection effects between plants (i.e. if 
production is reorganized to reflect the relative technical efficiency of different plants, or if 
capacity is better utilized). 
More generally, a claim that a merger allows the realization of significant economies of scale 
must be set against the alternatives of similar economies being achieved by firms through 
internal organization. Where returns to scale are significant, firms should have an independent 
incentive to exploit them, and inefficient production should be eliminated. The extent to which 
the 'buy' decision can be a substitute for the 'build' decision will depend for example on 
delays in plant construction and/or artificial entry barriers in a market - when these are 
1 77 
important then build is a poor substitute for buy. 
11.3.3. Empirical evidence 
A number of studies have sought to evaluate the empirical evidence on the significance of 
market power and cost reduction incentives for mergers. Some caution should be used, 
however, in interpreting these results. First, the construction of a sample of mergers always 
implies period selection, and this gives each research a historical context with a unique 
political, regulatory and (global and financial) economic environment. Further, the availability 
of appropriate data often forces a bias upon empirical research in favour of large US firms 
which are quoted on the stock market, and this gives the results a distinctly American flavour. 
Inferences on the market power motive have been attempted from both price studies and event 
studies. The evidence from price studies is not very systematic, but they tend to find that prices 
tend to increase following a merger. 
The event studies approach explores the effect of a merger announcement on the stock market 
price of the merging firms and their competitors, and seeks to make inferences on the welfare 
effects of the merger. The rationale is that considering the stock price of the merging firms 
alone does not identify the source of possible expected higher profits, which could be either 
cost savings or market power (or both). Looking at the stock market response of the merging 
firms' rivals may help to sign the welfare effects. For example, if a merger is expected to lead 
to price increases, then its announcement should be followed by positive abnormal returns to 
the stock prices of the rivals (as well as the merging parties), because the rivals should benefit 
from the price 'umbrella' created by the merging firms. Conversely, if the merger is expected 
176 In contrast, with independent assets marginal returns are no higher when these are deployed together or separately. See 
Hart [1995, Ch. 2] for an exposition of the relationship between optimal ownership structure and the nature of assets. 
See Gilbert and Newbery [1992] for an analysis of the 'build or buy' decision. 
For example, Kim and Singal [1993] examined price changes following a number of US airline mergers in 1985-88 
(when mergers usually went unchallenged because of the Reagan administration's relaxation on antitrust policy). They 
found that prices increased on routes served by the merging firms, relative to a control group of routes unaffected by the 
merger; and conclude that the impact of efficiency gains on air fares was more than offset by exercise of increased 
market power. Werden, Joskow, and Johnson [1991] also examined the price effects of mergers in the US airline 
industry. Two mergers (TWA/Ozark and Northwest/Republic) were found to have been followed by increases in fares 
and reduction in service on city pairs operated by the merging companies. 
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to lead to cost savings, the rivals' stock prices will fall as the merging party should be in a 
better position to compete strongly in the product markets. 
In practice, this methodology has not produced very clear results: either there are no wealth 
effects on rivals at the merger announcement; or where there are positive effects, they either 
disappear for firms challenged by the antitrust authorities, or they are uncorrected with pre-
and post-merger concentration.179 In the light of ex post results, event studies have been shown 
to be unreliable for detecting anti-competitive mergers: for example McAfee and Williams 
[1988] conducted an event study on a challenged horizontal merger which was known ex post 
to be anti-competitive, and found no ex ante indication of this. 
There are various reasons why the use of the event study methodology for inferring the welfare 
effects of mergers is a highly imperfect instrument. For example, if rival firms are large 
multiproduct firms which derive only a small fraction of their revenues from the affected 
market, their stock prices may not respond strongly to a challenge announcement affecting 
only one sub-market. Prager [1992] also argues that there may be deterrent effects of antitrust 
policy: failure of these studies to find evidence of anti-competitive effects may reflect the fact 
that mergers most likely to have such effects may not have been attempted because of 
anticipated antitrust prosecution. 
In summary, the stock price responses of rivals simply do not convey much information about 
market power, and the event study methodology does not seem well suited to analyse the 
market power effects of mergers. The price studies are more informative, but unfortunately too 
small in number. Given their focus on specific industries operating under different demand, 
cost, competitive and regulatory conditions, they provide little evidence from which to 
generalize. Nevertheless, what evidence is available from the price studies appears to support 
the notion that market power must be taken seriously as an incentive for merger. 
The evidence on the cost-saving effects of merger comes from specific studies of gains in 
scale economies and of productivity changes following changes in ownership. The first type of 
studies provide some evidence that mergers can allow exploitation of plant-related scale 
economies, though they also suggest that such mergers may be less necessary when there is 
strong product-market competition which forces companies to seek out scale economies any 
way.180 As argued by Scherer and Ross [1990, p. 165], 'Plant-specific and product-specific 
In a study of 11 horizontal mergers Stillman [1983] found no evidence of wealth increases for the rival firms. 
Conversely, Eckbo [1983] found evidence of positive abnormal returns for rivals at the announcement of several 
horizontal mergers in 1963-81. However he also found that there were no statistically significant abnormal returns at a 
subsequent antitrust challenge, and interpreted his results as indication that mergers which had been challenged had, on 
average, 'increased competition'. Similarly, Eckbo [1984] examined 196 horizontal mergers, 80 of which were 
challenged, and again found that the merger announcement was usually associated with positive abnormal returns to the 
rivals of the target firm. However, there was no correlation between the industry wealth effect and the change in 
concentration implied by the horizontal merger, nor the pre-merger Herfindahl index. If mergers are more likely to be 
anti-competitive when there is high pre-merger market concentration, or a large concentration increase, Eckbo 
concludes that the positive industry wealth effect is explained not by anti-competitive effects, but by the identification 
of cost savings in the merger process that were potentially applicable throughout the industry. A newer strand of 
research has emphasized the problems of aggregate analyses of mergers, and subdivided merger samples into 
subsamples (for example distinguishing conglomerate from horizontal mergers). Seth [1990] found that for 'related 
mergers', the returns to the merger are significantly higher the larger the relative size of the target firm to the bidder; 
while a higher debt level rises returns for 'unrelated' mergers. 
In a study of 12 industries across 6 nations, Scherer et al. [1975] find some evidence of post-merger product-specific 
scale economy gains. Such gains were greater in Europe than in the US, which is argued to depend on two factors. First, 
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scale economies can and do result from mergers. But for a significant fraction of the cases in 
which they do, it is because competition has failed to stimulate efficient plant investment, 
specialization, or closure choices. Mergers are a second-best solution, given the failure of 
competition. It follows conversely that the more effectively competition is working, the less 
essential mergers are as a source of production scale economies'. 
Studies of the productivity performance of plants following an ownership change have found 
i n i 
sizeable improvements following an ownership change. This evidence suggests that mergers 
play an important role in matching assets to their most effective owner. This in turn suggests 
that merger policy must take seriously the possibility that merger can lead to combination of 
complementary assets. 
In the next section, we consider how the pursuit of market integration and the adoption of 
policies facilitating integration may affect these incentives for merger. 
11.4. The effects of integration on the incentives for merger 
Given the incentives for merger described in the previous section, how should we expect firms 
to react to greater market integration? 
As argued at several points in this study, the expected effect of the integration programme was 
a reduction in two types of cost of doing business across space: the fixed costs of entry into 
foreign markets, and the marginal cost of providing goods to foreign consumers (equivalent to 
a fall in transport costs). The outcome of such cost reductions is effectively an increase in 
market size, and each firm may find itself facing a larger number of competitors than in its 
pre-integration markets. In equilibrium, this should lead to smaller per-firm price-cost 
margins, though the effect on the total number of firms in the market is indeterminate - it may 
be lower than the sum of the pre-integration markets. 
As a result, the effect of market integration on the market power incentive for merger is hard 
to assess. This is because the overall impact of integration on such an incentive is in fact the 
net result of two distinct effects. On the one hand, a larger market implies that more firms 
should be sustained in equilibrium than in each of the separate (pre-integration) markets, and 
price-cost margins should be lower than they would have been in the individual markets. This 
suggests that in an integrated market the effect of a merger on the price-cost margin should be 
proportionately smaller than in each of the separate markets. On the other hand there is a 
quantity effect which is potentially ambiguous, as each firm's sales in the integrated market 
can be larger than pre-integration. The crucial issue is what happens to the number of firms in 
the market, and this will depend on the specific market structure and conditions. 
the much greater size of the US market made it easier to attain most product-specific economies (optimal plant size) 
without merger, by de novo expansion. Second, price competition was fiercer in the US, generating greater pressure on 
US producers to specialize in products in which they could capture maximum scale economies. In Europe, where 
product-market competition had failed to enforce specialization, merger was a route to product-specific scale. 
McGuckin and Nguyen [1995] find that transferred plants in the US food manufacturing industry over 1977-87 
experienced significant improvements in productivity performance following ownership changes, and conclude that 
synergy gains were the most important motive for these merger. These results are consistent with those of Lichtenberg 
[1992] who finds that manufacturing plants involved in ownership change in 1972-78 showed productivity increases 
relative to a control group; and airline mergers in 1970-84 were associated with reductions in unit cost (both in 
absolute terms and relative to non-merging carriers), most of which were passed on to consumers in the form of lower 
prices. 
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Consider for example two separate geographical markets with two firms each. Suppose that 
after integration only three firms will be sustainable in the single market: that is, in 
equilibrium there are more firms in the joint market than in each of the two markets 
separately, but less than in the sum of these pre-integration markets. The price-cost margin 
will be lower, and compared with the pre-integration situation a merger will have a smaller 
effect on such a margin. However, this will apply to a larger amount of output. Hence the 
market power incentives are going to be ambiguous.182 
How would we expect integration to affect the cost-reducing incentive to merge? 
Enlargement of market size makes it possible to exploit economies of scale which were 
previously unrealized (for example if minimum efficient plant scale was greater than what was 
afforded by a domestic market). The question is then whether mergers may be effectively 
needed to exploit such economies. In fact, market enlargement (i.e. reduction of entry barriers 
into other geographical markets) should make possible the internal realization of economies of 
scale by firms, stimulating direct investment strategies to exploit such economies, and thus 
reducing the attraction of mergers for these purposes. 
Some indirect support for this hypothesis may be obtained from the study of Scherer et al. 
[1975] on post-merger product-specific scale economy gains. This found that such gains were 
greater in Europe than in the US, which suggests that the much greater size of the US market 
made it easier to attain most product-specific economies without merger. The inference is that 
as European integration proceeds, there may be less need for merger to exploit scale 
economies: the enlargement of market size should enable firms to attain optimal plant size by 
de novo expansion rather than by acquisition. 
In addition, price competition was fiercer in the US, which was interpreted as generating 
greater pressure on US producers to specialize in products in which they could capture 
maximum scale economies. In Europe, where product-market competition failed to enforce 
specialization, merger was a route to achieve product-specific scale economies. If integration 
leads to more intense competition, firms may be induced to exploit scale economies through 
direct investment, and therefore merger should be less necessary to capture scale benefits. 
Thus as European integration develops, and product markets become more competitive as a 
result, companies will be induced to increase productive efficiency internally, and the scale-
economy incentive for merger should become weaker. 
On the other hand, some integration measures should also be expected to facilitate the 
movement of assets across borders, and thus to generate new incentives for recombining 
assets. As discussed in Chapter 10, the task for policy in this case is to distinguish between 
asset combinations which are complementary, and thus efficient, and those which are 
substitutes, and thus more likely to be anti-competitive. In particular, it is important from a 
As for the 'collusive' incentive for merger (which in any case is a second-order effect), the impact of integration is also 
going to be ambiguous. Integration enlarges the size of the market, and more firms should be supported than in each 
separate geographical market (though less than in each market individually). In a larger market with more firms 
collusion may be more difficult, and the incentives to collude may be lower (each firm's share of the collusive profit is 
lower). This should reduce the attraction of mergers/takeovers of rivals to facilitate collusion. On the other hand, the 
incentive to cheat will also be lower, so collusion may be more easily sustainable. More generally, pricing behaviour 
across markets should become more interrelated, and make it easier to detect deviations from the collusive agreement. 
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policy perspective that the synergy claim is not allowed to become a carte blanche for 
approving mergers that lead to combinations of substitute assets. 
11.5. Mergers and joint ventures in the airline industry 
We briefly consider here the airline industry which has recently been the subject of an intense 
deregulation/integration programme, to assess whether any evidence can be gleaned from case 
law on the integration effects on merger behaviour. 
As the air transport liberalization programme has progressed,183 there has been a significant 
increase in the number of cooperative alliances (and other similar arrangements) involving 
airline companies operating in Europe. Cases which have qualified for notification under the 
European Commission Merger Regulation were Air France/Sabena (1992), BA/TAT (1992), 
ΒΑ/Dan Air (1993) and Swissair/Sabena (1995). 
Some insight into the possible effects of aviation deregulation and liberalization can be 
provided by the experience of the US, whose airline network moved to a hub-and-spoke 
system as a result of deregulation in the early 1980s. Hub networks make it easier for a given 
airline to serve a greater number of city-city combinations, and thus allow airlines to take 
greater advantage of economies of scope and traffic density. Extensive empirical research has 
shown in particular that in the US, (a) hub networks have led to fiercer competition at the city 
pair market level, but an increase in airport and industry-wide concentration; (b) hub networks 
allow for significant economies of scope and of traffic density; (c) the ease with which an 
airline can exercise market power depends much more on its dominance at a hub, than on an 
individual route; and (d) an airline with extensive inter-route contacts is more likely to have 
market power (through multimarket collusion).184 
In Europe, research has shown that wherever entry has occurred after the adoption of bilateral 
liberalization measures in Europe, lower fares followed (Abbott and Thompson [1991]). By 
allowing provision of flights between any two Member States, it is possible that the European 
liberalization programme could also encourage carriers to establish hub-and-spoke networks in 
place of direct city-city flights.185 However there are also other reasons - such as the 
characteristics of European geography (shorter distances, etc. - see our case study on airlines) 
- which suggest that a full move towards a hub-and-spoke system is not very likely in Europe. 
In the case of Air France/Sabena (1992), Air France bid to take joint control with the Belgian 
Government over the Belgian airline. For the affected markets (the routes Brussels-Lyon, 
Brussels-Nice and Brussels-Paris), the merger would have resulted in a transformation from 
duopolies to monopolies. The merged parties intended to establish a new hub-and-spoke 
network centred on the Brussels Zaventem airport, and would have taken all the resulting 
slots. The merger was cleared by the Commission, subject to a number of undertakings: that 
one of the companies would effectively withdraw from the Brussels-Lyon and Brussels-Nice 
183 As of 1 January 1993, airlines have been free to fly beUveen any two EU countries, and from April 1997 they will be 
free to run domestic services in other Member States (cabotage). 
184 See Brueckner and Spiller [1991], Keeler and Formby [1994], Evans and Kessides [1993], and Borenstein [1991]. 
185 This prediction is also made by Huston and Butler [1993], who anticipated a move towards the hub network in the EU 
- though less fully than in the US because of political and structural constraints limiting the strength of the competitive 
environment. 
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routes; that other EU airlines would be granted access on the Brussels-Paris route (with 
interline agreements being provided in all cases); and that the merged firm was restricted to 
65% of the slots at Zaventem for 10 years. 
This case illustrates the importance of examining potential dominance in the airlines sector 
both on city pair routes and on individual airports. The main implication for competition 
policy of any move towards a hub-and-spoke system is that it is crucial to ensure that airlines 
have easy access to airport facilities. Merger authorities should expect some consolidation in 
EU airlines as output transfers to the more efficient carriers, but mergers which allow airlines 
to dominate slot access at any given airport should be treated with circumspection. 
Eight weeks after the Air France/Sabena decision, the Commission cleared BA's plan to buy 
nearly 50% of the French regional airline TAT, after undertakings by Β A (BA/TAT (1992)). 
The terms of the initial proposal led the Commission to have competition concerns about the 
effects on the Gatwick-Paris and Gatwick-Lyon routes, because of the lack of actual 
competition and the absence of new slots. However, BA promised to give up slots on both 
routes if rivals want to start or step up their services. This commitment satisfied the 
Commission that the problems of market entry would be 'eliminated'.180 
In 1993 the Commission cleared the merger between Β A and DanAir, on the grounds that the 
merger did not create a dominant position on the London-Brussels route.187 Before the merger 
BA operated on the Brussels-Heathrow route and DanAir on Brussels-Gatwick. Thus if the 
two routes were taken as distinct markets the merger had no effects on competition. Taking the 
London-Brussels route as a whole, Β A had 40% of the market and DanAir 9% of the market 
beforehand. Two competitors, British Midland and Sabena, have greater flight frequency on 
the Heathrow-Brussels route than BA,188 and thus were adjudged to provide sufficient 
competition to restrain BA-DanAir's pricing. Especially important in the Commission's 
decision-making was the recent entry of British Midland, which entered Heathrow-Brussels in 
summer 1992 and had within a year greater flight frequency on this route than Β A. British 
Midland had obtained slots at Heathrow by transferring slots from other routes. 
Early in 1995, Air France sold its stake in Sabena, and later in the same year a 49.5% stake in 
Sabena was acquired by Swissair. There were several problems with this acquisition. Again, 
on the relevant city pair routes (between Brussels and Switzerland's three major airports -
Basle, Geneva and Zürich) the merger would transform a duopoly into a monopoly; in addition 
there was a lack of available slots during peak periods; and furthermore a 1960 bilateral 
agreement between Belgium and Switzerland provides for state mono-designation of air 
carriers, so that no airline other than Swissair and Sabena may fly on this route. Negotiations 
were underway (but not completed) between the EU and Switzerland to extend the EU's air 
transport market policy to Switzerland. The Commission was also concerned with network 
effects, as Swissair is part of a cooperative alliance with SAS and Austrian Airlines, which 
coordinates route scheduling and allows specialization of hubs. Taking into account an 
186 See Neven et al. [1993, pp. 124-125]. 
187 The concentration did not have a Community dimension, but the Belgian Government requested under Article 22 that 
the Commission examine the effects of the merger on the Belgian market. 
188 83% of passengers travelling the London-Brussels route use Heathrow. 
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alliance between SAS and Lufthansa, this agreement accounts for 35% of passenger traffic 
within Europe, and carries twice as many passengers as the next largest carrier. 
The Commission approved of the purchase subject to undertakings: first, that the Belgian and 
Swiss Governments were committed to change the existing regulatory situation so that the 
present system of mono-designation will become one of multiple designation. Secondly, the 
companies entered into a number of commitments relating to slot availability, interlining and 
Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFPs).189 The Commission determined that these would allow for 
effective new entry at the level of both individual routes and the air transport network, and 
thus cleared the merger. 
Two points relating to integration are worth noting here. First, it was clear that one of 
Swissair's major motives in acquiring Sabena was to establish a secure market position in the 
EU's deregulated single aviation market. Remaining outside this market, Swissair had felt it 
was to receive unfavourable treatment at key European hubs. Thus integration within the EU 
appears to have encouraged entry from outside the EU. Second, the mono-designation 
regulation was an important entry barrier, and suggests the value of extending deregulation 
measures to as many markets related to the EU as possible. 
This brief survey of cases in the EU airlines industry suggests firstly that integration may be 
encouraging companies to seek out the most cost-efficient industry structure. In the airlines 
case this may also mean a partial move towards a network structure more based on hubs-and-
spokes. Secondly, integration and increased competition are likely to have selection effects 
and to lead to some industry consolidation. In all cases, the main point for policy remains to 
ensure that airlines are not able to acquire control of access to airports, or more generally to 
any essential facility, and thus to discourage mergers which facilitate dominance over access 
to such facilities. 
11.6. The EU approach to mergers and market integration 
In this section we consider the current EU competition policy approach to mergers, and make 
use of the analysis so far to evaluate how this may need to be revised in the light of 
integration. As the market power incentive for merger is unlikely to be reduced in a wider 
(integrated) market, we emphasize the importance of a rigorous analysis of dominance. We 
then discuss the weight to be given in an integrated market to the efficiency defences for 
merger, and argue that these should not become more prominent. Finally we emphasize the 
importance of sçund market definition, which in an integrated market become more crucial for 
taking the correct decision. 
The current basis for the analysis of merger in EU competition policy is Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89, which came into force on 21 September 1990 (and created the Merger 
Task Force). This applies to 'Concentrations with a Community dimension' (CCDs), which 
are assessed On the basis of 'compatibility with the Common Market'. 
189 Swissair also undertook to terminate cooperation with SAS. 
190 The notion of 'concentration' includes both the case where two or more previously independent undertakings merge, 
and the case where one or more undertakings acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more other 
undertakings (concentrative joint ventures). The questions of the definition and control of concentrative JVs as opposed 
to cooperative JVs (which are assessed under Article 85) have been contentious ones. See Chapter 10. 
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In order for a concentration to possess a 'Community dimension' it must be large and pan-
national, which in practice means that it must exceed certain size thresholds, and at least one 
party should not operate predominantly in one single country. The specific requirements are 
that (a) the aggregate world-wide turnover of all parties concerned must exceed ECU 5 billion, 
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two parties must exceed ECU 
250 million, and (iii) unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds 
of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. The tests 
are based on geographic turnover and not upon the location of the parties: the Merger 
Regulation can therefore apply to transactions involving no EU company, or companies with 
little connection with the EU. 
It is worth noting that the Commission's initial intention was that the thresholds should be 
eventually reduced to ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million. Compared with the current average 
of about 60, it is estimated that such a reduction would increase the annual caseload to about 
130 concentrations. This proposal was put on hold in the face of opposition from the UK, 
France and Germany, but it has been reintroduced by the Commission in the January 1996 
Green Paper.191 
Since the creation of the Merger Task Force and up to November 1995 some 374 cases 
(including concentrative JVs) had been notified, of which 31 fell outside the scope of the 
Regulation and 4 have been blocked.192 
Table 11.3. European mergers 1991-95 
| 1991 
Notifications to the Commission under the Merger Regulation 1 
Concentrations cleared during the first month 
In-depth investigation opened 
63 
50 
6 
1992 
60 
47 
4 
1993 
58 
49 
4 
1994 
95 
80 
6 
1995 
112 
n.a. 
7' 
Source: European Community Competition Policy 1994, EC Competition Policy Newsletters 1995. 
1 Nordic satellite, Crown Cork, Kimberley Clark, Gencor, Orkla, ABB, RTL/Veronica/Endemol, 
The guiding principle in the Commission's analysis of merger is that a concentration which 
'creates or strengthens a dominant position, as a result of which effective competition would 
be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in a substantial part of it, shall be declared 
incompatible with the Common Market' (Article 2). The key role of merger policy is thus in 
The Paper also sought to address the problem of multiple jurisdiction for medium-sized mergers in different EU 
countries that fall below the thresholds, but which may require notification in several countries. Under the proposals, 
the Commission would take control of those mergers which fall between the old and new thresholds and which have to 
be notified to more than one national competition authority. 
The 4 blocked cases to date were: Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland (1991), where the proposed takeover of de 
Havilland was blocked because of its effect on the market for propeller aircraft with between 20 and 70 seats used for 
regional flights; the MSG Media Service (1994) joint venture formed between Bertelsmann, Kirch and Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom, to supply administrative and technical services to digital pay-TV operators; Nordic Satellite 
Distribution (1995), creating a joint venture that would broadcast programmes by satellite to the Nordic countries; and 
RTL/Veronica/Endemol (1995), where the three firms proposed creation of a joint venture - Holland Media Group -
that would become the largest TV broadcaster in Holland with about 40% of the TV audience. 
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the first instance to identify and control market power, which is costly (it inflicts direct harm 
upon consumers, and prevents the realization of the benefits of dynamic efficiency). 
Conversely, mergers which do not adversely affect competition should be approved without 
delay or concern as to whether or not they will eventually be privately profitable/ 
It is, of course, also possible that mergers allow efficiency gains in the form of cost reductions 
for the merging parties. These may go some way to offsetting the static efficiency losses from 
the increase in market power; and indeed it is conceivable that the overall welfare effect of a 
merger may be positive even if the merger leads to an increase in concentration, if there are as 
a result significant reductions in marginal costs which are 'passed on' to the consumer in the 
form of lower prices (see for example Hausman, Leonard and Zona [1994]). There is however 
a major obstacle to the evaluation of cost reductions (and more generally of post-merger 
induced efficiencies) on the part of the competition authority. Merger authorities do not in 
practice have complete information about costs and demand, and it is hard for them to 
measure directly the firm-specific own-price elasticity of demand. The information 
asymmetries between the merging parties and the competition authority mean that where firms 
are allowed to use efficiency defences, they have an incentive to behave strategically: i.e. 
overstate possible cost savings, in order to increase the likelihood of having their proposal 
approved.193 
In view of these difficulties, it is appropriate in our opinion that some competition authorities 
do not give a significant welfare weighting to cost savings claimed to result from a merger. 
Unlike the US Department of Justice (which places an explicit value on cost savings on the 
grounds that these enhance the dynamic competitive strength of the market, and shareholder 
welfare should be valued positively), in Europe the German Bundeskartellamt places no value 
on cost reductions per se, and deems cost savings to be beneficial only to the extent that they 
reduce prices. Similarly the EU approach is heavily focused on changes in market structure 
and does not easily accept efficiency defences. The Commission's services procedure for 
assessing mergers places far more emphasis on market power, and its centrepiece is therefore 
the analysis of dominance (given a certain market definition). 
We consider below, in turn, if and how the process of market integration should be expected 
to affect the procedure followed by the EU authorities for the analysis of dominance, the 
assessment of cost savings, and market definition. 
11.6.1. Analysis of dominance 
The purpose of the analysis of dominance is to evaluate to what extent the merger would 
weaken competition in the market. There are in principle two parts to this analysis: the 
evaluation of concentration measures, and entry analysis. 
Concentration indices (which should be estimated post-merger) are mainly useful as a safe 
harbour for excluding harmless mergers (at least 90% of mergers in practice): it will rarely be 
possible to exercise market power on a highly dispersed market. Much more important for the 
evaluation of market power is a careful analysis of entry, as the exercise of market power by 
Notice that the firm's incomplete information about the regulator (i.e. the uncertainty on how the regulator will assess 
each case) also implies costs both ex ante (some welfare-enhancing mergers will simply never be proposed because the 
firms place a positive probability on the case being blocked) and ex post (the resource costs of mergers that are 
proposed and eventually blocked). 
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incumbent firms will be difficult if entry is feasible. This aspect is taken very seriously by the 
US Department of Justice, which assesses whether entry would be timely, likely and sufficient 
(to keep prices down). Unfortunately, so far the European Commission's analysis of entry 
has not always been systematic. 
Our discussion of the impact of integration on merger incentives in Section 11.4 suggested an 
ambiguous effect on the market power incentives to merge. Accordingly, once the relevant 
market has been appropriately defined, taking into account the effects of integration (see 
Section 11.6.3 below), there should be no presumption that the analysis of dominance should 
be any less strict. It is possible that a merger which was previously anti-competitive in a 
locally-defined market may no longer raise concern if some artificial barriers are eliminated, 
and the market is wider as a result. However given market definition, there is no justification 
for relaxing market share criteria, and entry analysis. (Indeed, as we will see below, there 
might be a presumption that the analysis of dominance should be stricter, since following 
integration firms may no longer need merger in order to circumvent artificial barriers and 
exploit scale economies: they can simply expand capacity directly. That is, given that market 
expansion without merger is facilitated by integration, there is if anything a case for making 
dominance analysis stricter.) 
Undoubtedly the most important effect of integration on the analysis of dominance is that it 
raises the returns from a systematic analysis of entry. In a few cases, it would appear that the 
Commission's services have sought to take explicitly into account the effect of integration on 
entry barriers. In Mannesmann/Hoesch (1992), for example, the geographical market was 
defined to be national, but the analysis of dominance was carried out taking into account that 
the German market was in the process of opening up to foreign competitors, in particular 
because of the harmonization of technical standards for steel tubes and the impact of the 
European Commission Public Procurement Directive. Similar factors were assessed in 
Siemens/Italtel and Mercedes-Benz/Kässbohrer (1994) (line buses). However, there may be a 
case for enforcing a more thorough entry analysis by the Commission's services, perhaps 
along the lines of the US Department of Justice's guidelines on likelihood, timeliness and 
sufficiency of entry. 
A final point is that, as we have mentioned, there may be circumstances in which collusion 
may be facilitated by integration, for example adherence to cross-border collusive agreements 
can be better monitored if integration enhances the observability of pricing behaviour. From 
this perspective, integration may increase the importance of a well-formulated policy towards 
the joint dominance effects of merger. The text of the Merger Regulation does not discuss the 
possibility of joint dominance. However, the Commission's services have shown themselves 
to be sensitive towards mergers which result in concentrated oligopoly as and when such cases 
have arisen. For example, in Rhône-Poulenc/SNIA (1993) the Commission concluded that 
although the concentration lead to a combined market share of 65%, parallel behaviour would 
not be significantly facilitated because of the structural characteristics of the market, such as a 
general lack of transparency in prices and competitive pressures from outside the EU. In 
Nestlé/Perrier, a precedent was established for taking account of joint dominance. 
Nevertheless, in an integrated market the increased importance of the joint dominance issue 
The importance of the entry lags depends on the industry in question. For example, entry times are shorter in the 
electronics industry than in the airline manufacturing industry. 
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would suggest that it would be valuable to have an explicit policy framework defining joint 
dominance and clarifying how oligopolistic interdependence should be taken into account in 
merger cases. 
11.6.2. Assessment of cost savings 
There was a considerable debate before the Merger Regulation was passed as to whether an 
efficiencies defence was desirable. Jacquemin [1990] observed that many believed that some 
horizontal consolidations might help merger firms pursue R&D in high-tech fields more 
effectively.195 He further considered it unlikely that the role of potential dynamic efficiency 
gains in cases would be ignored. Indeed a careful reading of Article 2 of the Regulation, which 
deals with how concentrations are to be appraised, suggests that paragraph 1(b) does seem to 
open up scope for such a defence by referring to 'the development of technical and economic 
progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to 
competition'. In practice, thus far, the Commission does not seem to have allowed such a 
defence. 
Neven et al. [1993] note that the current EU approach on cost savings of mergers is not 
entirely clear. In AT&T/NCR (1991), the Commission took the parties' claims of cost savings 
from complementarities between technical know-how and marketing of workstations as a 
negative factor in assessing the merger, since it feared it would allow the merging parties to 
drive out their rivals. Without a clear statement of the conditions under which cost savings 
will be considered predatory or beneficial, this may have created a deterrent effect for 
subsequent firms contemplating cost-reducing mergers. For example in Aerospatiale-
Alenia/de Havilland (1991), the parties put forward an estimate of cost savings amounting to 
0.5% of combined turnover, to be realized through 'synergies in marketing and product 
support', and through 'rationalizing parts procurement'. The Commission regarded these cost 
savings as 'negligible' (it is possible that the AT&T/NCR decision might have caused firms to 
understate estimated savings). 
In another case dealing with the MSG joint venture between two German media companies 
and Deutsche Telekom, which proposed to offer infrastructure facilities and services for 
digital pay-TV, the Commission explicitly rejected this type of defence: 
'The reference to this criterion [contribution to technical and economic progress] in 
Article 2(1 )(b) of the Merger Regulation is subject to the reservation that no obstacle is 
formed to ^  competition. As outlined above, however, the foreseeable effects of the 
proposed concentration suggest that it will lead to a sealing-off of and early creation of a 
dominant position on the future markets for technical and administrative services and to a 
substantial hindering of effective competition on the future market for pay TV.' 
In their review of this case, C J Cook and CS Kerse [1996] observed that the Commission went 
on to question whether it was even likely that, given the dominant position acquired by the 
joint venture, technical and economic progress would in fact be achieved. The Commission 
identified almost a logical inconsistency between dominant positions and technical and 
195 A. Jacquemin, 'Horizontal concentration and European merger policy', European Economic Review, Vol. 34, May 
1990, pp. 539-50. 
196 Commission Decision, OJ L364/1, 31 December 1994. 
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economic progress, notwithstanding the reference in Article 2(1). Moreover, the technical and 
economic progress achieved by the merged enterprises was considered to enable them to out-
distance their competitors, and may be a factor which in itself contributes to the creation or 
enhancement of a dominant position.197 
The approach appears to be different in US antitrust law, where the trade-off between potential 
market power costs and benefits of cost reductions from mergers is assessed explicitly: if a 
merger is expected to enhance market power, then the regulator evaluates whether cost savings 
from the merger are likely to outweigh the adverse market power effects. This entails a 
reversal of the onus of proof. At the 'analysis of dominance' stage the onus of proof is on the 
competition authority, which must demonstrate that a merger has anti-competitive effects. 
This is appropriate as the majority of mergers have negligible anti-competitive effects. 
However, at the 'efficiency defence' stage the onus of proof is reversed so that it is incumbent 
upon the firms to demonstrate to the regulator that the cost savings are large. The reason is 
clearly that this onus of proof gives the firm better incentives to reveal its private information 
concerning prospective cost savings. 
Considering the effects of market integration on firms' efficiency justifications for merger, we 
have emphasized the difficulties of the regulator in assessing the cost savings which may 
result from a merger - given that the merging parties will have both the ability (due to their 
superior information) and the incentive to overstate these cost savings. Given these problems 
of incomplete information which inevitably beset competition authorities, a systematic policy 
of putting more weight on post-merger induced efficiencies is problematic. Market integration 
does not change this assessment in any way. Indeed, market integration increases the scope for 
firms to achieve certain efficiency gains (e.g. economies of scale) through organic internal 
growth rather than via merger. In this sense, the analysis of efficiency defences for cooperation 
in the previous chapter applies in full. 
11.6.3. Market definition 
The Commission uses a standard definition of the relevant product market as comprising those 
products 'which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of 
the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use.' One weakness of the 
Commission's approach is that while in recent years there has been a move towards the use of 
econometric evidence when assessing substitutability, there is still great reliance on technical 
characteristics of the product, its function and on consumer surveys. Another weakness is that 
the Commission's definition of the relevant product market tends to focus mainly on demand-
side substitution. 
Most important from the point of view of integration is the effect on the relevant geographical 
market. This is defined by the Commission as comprising 'the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply of products or services, in which the conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogenous and which can be distinguished from the 
neighbouring areas because, in particular, conditions of competition are appreciably different 
in those areas'. Factors relevant to the assessment of the relevant geographical market include 
'the nature and characteristics of the products or services concerned, the existence of entry 
197 CJ Cook and CS Kerse, EC Merger Control, Sweet and Maxwell (second edition), 1996, p. 166. 
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barriers or consumer preferences, and appreciable differences of the undertakings' market 
shares between neighbouring areas or substantial price differences'. 
The effect of integration will be to expand the relevant geographical market, other factors held 
constant. Thus integration makes it particularly important for the merger authority carefully to 
assess supply-side substitutability from a geographic point of view. Again, market 
integration may require a more careful analysis of the possibility of entry by firms for whom 
entry strategies may have been previously hindered by barriers. 
11.7. Institutional implications of market integration for merger control 
A very important implication of market integration, which must be emphasized, is that it 
provides strong incentives to modify the institutions of merger control. 
As markets become more integrated, and national market boundaries therefore become less 
relevant, there are implications for the distinction between mergers falling under the 
competence of national antitrust authorities, and those falling under the competence of the 
Commission. Integration should mean that relevant markets are increasingly 'stretched' across 
national boundaries, and not confined within national borders. In this context, maintaining the 
current approach to merger decisions would create two types of potential 'costs'. 
(a) To the extent that market definition by national authorities continues to be based on 
national boundaries, the outcome would be systematically wrong decisions. For 
example, to the extent that integration enlarges the size of the relevant market, a high 
level of market share at the national level should raise less concern. In other words, 
greater intra-EU competition should make it possible to tolerate higher levels of 
domestic concentration. Thus mergers which would have raised domestic competition 
policy concerns before integration should be let through after integration - if the firms' 
post-integration market shares are lower as a result of wider market definition. However, 
if the national competition authorities still define markets on the basis of their national 
boundaries, decisions will be systematically distorted. 
(b) Where, instead, national authorities were to adopt the 'right' market definition, and 
therefore consider relevant markets which extend beyond their national boundaries, the 
result would be overlapping competencies. This has an obvious duplication cost 
attached. Furthermore, it means that if the various national authorities have different 
degrees of stringency, the one with the harshest approach is implicitly that which is 
adopted. 
In this sense, integration raises the important institutional issue of coordination between 
competition authorities at the national and EU levels, including how to deal with overlapping 
competencies. 
An important consequence appears to be that the analysis of mergers should be reallocated or 
at least coordinated at the European level. This may imply a reduction in the number of cases 
In recent years the Commission appears to have paid more attention to intra-Community barriers to trade. For example, 
in Direct Line/Bankinter (1994) the Commission noted that in spite of the opening up of the non-life insurance market 
to intra-Community competition, the markets remain national due to national differences in consumer preferences, 
regulatory regimes and distribution systems. 
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which are brought in front of the national competition authorities, and a transfer of 
competencies to the EU authorities. Alternatively, the implementation of the rules could be 
delegated to the national authorities. This would appear a good solution to take into account 
on the one hand the benefits of a unified treatment of mergers across the EU (significant 
differences in the attitude of national authorities may distort the choice of merger partner), and 
on the other, the informational benefits of delegating implementation of merger rules to 
national authorities, wherever possible. In late 1996, the Commission published its Green 
Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation which includes a proposal to lower the 
thresholds of the Merger Regulation.199 
11.8. Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, we assessed the scope for anti-competitive behaviour in the single market 
through mergers and acquisitions. We discovered the relative importance of incentives to 
enhance market power and incentives to achieve cost reductions. Unlike other types of 
behaviour reviewed in earlier chapters, we found no systematic evidence that integration has a 
major effect on the market power incentives to merge or vice versa. 
The ambiguous impact of market integration on the market power incentive to merge 
suggested that there should be no general presumption that merger policy should become less 
stringent (provided that markets are defined taking properly into account the effects of 
integration). 
As for the cost-reduction incentive, whilst integration offers companies the opportunity to 
exploit scale economies, it also makes merger less necessary to attain such economies: that is, 
mergers are less likely to be needed to circumvent artificial entry barriers, and competition 
forces firms to behave in a more internally efficient manner without ownership changes. In 
addition, mergers that might have been pursued in order to overcome certain cross-border 
barriers are no longer necessary. Generally, no greater emphasis should be placed on efficiency 
defences, and there is a possible case for making competition analysis stricter. An important 
caveat should be emphasized, however, for the case of complementary assets: merger may 
perform an important function in bringing such assets under common ownership, which has 
beneficial effects, and this should be allowed. 
In the light of integration, which should make entry easier, it is crucial that likely entry effects 
are carefully and systematically assessed. Current EU treatment of entry effects is too often 
arbitrary. At the stage of market definition this means taking into account geographic supply-
side substitutability. At the analysis of dominance stage this requires a more systematic entry 
analysis, assessing the likelihood, timeliness and effectiveness of entry. 
COM(96) 19 final. 
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12. State aid 
12.1. Introduction 
Although the framework for control of state aids at a European level has been in place since 
the foundation of the EU, its importance has increased considerably with the implementation 
of the single market. In particular, market integration is likely to increase the incentives for 
firms to lobby for state aid due to increased pan-European competition. On the other hand, 
market integration may change those circumstances in which the granting of state aid is 
economically justifiable. We will need to consider these two effects of market integration in 
detail. 
Of key importance to state aid policy is the need to distinguish those circumstances in which 
state aid is economically justifiable as a response to a market imperfection or failure from 
those in which it is not. In the latter case, state aid is likely to have effects which are 
detrimental to economic welfare as a result of distorting the decisions of economic agents. In 
particular, state aid is likely to bias the exit and entry decisions of firms and thus lead to a 
distortion of market structure. These distortions of market structure are likely to be of greater 
concern in an integrated market for two reasons. First, a greater number of consumers will be 
affected. Second, there may well be greater incentives for national governments to foster 
'national champions' following market integration; state aid may have a proportionately 
greater effect in enhancing the competitive position of the recipient. 
These reasons suggest that there is a prima facie case that market integration may lead to 
increased lobbying for and, possibly, granting of state aid. This may hinder the achievement of 
the benefits of integration. If firms lobby for state aids, then this may in itself be a wasteful 
activity, whether or not the state aid is ultimately granted. Thus there is a case that market 
integration should be accompanied by some toughening of policy on state aids, both to reduce 
the granting of state aids and to reduce firms' incentives to lobby for aid. 
Market integration may also lead to circumstances in which the granting of state aid is 
beneficial. For example, increased product market competition following integration may lead 
to the exit of some firms. Where this creates structural adjustment problems, there may be a 
good case for the use of state aid to smooth the transition process. Thus, like competition 
policy, state aid policy will always need to be conditional, identifying those cases in which 
state aid is welfare-enhancing and those in which it is welfare-reducing. 
We will first sketch some of the trends in state aid, and then consider some of the effects of 
granting aid. We then consider how market integration is likely to have affected the incentives 
for firms to lobby for state aid, the incentives for governments to grant aid, and the effects of 
state aid on economic welfare. We critically review current EU policy on state aids and 
develop some conclusions on whether policy needs to be changed as a result of market 
integration. 
12.2. Trends in state aid 
Most of the issues raised in this chapter indicate the theoretical possibility that, without a 
toughening of restrictions, the incentives to lobby for aid and to grant state aid might increase 
as a response to market integration. However, the only information available on the actual 
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amount of state aid granted in the EU are four surveys conducted by the Commission. Table 
12.1, 12.2 and 12.3 show a general decrease in the amount of aid. 
Table 12.1. State aid to the manufacturing sector in the EU 
EUR-12 
In % of value added 
In ECU per person employed * 
In % of intra-Community export ** 
1988 
4.1 
1,497 
22.8 
Source: Fourth Survey on State Aid, European Commission, 
* at constant 1991 prices 
** intra-Community exports of industrial products 
; 1989 
| 3.2 
| 1,133 
j 15.9 
1995, p. 8. 
¡ 1990 
! 4 - 2 
j L475 
j 20.9 
j 1991 
! 3 · 5 
I 1,215 
j 17.3 
j 1992 
| 3.4 
| 1,210 
j 16.9 
Of course, the level of state aid is affected by several factors. The macroeconomic cycle will 
influence the number of business failures and hence have an important influence on state aid; 
during recessions the amount of state aid will tend to grow. The German unification of 1990 
had the effect of increasing the amount of state aid granted by the German state. Between 1990 
and 1992, 40.5% of all German aid to manufacturing was granted to the new Länder; this 
accounts for the somewhat anomalous figures for 1990 in Table 12.1. 
A dampening effect on state aid might among other things also be due to the following factors. 
(a) Greater Community control on the granting of state aid by national governments. For 
example, the total number of decisions on state aid made by the Commission increased 
from 294 in 1987 to 527 in 1994. Greater transparency in the application of Community 
rules may also reduce the amount of state aid granted. 
(b) The criteria of economic convergence set by the Maastricht Treaty in 1990 for 
participation in the Monetary Union (aiming at a 3% budget deficit and 60% of debt-
GDP ratio) may have constrained the ability of states to grant new state aid without 
raising taxes. 
(c) Table 12.2 shows that the decline in the amount of financial subsidies granted by the 
Member States has been compensated by an increase in aid at the Community level. 
As a political consequence of the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Commission has become a more active player in granting aid through its regional and social 
funds and other schemes. The actual amount of Community aid has increased in recent years. 
Although Community aid has rather different objectives to national state aids, it may in part 
reduce the need for national state aids. For example: EU regional funds may reduce the need 
for national governments to grant regional development aids; EU aids to promote R&D may 
substitute for national aid. 
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Table 12.2. A comparison of the state aid granted by national states and Community 
expenditure 
(million ECU) 
State aid * 
Community expenditure 
Total 
State aid as % of total 
1988 
37,691 
30,989 
68,680 
54.88 
i 1989 
j 30,254 
j 32,618 
j 62,872 
I 48.12 
! 1990 
i 42,059 
; 34,043 
i 76,102 
I 55.27 
; 1991 
i 35,734 
I 40,516 
j 76,250 
I 46.86 
j 1992 
i 35,673 
j 42,880 
j 78,553 
j 45.41 
Source: Fourth Survey on State Aid, European Commission, 1995, p. 85. 
♦State aid to the manufacturing sector in current prices. It includes EAGGF Guarantee, EAGGF Guidance (payments), Social 
Fund (commitments), Regional Fund (commitments, part corresponding to the concept of aid within the meaning of Art. 92 
of the Rome Treaty), R&D (both DG XII, part intended for large firms and SMEs, and DG XIII) and ECSC grants 
(resettlements, steel social, coal social, research and interest relief). 
Table 12.3 shows that the level of state aid has declined in all the EU Member States, though 
at a different pace, from 1981 to 1992. Thus, the factors leading to reduced state aid appear to 
have affected different countries similarly. 
Table 12.3. Overall state aid in the EU Member States, in percentage of GDP 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
EUR-12 
1981-86 
4.1 
1.3 | 
2.5 j 
2.5 I 
j 
2.7 ; 
4.0 j 
4.0 ] 
6.0 j 
1.5 | 
; 
1.8 
2.8 
Source: First, Second, Third and Fourth Survey on State Aid, European 
1986-88 
3.2 j 
1.0 j 
2.5 
4.5 
2.7 
2.0 
2.7 
3.1 
4.0 
1.3 
1.5 
1.1 
2.2 
Commission. 
1988-90 
2.8 
1.1 
2.5 
3.1 
1.8 
2.1 
1.9 
2.8 
3.9 
1.1 
2.0 
1.2 
2.1 
1990-92 
2.3 
1.0 
2.4 
2.2 
1.3 
1.8 
1.5 
2.8 
3.9 
0.9 
1.4 
0.6 
1.9 
12.3. The economics of state aid 
12.3.1. The reasons for granting state aid 
State aid provides a subsidy to private producers and/or consumers. While such subsidies can 
contribute to the achievement of allocational efficiency if they address market failure 
(resulting from externalities, public goods or market imperfections, e.g. due to asymmetric 
information), state aid may be used to further national objectives at the expense of other EU 
countries. In addition, it is also possible that the government can be captured by domestic 
interest groups engaged in rent-seeking. In this case, subsidies may simply constitute a 
redistribution of income (rents) to well-organized and politically powerful interest groups 
rather than being a corrective measure to market failures. Lobbying for such redistributive aid 
may itself be wasteful. In addition, state aid may also distort competition and increase the tax 
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burden, thus leading to inefficiencies and overall welfare losses. Finally, state aid may be used 
to pursue political objectives like, for example, an equal distribution of income over different 
regions. 
Basically, we can distinguish three kinds of state aid, based on different reasons for granting 
subsidies. 
(a) Aid that is intended to correct market failures resulting from externalities or public 
goods. Typical examples for externalities comprise (positive or negative) spillovers 
between industries, in particular spillover effects from R&D investment. Of particular 
interest in the context of integration are capital market imperfections and debt overhang 
problems. 
(b) A particularly prevalent special case of add to correct market failures is that intended to 
smooth structural adjustment. Rapid changes in industrial structure, following market 
integration, may entail frictions (for example, due to labour immobility) that could be 
avoided by affecting the way in which, and the speed with which, these changes take 
place. 
(c) Aid that is intended to promote domestic firms or industries at the expense of foreign 
suppliers, or that is granted in response to subsidies given by foreign governments to 
foreign firms. 
(d) Aid granted as a redistribution in favour of particular interest groups by governments. 
We will consider the reasons for granting aid that are relevant from the perspective of the 
interrelation between state aid and market integration in more detail. 
Capital market failures and R&D investment 
We first consider the main reasons for granting state aid to improve economic welfare. A 
common feature of all these reasons is that the granting of state aid is only optimal when there 
is a market failure of the economy elsewhere and state aid is being used in a corrective 
manner. 
Capital markets are particularly susceptible to problems resulting from asymmetric 
information. Creditors may find assessing the specific merits of an investment project difficult 
and may face an adverse selection problem. Higher interest rates may attract relatively more 
investors with high-risk projects. An increase in interest rates may, therefore, increase the 
average riskiness of the portfolio of projects for which credit is being given and decrease the 
lender's expected returns. As a result it may be profit-maximizing for banks to improve the 
quality of their portfolio by reducing interest rates below the market clearing level and rely on 
non-market means of credit allocation.200 This credit rationing may make it difficult for firms 
to get sufficient access to finance and may warrant subsidies to correct this market 
imperfection. 
Because these problems are caused by asymmetric information, one would expect credit 
rationing to be most severe for types of investment where information asymmetries are large. 
R&D investments in particular may give rise to the greatest concerns about rationing problems 
resulting from asymmetric information. However, there are additional potential externalities 
See, for example, Jaffee and Russell [1976] or Stiglitz and Weiss [1981 
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involved in the process of R&D which may justify the granting of subsidies. For example, 
there may be positive spillover benefits for other producers resulting from innovation by one 
firm. To the extent that innovators fail to take account of the benefits they generate for others, 
there may be a case for subsidy. Also, innovation by one firm may help other firms by 
allowing them to forecast non-accurately the likely pay-off from'innovation themselves. In 
such circumstances, firms will tend to delay innovation for strategic reasons.201 Such strategic 
delay is socially wasteful and provides a justification for so-called 'pump-priming' partial 
funding of R&D by governments.202 
However, one has to be cautious in applying these arguments in order to justify state aid given 
to particular firms. Governments are unlikely to be better informed about the characteristics of 
investment projects than private borrowers and are therefore unlikely to pick those investment 
projects that suffer most from credit rationing. A system which decentralizes investment 
decisions may be preferable to direct government funding of specific investment projects. For 
example, if credit rationing is felt to be a particular problem for innovative industries, then 
appropriate corrective fiscal policy for this sector may be desirable, such as an investment tax 
credit. 
Debt overhang problem 
Legal provisions for bankruptcy remove control over the firm from equity holders and give it 
to debt holders in situations of debt default. This may create a situation where efficient 
decisions to refinance the defaulted firm may not be taken because the marginal benefits to 
debt holders differ systematically from the social marginal benefits. Government subsidies 
may help to keep firms in business where it is socially optimal to refinance the bankrupt firm 
but where the debtors have insufficient incentive to do so. 
The following example may help to illustrate the problem. 
Debt overhang: an example 
Assume that the firm has debt equal to D. Let V be the liquidation value of the company, i.e. the realizable 
value of its assets. Upon liquidation of the firm debtors obtain pay-off equal to min[D,V]. Equity holders 
receive the remainder of the value of the firm, equal tomax[0,V-D]. If V < D, the firm is illiquid and faces 
bankruptcy. Suppose that refinancing the firm would lead to a value of V* > D with some probability p, 
but be completely ineffective with probability (1-p). Finally, assume that the refinancing cost R is covered 
exclusively by additional debt (i.e. the refinancing is being carried out in a situation of default on existing 
debt), and that successful refinancing at least covers its cost (i.e. V* > D + R). 
Refinancing the firm is socially optimal if, and only if, pV* + (l-p)V - R > V, i.e. if the expected value of 
the firm with refinancing net of the refinancing cost is greater than the current default value. However, 
because some of the potential gain from refinancing would accrue to equity holders, debtholders face a 
different incentive. They will decide to refinance if, and only if, p(R+D) + (l-p)V - R > V. Because V* > 
R+D, there may be cases where debtors have no incentive to provide additional funds to refinance the firm 
although it would be socially optimal to do so. 
See Chamley and Gale [1994]. 
We must make the proviso that there are circumstances in which there is too much expenditure on R&D from a social 
point of view. Recent literature on patent pacts has made the point that R&D competition can lead to wasteful 
duplication of R&D effort. Thus, it is not always true that the level of R&D investment is suboptimal and that 
corrective subsidies are needed. 
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Thus, in the presence of capital market imperfections, there may be economically justifiable 
reasons for using state aids to rescue ailing enterprises which are viable in the long run, but 
facing short-run difficulties due to lack of available finance. 
Smoothing structural adjustment 
Even if firms should go out of business in the long run because they are not competitive, there 
may be a reason for slowing down the adjustment process because of imperfections in other 
markets, primarily the labour market. This may be particularly important, for example, if the 
work-force is relatively immobile (geographically or sectorally) and if the social costs of 
unemployment are high. This problem may be reinforced by market imperfections such as 
wage rigidity. By smoothing the transition process, the cost of transition can be reduced. 
In this case, the justification for granting state aid is due to an imperfection elsewhere, for 
example, in the labour market. If the social costs of the transition process have to be borne by 
the community rather than by the individual firms, then firms will have incentives to diverge 
from socially optimal behaviour. In this case, corrective measures are necessary to achieve an 
optimal balance between efficiency gains from restructuring and the social cost of the 
transition process. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that aid to smooth adjustment may be justifiable even in 
the case that the enterprise is not viable in the long run, if the social benefits of smoothing 
transition are sufficiently great. What is at issue is a dynamic trade-off: a (static) misallocation 
of resources may be tolerated for some time in order to reduce the overall (dynamic) 
adjustment costs of changing that allocation. It must be stressed, however, that this form of 
government intervention may carry the risk of perpetuating an inefficient situation unless the 
government can credibly commit to limit the amount of aid and the time over which it is given 
to industries that are not competitive. 
Strategic promotion of national industries 
Subsidies granted to domestic firms or industries may modify the incentives of firms in a way 
that improves their competitive position relative to firms receiving no aid. For example, recent 
strategic trade theory has shown that in an oligopolistic market, export subsidies may shift the 
reaction functions of domestic suppliers and lead to a non-cooperative equilibrium outcome 
that is distorted in favour of the subsidized suppliers.203 Under specific assumptions about the 
nature of competition and the behaviour of foreign governments, export subsidies can be 
welfare-improving for an individual country even if the subsidies are financed by a lump sum 
tax levied on the subsidized firms or industries.204 More generally, in the presence of 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, state aid will affect the incentives of 
subsidized companies and can, therefore, be used to promote domestic suppliers. Export 
promotion may be achieved also by subsidizing domestic producers who compete with 
imports.205 
203 Notice that in this example state aid is granted related to export volumes, rather than just as a lump sum. 
204 See Brander and Spencer [1981, 1983]. 
205 See Chapters 12 to 14 in Krugman [1994] and, for an overview, Helpman and Krugman [1989]. 
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For example, there is a historical tendency of governments of the Member States to subsidize 
national champions in the car industry, which has often been regarded as a strategic sector. 
Over the last decade almost all car manufacturers have received some kind of financial support 
from state bodies. Despite the fact that often the Commission authorized aid schemes on the 
basis of supposed beneficial effects on depressed regions or because of the R&D contents, the 
number of state aid cases involving the car industry indicates the importance that governments 
attribute to the sector. In 1988, the Commission issued a framework on state aid specifically 
tailored to the motor vehicle industry,207 which has had the effect of tightening 
implementation of the state aid rules by the Commission. 
The promotion of national firms may be a response by national governments to market 
integration. If the number of firms in an integrated market is lower than before integration, 
then transient subsidies may be an effective instrument by which governments attempt to 
determine which firms will survive rather than letting the market pick the survivors. The 
shipbuilding industry is an example of this case: shipbuilding in the UK declined because UK 
suppliers were not competitive relative to the subsidized industries in other countries. Thus, if 
a country decides to refrain from granting state aid, those countries that subsidize domestic 
industries will win out. 
These domestic strategic reasons for granting state aid clearly increase national welfare. 
However, they do so at the expense of international competitors.208 Thus such policies will 
give rise to gainers and losers within the EU. In terms of average EU welfare, they may be 
expected to give rise to an overall loss due to the resulting distortion of competition (however, 
in oligopolistic settings this will not be universally true for the usual second-best reasons). We 
consider these welfare losses in more detail in the following section. 
Most of the cases of state aid can be divided into two categories: aid to support domestic producers and aid to attract 
foreign direct investment. The following cases belong to the former category: the French government provided new 
equity capital to Renault (1987); the Italian government gave aid to Alfa Romeo in the form of new equity capital 
(1985); the UK government aided the Rover Group with restructuring prior to privatization (1986); the French 
government gave financial aid to Peugeot (1988); the UK government donated further aid to Rover (1990); aid was 
granted by the German government to Volkswagen and Opel for investments in the new Länder (1991); the Italian 
government gave aid to Fiat to support its Mezzogiorno investment plan (1991); the Italian government aided the 
SEVEL joint venture between Fiat and PSA (1994). Examples of aid granted in order to attract foreign direct 
investment or to preserve the company's involvement in the country are the following: the Brussels regional authorities' 
proposal to grant aid to Volkswagen (1990); aid by Luxembourg to General Motors for setting up a new R&D centre 
(1990); Portuguese aid to an automotive component manufacturer subsidiary of GM (1990); Derbyshire County 
Council (UK) grant of indirect aid to Toyota (1990); aid from the Portuguese government to Ford and Volkswagen to 
set up a new plant for the production of multi-purpose vehicles (1991); aid from the regional government in Belgium to 
Volvo for innovation and environmental protection (1992); Dutch state aid to Volvo and Mitsubishi (1992); Spanish 
aid to Renault (1994); regional aid to Jaguar in the UK (1994). This information is drawn from the Annual Reports on 
Competition Policy. See also Hancher, Ottervanger and Slot [1994], EC State Aids, Chancery Law Publishing, 1994, 
pp. 111-122. 
OJ C 123, 18.5.1989. The framework has been renewed every two years since. In 1992. no expiry date was fixed and 
the Commission interpreted the latter as of unlimited duration. However, this interpretation has been recently overruled 
by the Court (Case C-l35/93 Spain v. Commission). 
If other countries take retaliatory measures, total welfare will decline, but it will still be in the interest of each individual 
country to promote its national industries. 
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12.3.2. Adverse effects of state aids 
Competition-distorting effects 
State aids will generally distort competition and market structure. Consider the simplest 
example of a state aid, namely a lump sum subsidy for a firm. This may induce the firm to 
remain in the market where it would otherwise exit. If this has the consequence that the 
number of firms in the market is increased, then such a state aid might have a pro-competitive 
effect. However, the more plausible case is that such aid will (providing the firms included 
have fairly similar costs) cause the exit of another firm. Thus the state aid has changed the 
identity of the firms in the market, without increasing the number of firms. This could have an 
adverse effect on allocative efficiency since the granting of state aid to one firm leads to the 
displacement of a lower cost producer by a higher cost one. 
State aid races 
Governments may face coordination problems in the granting of state aid. In particular, it may 
be individually optimal for each government to grant a state aid, even though it is not in their 
collective interests. Consider, for example, the location decision of a new plant. Such 
decisions are often accompanied by subsidy races. Each potential recipient of the new plant 
has an incentive to grant aid to influence the location decision at the margin. However, in the 
end, if all governments grant equal state aid, then all that has happened is that there is a net 
transfer to the builder of the new plant, which must be raised from general taxation with its 
accompanying dead-weight losses. 
Ex ante distorting effects 
We have seen that there may be socially beneficial reasons for governments granting state aid. 
However, even if a government pursues a policy of granting state aid only when (ex post) 
socially optimal, then even this will still distort firms' ex ante incentives. In particular, a firm 
might induce a government to grant it a subsidy if it can move first and commit itself to 
produce by making an irreversible (sunk) investment. In this case, a government will find it 
optimal ex post to subsidize such a firm even if it would not have given the subsidy without 
the firm's commitment. However, the firm will clearly anticipate the granting of a subsidy and 
so its ex ante behaviour will be distorted. 
Rent-seeking behaviour 
Individual companies or industries may have a strong incentive to lobby for government 
subsidy. As noted above, well-organized groups may be able to receive favourable treatment 
and subsidies at the expense of less well-organized groups. Rent-seeking behaviour usually 
not only has redistributive effects, but also leads to inefficiencies because it may lead to 
inefficient allocations if successful. Moreover, resources will be wasted in the rent-seeking 
process itself. This effect may far outweigh the 'pure' efficiency loss that results from an 
inefficient allocation. 
For these extensions of the basic Brander/Spencer model, see Dixit and Kyle [1985]. 
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One particular problem for assessing state aid measures is that most of the arguments that can 
be made for welfare-improving subsidies may be used in the process of rent-seeking. Firms 
may refer to capital market imperfections or competitive pressure that would force them to 
shed jobs in order to convince governments that some financial backing is needed. Trying to 
distinguish bona fide arguments from rent-seeking ones may be extremely difficult. 
A study by Neven [1994] has shown that political factors are the main determinants in the 
variation in the level of state aid granted to the manufacturing sector, though not necessarily of 
the level itself. This, study did not analyse, however, the extent to which state aid may be used 
as an instrument to promote national interests at the expense of the development of an 
integrated market. 
Distorting effects of state aid on production and pricing decisions 
State aid such as lump sum subsidies or inducements to locate plants clearly affect if and 
where production occurs. However, state aid may also affect competition and welfare if it 
affects firms' output, capacity decisions or pricing. A specific state aid measure will have such 
effects depending on the way it changes firms' costs. If the aid affects variable costs (e.g. 
subsidized input price for a variable input), profit-maximizing production and pricing 
decisions will normally be affected. By lowering firms' marginal costs, a subsidy allows the 
receiving firm to charge a lower price (not necessarily by the same amount). Production and 
pricing decisions will also be influenced by aid that affects fixed but avoidable costs (e.g. 
subsidized rental of non-specific capital equipment). Following this argument, aid that affects 
sunk costs (for example, the transfer of a sunk asset from the state to a firm) should not 
influence a firm's profit-maximizing decision. One has to be very careful, however, in 
identifying aid that affects sunk costs: for example, a payment to a firm to assist in the 
acquisition of assets, even of specific assets, does not fall under this heading. At the time of 
acquisition the relevant capital costs are obviously variable costs, so that the aid would rather 
affect variable costs. 
A more sophisticated analysis would suggest that even state aids affecting sunk costs (the 
transfer of ownership of sunk assets) might affect pricing and output decisions. The modern 
theory of corporate finance emphasizes that real decisions may be affected by the financial 
structure of the firm, and so even state aids affecting sunk costs may have real effects. 
12.4. State aid-and market integration 
There are three broad classes of reasons why firms may seek and why governments may grant 
state aid: 
(a) efficiency-enhancing reasons, where state aids are welfare-improving due to market 
failures elsewhere in the economy; 
(b) national self-interest reasons, typically advancing the interests of national producers at 
the expense of firms in other countries; 
(c) political reasons, when state aid is useful as a means of transferring resources to 
particular interest groups. 
We now ask how market integration is likely to affect these different motivations for state aid. 
Also, we ask how the granting of state aid is likely to affect the process of market integration. 
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12.4.1. Effects of integration 
We first consider the effects of integration on the three classes of reasons for granting state 
aids identified above. 
Efficiency-enhancing reasons 
As noted above, welfare-enhancing reasons for granting state aid have to be based on market 
failure, the most relevant being capital market imperfections and externalities like those in the 
debt overhang problem or in connection with rapid changes of the industrial structure. 
Market integration is likely to lead to changes in industrial structure (in at least some sectors). 
In particular, greater cross-border competition is likely to induce the exit of some firms. Thus, 
in the short term, market integration may require some transitional arrangements to smooth the 
effects of the exit of firms. We would emphasize that the circumstances in which such state 
aids would be warranted are quite limited: first, the industry must be one in which integration 
is likely to have a significant effect on the equilibrium number of firms; second, the effects of 
firms' exit following integration must be concentrated into particular geographic areas or a 
particular sector of the economy for which mobility of labour in other areas or sectors is 
limited. 
Where integration leads to exit, we are also likely to see the possible bankruptcy of some 
firms. Thus state aids may be justified in some circumstances to correct possible debt 
overhang problems resulting in firms being liquidated too readily from a social point of view. 
With regard to capital market imperfections, we would expect that the problem of information 
asymmetry might decrease a little within an integrated market. The difficulties of assessing the 
riskiness of an investment project are likely to be lower for foreign lenders than for domestic 
ones. In cases where domestic lenders have an informational advantage over foreign lenders, 
there is likely to be a continuation of fragmented capital markets rather than the development 
of an integrated capital market. Advantages from using an integrated capital market, therefore, 
are likely to result from the development of more specialized providers of financial services 
whose expertise will enable them to assess the specific characteristics of an investment project 
better than their less specialized competitors. Furthermore, advantages could be expected from 
escaping tightly regulated and restricted national capital markets in which imperfections may 
have been reinforced by excessive regulation. Unless regulations which are put into effect for 
the integrated market are tighter than national regulations, we may expect the number of 
economically justified cases in which state aid is needed to correct capital market failures to 
decline as a result of integration though this effect cannot be expected to be large. 
Thus, in consequence, we might expect that following market integration there will be 
increased economic justification for the granting of state aids resulting from exit of firms as a 
result of increased competition. However, this effect is only transient. Economically justified 
state aids would be a transitory response to smooth the effects of integration. In the long run, 
we would not expect market integration to expand the set of circumstances in which the 
granting of state aids is justifiable. Rather, if market integration reduces the impact of market 
failures (e.g. by integration of capital markets), then, in the long run, market integration should 
reduce the set of circumstances in which aid is welfare improving. 
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National self-interest reasons 
The gradual removal of non-trade barriers will lower transport costs and reduce firms' entry 
costs within the EU. As a consequence, firms that have previously been protected from foreign 
competition will become subject to increasing competition from companies located in other 
European and extra-European countries. This increasing competitive pressure may induce 
domestic firms to adopt anti-competitive strategies. In addition to strategic reactions which 
have been described in the previous chapters, firms may also react to increasing competition 
by lobbying their own national government to grant them some sort of protection. The 
incentives to obtain financial support from the state, together with some other type of 
protection (e.g. technical standards), are, in theory, increased by market integration. Lobbying 
for state aids may become easier for firms since it might be reinforced by credible threats of 
laying off parts of the work-force as domestic firms face increasing competition. 
Moreover, rather than shielding their national firms from the more intense competition in an 
integrated market, governments may actively want to create competitive advantages for 
national firms since these may now be exploited in a larger market. Governments are generally 
inclined towards supporting sectors that are deemed to be 'strategic' (e.g. steel in the past, 
semiconductors or computers today) or prestigious (e.g. cars, aeronautics). These industries 
tend to be highly concentrated and should be able, therefore, to organize their interests very 
well. If national governments grant aid in order to favour domestic firms, then market 
integration may not necessarily reduce the incentives for such behaviour. In particular, since 
integration expands the size of the market, a given expenditure of state aid may increase 
domestic output more in an integrated market than if markets are separated. 
These incentives for governments to grant state aid may differ from country to country, in 
particular if the process of market integration produces losers as well as winners. The 
governments of those countries where industries suffered losses may be more inclined towards 
supporting and protecting their domestic industries. Similarly, firms' incentives to demand 
financial support from the state could be strengthened in those countries that enjoyed the 
higher levels of protection and are now facing competition from foreign firms. 
Granting subsidies to national companies in an integrated market inevitably gives rise to 
requests for a 'level playing field': if a firm in country A is subsidized, firms in countries Β 
and C may have a greater incentive to demand a similar treatment from their respective 
governments to avoid a disadvantage. This reasoning is at the basis of international attempts to 
regulate subsidies in order to avoid 'subsidies races'. 
Political reasons 
State aid may be granted to favour particular interest groups. It is hard to provide an economic 
analysis of such aid and we have not undertaken any analysis of this third type of effect. It is 
not obvious, however, why we should expect integration to have any systematic effect on such 
motives for granting aid. 
12.4.2. Effects of state aid on market integration 
Assuming that the single market programme has had the effect of increasing market 
integration among the EU Member States, this will influence the impact state aid might have, 
lístate aid is granted to domestic firms that enjoy protection from import competition (e.g. due 
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to the non-tariff barriers whose removal has been object of the single market programme), the 
possible distorting effects of the state aid are limited, to a great extent, to the domestic market 
of the receiving firm. If market integration means that the size of the market is expanded, then 
the effect of one national authority granting financial support to domestic firms is clearly felt 
in a larger market, affecting a wider number of firms, although, depending on the nature of 
competition, the effect on each individual competitor is likely to be smaller. 
As argued above, the reduction of the costs of cross-border trade, which market integration is 
likely to have brought about, has the effect of increasing the level of competition in the EU 
markets. Increasing competition has positive effects on different aspects of economic 
efficiency. State aids may frustrate this process and prevent the full benefits of integration 
being reaped. 
As competition tends to reduce price costs margins, it will force the least efficient firms out of 
the market. State aid, affecting variable or fixed, but avoidable costs, introduces a distortion in 
this process, reducing allocative efficiency first by displacing low cost producers by higher 
cost, but subsidized, producers, and second by increasing the tax burden with its associated 
dead-weight losses. Aid may also negatively affect productive efficiency through removing the 
competitive pressures thought to favour internal efficiency in organizations. 
A wider market increases the ability of firms to reap the benefits of economies of scale. 
Allowing firms that would otherwise exit the market, or would be taken over by the most 
efficient competitors, to remain in the market might prevent the latter from enjoying the 
benefits of economies of scale through external growth. 
Of particular concern in an integrated market is the use of state aids to influence the location 
of productive capacity. In an integrated market there is presumably enhanced flexibility in the 
location of production facilities. Under such circumstances there may be greater incentives for 
state aids to be used as a means of influencing location decisions. Such behaviour has been 
seen to a large extent in the car industry, and more generally when multinationals consider a 
range of EU countries for the location of ab novo production facilities. 
Of course, all these effects of granting state aid were also present before markets became more 
closely integrated. Where national markets are only partially integrated, however, subsidizing 
only some selected firms is likely to have only a modest impact on other national markets, but 
the situation changes as market integration proceeds. In general, as the degree of tradability of 
the product increases with market integration, it is more likely that the aid would affect other 
firms in other countries. Because these firms might seek state aid with reference to the 'level 
playing field' argument, the risk of an escalation of the 'subsidies race' is, therefore, increased. 
In conclusion, we would expect that market integration may in the short run give rise to 
increased incentives for firms to lobby for all governments to grant state aid. In the absence of 
appropriate EU-level controls on the granting of aid, this could potentially hinder the 
achievement of the full benefits of market integration. 
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12.5. State aid policy 
12.5.1. EC Treaty 
The Commission takes decisions based on Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Articles 4 
and 95 of the ECSC Treaty in respect of aid paid by Member States' national or local 
governmental bodies to public and private enterprises. Article 92 lays down the general 
principle that aid which may distort competition between firms in different Member States is 
forbidden, but may be permitted in certain specified circumstances. Article 93 sets out 
procedures which the Commission must follow in exercising its powers and imposes 
obligations upon Member States to cooperate with the Commission. 
In general terms Article 92(1) declares incompatible with the Common Market 'any aid 
granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts 
or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods.' Several tests must be satisfied for a particular measure to be deemed 'aid'. 
According to Article 92(1) a particular measure must meet the following criteria: 
(a) it must be granted from state resources, either directly or indirectly; 
(b) it must favour certain undertakings or the production-of certain goods; 
(c) the aid must affect (or distort) trade between Member States. 
Measures that could qualify as state aid include, amongst others, direct financial subsidies, tax 
exemptions, preferential interest rates, guarantees of loans on especially favourable terms, 
dividend guarantees, foregoing of profits, indirect state participation in share capital, the 
acquisition of land or buildings either gratuitously or on favourable terms, provision of goods 
and services on preferential terms, preferential settlement of public accounts, and the deferred 
collection of fiscal and social contributions. This list is by no means exhaustive. 
Article 92(1) requires the Commission to give reasons why, in each specific case, the aid could 
be expected to distort competition.2" Currently, if aid is identified in a financial flow between 
the state and an enterprise, the conclusion that aid distorts competition is almost automatic. 
Numerous cases decided by the Commission have been challenged on the basis that 
insufficient evidence was given that the aid in question distorts trade or competition; however 
such challenges rarely succeed. 
Article 92(2) defines state aids that are compatible with the common market, particularly those 
which promote, the economic development of regions with an abnormally low standard of 
living and facilitate the development of certain economic activities without adversely affecting 
trade. 
See Lehner· and Meiklejohn [1991], Chapter 5 for a detailed description of Community state aid law; also Hancher 
[1994]. 
Opinion of the Advocate General in Case 173/73 Italy v. Commission [1974] 2 CMLE, 593 at 603-604. See generally 
Hancher, Ottovanger and Slot [1994, Ch. 2]. Also Case 248/84 Germany v. Commission [1987] ECR 4013; Case 
102/87 France v. Commission [1988] ECR 4067; and for a recent review of case law, Cases C-324/90 and C-342/90 
Germany and Pleuger v. Commission [1993]. 
Lehner and Meiklejohn [1991, p. 50], and Evans and Martin [1991, pp. 83-89]. However, the Court has ruled that the 
Commission must at least give reasons why aid will distort trade and competition, and Commission decisions now 
routinely contain market and trade statistics in an effort to support the conclusion that trade will be affected. 
228 Competition issues 
Article 93 is concerned with the application of the European state aid policy, regulating 
notification of state aid and the possible decisions by the Commission. Most interesting with 
regard to the integration process, Article 93(1) requires the Commission, in cooperation with 
Member States, to review the state aid policies of the Member States continuously as well as 
to propose appropriate measures to the Member States as required by the progressive 
development of the common market. 
12.5.2. The market economy investor principle 
The identification of the presence of state aid is the first step in any investigation conducted by 
the Commission. It is important to recognize that not each and every financial flow between 
the state and firms may constitute a form of aid. The so-called 'market economy investor 
principle' (MEIP) is intended to distinguish that part of a financial flow which constitutes state 
aid. 
According to the MEIP, aid should be assessed as the difference between the terms on which 
the funds were made available by the state to the firm or enterprise, and the terms which a 
private investor would find acceptable in providing funds to a comparable firm or enterprise 
when the private investor is operating under 'normal market economy conditions'. Only if 
public funds are provided at more favourable terms than could have been obtained from a 
private investor, government funding will be deemed to be 'state aid'. The MEIP, therefore, is 
supposed not only to help to determine the presence of state aid, but also to help to quantify 
the amount of aid that is granted. We may interpret the MEIP as a definition of 'state aid': a 
state aid (according to the MEIP) is that part of a financial flow between a state and a private 
enterprise in excess of that which would be provided by a private investor. Thus the MEIP 
provides a benchmark against which financial flows can be measured. If a financial flow from 
a state to an enterprise would have been forthcoming from a private investor on the same 
terms, then this transaction does not fall under the remit of Article 92. On the other hand, if the 
MEIP identifies a state aid, then further analysis is required to determine whether the aid is 
acceptable. Thus the MEIP is a way of determining whether a transaction falls under Article 
92.214 However, it would be quite incorrect to identify transfers which constitute 'state aid' 
under the MEIP with transfers that are per se incompatible with the competition articles 
because they reduce welfare, since these transfers may have efficiency defences. 
Nevertheless, a fundamental question is: if financial flows from the government to a company 
are on the same terms as a hypothetical investment by a private investor, then why should the 
government make this investment rather than leaving it to the market. If a financial flow does 
not constitute state aid under the MEIP, then government funds have replaced potential private 
investment. Because the funds have to be raised from either taxation or public borrowing, 
there can be no presumption that governments have a comparative advantage as lenders 
relative to the private sector. 
213 With regard to coal and steel, the ECSC Treaty contains special provisions relevant for state aid. Specific measures are 
declared to be incompatible with the common market for coal and steel in Article 4 of this treaty. 
The MEIP has been accepted by the European Court of Justice to be an appropriate way to deal with public ownership 
of an enterprise without violating Article 222 of the Treaty, under which the Treaty provisions may in no way prejudice 
the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership (Case C-305/89 or C-303/88). 
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A recent example for this source of concern has been given by the case of a capital injection of 
PTA 87 billion to the Spanish flag carrier Iberia in 1996 despite the 'one time/last time' 
bailout rule invoked in the granting of state aid of PTA 120 billion in 1992. The second capital 
injection was deemed not to be a case of state aid because the state holding company 
controlling Iberia was found to have acted in the same way as a private investor would have 
acted. This begs the question of why such funding was not forthcoming from the private 
sector. 
Although the current system of regulating state aids allows the government to act as a rational 
private investor and to make investments at market return where it wishes, it is not clear that 
governments require such freedoms if private investors would provide funds in any case. An 
alternative regulatory system might consider all investments by a government in an enterprise 
as potential state aids in need of investigation, not just those investments passing the MEIP 
hurdle. Such a system would be much simpler and more transparent, although governments 
would no longer be able to act as private investors. Under such a system, investments by the 
state would, be allowed only if there were demonstrable welfare gains and such investment 
corrected some market failure. Such a system avoids the problem that the MEIP is likely to be 
a very difficult rule to apply in practice since it compares an actual financial flow with a 
putative financial flow (i.e. that forthcoming from a private investor). 
A possible, but problematic, counterargument to this alternative system is that governments 
need to act as investors since capital market imperfections (such as credit rationing) lead to a 
suboptimal provision of private capital. However, under such circumstances the suboptimal 
actions of private investors are no longer an appropriate benchmark against which to consider 
financial flows; strict adherence to the MEIP would then classify as state aid investments 
which simply corrected capital market failures. Thus the MEIP is of limited usefulness in this 
case. 
Thus we may conclude the following: 
(a) A financial flow which constitutes a 'state aid' under the MEIP may nevertheless be 
economically justified since funds forthcoming from private investors may be 
suboptimal due to capital market imperfections. It is, of course, entirely a matter of 
definition as to whether one should call such a financial flow a 'state aid' or not. 
(b) There may be other reasons (e.g. debt overhang, structural adjustment, etc.) why a 'state 
aid' as defined by the MEIP is economically justifiable. Thus we cannot equate the 
existence of state aid with the undesirability of state aid. 
(c) It is not clear that the use of the MEIP as an initial hurdle in identifying state aid is the 
most transparent method of controlling state aids. Deciding what investment flow would 
be forthcoming from a private investor in an equivalent situation is difficult since 
'equivalent' must be defined. 
(d) Whilst recognizing the implications of Art. 222 of the Treaty which requires private and 
public ownership structures to be treated equally, as economists we may reasonably ask 
whether governments need to invest in enterprises at all, except insofar as this corrects 
market failures. 
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12.6. The application of state aid policy 
The general purpose of state aid regulation is to prevent the distortion of competition through 
government subsidy or aid. However, as we have discussed above, it can reasonably be argued 
that in some cases the granting of state aid is justified under an economic point of view. For 
example, 'market failures' distort competition, and aid which alleviates the effects of market 
failures may, therefore, be justified. 
In its practice, the Commission has taken account of the fact that market failures might exist in 
certain circumstances. Exceptions granted under certain circumstances for aid to R&D, small 
and medium-sized enterprises, and for environmental reasons, are all examples of what the 
Commission considers to be acceptable uses of state aid. However, derogations in favour of 
certain aids to particular sectors and regions seem to adhere more closely to other objectives of 
the Commission rather than to the objective of preserving competition. 
Table 12.4 gives the breakdown of the decisions taken by the Commission on state aid. 
Although the number of decisions shows a tendency to increase over time, at the same time 
both the share and the number of negative and conditional decisions has drastically decreased. 
In 1994 negative and conditional decisions combined represented only 1% of the total. This 
data leads us to examine the system of exemptions for state aid. In the following sections we 
will turn our attention to the policies of the Commission in this field, the economic rationale 
behind them and the possible changes introduced by the single market programme. 
Table 12.4. Percentage breakdown of the decisions taken by the Commission on state 
aid 
Types of decision 
No objection 
Termination 
Negative ** 
Conditional 
Other decisions *** 
Total (in numbers) 
1987 
63.9 
10.2 
2.4 
2.0 
11.9 
294 
j 1988 
173.9 
14.9 
13.4 
i 2.2 
j 6.8 
1410 
11989 
! 75.5 
16.1 
i 4.7 
iO.O 
13.2 
1343 
;1990 
184.3 
14.1 
12.8 
i 0.0 
11.8 
i 492 
j 1991 
182.6 
14.7 
i 1.2 
10.3 
i 2.2 
'1597 
i 1992 
185.7 
IM 
11.4 
11.3 
11.6 
1552 
! 1993 
185.4 
14.1 
11.3 
i 0.2 
j 2.1 
i 467 
; 1994 
183.5 
¡2:8 
10.6 
i 0.4 
i 5.1 
1527 
Source: XXIVth Report on Competition Policy, ¡994, Brussels 1995, Annex IV, p. 629. 
* Including extensions of procedures already initiated. 
** Including partly negative decisions. 
***Namely, appropriate measures under Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty and decisions made with the assent of the Council 
under Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty. 
Table 12.5 below shows a breakdown of the aid to the manufacturing sector granted by 
national states for the EU as a whole according to the classification adopted by the 
Commission. 
The objectives listed in Table 12.5 can be interpreted in terms of the economic analysis of 
state aid presented above. Aid given to promote SMEs or R&D could be attributed to the 
economic reason of correcting market failure from capital market imperfections. Sectoral aid 
can be seen as oriented towards smoothing transition processes or correcting externality 
problems that would lead to inefficient liquidation decisions. Regional objectives may address 
However, some cases might receive clearance after changes that followed a negotiation with the Commission. 
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distributional problems, and trade/export objectives, finally, may reflect the strategic trade 
policy aspect. 
One has to be careful, however, since almost every objective for giving state aid could be an 
instance of rent-seeking behaviour. Funding of R&D may act as 'a trade distorting measure 
favouring domestic firms, as well as a corrective measure for market failures. We want to give 
a short analysis of the effectiveness of state aid policy in dealing with these issues. 
Table 12.5. State aid to the manufacturing sector; percentage breakdown according to 
sector and function 
Sectors/function 
Horizontal objectives 
Innovation; R&D 
Environment 
SME 
Trade/export 
Economization of energy 
General investment 
Other objectives 
Particular sectors 
Shipbuilding 
Other sectors 
Regional objectives 
Regions under 92(3)c 
Regions under 92(3 )a 
Berlin and 92(2)c 
Total 
1981-1986 * | 
47 
9 ] 
0 j 
6 | 
16 
1 j 
5 
9 
16 
n.a. 
n.a. 
37 
18 
10 
9 
100 
1986-1988 
41 
11 
1 
9 
11 
1 
5 
3 
20 
n.a. 
n.a. 
39 
17 
9 
13 
100 
1988-1990 
42 
10 
1 
10 
11 
1 
3 
5 
20 
5 
15 
38 
8 
30 
0 
100 
1990-1992 
38 
10 
1 
9 
9 
2 
2 
4 
12 
2 
9 
50 
6 
43 
0 
100 
Source: First, Second, Third and Fourth Survey on State Aid in the European Community. 
*It includes 10 Member States, excluding Spain and Portugal. 
12.6.1. Capital market imperfections 
The main task for state aid policy is to separate those instances of state aid that lead to 
distortions of competition, inefficiency and an obstacle to market integration from those 
instances where the measures taken are justified. 
The issue of capital market imperfection is dealt with by the Commission only indirectly. The 
Commission attitude towards SMEs has, generally, been favourable. In particular, the 
Commission often mentions, among other things, that capital market problems are more acute 
for SMEs [Vlth Report on Competition Policy, p. 132 (in Italian)] and consequently it is less 
restrictive in the application of state aid rules to SMEs. However, as we mentioned before the 
single market programme may have made a wider range of financial options available to all 
the firms. If the problem is, as it seems, that SMEs lack internal expertise on how to take 
advantage of this possibility, state aid does not seem the best measure. 
State aid to R&D in public research institutes do not raise any objections from the 
Commission. State aid to basic R&D conducted by firms is allowed up to a maximum of 50% 
of the total investment. This threshold is reduced the closer R&D is to the final product market 
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(25% for applied R&D). Higher thresholds are applicable to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). 
In the Commission Decision Regeling Bijzondere Financiering,216 the Dutch government 
stated more explicitly that the goal of the proposed aid scheme was to overcome the 
imperfection of the capital markets in the Netherlands. It was also stressed that 'Dutch banks 
have a tradition of prudence, due among other things to Dutch bankruptcy laws, and that they 
are more familiar with short-term than with long-term financing of companies.' However, the 
Commission rejected arguments that state guarantees may serve to deal with imperfections in 
national capital markets. 
In taking the above position, the Commission might be right. In general, capital is becoming 
increasingly mobile, and the barriers that impeded domestic firms from seeking financing 
strictly in their domestic market are no longer in place to a great extent. Moreover, in these 
circumstances state aid is likely not to be the best measure to deal with national capital 
markets imperfection. 
12.6.2. Restructuring 
Special rules apply to sectors such as steel and coal (ECSC Treaty), agriculture, fisheries and 
transport. We will concentrate on sectors for which the Commission designed special policies 
to build on the state aid rules. The sectors involved are shipbuilding, motor vehicles, synthetic 
fibres, textiles and clothing. The main concern that guided the Commission's policy in these 
sectors is the necessity to restructure and reduce capacity at the same time. 
Broadly speaking, it seems that two very different motivations are at the root of these special 
sector policies. On one side, there are sectors such as steel, and at least in part, motor vehicles, 
where the main problem is overcapacity. States tend to over-subsidize their domestic firms, 
inducing them to expand capacity, thus causing cyclical crises. Political reasons, namely the 
reluctance of each government to stop supporting its domestic firms, are at the basis of the 
Community policy in these sectors. Although the industrial policies of the Commission for 
these sectors are likely to cause significant adjustment costs, they might be the only politically 
feasible way to keep down the level of state aid. 
On the other hand, sectors such as textiles and clothing, synthetic fibres and shipbuilding have 
suffered from very strong import competition from extra-EU firms. In some of these sectors, 
for example shipbuilding, competitors in the world market are subsidized so that granting 
aid may seem only a way to level the playing field. The Community has granted aid to the 
shipbuilding sector for this reason, though not to the textiles or fibres sectors. However, the 
main aim of state aid in this case is to make restructuring and conversion more gradual. We 
should see such policies as very much a second-best solution. Clearly it would be desirable to 
deal with the underlying friction in the labour market that necessitates aid. However, often this 
may prove difficult and indirect methods of transitional relief may be required instead. 
216 See Regeling Bijzondere Financiering in OJ C 22/6 1992. 
217 Ehlermann [1994, p. 415]. 
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As far as the effects of the single market programme for sectors such as shipbuilding are 
concerned, some increase in competition might arise from the liberalization of public 
procurement. For sectors such as textiles and clothing, the main effect on competition will 
come through the lowering of tariffs on extra-EU products in the context of the GATT 
Rounds. 
12.6.3. Promotion of domestic industries 
A relatively large proportion of state aid measures appear to be devoted to trade and export-
enhancing objectives. However, this category is wide-ranging and includes relatively minor 
measures (such as, for example, grants to SMEs to attend trade fairs). General measures 
applying to all firms in a Member State do not constitute state aid under EU rules,218 but 
export aids are specifically prohibited for intra-EU exports; such export aids would not 
constitute 'general measures' since they are specific to exporting companies. Nevertheless, the 
prime mover in restricting such subsidies has been GATT, rather than the EU. 
Given that companies from outside the EU receive government subsidies, there may be 
justifiable reasons for granting export-promoting state aids. However, in such cases it is 
essential that subsidies should be administered at the EU level in order to remove the 
incentives of Member States to distort intra-EU trade to their advantage. 
12.7. A case study: state aid to airlines 
Air transport between different countries has traditionally been heavily regulated, based on the 
principle of sovereignty of air space established by the Paris Convention of 1919 and the 
Chicago Conference of 1944. Up to 1993 when the measures of the third Intra-EC Air 
Transport Policy Package took effect, even between countries within the EU all scheduled air 
services were governed by air service agreements or bilateral agreements. This package was 
the last in a series of measures taken in order to liberalize and deregulate air transport within 
the European Union, following the first package (taking effect from 1 January 1988) and the 
second package (taking effect from 1 November 1990). 
These first two packages gradually removed restrictions on fares, designation, capacity and 
route access that could be agreed upon in air service agreements or bilateral agreements, and 
established the applicability of competition rules to air transport. The third package brought 
about free pricing, unrestricted capacity for intra-EU transport, an abolishment of designation 
agreements and the full freedom to start an airline. From April 1997, full cabotage will be 
allowed for any European carrier in any European country. Airlines responded by forming 
strategic alliances and cross-border mergers, code-sharing and franchising and, in many cases, 
a revision of their pricing, route developing and planning and scheduling strategies. 
Looking at all EU interstate services, the percentage of routes that are served by only one 
carrier has decreased between 1988 and 1995 (over 60% of all EU interstate services are 
served by only one carrier). This decrease has been accompanied by an increase in the 
percentage of routes served by two carriers (below 30%), while the percentage of routes served 
by three or four or more carriers has remained roughly constant at a low level (around 5% 
Ehlermann [1994, p. 413]. 
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each).219 However, the number of non-stop cross-border routes between European cities has 
increased sharply (in 1995 alone the number of routes increased by 12% over the previous 
year).220 Thus, competition (at least actual) on some routes has increased, and competition 
between an increasing number of (non-stop) routes may have increased as well, offering better 
connections and somewhat more choice to passengers. 
The economic impacts of these changes, in particular changes in performance and profits 
resulting from potentially more intense competition, are still more difficult to isolate, because 
developments in transport volume and yields are affected by general economic developments. 
The growth of GDP was found to be the major determinant of the development in transport 
volume with transport volume growing stronger than GDP. While real yield has fallen 
between 1987 and 1994 to slightly over 80% of the 1987 level, it is difficult to establish an 
221 
influence of the liberalization packages based on econometric estimates. 
Looking at changes in fares, we find that from 1986 to 1995, the level of air fares on average 
has risen at an annual rate of up to 4%, but that deep discount fares have decreased in some 
countries.222 However, given that airlines use complex yield management techniques to 
maximize their revenue (on the basis of scheduled output), changes in average fares do not 
give a clear-cut indication of changes in revenue. Furthermore, changes in cost structure and 
productivity will change the profitability of carriers on specific routes. However, we may 
assume that different airlines have had different success in adapting to a more competitive 
environment, leading to some of the carriers losing money in the more competitive, single 
market. For example, Olympic Airways had a load factor of only 60% in 1992, compared to 
68.9% in 1989. With 21% of total available seat capacity for traffic to or from Greece, it 
carried only 15.5% of the traffic in 1992, dropping further to a mere 13% in 1993, but much of 
it as a result of increased competition from the already liberalized charter market. Olympic 
Airways' market share on the main European routes terminating in Athens (which is the 
starting or end point for 90% of European passengers going to or coming from Greece) fell 
from 27.6% in 1988 to 22.7% in 1992.223 
Since the first liberalization package in 1987, the demands of a non-competitive environment 
have significantly impacted on state-owned airlines and have been associated with the granting 
of large state aids to flag carriers. For example, in the decision on aid granted to Olympic 
Airways (OJ L 273, 25.10.1994), it referred to the various obligations and duties that were 
imposed on the flag carrier after having been made over to the Greek state in 1975. 
See European Commission [1997b], The Single Market Review, Volume 11:2, Air Transport. 
220 Ibid. 
'Almost all passenger variations were explained by variations in real GDP and real yield. Frequency competition is 
likely to have had little effect on the overall market size, but would have been used to increase market shares of 
individual carriers. Attempts were also made to insert a competition or liberalization dummy variable into the equation 
from 1989 onwards, with poor results. This was hardly surprising given the gradual introduction of liberalization within 
Europe, starting as early as 1985 for some country pairs.' (Ibid). 
Ibid. 
See the information provided in the Commission Decision, OJ L 273, 25.10.1994. 
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Table 12.6. shows the amount of state aid granted to European airlines since 1991. 
Table 12.6. State aid to European airlines 
Year 
1991 
1991-92 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1994 
1994 
| Airline (financial stake of national government in 
; Sabena (61.8) 
i Air France (99.3) 
; Iberia (99.8) 
j AerLingus(lOO) 
j Air France (99.3) 
; TAP Air Portugal (100) 
j Olympic Airways (100) 
| Air France (99.3) 
%) ! Amount 
Source: British Airways and News Publications. 
The 1995 grant of ECU 562 million to Iberia was not classified as state aid with reference to the MEIP (see 
1 February 1996). 
The aid to TAP included a loan guarantee of up to ECU 858 million. 
(million ECU) 
1550 
843 
929 
224 
228 
914 
1900 
3000 
Financial Times, 
This massive amount of government aid has invariably been justified in terms of the need to 
restructure a carrier that was faced with major adjustment problems.224 Most state aid cases in 
the airline sector have been very controversial and were dealt with by the Commission in a 
highly political environment. 
12.7.1. Economic reasons for state aid 
Going back to the economic reasons for government subsidies, we may want to ask which of 
them could possibly justify state aid to national air carriers. 
Market failures 
Although capital market imperfections can be regarded as a potential justification for 
government subsidies, it is debatable that airlines are faced with this problem. In particular, 
with government ownership and continued protection on extra-EU routes airlines should be 
able to borrow any funds needed for restructuring through national or international capital 
markets. Other market failures that affect airlines are difficult to establish. There may be some 
problems of stability of competition on low density routes which lead to either monopoly 
situations or competitive outcomes where no carrier is likely to earn sufficient returns. 
However, this does not provide a rationale for the granting of state aids in general. Subsidies 
to keep very low density routes may be justifiable in terms of meeting a public service 
obligation; they are not justifiable as a means of influencing which of a number of carriers 
becomes the ultimate sole carrier on a low density route. 
See for example OJ L 300, 31.10.1991 (Sabena). OJ L 54, 25.2.1994 (Aer Lingus), OJ L 254, 30. 9.1994 (Air France), 
OJ L 273, 25.10.1994 (Olympic Airways). 
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Smoothing the adjustment process 
The massive lay-offs that have threatened airlines may well give rise to the need to find 
appropriate adjustment mechanisms where labour markets are not sufficiently flexible to cope 
with the huge reduction of demand from a leading employer in an area. Airports regions have 
become very important job centres. The problem here is that a reduction in demand by one 
carrier may well be compensated by increases in demand for labour by competitors. More 
importantly though, the resistance to the adjustment process is due to the desire to protect high 
wages. In the case of Air France and Iberia, the Commission only allowed aid to be granted on 
the basis of restructuring plans which foresaw substantial reductions in wages.225 
Export promotion 
State aid to airlines may well be seen as a form of export promotion. However, the incentives 
to promote domestic firms rest upon the prospect of shifting profits from foreign competitors 
to the domestic players. When such a transfer of profits occurs within the EU, then there is an 
overall loss on an average EU-basis due to the distortion of competition. Most state aid 
measures, however, appear to have been given in order to cover losses rather than for the 
purpose of increasing profits in this way. 
Rent-seeking 
It is very difficult for any outside observer not to suspect that seeking state aid is nothing else 
but the replacement of a previously protected status with another form of protection. While 
operating in a highly regulated environment inefficiencies and excessive costs were easily 
compensated by high regulated fares. In a more competitive environment, low-cost carriers 
exert pressure on fares and subsequently on costs as we have seen above. By seeking state aid 
airlines can avoid facing the full pressures of competition and continue to earn rents (above 
returns) even if they get appropriated by staff rather than shareholders. 
12.7.2. State aid policy in the airline sector 
The Commission has developed a framework for dealing with state aid and public subsidies in 
the airline sector on the basis of the Competition and Transport chapters of the Treaty of 
Rome.226 The rules of state aid that apply to the airline sector are largely similar to the general 
policy on state aid based on the application of the 'market economy investor principle' 
(MEIP). The basic elements of the Memorandum can be summarized as follows. 
Furthermore, the competitive pressures on flag carriers created by liberalization may be lower than expected, because 
entry from independent airlines does not seem to occur on a major scale. Based on an empirical analysis of entry and 
exit decisions post-liberalization, Marin [1995] concludes that 'the liberalization of the market has not provoked a 
drastic alteration in the identity of the companies operating in the market, but rather a reorganization of the European 
flag carriers network structure. Moreover, this means that even if the belief that flag carriers are less efficient than 
independent airlines is true, differences in efficiency are not large enough to offset the positive effect of other 
advantages enjoyed by the flag carriers. We can conclude that it is difficult to justify the protection and subsidies that 
many European flag carriers request from their governments.' 
The first guidelines for dealing with state aids in the airline sector were set out by the Commission in its Memorandum 
No 2 of March 1984 on progress towards the development of a Community air transport policy. In March 1992 these 
guidelines were reinforced. In December 1994, a further revised memorandum was issued which further tightened the 
rules for granting aid and sought to increase the transparency of state aid policy in this area. 
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(a) All state aid which potentially distorts competition is in principle incompatible with the 
common market. 
(b) Only a strongly proven common interest may allow for the acceptance of competitive 
distortions. 
(c) State aid for offsetting the operational losses of an airline is incompatible with the 
common market. The 1994 Memorandum makes it clear that such a subsidy may only be 
granted in exceptional circumstances in the context of a restructuring plan with the 
objective of returning the airline to viability within a reasonable period. A strong case 
would be required to justify such aid, which would be granted for a clearly specified 
period only. 
(d) The granting of restructuring aid should, in principle, be one-off and the government 
granting the subsidies must normally commit itself to not grant any further aid in any 
form. 
(e) Compensation for operating a route under a public service obligation is considered not 
to be state aid if the relevant conditions of Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 are respected. 
(f) The granting of other subsidies to support the operation of domestic routes is not 
normally permitted, except for regional policy reasons in the Greek islands and the 
Azores, which are for the time being outside the scope of Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92. 
The Commission has to be notified in advance of all proposed state aid or changes to the 
extent of existing aid. 
12.7.3. Effectiveness of state aid policy in the airline sector 
Given this explicit policy of the Commission, the practical results captured in Table 12.6 must 
seem rather disappointing. If restructuring (and, subsequently, privatization) restores the 
profitability of the carrier, then private investors should be willing to finance the measures for 
which aid was being granted. If, as noted in the Sabena decision, 'in view of the accumulated 
debts and the costs of the restructuring programme, no investor apart from the state would at 
present be prepared to take part in the restructuring programme',227 then the granting of state 
aid can be justified only with social inefficiencies which would result from competition 
driving inefficient carriers out of the market. Thus, unjustified distortions of competition must 
follow by definition unless failure of other markets (such as the labour market for airline staff, 
or a second-hand market for equipment) can be proven. 
Furthermore, the 'one time/last time bail out' rule, which seems only reasonable if aid is given 
for commercially successful restructuring plans, has been broken more than once. On the 
contrary, in its report to the Commission the 'Comité de Sages' for Air Transport (Expanding 
Horizons, 1994) recognized that state aid to airlines contributes to the problem of overcapacity 
and uneconomic pricing. While the assessment of uneconomic pricing is more difficult to 
determine, we can certainly observe a policy of aggressive expansion which was, for example, 
pursued by Air France and Iberia. The latter would certainly not have been approved as part of 
a state-aided restructuring plan. This becomes obvious in the recent decision of the 
Commission on the second large financial transfer to Iberia as state aid, where Iberia will have 
to divest itself of its 83% stake in Airolinas Argentinas and its 38% stake in Ladeco of Chile 
OJL 300, 31.10.1991. 
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(which is transferred to another joint venture, in which Iberia's parent holding company Teno 
will have a 40% stake alongside US investment banks Merrill Lynch and Bankers Trust).228 
The recent Iberia case (also the Air France case) casts doubt on the usefulness of the MEIP to 
determine the presence of, and to quantify, state aid. The classification of the financial transfer 
to Iberia as not being state aid, based on an application of the MEIP, is considered debatable 
by many industry analysts. The use of the MEIP leads to a certain lack of transparency, 
creating an opportunity for lobbying thus weakening the effectiveness of the EU's state aid 
control. If cases like Iberia and Air France set precedents for further capital injections into 
national carriers which do not qualify under state aid, European control over state aid policy is 
likely to become a blunt instrument and an almost empty threat that can be bypassed by 
invoking the MEIP. 
The danger is that competition-distorting state aids will be granted at the expense of taxpayers 
and to the detriment of consumers. The airline sector gives particular cause for concern in that 
substantial state aids continue to be granted against a background of overall total EU levels of 
state aid falling. Thereby, the desired effects of the major liberalization programme of the 
Commission is put in doubt. As the Commission itself acknowledged in an evaluation of state 
aid: 
'In a more competitive environment state aids might be of substantial increased importance for 
the government looking for measures to protect the economic interest of their own airlines. 
The common interest and the basic objectives of the liberalization process would, however, be 
at stake if such a subsidy race took place' (SAC (92)431). 
12.8. Conclusions 
As summarized by Faull [1994], 'competition may be distorted by advantages given by public 
authorities to certain companies or categories of companies which compete with other, less 
fortunate companies in the EC'. On the other hand, 'state aid may also have more honourable 
objectives ... The purpose of the EC's state aid policy is to provide for central control and 
checking, sorting out the good from the bad, allowing some and prohibiting others.' 
State aid measures generally discriminate in favour of a particular firm or group of firms. 
Since when granting aid a government is unlikely to take account of the EU-wide impact of 
the aid, it is likely that the aid will distort trade and competition thus lowering EU welfare 
overall, even if national welfare has been increased. Hence there is a clear rationale for the 
control of state aids at the EU level. Market integration is likely to increase the size of the 
negative impact on other states of a state aid increase and so reinforce the need for EU-level 
controls. 
There are economically justifiable reasons for granting state aid in order to correct market 
failures. Thus, the recognition that 'the prohibition of state aid that distorts competition is 
neither absolute nor unconditional' (Ehlermann [1994, p. 412]) reflects the fact that some 
government subsidies may be justified. The legal framework of state aid policy mostly allows 
the problems that may be regarded as appropriate reasons for state aid to be addressed. 
228 Financial Times, 20 December 1995. 
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Despite acknowledging that the overall objectives of state aid policy accord with economic 
objectives, we are concerned about the practical usefulness of the MEIP in implementing state 
aid policy. Due to the difficulties of determining an 'equivalent' private sector transaction, the 
MEIP is not very transparent and is likely to be subjective in its implementation. It is 
reasonable to ask why, if a given level of financial support does not constitute state aid since a 
private investor would be willing to provide it as well, such an investor is not forthcoming. 
This alternative perspective would suggest that all of a financial flow from a government to an 
enterprise should be treated as a potential state aid in need of further investigation, not just, as 
the MEIP would require, that part of the flow additional to the investment that would be 
forthcoming from a hypothetical private investor. Such a perspective would be extreme and 
would probably be difficult or even impossible to square with case law on the compatibility of 
state aid under Articles 92 and 93 with Article 222 of the Treaty which requires equal 
treatment of diverse ownership/property rights systems. 
Regarding the impact of integration on state aid it can be noted that the increased granting of 
aid at the EU level rather than through Member States is a welcome trend, providing that the 
EU aid-granting process can be insulated from national lobbying. It should be expected that 
EU-level aid would be granted with a view to raising EU welfare and so avoid the problem of 
national governments granting aid to pursue national interests. The example of the airline 
sector discussed in this chapter offers only little comfort in this respect, a fact that even the 
Commission acknowledges. 
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Part III Conclusions and policy recommendations 
We now present our conclusions. Due to the wide-ranging nature of the study, these 
conclusions are divided into two sections. 
First we consider how integration has affected the conduct of firms. Integration has been 
generally expected to have pro-competitive effects (for example, as predicted by the Cecchini 
report). We review the evidence for such effects that has been presented in Part II of this 
report. However, we must also consider potential anti-competitive responses by firms to 
integration. Although integration can be shown to have led to more competitive outcomes, the 
full potential benefits of integration may not yet have been reaped as a result of anti-
competitive responses by firms. We believe that this is the key question which must be asked. 
It is insufficient simply to point only to evidence of integration leading to more competitive 
outcomes. Integration may have pro-competitive effects simultaneous with firms engaging in 
anti-competitive responses. Thus the relevant comparison is of actual firm behaviour with 
what might be called 'potential full integration behaviour', that is, how firms would be likely 
to act if policy could prevent anti-competitive responses to integration. Although this question 
is a very difficult one to answer, it is clearly the relevant one to ask if we are interested in 
looking forward to how policy should be framed in an increasingly integrated European 
economy. To address this question we will need to use three strands of our analysis: 
quantitative empirical evidence; case studies and case law; and finally our detailed analysis of 
potential anti-competitive behaviour given in the chapters on competition issues. 
Second, we offer some conclusions on policy. Competition policy may require revision in 
some areas as a result of the changing nature of the European economy due to market 
integration. However, competition policy may also have a role in preventing potential anti-
competitive responses by firms to integration and in doing so helping to realize the full 
potential benefits of the single market programme. In some areas competition policy has 
limited effectiveness in preventing such anti-competitive responses, and other policy 
instruments, such as external trade policy, may be more potent. 
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13. Conclusions on the evolution of competition in the 
single market 
13.1. Introduction 
The Cecchini report, published in 1988, concluded that a substantial part of the benefits of 
completing the single market would derive from the effects of intensified competition. 
Reductions in the costs of doing trade across national borders, including reductions in 
restrictions of competition, due to national systems of regulation and public procurement, were 
expected to lead to entry of new competitors into national markets. Markets that were 
previously mainly delineated by national borders would become larger. Economic boundaries 
would be determined by the economic fundamentals of transport costs, tastes and technology 
rather than by national borders. Market power and hence margins would be reduced. Within 
these larger markets tougher cross-border competition would ensure that inefficient firms 
would either exit the market or improve their performance. These competitive pressures would 
affect not only product markets but also input markets for labour and capital. Furthermore, 
larger markets, and reductions in barriers to entry, were expected to be a spur to designing new 
products and undertaking R&D. 
These high expectations of the effect of intensified competition in the single market have 
some justification in economic theory. Generally speaking our study shares the assumption 
that competition can be expected to have a beneficial impact on efficiency. The question that 
this study raises is not, however, whether increased competition in the single market is a good 
or bad thing. This study seeks to establish the nature of the interaction between integration and 
competition, and then to assess the role of competition policy in securing the potential benefits 
of the single market. In particular, we address the question of how integration affects firms' 
behaviour. 
Market integration should reduce the additional variable costs of producers in one EU country 
serving consumers in another country. It should also reduce the fixed costs of entering a 
foreign market. Thus market integration should bring producers in different countries into 
competition with others where previously border costs constrained competition. Other 
expected benefits were the lowering of production costs through greater flexibility in the 
location of production facilities and the associated exploitation of economies of scale 
unreaped by serving just domestic markets. Tougher product market competition may provide 
stronger incentives for the reduction of internal inefficiencies in firms. 
There is a wide variety of behaviours which could lead to these potential benefits of 
integration not being fully achieved. Barriers to entry may exist which hinder cross-border 
entry even after market integration. For example, access to essential facilities may not be 
forthcoming at a reasonable price. Firms may collude and share markets along national 
borders. Pro-competitive direct entry into foreign markets may be avoided by joint ventures or 
licensing agreements. Mergers may lead to market power even in a broader post-integration 
market. Finally, firms may call on governments to protect them from the necessary 
adjustments to a more competitive environment. 
It is important to emphasize that even if we observe apparently pro-competitive effects of 
market integration, this does not imply that firms are failing to make such anti-competitive 
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responses. It is perfectly possible that although some of the benefits of integration are being 
achieved, we have yet to achieve the full potential benefits of integration. This could happen 
even within an individual product market. For example, firms' pricing could be somewhat 
constrained by the threat of entry into their domestic markets by foreign producers, whilst the 
threat of entry is itself moderated by an 'anti-competitive response'. In general we may see the 
balance of pro- and anti-competitive effects being very different in different markets. Such a 
shortfall in achieving the potential gains of integration is clearly extremely difficult to identify 
in general. 
In an attempt to overcome these difficulties we have used a broad approach and have 
considered the issue of how market integration affects firm behaviour from a number of 
perspectives: 
(a) aggregate statistics on trade flows, firm performance and concentration; 
(b) sector-level data on prices, margins and trade flows; 
(c) theoretical analysis of potential anti-competitive responses; 
(d) case study analysis; 
(e) review of case law. 
13.1.1. Aggregate statistics on trade flows, firm performance and concentration 
We have reviewed the literature and looked at primary data sources on how aggregate 
statistical measures have moved. These statistics have moved in directions which are broadly 
consistent with market integration having pro-competitive effects. However, it would be quite 
incorrect to infer more from aggregate statistics than broad consistency with the hypothesis 
that integration leads to more competitive outcomes. In particular, there are many possible 
drivers for these aggregate statistics and we cannot impute a cause for their change. 
13.1.2. Sector-level data on prices, margins and trade flows 
Sectoral data can provide further evidence that market integration has progressed and has had 
pro-competitive effects. In particular it allows the examination of trends in selected industries 
which were most heavily protected by non-tariff barriers, showed less trade flows or which 
exhibited persistent price differentials across Member States. The strong message from 
looking at sectoral data is that price-cost margins have indeed fallen relative to the trend 
observed in other sectors. Trade flows, however, do not show a stronger pattern in these so-
called Buigues sectors against the trends observed in a larger sample of sectors. 
We also undertook an analysis of price-cost margins by type of industry, similar to the analysis 
undertaken in other studies in The Single Market Review, using a classification of industries in 
terms of advertising and R&D intensity. This revealed only one sectoral effect: advertising 
intensive industry appears to exhibit increasing margins relative to other industries. 
13.1.3. Theoretical analysis of potential anti-competitive responses 
Although theory suggests potential benefits from integration in tenns of increased 
competition, it also suggests that there are many ways in which firms may try to limit such 
beneficial effects. The next step is to enumerate the types of anti-competitive behaviour which 
could hinder integration. In our 'competition issues' chapters we have considered how the 
incentives for various types of anti-competitive behaviour have been changed by market 
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integration. We consider that this theoretical analysis is a vital step on the route to obtaining 
generalizable conclusions relevant to policy formulation. It provides us with a list of types of 
behaviour which we can look for in actual examples. 
13.1.4. Case study analysis 
We have analysed a number of markets in detail (cars, beer, soda ash, airlines). These case 
studies are useful for a number of reasons. 
(a) They show that the effects of market integration may be very different in different 
markets. Typically, market integration may have a small effect on firms' conduct which 
may be masked by simultaneous changes in other environmental variables. 
(b) They illustrate some examples of what we have called 'anti-competitive responses' to 
integration. This confirms our general conclusion that achievement of the full potential 
benefits of integration is being hampered by the strategic behaviour of firms in some 
cases, despite on average there being pro-competitive benefits from integration. 
13.1.5. Review of case law 
Looking at recent competition law provides further examples of anti-competitive responses to 
market integration. In addition, it provides some evidence of the relative prevalence of 
different types of anti-competitive behaviour. However, looking at individual cases 
demonstrates again that there are many factors influencing firm behaviour, of which market 
integration is just one. Thus, case law helps our understanding of the competition issues 
involved and provides examples of anti-competitive responses to integration, but does not by 
itself provide much in the way of general conclusions about how integration has affected firm 
behaviour. 
Market integration has been claimed by many to have substantial effects on competition (e.g. 
the Cecchini report). However, market integration clearly has a small incremental effect on 
firms already facing substantial changes in domestic economies and in world trading 
conditions. Thus identification of the effects of integration with any precision is very difficult. 
We contend that it is only by looking at the effects of integration on firm behaviour and on 
competition from all of the perspectives listed above that any reasonable general conclusions 
can be drawn. We therefore consider each of these perspectives in turn in the following 
sections. 
13.2. General trends in integration and competition 
The 1985 White Paper raised a number of expectations about the impact of removing non-
tariff barriers on competition in enlarged and more integrated markets. Entry of EU producers 
into other EU countries should be facilitated by a reduction in both the fixed and variable costs 
of trading across EU internal borders. 
As a consequence of integration, incumbent firms were expected to improve their efficiency in 
order to see off the challenge from new entrants. Price-cost margins would come under 
pressure. Incumbent firms previously exploiting a dominant position in national markets 
would earn fewer rents. Similarly, more direct measures to open up markets that were 
previously regulated, or reserved to domestic firms, would dramatically change the manner in 
which firms behaved in a more competitive market environment. Some firms could be 
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expected to exit, while more efficient firms would be able expand their sales exploiting 
economies of scale. Finally, entry of new firms and the enlargement of markets was thought to 
lead to a breakdown of collusion. 
Has our study revealed any evidence that is consistent with these expectations? In our review 
of empirical evidence of markets and selected industrial sectors in Chapter 5 we have indeed 
found evidence of integration and changes in competition conditions. The findings for the 
period leading up to 1992 show that trade flows across Members States increased; post-tax 
prices converged; firm size generally increased; and industry concentration increased. Intra-
EU trade flow increased, albeit at the expense of some trade diversion. 
Of particular interest is the detailed study of price-cost margins undertaken in Chapter 5. This 
research provides strong econometric evidence of a significant impact of integration on price-
cost margins. Moreover, the overall magnitude of the effect is large. We also find statistically 
significant evidence of a fall in cross-country differences in margins since 1987. It is of 
considerable significance that both the fall in margins and the reduction in cross-country 
differences in margins appear to have started in 1986, and to have accelerated from 1987 
onwards. This timing is consistent with the single market programme having a slightly delayed 
impact. 
Table 13.1. General trends in aggregate statistics 
Trade creation yes 
Price convergence I yes 
Exploitation of economies of scale/exit in response to I yes 
increased competition 
Reductions in price-cost margins I yes 
Fall in cross-country variance of mergers j yes 
This picture of increased trade, decreasing price differentials, reduced price-cost margins and 
increasing firm size and concentration is consistent with the expectations associated with the 
single market programme. Price differentials should fall as a response to reduced costs of 
arbitrage across EU economies and economic fundamentals (driving costs and hence prices) 
becoming more similar. The increased possibility of substitution of domestically produced 
products by those produced in other EU countries should lead to falling price-cost margins in 
the absence of countervailing changes in market structure. Also, we would expect market 
structure itself to be affected by integration, with firms exiting as a response to tougher 
competition. As domestic markets are broken down and market size increased, at the EU level 
this should lead to fewer firms as an equilibrium response. 
However, we need to be careful to relate these trends causally to the effect of the removal of 
non-tariff trade barriers in the single market. There are other significant forces that may have 
been responsible for the observed effects. The main reason is that trade liberalization at the 
Community level cannot easily be distinguished from the impact of external trade 
liberalization, industry deregulation or industry-specific technological developments. We 
agree with Neven and Roller [1990] and other commentators (Silberston and Raymond 
[1996]) that these effects are difficult to disentangle. Clearly, there are industries where reform 
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and direct liberalization have made a significant impact on the development of competition. In 
other cases it is arguable that technological developments are the principal drivers of change. 
For example, the liberalization of telecommunication services and equipment procurement has 
had a widespread impact. But at the same time this industry experienced the development of 
digital switching technology. This technological development has radically altered the 
production and R&D conditions under which firms Supplying telecommunications switching 
equipment operate, leading to major changes in market structure. 
Despite the EU's procurement initiative, the procurement patterns have not changed much. 
The reason is transaction-specific instruments. Thus, multiple sourcing is still limited. But the 
option to switch has had a big effect on prices (plus 'digitalization'). For both airlines and 
telecommunication equipment, EU measures have only limited effects because of global, 
extra-EU competition forces. 
The airline sector, or rather more precisely the markets for scheduled air travel, are similarly 
characterized by a combination of trade liberalization between Member States, and between 
Member States and third countries. Intra-EU and domestic travel are only slowly being opened 
up to competition. This is in contrast to the market for charter travel where competition has 
historically been much tougher. 
13.3. Changes in competition conditions: sectoral trends in trade flows and price-cost 
margins 
It is appropriate to consider a cross-sectoral view, and to try to identify integration in the 
differential response to those sectors expected to be strongly affected by integration relative to 
the average of all sectors. Looking at the differential effects on those sectors we strongly 
expect to be affected by integration also filters out some of the common influences on firm 
behaviour which might otherwise mask any integration effects. However, a problem will 
always remain that it is very difficult to disentangle the effects of intra-EU and extra-EU trade 
liberalization, since the same sectors will tend to be most strongly influenced by both these 
factors. In fact our analysis of trade flows shows an increasing degree of correlation between 
intra- and extra-EU trade. 
At the sectoral level our analysis centred around two types of industry classifications: (a) the 
so-called Buigues sectors and (b) the Davies/Lyons sectoral classification. 
Buigues et al. [1990] identified 40 industrial sectors as being particularly exposed to single 
market measures. 
(a) High technology public procurement sectors, where non-tariff trade barriers were 
considered to be high (Group 1). 
(b) Traditional public procurement or regulated markets, where non-tariff trade barriers 
were also high (Groups 2 and 3). 
(c) Sectors with moderate trade barriers, covering various consumer, capital and 
intermediate goods (Group 4). 
The evidence from the analysis of trade flows and price-cost margins is partly consistent with 
these expectations. 
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The analysis of price-cost margins, wholly original research which to our knowledge has not 
so far been undertaken, revealed a significant policy impact on the non-Buigues sectors and a 
significantly lower impact on Group 4. We summarize the results in Table 13.2. 
Table 13.2. Impact on price-cost margins 
Margin definition Ml 
Margin definition M2 
Average level of margin 
across EU in sample period 
44.1% 
15.2% 
Policy impact on non-
Buigues sectors 
-0.7% per annum 
-0.2% per annum 
Policy impact on group 4 
-0.9% per annum 
-0.2% per annum 
These are large effects. Over a decade, a 0.2% per annum reduction in margins with an 
average level of 15% amounts to a fall of 2%. 
Sectors 2 and 3 show a significant lack of impact on integration. (There was significantly less 
impact than for the non-Buigues sectors.) Thus the public procurement sectors appear to have 
been affected by integration, despite expectations. We could not determine the nature of the 
effect of integration on Group 1 from the available data. 
Those sectors characterized by an ex ante high degree of single market sensitivity have not, in 
fact, shown marked trends towards integration. Indeed, for these sectors, integration between 
the EU and the rest of the world economy appears to be happening at a faster rate than 
integration within the EU. This result could be interpreted to mean that competition from 
outside the EU had a major impact. 
Nevertheless, we would point to the evidence provided by the coincidence of the fall in 
margins with the onset of the single market programme to suggest that in fact the single 
market programme is likely to be the cause of these changes. However, it is methodologically 
impossible ever to prove this conclusively. 
We also looked at sectors according to whether they were advertising intensive, R&D 
intensive or both. We found that advertising intensive sectors had a significantly smaller 
impact of integration than other sectors. Possible interpretations of this finding are that 
advertising intensive sectors produce differential goods that are less affected by integration, or 
possibly even that product differentiation through advertising has been a response to the 
potential increase in competition caused by market integration. This is consistent with the 
finding by EAG of rising firm size for this group. 
However, care is needed when generalizing from statistical indicators in this way. We have 
assessed the degree to which the statistical picture is consistent with expectations about the 
single market programme. What we have not assessed is whether the single market 
programme has caused changes in our statistical indicators. For example, we have observed an 
increasing degree of correlation of internal EU trade and external EU trade. This observation is 
consistent with expectations of external trade liberalization in the wake of the GATT and 
those created through the single market programme. 
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13.4. Interaction of competition and integration in selected markets 
Our findings suggest that it is misleading- to make generalized and unconditional statements 
about the impact of market integration. Firstly, integration impacts on different sectors to quite 
different degrees. Secondly, where integration has a significant potential effect, that effect may 
be mitigated by anti-competitive responses. To the extent that these anti-competitive responses 
are of different magnitudes, yet further heterogeneity is introduced in the observed pattern of 
firm behaviour. Our selected market studies exemplify this aspect of the interaction of 
integration and competition. These market studies, summarized in Chapter 6, provide 
examples of the differences between those sectors where major progress in integration could 
have been realistically expected and those where markets do not offer any scope for 
integration. Moreover, they indicate the importance of drivers other than market integration on 
firm behaviour. 
Table 13.3. Drivers of competition and integration 
Single market 
programme i 
External trade 
Technological change 1 
Industry reforms j 
Competition policy 1 
Soda ash 
no ; 
yes I 
no | 
no j 
yes ! 
Beer Cars 
little j yes 
no j yes 
yes | yes 
no | no 
yes | yes 
Air travel 
j yes 
! v e s 
j maybe 
i y e s 
i y e s 
Washing 
machines 
little 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
Soda ash is a market for which expectations for major changes in firm behaviour following 
market integration are not realistic, given the nature of the product. Soda ash is a 
homogeneous raw material and its markets are chiefly determined by transport costs. With 
high transport costs soda ash will never be sold across a single European market. Rather local 
markets will be determined by plant location and transport costs. The scope of these local 
markets was in large measure independent of national borders before and after market 
integration. Changes in competition conditions in this market were induced by two types of 
government measures outside the single market programme. First, the lifting of anti-dumping 
duties in 1990 made importation of soda ash from the US attractive for those markets that 
could be accessed in sufficiently large volumes by sea transport. Second, the imposition of 
tough penalties on the major European companies, in the antitrust decisions of late 1990, 
signalled the end of the stand-off agreements that had characterized this industry for a century. 
As a consequence the major customers of this key raw material, the European glass industry, 
were able to source more competitively. 
We would conclude that by far the most important determinant in the soda ash market has 
been external rather than internal EU trade policy. In particular, the removing of external 
duties appeared to reduce price, and their later reimposition to raise it. 
Major changes in competition conditions were observed in the market for washing machines, 
and white goods more generally. Having already shown decreasing price dispersion across 
Member States in the early 1980s, this sector saw major technological changes that facilitated 
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large-scale production whilst maintaining product variety. This in turn drove progressive 
integration with fewer production locations and increased trade. In parallel, there were major 
attempts by leading manufacturers to establish European brands and adopt a common 
approach to advertising and distribution, while at the same time meeting national differences 
in preferences. At best the single market programme can be considered to have contributed to 
this development by easing this restructuring process, and reducing the costs of pan-European 
production and distribution strategies. The wave of mergers that helped to create major players 
such as Electrolux, the Swedish company that took over Zanussi and many other domestic 
appliance companies in the 1980s, and Phillips who took over Whirlpool in 1986, did not raise 
major competition concerns. Nevertheless, as a consequence industry concentration increased 
significantly. Although market integration is likely to have had some effect, it would seem that 
at most it reinforced underlying technological changes, rather than being instrumental in 
changes in firm behaviour. 
In the case of cars expectations of progress in integration were relatively high given that 
national price differentials were high, and national registration and approval systems provided 
domestic manufacturers with a considerable degree of protection. In addition, most national 
markets were subject to import restrictions for non-EU manufacturers. What we observe today 
is the continued organization of distribution at the national level that is supported by a recently 
renewed block exemption of the Commission. Other non-tariff barriers have been largely 
abolished and external trade restrictions are progressively weakened. At the level of 
production and development there appears to be evidence of (a) more cooperation between 
manufacturers and (b) an organization of production across Europe that seeks to exploit 
locational cost advantages. This case study concludes that the trends are toward more 
competition rather than less, but that full liberalization and further integration is a prospect 
rather than a reality. Price differentials have not been eliminated. However, this is interesting 
for policy, since we argue that it is not necessarily welfare-improving to eliminate them. 
The airline sector, for intra-EU and domestic travel, is only slowly being opened up to 
competition. Overall, European air transport markets are still dominated by national flag 
carriers who benefit from many incumbent advantages. Fuller liberalization can be expected 
with the implementation of the third package in 1997, which grants increased access to 
international and domestic routes and introduces the concept of Community ownership, 
instead of national ownership and control of carriers. In response to this liberalization 
programme, this sector has seen significant changes in market structure and firms' behaviour. 
Against a background of increased traffic since 1992, several national carriers have reduced 
their capacity (Air France, Aer Lingus, Iberia and Air Portugal). Others have embarked on a 
number of collaborative agreements ranging from code-sharing to more extensive joint 
ventures. Several mergers have taken place, leading to a consolidation of the position of major 
carriers such as British Airways and Air France. Evidence on changes in competition (fare 
levels and entry) is thin. The limited degree of entry highlights the problem that in this 
industry there are many city pair routes where the number of carriers that can viably compete 
is relatively small. Not many routes allow more than two carriers, to offer the minimum scale 
of operation of three to four flights a day. The proportion of round trip flights with two or 
more competitors on scheduled routes has increased, but is still only 36% for domestic routes 
and 25% for international routes (CAA [1995]). Our conclusion on airlines is that there are 
large potential effects of integration, but only limited progress in realizing them. 
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For beer, the single market programme had a special significance: German purity laws and 
Danish packaging laws were seen to be typical non-tariff barriers that prevented integration 
and inhibited entry into national markets by other European brewers. While there is evidence 
of increased trade and entry of brewers from smaller Member States into larger markets, 
Europe is still best considered as a set of intersecting beer markets that are based on local 
tastes and traditions and the scope for integration may well be limited. Our case study reveals 
that there are a number of responses by national incumbents that appear to continue to support 
national market segmentation. The Commission has taken a permissive stance towards 
selective distribution agreements that include tying of retail outlets to brewers and to the 
increasing use of cross-licensing agreements whereby major national brewers market and 
distribute foreign brands under licence. In conclusion, we find that a complex interaction of 
traditions and firm behaviour limit the degree of integration, even if full integration is not 
possible due to cost conditions and local preferences. 
13.5. The scope for further progress in integration 
Case study evidence suggests that in a number of cases the single market measures provide -
unless accompanied by sector-specific measures and additional policy interventions - a mainly 
facilitating function, rather then being instrumental in change. Observed heterogeneity in the 
cross-sectoral pattern of responses to integration is consistent with the hypothesis that there 
are 'laggard' sectors where the full potential benefits of integration have not been achieved. 
For example, public procurement sectors have not demonstrated a positive impact from 
integration, despite the expectation by Buigues et al. that they would. Also, as we will see in 
the following section, there are numerous instances where the general positive impact of single 
market measures meets with anti-competitive responses that may hinder the achievement of 
the full potential benefits of integration. These responses, if they remain unchecked, operate 
against the aims of the single market, and prevent the realization of the expected benefits of 
integration. Competition policy plays an important role in bringing about the gains from 
increased competition in integrated markets. It is therefore necessary to review carefully what 
the obstacles to further integration are, and how competition policy can assist in progressing 
the positive developments of competition. 
Having observed the heterogeneous pattern of progress in integration across sectors, there are, 
nevertheless, some tentative conclusions that we would like to draw regarding the remaining 
obstacles to integration. 
Except in some well-defined areas where single market measures and other liberalization still 
need to be implemented (e.g. airlines and certain procurement markets), there are no longer 
major non-tariff barriers of the kind that the single market programme tried to tackle 
(administrative, fiscal and technical barriers). Any real obstacles that we observe are of a more 
behavioural nature. If further progress is to be achieved then it is through measures that have a 
direct impact on behaviour of firms and governments. The behavioural obstacles that we have 
in mind here are firstly those that we analysed in our review of competition issues in Part II. 
Then there are those obstacles that derive from historical traditions and purchasing habits. In 
combination they may have the effect of maintaining segmentation of markets along national 
borders. We can use our case studies to illustrate this point. 
Tacit collusion, market-sharing agreements and entry deterrence. The case of soda ash 
demonstrated a type of behaviour where stand-off agreements between suppliers in the UK 
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and other parts of the EU helped to support national pricing policies that prevented customers 
from obtaining competitive supplies from alternative sources. In the case of airlines city pair 
markets in the EU have been traditionally serviced by flag carriers with little entry from other 
countries. Even with increased liberalization there are few routes where more then two carriers 
operate in a competitive environment, not least because of major barriers to entry that can be 
exploited by incumbents. In the case of beer the observation of fairly extensive licensing 
across national markets can be contrasted with the more competitive effect of direct entry by 
foreign brands. 
Purchasing habits. For a number of reasons European countries exhibit different purchasing 
habits. Some have a wholly objective justification in terms of climate, or geography. Cinema 
going in southern countries such as Italy or Greece is highly seasonal given that cinemas are 
generally not air-conditioned. Purchasing habits for clothes and footwear will differ with the 
climate. Tumble dryers, for example, are not needed in warmer countries. Other purchasing 
habits are not so easily justifiable on an objective basis. Many patterns of consumption are 
based on national preferences. Cultural differences contribute to these patterns of consumption 
and are themselves often the product of habit if nothing else. National preferences for 
domestically produced cars, for example, may have some justification in superior domestic 
distribution and servicing systems, but are often the product of historical and political 
attachments to national brands. Culture supported by language barriers will always contribute 
to national purchasing habits that differ from Member State to Member State. These reasons 
for national market segmentation are not intrinsically bad or against the spirit of the EU. 
Nevertheless, to ignore the reality of them is to overlook their role as a potential obstacle to 
fuller integration. 
National distribution organization. Many goods are distributed through a system of national 
distributors. Such national distribution systems will tend to support national market 
segmentation and can in some circumstances give rise to serious obstacles to competition and 
integration. The national organization of distribution can become an obstacle to integration if 
the two factors discussed above are present. Purchasing habits may be national, either because 
they are objectively justified or because they are based on more subjective or cultural systems 
of preferences. It may then be easy to support national market segmentation through 
agreements or types of behaviour that may be considered anti-competitive because of their 
entry deterrent effects. For example, both the car and beer industries exhibit strong patterns of 
national purchasing habits and are characterized by an organization of distribution in form of 
agreements that require an exemption from the competition articles of the Treaty of Rome. 
These block exemptions have been renewed by the Commission in the last few years (beer 
1991 and cars 1995) and in both cases were subject to extensive debate and lobbying by the 
respective industries. Without judging here the merits of the case for or against, it is fair to say 
that these agreements may have as their object or effect the organization of distribution along 
national lines. The Commission, in its interpretation of the Treaty of Rome, has focused on the 
scope for market segmentation and has insisted on limiting the parallel import restrictions. 
In the next sections, we proceed to summarize our conclusions on the analysis of competition 
issues in Part II of our report. We present our conclusion of how integration interacts with firm 
behaviour and try, where possible, to generalize our findings with respect to the case studies 
and case law that have been reviewed as part of the analysis. 
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The discussion of competition issues was guided by the assumption that changes in some types 
of behaviour are related to the integration process. We deliberately avoided the headings under 
which competition policy is usually discussed, and focused on behaviour that can be seen as a 
response to single market measures. Not surprisingly, therefore, we discussed types of 
behaviour at the beginning of Part II that are particularly closely related to the single market 
programme: 
Chapter 7: geographical price discrimination and arbitrage restrictions; 
Chapter 8: entry barriers and access restrictions. 
We followed this discussion with an examination of: 
Chapters 9 and 10: cooperative behaviour (collusion, joint ventures (JV) and other 
cooperative agreements); 
Chapter 11 : mergers; 
Chapter 12: state aids. 
The remainder of this chapter follows the same order. 
13.6. Measures preventing arbitrage 
The existence of price differentials across Member States is one of the main indicators of 
market segmentation. The single market was expected to lead to a reduction in price 
differentials through a process whereby price differentials are competed away by firms or by 
consumers who arbitrage between markets. Reducing cross-border transaction costs reduces 
the costs of arbitrage and makes arbitrage more effective. The removal of arbitrage restrictions 
can have a pro-competitive effect (though we also see cases in which this is not true). 
Our study analysed the economics of price discrimination in Chapter 7 and recognized that 
price discrimination may well be a symptom of market power. Dominant firms faced with an 
opportunity to exploit differences in preferences and income across Member States may want 
to use parallel import restrictions that prevent or restrict arbitrage. In other circumstances, 
however, there may also be incentives to engage in price discrimination that have beneficial 
effects in terms of allowing firms to compete for marginal customers and to access new 
markets. Firms that can vary their prices depending on location have a richer set of 
instruments with which to compete. This effect has, for example, been applied to the case of 
mill pricing versus discriminatory pricing. It could be shown that uniform mill pricing by a 
manufacturer of a product such as cement is likely to lessen price competition compared to a 
situation where manufacturers price differentially by location of consumers. Price 
discrimination provides an interesting example of an issue where pursuing integration 
objectives exclusively (e.g. prohibiting price discrimination generally) is not competition- or 
indeed welfare-enhancing. We discuss this point in the second part of the conclusion. 
It has been the policy of the Commission to clamp down severely on any 'agreements which 
have the effect of resealing borders that have been opened up by the single market 
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programme'.229 The sample of cases that we listed in Section 7.4 is only illustrative of the 
cases in this area. They include: 
(a) pharmaceutical products (Sandoz Italia case 1987); 
(b) machinery (combine harvesters in Sperry New Holland 1985); 
(c) cars (block exemption Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 and Ecosystem v. Peugeot 1990); 
(d) consumer products (tennis balls in Tretorn 1994 and Newitt/Dunlop/Slazenger 
International 1992); writing instruments (Parker Pens 1992, Tipp-Ex 1987); 
photographic films (Konica 1987); toys (Fisher Price 1987) and drinks (Gosme/Martell 
1991). 
This illustrative list is not necessarily representative of the type of industries where parallel 
import restrictions are prevalent. A wide variety of industries are likely to be affected. What is 
apparent, though, is that there are quite a few well-known brand names in our list of cases. If 
we refer back to the motivation to price discriminate discussed in Chapter 7, then differences 
in price elasticities are a reason for price discrimination. Branded goods may well face 
differing preferences in different Member States, and certainly face different average income 
levels. If for certain goods price elasticities vary with income, then this may lead to different 
market positioning of brands and provide a strong incentive for engaging in price 
discrimination between national markets. 
Chapter 7 also assesses the welfare implications of measures to support price discrimination. 
We consider that in a number of instances measures facilitating price discrimination can be 
pro-competitive rather then anti-competitive, particularly where market concentration is low 
and interbrand competition strong. In unconcentrated markets with many competitors, 
arbitrage restrictions cannot have any major negative welfare effects, given that we would 
expect sufficient competitive pressure to prevent the occurrence of major price differentials. 
13.7. Access restrictions and other exclusionary practices 
To the extent that the single market programme succeeds in removing barriers to trade, entry 
into foreign markets presents a direct threat to incumbents. Their incentive to try and re-erect 
barriers to entry or deny new competitors access to essential infrastructure must be obvious. 
Chapter 8 discusses ways in which firms may respond to this threat in some detail. In general, 
we identify two ways in which exclusionary behaviour is likely to prevent entry and therefore 
inhibit the realization of the aim of integration: 
(a) the first type of behaviour relates to restrictions of access to a complementary asset; 
(b) the second relates to exclusionary pricing on markets. 
In addition our analysis identifies how institutional entry barriers can be exploited to prevent 
entry of new competitors. 
13.7.1. Restrictions of access to complementary assets 
Chapter 8 lists many cases where new entrants were denied access to essential facilities and 
other complementary assets. Typically these cases occur where major infrastructure facilities 
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are necessary for the provision of a downstream service, and are difficult or wasteful to 
replicate for a new entrant. In a similar manner, operators of essential facilities may price 
access to these complementary assets excessively, which again has the effect of deterring 
entry. Such issues are likely to be a significant reason why the full potential benefits of 
integration are not being achieved in some markets. 
There are many examples of access restrictions, particularly in utilities where often - but not 
always - entrants need to rely on infrastructure networks to access another market. These 
include electricity distribution and transmission networks, gas pipelines and 
telecommunication and broadcasting networks. 
Similarly, transport services rely on access to sea and air ports, including a number of related 
services, such as baggage and ground handling, and computer reservation systems. In all of 
these industries there is considerable scope for undermining progress in integration by 
deterring the entry of new competitors who require access to essential facilities. 
Also, vertical restraints between suppliers and retailers can raise access issues in situations 
where there is foreclosure of outlets to new entrants. In Chapter 8 we dealt with the ice cream 
case, where freezer exclusivity in contracts between retailers and suppliers of single-wrapped 
ice cream were found to foreclose entry to these mainly small retail outlets. Generally though, 
vertical restraints, including tying practices, rarely have foreclosure effects. If they do not, then 
it is difficult to see how they inhibit integration and the development of effective competition 
in the single market. While integration may well provide an incentive to use vertical restraints 
to maintain national distribution systems, there are not that many instances where these 
restrictions can prevent entry. 
An unusual but interesting example of a complementary asset is intellectual property rights. In 
a small number of cases the Commission has established that IPRs were being used to exploit 
a dominant position and to leverage market power from one market to other markets. 
Copyright over TV listings is one such example, where the broadcaster tried to extend his 
market power in the broadcasting market by claiming copyright over his programme schedule 
in order to dominate the market for weekly publications with TV listings. 
13.7.2. Foreclosure through exclusionary pricing 
It is extremely difficult to asses the extent to which predatory pricing strategies are a prevalent 
anti-competitive response to integration since it is rarely the subject of competition authority 
action. On the one hand, prédation is one of the responses that an incumbent, faced with entry, 
may want to use. On the other, there are probably fewer reasons why incumbent firms, faced 
with more competition in enlarged markets, can credibly use predatory behaviour. In markets 
with an increased number of competitors the ability to raise prices after the exit of one 
competitor is less then before. Hence the benefit of prédation, which involves foregoing 
current profits for the benefit of higher profits in the future, is reduced. 
There is not much evidence of predatory behaviour in the single market. The classic prédation 
case in the Community is AKZO, but this case dates from 1982. One of the problems is the 
detectability of predatory behaviour. It is generally very difficult to distinguish between 
predatory behaviour and the vigorous pricing that is the sign of healthy competition in a 
market. 
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Non-linear pricing is the other type of pricing behaviour that can have exclusionary effects. 
This form of pricing behaviour includes offering discounts to customers who buy large 
quantities, and amounts to a penalty for buying from a competitor. It is not obvious how non-
linear pricing behaviour relates to integration. In enlarged markets with more competitors, 
firms may have to offer larger discounts to have the effect of deterring competitors. The 
negative effect of such pricing behaviour heavily depends on the existence of dominant firms 
in concentrated industries. 
13.7.3. Institutional entry barriers 
Institutional features of a market, such as rules and regulation imposed by governments, can be 
exploited by firms to create institutional barriers to entry. While the scope for erecting these 
barriers to entry will be reduced with harmonization of regulation throughout the EU, there 
may still be some room for firms to behave in an anti-competitive manner. Examples of this 
type of behaviour have been found in our study on airlines. Regulation of airports, including 
traffic management and airport slots, may be combined with other strategic behaviour to 
establish institutional barriers to entry that affects the nature of competition in air travel. 
National flag carriers are usually in a privileged position at their domestic airport. Given that 
airport facilities in the EU are heavily congested - in contrast to the US where airport 
congestion is the exception rather than the rule - there is considerable scope for preventing 
entrants from establishing themselves as serious competitors unless government or 
competition authorities intervene. 
Environmental regulations such as those that governed the bottling of German mineral water, 
are another example in our study that shows how domestic incumbents are able to foreclose 
entry. In this case German mineral water manufacturers exploited packaging rules that are 
unique to the manufacture of recyclable bottles by a cooperative of German mineral water 
manufacturers. Combined with a refusal to supply that affected foreign firms, these 
arrangements worked to the disadvantage of other European mineral water producers. The 
Commission rightly took an unkind view of this type of behaviour. 
13.8. Collusion 
Chapter 9 distinguishes between two types of collusive agreement that are affected by the 
single market programme: 'stand-off agreements between potential competitors that segment 
markets along national borders, and national cartels that establish within-country collusion and 
are designed to keep entrants out. 
The opportunities to enter into new within-country cartels and other collusive agreements are 
not substantially increased when markets become integrated and enlarged. Even if some firms 
may want to protect their previously protected position in a national market by entering into 
such agreements, then there is the potential disciplining effect of entry of other EU producers. 
In addition, market integration may cause problems in sustaining these agreements and 
stopping colluding partners cheating on the agreement; the incentives to cheat become larger 
when markets become integrated, as the gains from cheating increase. We therefore expect 
within-country collusion to become less of a competition issue in the single market. 
In contrast, effects on cross-country collusion are unclear because both incentives to cheat and 
means to punish deviant cartel members become greater. Pan-European market-sharing 
agreements which operate along national borders may thus be expected to continue to be 
Conclusions on the evolution of competition in the single market 257 
attractive in the single market. National borders form a focal point for market-sharing 
agreements. In some industries, though, conditions may change if national regulations which 
have helped to sustain or even actively support cartels (airlines, telecommunications, postal 
services, broadcasting) are replaced by pan-European regulation or liberalization. 
There are a number of cases of price-fixing agreements that have been investigated by the 
Commission: Polypropylene (1986), milk market quotas in Meldoc (1986), roofing felt in 
Belasco (1986), flat glass in Italy (1988), thermoplastics (1988), welded steel mesh (1989), 
storage facilities in VOTOB (1992), the Dutch construction industry (1992), customs agents in 
Italy (1993), lifts in NVL (1993), steel beams (1994), Cement (1994), Cartonboard (1994). 
What some of these industries have in common are features of their industry which predispose 
them towards entering into agreements that, among other things, help to stabilize prices: 
(a) they are relatively homogeneous goods which serve as intermediate goods for other 
manufacturing industries; 
(b) production is characterized by large sunk costs investment, into capacity that cannot be 
shed if demand is substantially reduced or excess capacity is built; 
(c) demand fluctuates with the macroeconomic cycle, leading either to excess levels of 
capacity or shortages of capacity, and hence to strong price fluctuations. 
If some other conditions are present that facilitate the operation of a pricing agreement (such 
as the prevalence of list prices that can easily be monitored), we would expect collusion to 
occur more frequently in these industries rather than in other industries which do not exhibit 
the characteristics listed above. 
What the soda ash case demonstrates is that competitive conditions in markets with collusion 
can be affected both by competition policy measures and by other measures such as trade 
liberalization. External trade barriers such as tariffs can affect the competitive pressures that 
imports can bring to bear on a market. In the case of soda ash, the defensive action of 
European producers, in bringing an anti-dumping action against US exporters, looks 
suspiciously like a collusive response to competitive pressures. 
13.9. Efficiency defences for cooperative agreements 
In Chapter 10 we address expectations that market integration was to lead to an increase in 
cross-border cooperative agreements between firms, thus allowing the realization of various 
types of efficiency gains. These include combining resources or assets in a way that is more 
efficient, entering a new market, and carrying out joint R&D. 
An important frame of reference is the distinction between substitute and complementary 
assets. The efficiency gains are more obvious where cooperation brings under joint control 
assets with strong complementarities, such as is often the case with vertical integration of 
activities in one firm. Where the agreement joins firms with substitute assets, there is greater 
potential for horizontal concentration, making the market more concentrated. That is, 
cooperation between firms with substitute assets is more suspicious, because comparable 
benefits can often be realized through open market transactions, without restrictive effects on 
competition in the product market. Thus, for example, claims of cost reductions and 
rationalization of capacity should be treated with caution. 
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A more robust case can be produced in favour of joint R&D, though the distinction between 
substitute and complementary assets for inventing new products/services remains important -
both for competition in the product market and competition in the dynamic process of 
innovation. 
In our adopted framework, cooperation for achieving entry into a new geographical market is 
likely to be welfare-enhancing when it combines complementary assets (e.g. manufacturing 
and marketing skills), but the benefits of increased variety for the consumer may be 
outweighed if this type of entry effectively eliminates the competitive effects of entry. This 
may be the case, for example, when entry into a new geographical market is achieved through 
licensing of know-how and trademarks to a product-market competitor, which receives 
exclusive production and distribution rights. Where the licensee has substitute assets and is 
already supplying similar products, the licence may be an effective device for sharing markets 
between the parties, and avoiding the competitive effects of entry. We have given as an 
example the case of the European beer industry, where brewers have in some cases adopted 
the practice of licensing a dominant rival brewer in the destination market for the production, 
distribution and marketing of a brand. It is arguable that rivalry through direct entry would be 
more competitive, unless there are other barriers to entry that would deter direct entry. 
We have considered in some depth the impact of market integration on firms' incentives to 
enter into cooperative agreements. To the extent that cooperation is motivated by firms' efforts 
to overcome certain artificial or institutional barriers to market access, we would expect 
market integration to weaken the incentive to cooperate. This is because in an integrated 
market there should be increased opportunities for direct entry - as suggested by the case of 
the US, an integrated market in which there are comparatively few joint ventures between 
domestic firms. 
At the same time, there may also be stronger incentives to enter into cooperative agreements 
which reduce the intensity of competition from new rivals (for example, in order to avoid the 
competitive effects of entry). That is, as competitive pressures increase - both inside the EU 
and possibly from rivals in other trading blocs - the strategic motive for cooperation may 
become stronger. 
Aggregate information on cooperation suggests some evidence of both these effects. Firstly, 
the proportion of all cross-border agreements which involved partners within the EU declined 
over the period 1986-93, relative to 1975-85 - which is consistent with the possibility that 
more direct entry might have occurred. 
Secondly, however, the incidence of cooperation with rivals in the same product market 
remains very high, relative to cooperation with 'complementary' firms. There has also been 
some shift from agreements on R&D to agreements for joint production and joint marketing. 
In Chapter 9 we consider in some detail a number of agreements for which firms have sought 
individual exemption from the EU competition authorities. These often concern the 
concession of a know-how licence of some sort, including exclusive distribution rights for the 
licensee over a given territory. A variety of cases concern agreements for the organization of 
production or marketing between competitors - for example using each other's products to fill 
gaps in their respective product lines - which is effectively equivalent to sharing geographical 
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markets between them. In several cases there is a clear effort to share markets and reduce the 
intensity of competition. 
These cases can be contrasted with some recent examples of agreements joining together 
telecoms/media/IT firms with complementary assets and skills, for the purposes of developing 
a new product. The emergence of cable operators, often with their independent infrastructure 
for the delivery of TV programmes to the home, has created the opportunity for new 
complementarities and synergies, for example with input providers (e.g. of programmes and 
movies). As new possibilities have arisen for combining complementary assets and developing 
new products, there has been an increase in joint ventures and strategic alliances for the 
provision of the new services created by convergence. 
13.10. Mergers 
The impact of market integration on firms' incentives to merge is discussed in Chapter 11. We 
focus in particular on two product-market incentives for merger (as opposed to those 
incentives linked to managerial labour markets, and financial markets): the incentive to 
enhance market power, and to achieve cost reductions and other efficiency gains. 
We argue that in a wider integrated market, which should result from the elimination of 
various artificial barriers to entry, the private benefits of merger in terms of market power may 
or may not be greater for the merging parties (relative to what they would be in pre-integration 
segmented markets). This will depend on structural features such as the number of firms 
which effectively compete in the wider market. It may well be the case that the sum of firms in 
the pre-integration market is greater than in the larger post-integration market as some firms 
would exit in a tougher competitive environment. It is thus not clear a priori whether from the 
point of view of market power, integration should be expected to encourage or deter mergers. 
A more clear-cut view can be taken, however, of the effects of integration on firms' incentives 
to merge for achieving cost reductions and efficiency gains/The enlargement of market size as 
a result of integration should enable firms to exploit certain economies of operation internally, 
through organic growth, without mergers. The efficiency rationale for mergers could thus be 
weakened by integration in a few cases. In addition, as artificial barriers to entry into other 
geographical markets are eliminated, the use of merger as an instrument for achieving new 
market entry may also be reduced. As a more general point, the distinction made in the 
previous chapter, between the benefits of common ownership for complementary and for 
substitute assets, also remains valid when assessing efficiency defences for mergers. Claims of 
large merger-induced efficiency gains should be viewed very cautiously in the case of most 
horizontal mergers. 
13.11. State aids 
Our review of the interaction of state aids and integration in Chapter 12 emphasized the 
danger that the efforts of firms to lobby national governments for subsidies may well increase 
as a consequence of the single market programme. If single market measures have the effect of 
increasing competitive pressures in previously protected national markets, then one of the 
possible responses is to seek continued protection, claiming that transitional support is 
necessary to facilitate the adjustment process. While there are circumstances where such 
support may indeed be justified, there must be serious concern that the system of state aids 
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could be exploited. Furthermore, if firms lobby for state aids then this in itself may be a 
wasteful activity. 
State aids have a distorting effect on competition and can change market structure in an 
undesirable way. listate aid supports a relatively inefficient firm in a market, then exit of more 
efficient rivals may be one of the consequences. Such an effect would adversely affect 
allocative efficiency. When several firms are simultaneously affected by major changes in 
their previousl markets, then a race between firms may ensue whereby firms seek support from 
their respective governments. In particular geographic areas, such state aid races can easily 
happen in industries with so-called 'national champions' and high concentration of 
employment. The result may be an unchanged market structure, and a transfer of government 
revenues to suppliers of plant and protected labour. 
With integration all these negative effects of state aid are amplified: 
(a) the costs of granting protection in larger markets increase; 
(b) the number of firms affected by market structure distortions caused by state aids 
increases. 
Nevertheless, there are justifiable reasons why governments may grant state aids. These have 
to do with market failures and negative externalities. Generally, if the social rate of return is 
higher than the private rate of return, a state subsidy for the undertaking is justified (e.g. 
R&D). The process of integration may affect these reasons in the following manner. 
(a) In the short run, state aid may be needed to smooth the adjustment process for immobile 
resources that become underemployed as a consequence of rapid change. This is 
particularly the case when these resources are concentrated in a geographical area, or in 
a very specific industrial sector. 
(b) Capital market imperfections may exacerbate the problem of adjustment, leading to a 
socially excessive number of bankruptcies. 
(c) In the long run, we would expect the economically justifiable reasons for granting state 
aids in integrated markets to weaken as the adjustment to an integrated market is 
achieved (as capital markets become more efficient). 
Our review of trends in state aid in Chapter 12 shows that between 1988 and 1992 state aid to 
the manufacturing sector in the EU has decreased. The number of decisions has increased and 
with it the number of objections, which in 1994 had reached 83.5% of all decisions. Against 
that trend we need to set the marked increase in Community expenditure through regional and 
social funds that often substitutes for national aid. 
One of our market studies offers an example of the impact of integration on state aid, namely 
the air travel sector. The impact of the three liberalization packages agreed at the Community 
level under the single market programme is difficult to gauge. The sector is in a process of 
transition and the full impact of the third package will only be felt in 1997. Nevertheless the 
amount of state aids to national flag carriers granted since 1991 is very substantial. An 
expenditure of ECU 9,433 million has been granted in nine cases, with Air France benefiting 
three times to the tune of ECU 4 billion. This massive amount of government aid has 
invariably been justified in terms of the need to restructure a carrier that was faced with major 
adjustment problems. Most state aid cases in the airline sector have been very controversial 
and were dealt with by the Commission in a highly political environment. 
Conclusions on the evolution of competition in the single market 261 
Without a more detailed study of state aid cases and other Community support programmes, it 
is difficult to generalize from this example. There appears to be some reason to believe that 
those sectors that were the target of the single market programme are also the sectors that most 
often seek protection from the effects of the measures. It is a difficult task for the Commission 
to sanction state aid in the knowledge that one of the effects of state aid will be that 
competition may be distorted as a consequence. Moreover, it is particularly difficult to accept 
the appropriateness of state aid, when there are doubts over the true transitional nature of the 
aid. 
13.12. Summary conclusions 
How can we summarize our conclusions on the evolution of competition in the single market 
and changes in firm behaviour caused by market integration? 
There is strong evidence of positive trends in integration. Generally trade flows increased, 
price differentials across Member States have been reduced and price-cost margins show a 
significant decrease that can be related to the impact of the single market programme. These 
results present an encouraging picture but do not offer conclusive evidence of causality. Our 
findings are mainly consistent with the general expectation that integration had pro-
competitive effects but could also have been the result of increased external trade 
liberalization. In fact, there is some evidence that shows the so-called Buigues sectors 
exhibiting a significant degree of external trade diversion. 
Our more detailed analysis of case studies in selected markets shows that not all sectors 
expected to be affected by integration have seen corresponding changes in behaviour. 
Generally, if there is a patchy response, this is, we hypothesize, due to: 
(a) differential effects of integration in different markets; 
(b) anti-competitive responses hindering the achievement of the full potential benefits of 
integration; 
(c) a combination of historical distribution patterns and strategic behaviour. 
There are some indicators that integration has been progressing more in markets where 
external trade has increased - relevant markets for some goods change over time with 
technological change or ongoing trade liberalization on a global scale. Therefore, relevant 
markets in some industries are not compatible with EU boundaries and become drivers of 
change beside any EU single market measures. 
More generally, it becomes apparent that other drivers of competition have played a significant 
role. The chief drivers that appear to have been of major importance are: 
(a) external trade liberalization: examples are the airline sector, cars and to a more limited 
extent soda ash; 
(b) sector-specific reform; air travel is undergoing major liberalization, as is the 
telecommunications sector; 
(c) technological developments; telecommunication is the chief example, domestic 
appliance production another. 
Against this complex picture of the interaction of integration and competition, we have 
focused our attention on the analysis of behavioural obstacles to further integration. We 
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believe that in many industries the remaining obstacles to integration are based on a 
combination of factors that can reinforce each other. Purchasing habits that are based on 
national preferences or are due to environmental factors can be exploited in conjunction with 
anti-competitive behaviour. This behaviour then has the effect of maintaining the 
segmentation of markets along national borders. 
Our analysis of the behaviour of firms in the single market has therefore focused on those 
responses that are most closely related to the single market programme. At the same time, we 
tried to make generalizations about the likelihood of such responses by type of industry. While 
extremely difficult, in a few instances we have been able to make some comments on the 
conditions that may favour certain strategic responses backed up by examples from our case 
studies and EU case law. 
(a) Price discrimination and parallel import restrictions: the relatively high number of cases 
involving branded goods indicates a desire to .segment markets that have different 
demand elasticities across the EU. 
(b) Access restrictions: typically these apply to industries where infrastructure facilities and 
networks are essential for entering a new market. 
(c) Collusion: homogeneous goods industries with high sunk costs that are exposed to 
demand fluctuations have been shown to have strong incentives to enter into collusive 
agreements. 
(d) Joint ventures: a complex picture emerges of a general decline in the need to establish 
collaborative agreements to enter new markets. Against that trend there are concerns 
over the potential anti-competitive effects of agreements that avoid direct entry into new 
markets and combine substitutable activities of two potential competitors. 
(e) Mergers: no obvious trend or generalizations can be made. 
(f) State aids: industries that are subject to major restructuring under the single market 
programme may be particularly prone to state aid cases. 
What remains to be discussed are the policy implications of our findings. The next and final 
chapter draws conclusions on the role of competition policy in dealing with these behavioural 
obstacles to integration and, more generally, with the function of competition policy in 
preventing and challenging distortions of competition, once markets have become integrated. 
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14. Policy conclusions 
14.1. Introduction 
The ultimate aim of this study is to assess the significance and the implications of European 
market integration for competition policy. In the previous chapter we have drawn our 
conclusions on the evolution of competition in the single market. Our specific focus there has 
been on how the integration process has affected the incentive of firms to adopt certain types 
of anti-competitive behaviour. We have shown that progress in integration across sectors has 
been patchy and incomplete. In particular we have demonstrated the scope for firms to 
frustrate the aims of integration through anti-competitive responses. 
In this chapter we build on this body of work to make a variety of suggestions as to the role of 
EU competition policy in a more integrated market. Indeed integration makes this exercise 
necessary: as the market becomes more integrated, and there is more cross-border activity, the 
geographical limits of national competition policies to national boundaries will coincide less 
and less often with relevant geographical markets. This leads to overlaps of national 
jurisdictions, and therefore multiple competencies and a need for coordination. Given that, the 
social costs of bad rules and a poor decision-making structure at the EU level will become 
greater. In other words, the costs of bad decisions are higher, and therefore the benefits of 
improving rules are greater. For this reason market integration is an important point at which 
to consider critically the application of Community instruments of competition policy. 
Through the Treaty of Rome, the Commission has considerable powers to investigate anti-
competitive behaviour in the Common Market. In addition, the Merger Regulation of 1989 has 
given the Commission an effective instrument through which it can control larger-scale 
mergers with a Community dimension. 
In the remainder of this chapter we present our conclusions on policy under the headings of the 
main competition policy instruments: 
(a) restrictive practices (Art. 85, Treaty of Rome); 
(b) monopolies (Art. 86 and 90, Treaty of Rome); 
(c) mergers (Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89); 
(d) state aids (Art. 92-95, Treaty of Rome). 
As a preliminary step, the next section discusses the interaction between competition policy 
and trade policy. These two policy instruments are frequently seen as substitutes: a liberal 
trade policy regime is said to create the same or similar competitive pressures on firms in 
Europe as the instrument of competition policy. We disagree, and argue that in order to 
appreciate the interaction of competition policy and trade liberalization - whether external or 
between Member States - it is important to understand the extent to which these policy 
instruments differ in their impact on competition in markets. 
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14.2. Market integration, competition policy and trade policy 
Over the last few years a considerable literature has emerged on the relationship between trade 
liberalization and competition policy (Smith and Venables [1988]; Emerson et al. [1988]; 
Levinsohn [1994]; Jacquemin and Sapir [1991a, 1991b]; Neven and Seabright [1995]; Guai 
[1995]). The general approach is to consider whether market integration and trade 
liberalization should be considered 'substitutes' or 'complements' to competition policy. 
Traditionally trade liberalization has been viewed as a 'substitute' for competition policy, 
because both policy instruments are thought to lead to more effective competition in markets -
in the sense of prices reflecting more closely marginal costs (this is sometimes discussed in 
terms of a 'disciplining effect' of trade liberalization on domestic market power). The contrary 
view that these policy instruments have to be considered 'complements' reflects the notion 
that firms will respond to the elimination of trade barriers by erecting new barriers to 
competition in the absence of strong competition policy measures (e.g. Smith and Venables 
[1988]). 
In this report we take the view that competition policy and trade liberalization differ in the way 
they impact competition in the market. We certainly disagree with the notion that the two 
policy instruments are 'substitutes'. Therefore we cannot agree with the corollary that there 
should be less competition policy intervention if there is trade liberalization, or that as a 
response to trade liberalization competition rules can and should be relaxed. To see this, let us 
consider the respective effects of competition policy and trade liberalization. 
The conventional goal of competition policy is to restrict firms from exercising market power 
in a given market. Thus relative to a situation without intervention in the market, competition 
policy prevents for example external growth through merger in very concentrated markets, and 
imposes restrictions on firms that make collusive behaviour difficult. Other policies are aimed 
at eliminating artificially erected barriers to entry. Conceptually, virtually all competition 
policy instruments attempt to limit the degree to which firms can sustain raising prices above 
marginal costs for any significant length of time. 
Trade liberalization achieves more competitive outcomes in a fundamentally different way 
from competition policy. Instead of aiming directly at firms' strategies to raise prices, the 
effect of trade liberalization works through augmenting the size of the market. Typically, 
doubling the size of the market will not double the number of firms present in the market in 
equilibrium. However, in a market half the size there will typically be less firms than in the 
larger market. Intuitively, more firms can'make positive profits in a larger market for a given 
price-cost differential. Hence, more firms will tend to enter the market and drive price-cost 
margins down; therefore a closer relation between prices and marginal costs will typically be 
achieved in the long run in a larger market.230 
Trade liberalization is therefore very different from competition policy in its effects. While 
competition policy attempts directly to limit market power for given market size, trade 
Because of this effect, markets with horizontal product differentiation have equilibrium prices that converge to marginal 
costs as the market becomes arbitrarily large. This may not be the case in markets with vertical product differentiation 
(see Shaked and Sutton [1987] for limiting results as market size is increased). However, only with pure vertical 
product differentiation, a case that we do not expect in practice, does an increase in market size not increase the number 
of firms in the market and leave market prices unaffected. 
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liberalization increases market size and therefore allows a larger number of firms to survive in 
equilibrium. This only indirectly limits the market power of firms. 
14.3. Restrictive practices 
Art. 85 prohibits a large range of anti-competitive agreements and practices among firms. The 
policy aim is to prevent coordinated market behaviour.231 Articles 85(1) and (2) cast a wide 
net by declaring all agreements or concerted practices void which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the Common Market. The list of 
practices in Art. 85(1) covers cartels, price-fixing market-sharing agreements as well as 
discriminatory agreements that disadvantage third parties. The former group of agreements are 
of a horizontal nature, whereas the second are vertical restrictions between parties at different 
levels of the market. Art. 85(3) allows for exemptions from this wide-ranging prohibition and 
narrows down the scope of Art. 85(1) in circumstances where agreements or concerted 
practices provide significant benefits in terms of improved production, distribution or 
innovation. The control of restrictive practices in European competition law is, therefore, at 
the same time both wide and narrow. 
After careful analysis, we have come to the conclusion .that the application of Art. 85 is 
sometime too tough and sometimes too lax. In particular, we find that for a broad class of 
horizontal cooperative agreements, a more careful assessment of their anti-competitive and 
anti-integration impact is required. On the other hand, the rather rigid attitude towards vertical 
restraints, such as parallel import restrictions, is too much influenced by the single market 
objective of the Treaty of Rome. Not enough attention is paid towards the pro-competitive 
effects of price discrimination and some other forms of vertical restraints. 
The following sections deal with the policy implications of our analysis of integration and 
restrictive practices, covering: 
(a) collusion; 
(b) price discrimination and parallel import restrictions; 
(c) joint ventures and other cooperative agreements. 
14.3.1. Collusion 
Market-sharing agreements on a country by country basis are among the most notable 
obstacles to integration due to anti-competitive behaviour. The Commission has used its 
powers to challenge cartels and collusive behaviour, and in the last few years there have been 
some notable cases resulting in large fines (Steel beams (1994), Cement (1994) and 
Cartonboard(1994)). 
In Chapter 9 we have argued that between-country collusion, which results in market-sharing, 
is affected through the incentive to replace non-tariff barriers. We have also argued that the 
effects of market integration on the sustainability of general EU-wide collusion are 
ambiguous. Within-country collusion, however, will we believe be undermined by the fact that 
entry is becoming easier and cartels more difficult to sustain. 
Whish [1993, p.186]. 
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From the integration point of view, the most important collusive agreements are therefore: 
(a) collusive agreements not to enter a market (mutual stand-offs); 
(b) joint threats to deploy predatory responses to market entry from another region. 
Antitrust enforcement against such practices is generally extremely difficult. Evidence of 
explicit price-fixing or market-sharing is hard to obtain, even though the Commission has 
considerably more powers to investigate than competition authorities in other countries. 
Collusive pricing behaviour is often difficult to distinguish from the outcome of competition 
in markets with few competitors. Furthermore, the absence of market entry as a response to 
market integration cannot be seen as a sufficient evidence for market-sharing agreements or 
for predatory threats. 
More generally we have made the following observations on policy. 
(a) In a relatively small market very strong enforcement of competition policy may in some 
senses be self-defeating. Technological considerations may limit the number of firms 
that can be in a market, for a given market size, and tougher competition policy 
enforcement may just reduce the number of firms in the same market. For example, 
consider a market in which two firms could cover their fixed costs if they raised prices 
moderately through collusive means. However, were they to refrain from collusion, 
prices would be so close to marginal costs that fixed costs could not be covered. In such 
a market very strong enforcement of rules against collusion may lead to exit (or lack of 
entry) of the second firm and the result would be a monopoly without price constraints 
from a competitor. However, if the market size is increased, the same degree of 
enforcement may still give enough profits to the second firm to enter the market, and 
lower prices become sustainable. In this sense we may think of market integration as a 
process which makes tougher competition policy enforcement feasible: market 
integration creates more room for effective competition policy enforcement. 
(b) Given that competition policy authorities find it hard to collect evidence on collusive 
agreements that documents the existence of negotiations about prices and production, 
the promise of reduced fines for firms that surrender evidence that helps convict others 
seems like a powerful incentive scheme to detect collusion. The recent proposals along 
these lines by the Commission certainly go in this direction. However, market 
integration will change nothing in the way this policy should be employed. 
(c) Agreements on market-sharing according to geographic boundaries rely on careful 
monitoring of entry and market shares by the firms and the use of national focal points. 
One of the most effective destabilization policies available to the EU Commission 
appears to be a liberal trade policy which opens up the market in the EU to competition 
from the rest of the world. A good example of the complementary nature of trade policy 
and competition policy is provided by the soda ash case study where protectionist 
measures such as anti-dumping actions can be seen as attempts to foster conditions that 
facilitate collusive behaviour. 
(d) Predatory threats that induce exit or preclude entry into the market appear to be effective 
only where the firms colluding on predatory action can assure each other that this action 
will not affect their relative position in the market. In these cases, extensive exchange of 
information is needed to coordinate predatory action credibly. Restrictions on 
individualized information exchanges could therefore be introduced to deal with this 
issue. 
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(e) More generally, individualized information-sharing can be considered a crucial 
instrument for maintaining any collusive agreement. If competition authorities find it 
hard to obtain direct evidence of collusion then action against measures that greatly 
facilitate collusion need to be brought into consideration. Certain forms of information 
exchange, such as direct exchange of price and quantity information, could be 
considered a direct infringement of Art. 85(1). 
14.3.2. Policy towards geographic price discrimination and parallel import restrictions 
Competition policy in the EU has traditionally been very hostile to geographic price 
discrimination. Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome contains a per se prohibition of price 
discrimination by dominant firms, while agreements between firms that facilitate price 
discrimination are also per se illegal under Art. 85(1). As seen in Chapter 7, this treatment is 
not always justified in economic reasoning, and the approach appears motivated to a large 
extent by the integration goals of the Treaty of Rome. 
Price discrimination 
Our review in Chapter 7 suggests that a 'rule of reason' approach towards geographic price 
discrimination may be the most appropriate. This follows from the fact that geographic price 
discrimination can be welfare-enhancing even with a monopoly, and may lead to pro-
competitive effects in oligopolies. In many cases, uniform prices are therefore not second-best 
optimal. Furthermore, when there is sufficient competition in the market, potential welfare 
losses from geographic price discrimination will tend to be small (i.e. welfare losses are 
second-order in price differentials).232 
This suggests that the following rules may be appropriate from a theoretical point of view. 
(a) Where market concentration is low there should be a presumption that price 
discrimination is permissible. In such a situation, firms have little market power in each 
market and effective geographic price discrimination cannot be large. Any welfare losses 
from price discrimination will therefore be of small order, while the potential pro-
competitive effects of price discrimination may still be significant. Hence a prohibition 
of price discrimination in markets that are not very concentrated is not economically 
justifiable. 
(b) Geographic price discrimination raises potential concerns when: 
(i) there are few producers; 
(ii) the price differentials across geographical markets are large. 
However, this is in itself not sufficient to conclude that price discrimination leads to welfare 
losses. It is important to consider also whether a reduction in output in the low-price market 
will lead to exit from that market. The first point is that where price discrimination does not 
lead to an expansion of output relative to the situation where it is prohibited, then in 
reasonable circumstances price discrimination should be expected to produce a welfare loss.233 
It is important to emphasize that the issue of whether price discrimination should be prohibited or not is treated here as 
a second-best problem, i.e. given the extent of market power. In other words, we consider whether price discrimination 
should be prohibited or not given the existing level of market power; it is therefore a second-best problem. 
Unfortunately not even this simple conclusion is entirely robust, since certain specifications of demand can overturn it. 
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In addition, if the elimination of price discrimination gives the firm an incentive to exit the 
low-price market in order to sustain high prices in the high-price market, we would expect the 
welfare losses from an anti-discriminatory policy to be potentially high. (The test of whether a 
market would still be supplied if price discrimination was not allowed also applies to a market 
where price is high.) 
Parallel import restrictions 
In Chapter 7 we also discussed the role of various practices that may be used to facilitate price 
discrimination across borders. The ability to sustain such discrimination crucially depends on 
arbitrage (by intermediaries or final consumers) being restricted or ineffective. The most 
obvious way for firms to achieve this are clauses which restrict the ability of purchasers to 
resell, as are often attached to other vertical restraints. For example, exclusive distribution 
agreements often include an 'export ban' clause forbidding the distributor from selling to 
foreign customers or to arbitrageurs. The effect of these clauses is effectively to eliminate the 
arbitrage possibilities that arise when different prices are charged in different areas. 
It can be argued that practices facilitating price discrimination should be assessed by the 
competition authorities on the same criteria as price discrimination. From an economic point 
of view, in circumstances where price discrimination cannot be considered welfare-reducing, 
the practices which make this possible should not be deemed illegal. For example, a policy of 
selective discounts which are conditional on location may be pro-competitive. And contractual 
restrictions which make price discrimination feasible should only be deemed illegal if the 
effect of such practices is welfare-reducing as well. 
It is also important to emphasize that the welfare effects of price discrimination are separate 
from the efficiency effects of closed territory distribution in some instances. That is, there are 
cases where arbitrage is restricted with the sole purpose of achieving price discrimination, and 
others where the motivation is to achieve efficiency in distribution (it may be efficient for a 
particular product to be sold under conditions of territorial exclusivity, for example where 
there are significant pre-sale services or provision of information by retailers). In these cases, 
distribution agreements will also feature clauses which restrict the distributor's ability to 
resell, and price differentials will not be eroded by arbitrage. As in all cases concerning price 
discrimination, the welfare effects of prices being different in different countries should be 
assessed; and if these are not found to be welfare-reducing, then a fortiori there is no reason to 
be concerned about clauses restricting arbitrage (because these may have positive side effects 
in terms of allowing more efficient vertical contracts to be written). 
In summary, a per se prohibition of all agreements restricting resale or parallel imports does 
not appear to be socially optimal. As we have already noted, this is one clear case where 
integration objectives are being pursued to the detriment of efficiency considerations. In fact, 
from a competition policy point of view parallel import restrictions should be treated like any 
other restriction on resale, and evaluated on the basis of the welfare effects of price 
discrimination. Given that we have argued that price discrimination is less likely to be a 
problem where it is practised by non-dominant firms, in practice restrictions on resale should 
not be prohibited when they involve firms that do not have a dominant (or joint-dominant) 
position in a market. 
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Unfortunately, the current wording of the Treaty of Rome implies a very inconsistent 
treatment of price discrimination, on the one hand, and practices that facilitate price 
discrimination on the other. A clear dominance criterion is applied to price discrimination as 
such, because it is dealt with under Article 86 (which makes a particular conduct 'abusive' 
only when practised by a 'dominant' firm). However practices such as parallel import 
restrictions, which facilitate geographic price discrimination, are dealt with under Article 
85(1) (on agreements between firms which restrict competition); and are per se illegal 
according to the Commission's action record. There is no economic efficiency justification for 
this harsh treatment.of parallel import restrictions. The only justification derives from the 
secondary objective of the competition articles of the Treaty of Rome to pursue integration in 
the single market. This objective appears to clash here with considerations of efficiency that 
support competition policy in most other jurisdictions. A solution to this tension would be to 
apply our proposed rule of reason under Art. 85(3) or to make the test of Art. 85(1) tougher, 
such that price discriminatory behaviour would not automatically be covered by the per se 
prohibition. This would mean focusing on the effect of price discrimination rather than on the 
form. 
14.3.3. Joint ventures and other cooperative agreements 
As discussed in Chapter 10, joint ventures imply cooperation between firms across any of a 
wide range of their activities. These can only be justified when there are significant efficiency 
defences for such behaviour. We take the position that such efficiency defences have much 
greater importance in areas in which R&D or new product introduction is involved, than when 
claimed efficiency gains are not related to such activities. 
Joint ventures in production and sales 
When considering joint ventures in production and sales, it is important to distinguish whether 
their effect is merely one of horizontal concentration, or includes elements of vertical 
integration. 
(a) Cases with horizontal joint ventures on production and sales should simply be 
considered as collusive agreements under Art. 85(1), and should be treated as such. 
(b) If production and sales joint ventures merely lead to selective vertical integration, they 
should generally be allowed. The main effect we should expect from this is, for example, 
that a producer gains access to a market by finding an established distributor - and 
thereby sqves on distribution costs. Such agreements should only be impeded by the 
Commission if it finds strong evidence that the agreement has been reached to avoid the 
entry of a potential competitor. In particular, there should be scrutiny of such an 
agreement if there are exclusive dealing restrictions which have foreclosing effects. 
As in other cases, there should be some kind of market structure test: action should be taken 
only in very concentrated markets. 
As a general rule, in line with our general recommendation to separate competition policy 
from other issues, we believe that the mere fact that cooperation goes across national 
boundaries should not affect the decision on whether to allow a joint venture or not. As far as 
the Commission has accepted such arguments in the past (Whish [1993, p. 441]), we believe 
that given the degree of integration reached in some markets it is undesirable generally to 
sacrifice competition policy goals. 
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Joint ventures involving R&D or product introduction 
We do not find the general 'financial restrictions' argument for joint R&D very convincing, 
particularly in the case of large, established firms which tend to have large cash flows and the 
opportunity to diversify their R&D portfolio. There should therefore be obvious firm size 
criteria. 
Similarly the argument that an R&D joint venture allows 'completion of a product line' is not 
compelling. 
Most importantly, the crucial question is whether the joint venture integrates activities that are 
complements or substitutes for either inventing new products/services, or launching new 
products into a market. That is, competition policy should discriminate between cases in 
which firms participating in the joint ventures contribute complementary skills and assets to 
these activities, and those in which these are substitutes (concrete examples: joint ventures of 
télécoms and publishing companies vs. joint ventures between telecom operators). 
As a general rule, we would think that joint ventures in which assets that are substitutes are 
combined would be primarily competition-reducing, unless the parties to the joint venture can 
demonstrate that there are substantial economies of scale in the R&D activity. In contrast, we 
would expect substantial efficiency gains from combining complementary assets, for the speed 
of R&D both in new products and processes.234 However, even when firms have substitute 
assets, joint ventures avoid the duplication of costs. 
We would also recommend a distinction between product development (i.e. producing new 
varieties of existing products) and technological development (i.e. new production processes 
combining assets that had not been combined before). All large firms have ongoing in-house 
product development, and therefore their product development divisions are very much 
substitutable assets. But also in the case of technological development we can see reasons for 
exempting fewer agreements, because we are concerned with competition in the product 
market - in that context, even an agreement that combines complementary assets has to be 
evaluated according to the existence of other horizontal agreements which tie together 
substitute assets in the market. We therefore would argue in favour of: 
(a) preference for agreements between firms with complementary assets, relative to 
substitute assets; 
(b) assessing the overall concentration in the notional market for these new products; i.e. 
concentration of firms who hold assets that are relevant to that market. 
However the competition authority should apply a caveat to this simple rule, if the joint venture between firms with 
complementary assets includes one firm already involved in joint ventures with other partners with similar 
complementary assets. This would essentially imply concentration of control over relevant assets that are in fact 
substitutes, and could significantly reduce competition in the market (case: Optical fibres (1986): joint ventures were 
set up between Corning Glass Works (US), world leader in the production and distribution of optical fibres, and BICC 
in the UK and Siemens in Germany. Although the Commission found that the individual joint venture agreements did 
not restrict competition between Corning and its partners, it found that there was a distortion of competition in the 
relationship between the joint ventures, and the existence of other similar joint ventures in which Corning participated 
actively. The network of joint ventures was considered likely to lead to market sharing between them. However, after 
amendments, the Commission granted an Art. 85(3) exemption since it enabled several European companies to 
manufacture a high-technology product, thereby promoting technical progress and benefiting consumers). 
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More generally, as discussed in the chapter on cooperative agreements (Chapter 10), the social 
benefits of cooperative agreements in R&D depend very much on the dynamic process of 
innovation, and retaining competition in innovation may be an important objective. For this 
reason, the exemption of R&D activity from competition policy rules - which «is implied by 
the block exemption on R&D agreements - may be going too far in withdrawing competition 
policy control from this dimension of competition. As is well known, the firm competing in 
research may have excessive or not enough incentives to join R&D from a welfare point of 
view. Current policy takes for granted that cooperation enhances welfare because it allows 
firms to internalize the effect of each firm's research on the profits ofrivals. 
Overall, the effects of cooperation in R&D and product introduction should be evaluated with 
reference to the effects of this cooperation on the elimination of potential competitors in 
developing markets. For this reason, it would be appropriate to condition policy on the degree 
of complementarity/substitutability between assets, and on the extent to which coopération 
removes from the market assets which could give rise to competition in R&D (as well as in the 
product market). The current treatment of R&D cooperation under the block exemption 
appears not to satisfy this criterion, because it ignores the effects of cooperation on 
competition in R&D, and therefore on potential competition in future product markets. An 
important advantage of cooperative agreements, however, is that they save on research costs 
by avoiding duplication and this can yield social benefits even when cooperating firms have 
substitute assets. This may be particularly important when the lack of cooperation results in 
excessive investments in research. 
Licensing agreements 
One of the most effective entry-avoidance strategies, which has similar effects on prices as 
tacit market-sharing according to geographical area, is to grant manufacturing licences and 
trademark licences to a competitor, with or without exclusivity. 
Such licensing agreements usually involve the delegation of pricing and marketing decisions 
to the licensee and may be seen as a commitment of the licensor to the licensee not to enter the 
market. This is obvious in the case of exclusive dealing; however, even licensing agreements 
without exclusive dealing imply a strong commitment not to enter the market. The reason is 
that by entering, the licensor and the licensee would compete with each other. In the context of 
a homogeneous product, this may lead to such strong price competition that entry would not 
be as attractive as licensing. Thus one could think of licensing agreements as an indication that 
the licensor does not intend to enter the market. 
From a social welfare point of view, the strategy of avoiding competitive entry through 
licensing is not as detrimental to consumers as tacit market-sharing at a collusive price, 
because consumers gain through the increase in variety. However, the 'increased variety' 
argument should not necessarily be deemed to be a sufficient defence to allow licensing 
agreements, if the licensor would have entered the market anyway. These agreements are 
therefore only beneficial if firms could not enter the market at minimum efficient scale. In 
economic terms, these agreements can be interpreted as selective mergers in geographical sub-
markets. 
An argument frequently made by firms for defending licensing agreements is that they serve as 
a foothold to achieve brand recognition in a market in which firms plan to compete in the 
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future. This does not appear to be a credible argument on economic grounds. If this argument 
were true, it is hard to see why licensees would accept licence contracts in the prospect of 
promoting future competition to themselves unless they considered the effect of future 
competition to be insignificant. Furthermore, the promised benefits from future competition 
should be deemed small, if contracts have such long terms that the effect of competition lies so 
far in the future that it can be neglected in current decisions. Overall, this argument does not 
alter our view that the appropriate test to be applied is that of the failure of 'entry at minimum 
efficient scale'. 
We would suggest the adoption of a procedure whereby cases are preselected on the basis of 
market structure. As in all competition policy issues, we do not believe that cooperation of 
small firms in the market has enough effects on outcomes to justify competition policy 
intervention. Thus in markets that are concentrated, licensing agreements with dominant firms 
that avoid the competitive effect of entry should be deemed an infringement of Art. 85(1), 
unless firms can credibly demonstrate that entry at minimum efficient scale is not profitable. 
Furthermore, in markets that are fairly concentrated we may have an a priori presumption that 
entry at the margin would be more profitable (on average). Hence in concentrated markets it is 
likely both that entry would occur in the absence of licensing agreements, and that entry 
avoidance through licensing agreements has large welfare-reducing effects. 
The case evidence suggests that the policy of the Commission does generally go in this 
direction. However, there are also cases where the Commission has been convinced that 
licensing should be allowed because direct entry is hampered by peculiar arrangements. For 
example, in the case of beer, contractual barriers to entry (ties between brewers and publicans) 
were seen as sufficient reason for allowing licensing agreements (MooseheadVWhitbread, 
1990). In Carlsberg/Courage (1992), a less favourable stance was taken, as the agreement 
included exclusive distribution rights for Courage in the UK. 
14.4. Monopolies 
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome deals with the exploitation of market power at the expense of 
customers or suppliers, as well as anti-competitive practices which have the effect of 
damaging competitors or restricting competition.235 It is aimed primarily at the conduct of a 
single dominant company. A dominant position was defined by the European Court of Justice 
as the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of one's competitors, customers 
and ultimately of one's consumers. Like Art. 85, Art. 86 lists examples of behaviour that 
constitute abuse: these examples cover excessive pricing, discriminatory pricing or other 
trading conditions, and tying. Another instrument that it is relevant to consider in this study of 
competition issues in the single market is Art. 90. Art. 90 is not addressed at anti-competitive 
behaviour of firms. Rather, it obliges Member States not to enact or maintain in force any 
measure contrary to the Treaty and, in particular, one which would contravene Articles 7, 85 
or 86.236 As government regulation is a major source of monopoly power, this instrument of 
the Commission to challenge monopolies protected by Member States is worth considering. In 
Department of Trade and Industry, Abuse of market power, a consultative document on possible legislative options, 
HMSO, London, 1992, p. 9. 
Whish [1993, p. 333]. 
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fact, some of our case studies deal with competition issues that have at their source regulatory 
restrictions (airlines). 
In the remainder of this section we present our conclusions on four types of anti-competitive 
behaviour in the single market that are associated with monopoly or market dominance:237 
(a) price discrimination; 
(b) access restrictions and foreclosure; 
(c) tying; 
(d) exclusionary pricing. 
14.4.1. Price discrimination 
In principle, we believe that Art. 86 is appropriate in making the concern over, price 
discrimination contingent on dominance; however, given the ambiguous effects of price 
discrimination discussed in Chapter 7, and summarized in section 14.3.1 above, even in the 
context of this Article the per se prohibition of price discrimination is questionable. A 'rule of 
reason' approach that takes into account the degree of price discrimination (i.e. the size of 
price differentials), and the potential entry/exit effects from geographical markets, may be 
more appropriate. However, such a rule may be difficult to implement. A general prohibition, 
in cases where significant price differentials have been established, may have to be followed. 
In terms of policy relevance, it appears to be more important to spend resources on the 
prosecution of competition policy cases with potentially larger efficiency effects than those of 
price discrimination, particularly as the degree of integration achieved through the single 
market programme increases. Given the ambiguities in the welfare effects of price 
discrimination, which do not easily allow one to reach clear-cut conclusions, we would expect 
more important issues for competition policy than the issue of price discrimination. 
In our view, therefore, two further questions should be considered: 
(a) whether prohibiting price discrimination is going to cause exit of the firm from one or 
more markets; 
(b) whether price discrimination is being used as a pro-competitive device to compete for 
marginal consumers (and therefore prohibition of price discrimination would reduce 
competition). 
The grounds on'which cases are brought should be more selective, with the focus being on the 
abuse which brings the largest welfare damage. This is clearly illustrated by cases such as 
Tetra Pak-II or AKZO, where the welfare effect of price discrimination was second-order 
relative to that of exclusion resulting from tying. 
14.4.2. Access restrictions to essential facilities: refusal to supply 
There are an increasing number of sectors in which access problems arise, and which have not 
at any point been subject to regulation. The classic case - as seen in Chapter 10 - is ports, but 
there are various other possibilities: one of many examples is local telephone access to the 
We do not, however, review the policy implications for Art. 90 actions. 
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Internet, which is achieved by modem users through a facility offered by the telephone 
companies. As this facility is very costly to duplicate, others cannot set up a rival service. The 
question is whether, as these access issues arise, we should take these sectors into regulation; 
or, given the unpredictability of how these issues arise, they should be taken under the control 
of Article 86, and an appropriate procedure should be set up for determining access pricing. 
Here we make a suggestion as to how the problem of dealing with these new access issues in 
deregulated sectors could be addressed through Article 86. In particular, given that in a wider 
market access prices become more and more important, this is a suggestion on how to use 
competition policy to avoid permanent regulation of sectors with access problems. 
The first point to make is on the correct definition of an essential facility: an asset should not 
be defined as an essential facility if there are other services outside those using the essential 
facility that are in the same market. The simplest example is that of a ferry service between 
Calais and Dover; here the extent to which the port of Dover may be defined as an essential 
facility is reduced, if we consider that there is also the Channel Tunnel, and to some extent the 
ferry and the train are in the same market. That is, an asset should not be defined an essential 
facility if the firm that owns or controls it would not have a dominant position in the market if 
it completely refused access to the essential facility. 
Two general principles must be established for a correct approach to access restriction issues. 
Firstly, a simple prohibition of refusal to supply is not a sufficient remedy to achieve access in 
such markets, and induce competition. This is because a firm can duplicate the effects of 
refusal to supply by charging high access pricing. The competition policy authority is therefore 
faced with the problem of determining how access should be priced in the difficult situation 
where the firm controlling the essential input has private information about the cost of access. 
Secondly, ordering non-discriminatory access is also not a sufficient remedy, i.e. the 
imposition of a non-discrimination condition, whereby the owner/controller of the essential 
input must set the same terms for a competitor as it sets to its own subsidiary, is not in itself 
sufficient to solve the access problem (thus the 'essential facilities doctrine' as defined in 
Holyhead II does not appear satisfactory). This would simply create the incentive for the 
incumbent to charge a high access price, and thus recover any losses made by its downstream 
subsidiary through the high access charges paid by rivals. 
Solving the access problem when an essential facility is involved always requires an element 
of price regulation of access. However it is clearly desirable to avoid full-scale, systematic 
regulation of all sectors whenever access issues arise. Competition policy offers an attractive 
model, because it relies on the element of complaint on the part of the competitor which is 
'hurt'. The competition authorities tend to intervene selectively upon complaint; similarly with 
access pricing, selective regulatory intervention upon complaint becomes feasible when there 
is someone who will complain. 
For these reasons, we suggest a two-step procedure for dealing with access problems. 
(a) Establish whether an input may be defined as an essential facility in the sense defined 
above. This involves a careful market structure analysis of the relevant market. For 
access to be a problem, the duplication of the essential facility must be very costly 
relative to the value of the product, while the shadow cost of access is low. Secondly, 
there must be a lack of substitutes for the essential facility in question. Only if it is 
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deemed that neither duplication of the facility is feasible, nor that substitutes are 
accessible to the firm, should the competition authorities consider taking action to order 
access, 
(b) If subsequently there is a complaint about the price of access, there is a second step 
which consists of regulating the conditions of access. That is: if, because of limited 
substitution possibilities, the facility is deemed to be essential for the firm that has 
brought the complaint, then the conditions of access (access price) should be regulated. 
An advantage of regulation on complaint is that it implicitly makes use of the entrant's 
information on costs (which is likely to be higher that the regulator's). 
From an institutional point of view, it may be appropriate to delegate this step to a separate 
body within DG IV. This body should be considered a regulatory agency for access issues, and 
should be vested with the power of eliciting the necessary data on costs and demand in order 
to estimate appropriate access prices. This body should be conceived as a residual authority, in 
the sense that it would only deal with those sectors which are not permanently regulated (see 
below). 
The agency would collect cost data, and calculate the appropriate access charges according to 
generally accepted best-practice regulatory rules for access pricing, such as the Baumöl-Willig 
rule which is based on the opportunity cost of access. A good regulatory formula is one with 
the smallest information requirement (a cost-based formula) and which is simple enough to 
apply to generate security about competition policy in the market. This means generating a 
generally accepted benchmark for an acceptable price of access, which is consistent with 
accepted practices. 
Obviously this procedure will only produce good results on the following conditions. 
(a) The regulatory rule is simple. Simplicity is advisable because it may save more on 
regulatory costs than that which is gained through setting the 'right' access charges. Also 
formulae which are demand-based are undesirable because they are often too 
complicated. 
(b) There is full transparency. 
(c) The firm owning the essential facility is given certainties on the rules applied by the 
authorities, which should be clearly known ex ante. Giving the firm greater certainty in 
this way should minimize regulatory intervention, because it should enable it, at any 
point in time, to capitalize costs and set appropriate access prices on the basis of its own 
data - and thus avoid complaints. 
There may be, however, some sectors in which permanent regulation may be needed. In these 
cases it makes sense to maintain and enforce access prices, as part of the overall regulatory 
regime. Hence our recommendations are really about residual regulation in all those areas 
where it is not desirable to have permanent regulatory oversight. 
While our suggested procedure minimizes regulatory intervention, it also takes care of the dual 
problem that - as seen above - simply 'ordering access' is not sufficient to ensure access at the 
right price; while at the same time setting access prices is a regulatory problem, which requires 
detailed cost information. Secondly, this procedure allows for complete flexibility of access 
prices to adjust to changing cost conditions. 
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To summarize: a general decision has to be taken whether to submit specific sectors to 
regulation of access prices (with specific bodies), or to transfer the whole access issue to the 
area of Article 86. In the latter case, a procedure like the one we have just suggested is 
necessary to solve the access pricing problem. The most detrimental way of dealing with the 
access pricing problem is in our view the combination of both the explicit regulation and case-
by-case competition policy intervention, which would lead to a high degree of uncertainty on 
the part of firms on the regulatory regime and a duplication of administrative cost. 
In other words: Article 86 should be used for sectors which are not regulated, and not for those 
which are regulated. 
14.4.3. Vertical restraints as an access restriction 
As seen in Chapter 9, foreclosure of competitors by restricting access to an essential 
complementary input can in fact take various forms, from vertical restraints which tie up the 
downstream retail function, such as exclusive dealing, to long-term contracts which impose 
high penalties for exiting, and so on. 
The conceptual approach to these practices should be the same as that to any other restriction 
of access to a complementary input controlled by the incumbent, and without which the 
competitor cannot supply the final market. That is, the 'access' framework can be applied to 
all types of vertical contracts which may lead to foreclosure effects. In this way the threshold 
for vertical restraints to be considered anti-competitive is raised considerably. 
In particular, a complaint that the incumbent has 'tied up' the distribution sector through a 
network of exclusive purchasing agreements, and made entry at minimum efficient scale 
unfeasible, is essentially a complaint of 'refusal to supply'. In these cases, what must be 
verified is whether: 
(a) the distribution channel has the characteristics of an essential facility: here, as in the 
above definition, a distribution chain can be considered an essential facility for a 
manufacturer if his good has low value relative to the cost of setting up an alternative 
distribution channel, and exclusivity imposed by a competitor forecloses access to the 
downstream market; 
(b) there are any efficiency defences for restricting access. 
When it has been ascertained that there are essential facility characteristics, and no efficiency 
defences, access should be essentially 'ordered' by disallowing the vertical (exclusive 
purchasing) agreement. Whether this solves the problem will depend on who is actually 
imposing the exclusive agreement (the manufacturer or the retailer). 
The distributor is then in principle free to charge manufacturers a fee for 'access' to its facility 
(e.g. for retail space, for stocking products lines, etc.), and in the case of a complaint about the 
fee, this should be dealt with in the same way as access pricing. That is, the 'access price' for 
retailing would be a fee set by the retailer to accept business from various manufacturers; and 
if there is a complaint about the level of such a fee, this should be looked at by the competition 
authorities. 
Notice, however, that exclusive purchasing agreements - i.e. contractual clauses imposing the 
obligation not to purchase from a third party - may also be in some cases instances of refusal 
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to buy on the part of the retailer. This case is much more problematic than refusal to supply, 
because in order to establish whether this practice is restrictive, it is necessary to obtain 
information about demand. Purchase may have been refused because the retailer deemed the 
cost of supplying the good too high, but generally in order to see whether refusal to buy was 
'unreasonable' and a restriction of competition, what is needed is an evaluation of demand. 
This is not feasible, which suggests that competition policy should not intervene in these 
cases. In addition, there may be the usual efficiency reasons for the vertical restraint, which 
reinforces the position that action should not be pursued. 
14.4.4. Tying of products for sale to consumers 
Tying occurs when the producer makes the sale of a particular product conditional on the 
purchaser also acquiring another good (or service). 
Following from the analysis in Chapter 9, tying is not a concern where the firm does not have 
market power. This suggests that a very clear dominance criterion should also apply in this 
case. Tying should be permitted where the firm does not have large market shares in either the 
tying or the tied product. The argument is that under such circumstances, the firm has a small 
market share in the market for the 'bundle' (the 'system' of the tying and the tied .product); 
hence competition on the bundle 'parts' will tend to reduce effective mark-ups in both 
markets. 
Conversely, tying raises concerns where the firm has achieved monopoly power over a 
(durable) good - often obtained through the patent system - and is able to tie sales of a 
complementary product in which there are potential rival suppliers. In other words, monopoly 
power can be extended to goods which are complements to the good in which the firm has its 
monopoly power. In these cases it is appropriate that such tying arrangements should be 
illegal, and the prohibition of tying by dominant firms under Article 86 appears quite 
satisfactory. 
In addition, there are various ways in which firms may seek to justify tying agreements for 
efficiency reasons, and some of these efficiency defences may be appropriate for tying even in 
concentrated markets. Here the competition authorities will have the task of trading off claims 
of efficiency defences, against the loss from the exclusion of competition on the market for the 
tied product. The main criterion here is that tying should not be allowed if there exist 
substitute arrangements that can achieve the same efficiency gains. 
Beer may be a "good example, and may serve to illustrate the point that in the area of tie-ins, 
competition policy should consider the interaction of different restraints on competition. In the 
British pubs system, typically finance and beer sales are bundled together. While there are 
claimed efficiency reasons for such 'bundling', the effect may be a barrier to entry for new 
brewers (as there is, supposedly, a 'fixed' stock of pubs). Indeed, European brewers have 
claimed that the tying system for British pubs^has not allowed them entry into the UK market 
at minimum efficient scale, and has required ¿hem to adopt production licensing arrangements 
instead. This case illustrates the need to re-evaluate the trade-offs between efficiency defences 
for ties, and potential losses from restriction of competition. 
An interesting variety of the tying problem arises with aftermarkets, i.e. markets for 
complementary products which are bought subsequent to an original durable purchase. 
Suppliers of a durable good often face little competition in the supply of subsequent 
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complementary products. As seen in Chapter 9, observing that manufacturers have large 
market shares in aftermarkets related to their primary products should not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that aggressive competition intervention is warranted. 
In particular, even if there is little competition in an aftermarket, this may not affect consumers 
too greatly if there is competition in the primary ex ante market for the supply of the durable 
good. Consumers may be protected by primary market competition. If competition in the 
primary market is vigorous, then any profits that manufacturers expect to make through high 
prices in their aftermarkets might be competed away in the primary market, with prices in this 
market being set below costs. Thus, markets cannot be investigated in isolation, but their 
interaction should be taken into account. 
We have also argued that the problem of firms taking advantage of consumers' bounded 
rationality may be reduced if firms offer contracts which bundle the purchase of a durable 
good with aftermarket services for a single price, in which case manufacturers of the primary 
good essentially engage in competition in the contracts which they offer. Provided the ex ante 
market is competitive, interbrand competition in the primary market is sufficient to protect 
consumers: contracts bind the actions of equipment suppliers and commit them not to engage 
in installed-base opportunism. Thus, contracts which fix the terms of future aftermarket 
services in advance, and so remove this informational burden on consumers, should be 
encouraged. For example, laser printers are often advertised stating the low price of the toner 
cartridges. However, a policy concern must be the situation where firms can unilaterally 
change the terms of the implicit contracts once consumers are locked in, i.e., the price of the 
toner can be changed as soon as the advertising campaign is over. 
If primary market competition is strong, and if firms offer contracts of the type discussed 
above, then the observation that each manufacturer has a high share of its own aftermarket 
should not worry competition authorities. However, action may be needed to ensure that 
contracts for aftermarket services are sufficiently transparent to ensure that primary market 
competition alone is sufficient to protect consumers. For example, the Office of Fair Trading 
has recently investigated the practice of photocopier manufacturers in the UK purposefully 
putting hidden charges into the small print of their leasing arrangements. The encouragement 
of active competition in transparent contracts is to be encouraged by competition authorities, 
since it effectively removes the need to worry about aftermarket power whether or not 
consumers are rational and forward-looking. 
If there is market power in the primary market, it is no longer obvious that profits earned in 
aftermarkets will be dissipated by primary market competition, and direct competition action 
against the primary market power will tend to be most desirable. However, there may be a 
limit to how much primary market concentration can be reduced, in which case reduction of 
aftermarket power may be beneficial. 
In all cases, a clear conclusion is that competition in transparent contracts - which specify at 
the time of the initial purchase the terms on which aftermarket services will be available - is to 
be encouraged as a relatively simple way of protecting consumers without requiring direct 
intervention in the conduct of aftermarkets. Competition authorities should be concerned only 
when firms can change unilaterally the terms of the contracts. 
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14.4.5. Exclusionary pricing 
We have considered two forms of exclusionary pricing which are relevant in the context of 
integration: predatory pricing to force the exit of a competitor; and non-linear pricing which is 
aimed at increasing the customers' cost of dealing with a competitor, and was thereby argued 
to have similar effects to exclusive dealing (see Chapter 8). 
Predatory pricing is a very difficult area in any case, because of the detection problems which 
make policy intervention based just on pricing a particularly delicate exercise. The most 
important conclusion is that market structure must be considered first: this is important, 
because if this is not sufficiently concentrated, it will not be possible for the predator to raise 
prices after the exit of the rival - and therefore prédation will not be a rational strategy. More 
generally, we recommend considering the overall pattern of market structure, the financial 
strength of the firm, and the path of prices over time, in order to create 'safe haven' situations 
where the competition authorities should not intervene. 
On non-linear pricing, we have made a clear distinction between quantity discounting over a 
single purchase, which is pro-competitive, and discounts on aggregate purchases over time, 
which effectively amount to penalties for purchasing from a rival supplier, and in this sense 
have a certain analogy with exclusivity requirements. The reason is that in this way the 
downstream sector is 'tied' to the incumbent offering the discounts, and the rival may not be 
able to enter at the minimum efficient scale. 
14.5. Mergers 
Unlike joint ventures, mergers are a complete and permanent combination of assets and 
control of the merging parties. The Commission controls mergers of firms with a minimum 
turnover and a Community dimension by virtue of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89. Since its 
establishment, the Commission's Merger Task Force has dealt with a large number of merger 
proposals and in a minority of cases has subjected them to more close scrutiny. Very few 
mergers have been blocked outright (four). 
Our conclusions on policy dealing with mergers are twofold: first, there are those 
considerations that are similar to the conclusions on policy towards joint ventures and other 
cooperative agreements. In particular, we expressed our doubts as to the strength of efficiency 
defences except in a well-defined set of circumstances. Second, there are considerations of a 
more institutional nature. More integrated markets raise issues of allocation of jurisdiction and 
coordination of national merger control. 
14.5.1. Efficiency defences 
Our analysis of the impact of market integration on firms' incentives to merge is that the effect 
on the market power incentive is ambiguous, while economies of scale, scope and selection 
effects may be achieved in a wider market organically, rather than through mergers. We have 
generally argued therefore that no more weight should be given as a result of integration to 
firms' efficiency defences for merger. Indeed we wish to recommend against more emphasis 
being placed on efficiency defences: these are always hard to evaluate, and policy-making 
based on them is not practical. The only notable exception should be those defences which are 
based on arguments of complementarities in R&D. This position finds support in the fact that 
the empirical literature on mergers (see Chapter 10) fails to demonstrate substantial efficiency 
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gains. Indeed, it may be argued that by allowing mergers at all when there is not much increase 
in concentration, we are already implicitly allowing for some efficiency defence. The case is 
different for R&D because in that case the potential efficiency gains are of a different order of 
magnitude. 
The current distinction between cooperative and concentrative joint ventures makes little 
sense from the point of view of economic analysis. We believe that the main difference from 
an economic point of view has to be seen in a concentrative joint venture being a cooperative 
agreement with a permanent institutional structure, i.e. not limited in time. In contrast, 
cooperative joint ventures are institutionally less durable, and in R&D they are explicitly 
limited in their duration by the protection conferred by IPRs. 
This leads to several conclusions. 
(a) Concentrative joint Ventures should be defined only by the characteristic that they give 
rise to a separate legal entity. For that reason, they should be treated under the Merger 
Regulation. All other cooperative agreements should be dealt with under Art. 85. 
(b) The standards of efficiency defences for cooperation should be stricter for concentrative 
joint ventures than for cooperative joint ventures in R&D, where these involve 
cooperation on production and sales. This is because one regime essentially gives a 
permanent allowance, while the other is only over the lifetime of the patent. 
14.5.2. Institutional implications 
In general, there is no reason for merger policy at the EU level to slacken as a response to 
integration; if anything, there is an argument for tightening such policy, because - as argued in 
Chapter 11 - firms in a larger market can achieve greater economies of scale internally, and 
therefore do not need mergers to exploit volume effects, for example. On the other hand, we 
believe that national merger policy needs to be refocused. National merger control in markets 
that have a wider geographic dimension must take the competition effect of integration into 
account, or leave it to supranational authorities to deal with mergers that have a transnational 
dimension. 
The overall recommendation is therefore that there should be tighter EU policies and policy 
coordination with delegation of implementation to the national authorities. 
It is thus crucial that EU competition policy rules dealing with mergers are improved to reflect 
this enhanced role. A wider market resulting from integration also implies that, at the margin, 
the decisions of the competition authority tend to affect a larger population. Hence the 
marginal benefits of correct and rigorous application of competition rules become greater, and 
so do the marginal costs of bad decisions. This strongly suggests that (unlike national rules) 
the criteria for the evaluation of mergers at the EU level should not be slackened as a result of 
integration. Furthermore, there is a case for more resources being allocated to deciding cases 
in an integrated market. 
238 Cooperative joint ventures are dealt with under Art. 85, concentrative joint ventures under the Merger Regulation. As 
seen in Chapter 7, this implies important jurisdictional and procedural differences. 
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The most important issues arising from integration in the case of mergers are therefore 
institutional. As a response to more cases occurring at the EU level, procedures have to be 
adapted. This means in particular an increase in transparency, and the separation of 
competition policy concerns from other concerns. This particular recommendation could be 
embodied institutionally into the formation of an independent competition authority, with clear 
mechanisms whereby decisions of the authority can be explicitly overruled by the Commission 
only on grounds other than competition. That is, the Commission should not be able to 
overrule decisions on mergers on competition grounds, but only explicitly for example on the 
basis of industrial policy considerations (separation of merger policy from other policy areas). 
14.6. State aids 
State aid control in the EU constitutes a policy model without precedent, with thé aim of 
separating economically justified subsidies from unjustified ones. The aim is to avoid 
distortions of competition and trade between Member States, although some objectives will 
take precedence, such as making aid compatible with the common market, even if it has 
distorting effects. 
While this policy orientation can be regarded as economically reasonable, our. analysis 
suggests that in the application of state aid control some problems remain unsolved. As 
suggested in Chapter 11, using the so-called market economy investor principle for 
determining the presence and the amount of aid suffers from inherent inconsistencies given the 
economic rationale for government subsidies. 
One precondition for the application of European state aid control is an effect of the aid 
measure on competition and trade between Member States. Although the Commission and the 
European Court of Justice operate what is nearly a per se rule on the basis of which the 
conclusion of distortive effects follows almost automatically from the detection of aid, the 
Commission must at least give reasons why aid will distort trade and competition. 
Given that in order to have any real effects subsidies have to affect firms' behaviour and, 
therefore, trade and competition, this rule does not seem very reasonable. If it is accepted that 
government subsidies are likely to have effects on competition and trade which may be 
justified by correcting market failures or addressing specific policy objectives (such as 
cohesion), then an effective approach to state aid control should require governments to prove 
that any financial transfer in whatever form: 
(a) is an attempt to address a specific market failure or pursue a specific policy objective; 
(b) is suitable to correct the specific market failure or promote the policy objective; 
(c) will not have adverse effects which could more than compensate for the gains from 
correcting the market failure. Where state aid is intended to achieve other policy 
objectives, the potential trade-off between efficiency and a more equal distribution 
should be made clear. 
We therefore believe that the MEIP as a guiding principle should be revoked, that the burden 
of proof should lie entirely on the subsidizing governments, and that in order to receive 
approval these governments should have to prove the suitability and effectiveness of the 
measure in the pursuit of acknowledged policy objectives. 
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14.7. Summary 
Our review of policy recommendations suggests both a tougher approach and a more relaxed 
stance compared to our perception of current practice. The Commission has considerable 
powers to deal with anti-competitive behaviour that frustrates the achievement of integration 
and prevents the reaping of the expected benefits of intensified competition. Those powers to 
support the integration objective of the single market programme are predominantly applied to 
restrictive practices, which may take the effect of sharing markets along national borders and, 
thus, inhibit integration. We conclude that the enforcement of competition policy in this area 
remains as important as ever, and that there are no grounds to believe that collusive behaviour, 
except maybe for the case of within-country collusion, is any less of a problem in the single 
market. We have suggested that for a broad class of cooperative agreements the scope for 
exemption under Art. 85(3) is perhaps too wide, given that some types of agreements are 
prima facie likely to frustrate integration with negative effects on the competitive process. 
We further suggested that the emphasis on prohibiting price discrimination and measures 
facilitating price discrimination is too tough, given that price discrimination can often be 
justified as pro-competitive behaviour. It is in this area that the objective to achieve integration 
clashes with the efficiency objective underlying competition policy. Certainly for markets 
where integration has substantially been achieved, and where market structure does not give 
rise to major concerns, strict enforcement of price discrimination is counterproductive to the 
ultimate aim of achieving effective competition in the single market. 
Similarly, we reviewed the scope for anti-competitive practices for monopolies and provided 
conclusions for policy. One major policy issue here for the Commission is to establish clear 
rules and an efficient allocation of responsibilities on access restrictions and access pricing. 
We suggest that DG IV, the Competition Policy Directorate of the Commission, play the role 
of a residual regulatory authority in areas which are not subject to Community regulation or 
national regulatory control. Other types of anti-competitive behaviour in monopoly situations 
have been reviewed and recommendations made. 
One general recommendation that relates to the application of both Art. 85 and Art. 86 is that 
action by the competition authorities should be contingent on market structure/analysis. It is 
worth mentioning that our work has found that documentation on trends in concentration and 
price-cost margins is very difficult to obtain and is generally much worse at the EU level than 
at the national level. We would thus recommend to the competition authority to make it a duty 
to track these indicators of market structure in a systematic way. 
Another important issue relates to rules that govern the implementation policy and whether 
they should be adjusted to the change in market size induced by market integration. The first 
point here is that if there should be any adjustment, this should only be towards tougher 
competition policy rules. In small markets the dead-weight losses are relatively small for a 
given exercise of market power. In larger markets these costs are larger, so that it becomes 
more worthwhile to spend resources on limiting the market power of firms. In this sense, for 
example, the market share criteria for mergers (at the EU level) should not be relaxed (i.e. 
raised) when the market grows.239 Since it seems very difficult to fine-tune rules to market 
On the other hand, it makes sense to raise indicators of financial strength to take account of the larger market size. 
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size, this suggests that otherwise the basic principles and rules on which competition policy 
rests should not be affected by market integration. 
Finally, a general issue arises as to the appropriate level of resources that should be spent on 
the enforcement of competition policy in integrated markets. At the margin, individual 
competition policy decisions in integrated markets will affect a larger population. This implies 
that the marginal benefits of competition policy enforcement are increased, and also the 
marginal costs of bad decisions will be larger. Hence for every case that does raise competition 
policy concerns, the effort spent by the competition policy authorities should increase. This is 
in contrast to some commentators who argue that market integration, or trade liberalization 
more generally, may be a 'substitute' for the enforcement of competition policy in integrated 
markets. In other words competition policy in larger integrated markets becomes less 
important given the impact of trade liberalization. In our view, however, competition policy 
enforcement efforts are crucial for the achievement of the single market and have to be seen as 
a complement rather than a substitute. 
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NACE sectors included in the analysis of trade flows 
1400; Mineral oil refining 
2210jlron and steel industry excluding integrated coke ovens 
2220! Manufacture of steel tubes 
2230iDrawing, cold rolling and cold folding of steel 
2240TÑF-Metaís (Prod.','Preï.'ftöc.)' 
2300lExtraction of minerals other than metalliferous and enefgy-producing; peat extraction 
2400 ; Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
2500¡Chemical industry 
2600¡Man-made fibres industry 
3110'jFoundries 
3120; Forging; closed die-forging, pressing, stamping 
3130;Sec. transf., treatment and coating of metal 
3140 j Manufacture of structural metal products 
3150;Boilermaking, manufacture of reservoirs, tanks and other sheet-metal containers 
3 i óÓÏManufacture of tools & finished metal goods, except electrical equipment 
3210;Manufacture of agricultural machinery & tractors 
3220:Manufacture of machine-tools for working metal, and of other tools and equipment for use with machines 
323ÓÏManufacture of textile mach, and accessories; manufacture of sewing mach. 
3240;Manuíacture of machinery for food, chem. and related ind. 
325^jManufacture °f P'an* *°Γ mines, t n e ' r o n and steel industry and foundries, civil engineering and the building trade; 
; manufacture of mechanic handling equipment 
327ÒiManufacture of other machinery and equipment for use in specific branches of industry 
33ÖÖ;Manufacture of office machinery and data processing machinery, office and DP machinery 
344Ö] Manufacture of teïecoms equipment, electrical and electronic measuring and recording equipment and electro-
I medical equipment 
345ÖÏManüfacture of radios & TV receiving sets, sound reproducing and recording equipment and apparatus, manufacture 
: of gramophone records and pre-recorded magnetic tapes 
3460ÏManuiacture of domestic type elee. appi. 
347ÖÏManuf. electric lamps & other electric lightening equipment 
350Ö] Manufacture of motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts and accessories 
36ÖOÏManufacture of other means of transp. 
3 7ÖÓI instrument engineering 
41001 Food, drink, tobacco industry 
42ÖÓ;Sugar manuf. and refining 
44ÖÖILeather and leather goods 
451 Ó]Manufacture of mass-produced footwear 
453ÒJManuf· of ready-made clothing and accessories 
4610 j Sawing and process of wood 
46^01 Manufacture of semi-finished wood products 
463Ó] Manufacture of οβφβηϊο' & joinery compon. 
4640: Manufacture of wooden containers 
465Ó!Öther wood manuf. (excl. furn.) 
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NACE sectors included in the analysis of trade flows 
4660; Manufacture of articles of cork and articles of straw and other plaiting materials; manufacture of brushes and brooms 
4670jManuf. of wooden furn. 
4710|Manuf. of pulp, paper, board 
47401 Publishing 
4820¡Retreading and repairing of rubber tyres 
4940 i Manufacture of toys and sports goods 
5100;Building and civil engineering without specialization 
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NACE sectors included in the analysis of price-cost 
margins 
NACE sectors included in the analysis of price-cost margins 
2100 i Extraction and preparation of metalliferous ores 
21 lOjExtraction and preparation of iron ores 
21201 Extraction and preparation of non-ferrous metal ores 
2200¡Production and preliminary processing of metals 
2210ilron and steel industry excluding integrated coke ovens 
2220 i Manufacture of steel tubes 
2230 ¡Drawing, cold rolling and cold folding of steel 
2^40:NF-Metais (Prod., Prel. Proc.) 
23ÖÓIÈxtraction of minerals other than metalliferous and energy-producing; peat extraction 
2310 ¡Extraction of building materials and refractory clays 
2320;Mining of potassium salt and natural phosphates 
24001 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
2410;Manufacture of clay products for constructional purposes 
24201 ¡Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 
2430]Manufacture of concrete, cement of piaster products for constructional purposes 
2440¡Manufacture of artides of asbestos 
245ÓÏWorking of stone and of non-metallic mineral products 
246Ö'i Production of grindstones and other abrasive products 
2470 ¡Manufacture of glass and glassware 
248ÓI Manufacture of ceramic goods 
25ÖÓÏChemicai industry 
'25ÏÖÏManuia^ and manufacture followed by further processing of such products 
2550TManufacture of paint, painters' fillings, varnish and printing ink 
256Õ [Manufacture 'of other chemical products, mainly for industrial and agricultural purposes 
2570; Manufacture of pharmaceutical products 
258Ó]Man'ü'facturë of"soap, synthetic detergents, perfume and toilet preparation 
259ÖÏManüfacture of 'other chemical products, chiefly for 'household and office use 
26ÖÓ;Man-made fibres industry 
3ïöÖlManüfacture'of'meta'i artïcïe's'(exœ electrical and instrument engineering and vehicles) 
3Íl0jFoundries 
3 Ï20ÏForging;'closed die-forging, pressing, stamping 
'inÖjSec. t ransf · · t r e a t m e n t and coating of metal 
3 HÓ'! Manufacture of structural metal products 
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NACE sectors included in the analysis of price-cost margins (cont'd) 
3Í50;BoiIermaking, manufacture of reservoirs, tanks and other sheet-metal containers 
3160 ¡Manufacture of tools & finished metal goods, except electrical equipment 
3190jOther metal workshops not elsewhere specified 
3200¡Mechanical engineering 
3210;Manufacture of agricultural machinery & tractors 
3220ÏManufacture of machine-tools for working metal, and of other tools and equipment for use with machines 
3230JManufacture of textile mach, and accessories; manufacture of sewing mach. 
3240;Manufacture of machinery for food, chem. and related ind. 
3250jManufacture of plant for mines, the iron and steel industry and foundries, civil engineering and the building trade; 
¡manufacture of mechanic handling equipment 
3260;Manufacture of transmission equipment for motive power 
3270;Manufacture of other machinery and equipment for use in specific branches of industry 
3280;Manufacture of other machinery and equipment 
3300¡Manufacture of office machinery and data processing machinery, office and DP machinery 
3400 i Electrical engineering 
3410;Manufacture of insulated wires and cables 
3420;Manufacture of electrical machinery 
343ÓÏManufacture of electrical apparatus and appiiances for industrial use; manufacture of batteries and accumulators 
3440¡Manufacture of télécoms equipment, electrical and electronic measuring and recording equipment and electro-medical 
j equipment 
3450;Manufacture of radios & TV receiving sets, sound reproducing and recording equipment and apparatus, manufacture of 
j gramophone records and pre-recorded magnetic tapes 
3460;Manufacture of domestic type elee. appi. 
3470;Manuf. electric lamps & other electric lightening equipment 
3480JAssembly and installation of electrical equipment and apparatus 
3500iManufacture of motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts and accessories 
3510;Manufacture and assembly of motor vehides and manufacture of motor vehicle engines 
3520 ¡Manufacture of bodies for motor vehicles and of motor-drawn trailers and caravans 
3530 j Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
3600¡Manufacture of other means of transp. 
36ÏÓ; Shipbuilding 
3620:Manufacture of standard and narrow-gauge raiiway and tramway rolling stock 
3630;Manufacture of cycles, motorcycles and parts and accessories thereof 
3640;Aerospace equipment manufacturing and repairing 
3650;Manufacture of transport equipment not elsewhere specified 
3700ilnstrument engineering 
37ÏÓ ¡Manufacture of measuring, checking and precision instruments and apparatus 
3720;Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances 
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NACE sectors included in the analysis of price-cost margins (cont'd) 
3430|Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 
3740¡Manufacture of clocks and watches and parts thereof 
4100¡Food, drink, tobacco industry 
4110; Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 
4120;Slaughtering, preparing and preserving of meat 
41301 Manufacture of dairy products 
4140 ¡Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 
4150 ¡Processing and preserving offish and other sea food fit for human consumption 
4160 ¡Grain milling 
4170¡Manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, etc. 
4180¡Manufacture of starch and starch products 
41901 Bread and flour confectioning 
4200¡Sugar manuf. and refining 
4210¡Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confection 
4220; Manufacture of animal and poultry foods 
4230¡Manufacture of other food products 
4240¡Manufacture of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials; spirit distilling and compounding 
4250;Manufacture of wine of fresh grapes and of beverages based thereon 
4270¡Brewing and malting 
4280] Manufacture of soft drinks, including the bottling of natural spa waters 
4290¡Manufacture of tobacco products 
4300¡Textile industry 
43ÏÓ;Wooi industry 
4320ÏCotton industry 
4330lSiïk industry 
4340 ¡Preparation, spinning and weaving of flax, hemp and ramie 
4350;Jute industry 
4360;Knitting industry 
4370]fextiie finishing 
438ÓTManüfacture of carpets, linoleum and other floor coverings, including leather cloth and similar supported synthetic 
¡sheetings 
43901 Miscellaneous textile industries 
46ÖÖ]'f imiier and wooden furniture industries 
4610; Sawing and process of wood 
462Ó;Manufacture of semi-finished wood products 
4630]Manufacture of carpentry & joinery compon. 
4640; Manufacture of wooden containers 
465ÓTÖther wood manuf. (exd. furn.) 
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NACE sectors included in the analysis of price-cost margins (cont'd) 
46601 Manufacture of articles of cork and articles of straw and other plaiting materials; manufacture of brushes and brooms 
46701 Manuf. of wooden furn. 
4700iManuf. of paper and paper products; printing and publishing 
4710;Manuf. of pulp, paper, board 
4720¡Processing of paper and board 
4730jPrinting and allied industries 
4740'jPubiishing 
4800 ¡Processing of rubber and plastic 
4810jManufacture of rubber products 
4820¡Retreading and repairing of rubber tyres 
4830iProcessing of plastic 
4900 j Other manufacturing industries 
4910;Manufacture of articles of jewellery and goldsmiths' and silversmiths' wares 
4920¡Manuf. of musical instruments 
4930;Photograpnic and cinematographic laboratories 
4940¡Manufacture of toys and sports goods 
4950jMisceilaneous manufacturing industries 
5100lBuilding and civil engineering without specialization 
5000jBuilding and civil engineering 
5010 ¡Construction of flats, office biocks, hospitals and other buildings, both residential and not residential 
5020¡Civil engineering: construction of roads, bridges, railways 
5Ò3Ò;ìnstaÌÌation 
5040;Building completion work 
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APPENDIX C 
Analysis of price-cost margins 
C.l. Data 
The data was drawn from the Survey of Industrial Production for 1980-92 compiled by 
Eurostat. This consists of data on a number of variables at a finely disaggregated sector level 
(3-digit NACE sectors) for the EUR-12 countries. This is the most recent data available from 
Eurostat. 
Price-cost margins were calculated from this data set using two alternative definitions: 
Ml = (value added - labour costs) / value added 
M2 = (value added - labour costs) / sales 
Both of these definitions have been used in previous empirical studies. The first (Ml) has been 
widely used in studies assessing the relationship between profitability and concentration. The 
second definition (M2) has been used less widely, but does in theory conform more closely to 
the true definition of margin as (price - average cost)/price. The justification is as follows. 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale: 
(price - unit cost)/price = (sales - total cost)/ sales = profit / sales 
We use (value added - labour costs) to measure profit, giving the definition M2. 
Throughout we report results using both definitions of margin. The results are generally not 
too sensitive to which definition is used. 
The original data set had a number of missing observations of variables required to calculate 
margins. In particular, a very large number of observations for Spain and Portugal were 
missing. In addition, there are a small number of sectors for which value added is less than 
labour cost, giving a negative margin. The approach taken was to drop those observations for 
which: 
(a) either Ml or M2 was not defined due to missing data; 
(b) or Ml and M2 are negative. 
Thus on remaining observations, both Ml and M2 are defined. This procedure required the 
dropping of Spain and Portugal from the data set as there were insufficient observations left 
for these countries. This left an unbalanced panel with 7,917 observations. 
C.2. Summary statistics 
The following tables give means for the margin definition Ml across time and countries. 
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Table C.l. 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
Ttl 
Germany 
0.354 
0.336 
0.346 
0.354 
0.358 
0.357 
0.361 
0.366 
0.377 
0.379 
0.388 
0.383 
0.363 
Margin definition Ml 
France 
0.470 
0.471 
0.464 
0.464 
0.443 
0.452 
0.464 
0.475 
0.499 
0.498 
0.494 
0.483 
0.456 
0.472 
Italy 
0.515 
0.508 
0.513 
0.517 
0.539 
0.547 
0.560 
0.570 
0.578 
0.553 
0.540 
0.527 
0.539 
Netherl. 
0.432 
0.393 
0.398 
0.434 
0.448 
0.454 
0.469 
0.468 
0.462 
0.488 
0.458 
0.441 
0.449 
across 
Belgium 
0.495 
0.487 
0.513 
0.522 
0.510 
0.543 
0.555 
0.554 
0.584 
0.563 
0.533 
time and countries 
Luxem. 
0.337 
0.372 
0.402 
0.400 
0.397 
0.375 
0.423 
0.386 
UK 
0.406 
0.394 
0.403 
0.436 
0.443 
0.438 
0.436 
0.455 
0.467 
0.435 
0.408 
0.429 
Ireland 
0.475 
0.495 
0.486 
0.485 
Denmark 
0.250 
0.267 
0.280 
0.310 
0.317 
0.301 
0.301 
0.302 
0.369 
0.374 
0.376 
0.393 
0.401 
0.325 
Greece 
0.371 
0.360 
0.341 
0.361 
0.353 
0.358 
Total 
0.422 
0.414 
0.420 
0.437 
0.438 
0.441 
0.451 
0.448 
0.466 
0.463 
0.446 
0.434 
0.432 
0.441 
The average row at the bottom of this table gives an indication of the relative sizes of margins 
in different countries. Germany, Denmark and Greece have relatively low margins, whereas 
Italy and Belgium have relatively high margins. For the measure Ml, the overall average level 
of margins was 41.1%. 
The following table gives the means of Ml by group and by year. 
Table C.2 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
. Ml by 
Non-Buigues 
0.427 
0.415 
0.421 
0.440 
0.442 
0.446 
0.458 
0.455 
0.472 
0.468 
0.452 
0.441 
0.443 
group and year 
Group 1 
0.431 
0.441 
0.459 
0.467 
0.480 
0.459 
0.462 
0.463 
0.512 
0.523 
0.484 
0.447 
0.435 
Group 2 
0.489 
0.483 
0.499 
0.501 
0.471 
0.484 
0.490 
0.482 
0.518 
0.478 
0.514 
0.488 
0.473 
Group 3 
0.407 
0.395 
0.393 
0.412 
0.414 
0.407 
0.418 
0.398 
0.422 
0.459 
0.440 
0.441 
0.448 
Group 4 
0.396 
0.398 
0.401 
0.414 
0.422 
0.424 
0.425 
0.428 
0.441 
0.438 
0.413 
0.399 
0.401 
Total 
0.422 
0.414 
0.420 
0.437 
0.438 
0.441 
0.451 
0.448 
0.466 
0.463 
0.446 
0.434 
0.432 
Total 0.446 0.470 0.492 0.419 0.417 0.441 
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The corresponding tables for M2 are given below. 
Table C.3. M2 by group and year 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
Germany 
0.129 
0.121 
0.123 
0.124 
0.124 
0.123 
0.127 
0.130 
0.134 
0.132 
0.134 
0.133 
France 
0.173 
0.173 
0.168 
0.166 
0.155 
0.155 
0.161 
0.163 
0.169 
0.162 
0.159 
0.154 
0.155 
Italy 
0.176 
0.176 
0.176 
0.174 
0.176 
0.178 
0.187 
0.199 
0.190 
0.163 
0.161 
0.157 
Neth. 
0.142 
0.118 
0.124 
0.127 
0.140 
0.140 
0.153 
0.155 
0.157 
0.161 
0.151 
0.146 
Belgium 
0.181 
0.172 
0.182 
0.177 
0.174 
0.184 
0.191 
0.200 
0.204 
0.193 
Luxem. 
0.145 
0:146 
0.163 
0.166 
0.161 
0.156 
0.172 
UK 
0.151 
0.146 
0.146 
0.159 
0.159 
0.155 
0.155 
0.166 
0.171 
0.154 
0.143 
Ireland 
0.175 
0.183 
0.179 
Den m k 
0.087 
0.091 
0.096 
0.108 
0.108 
0.099 
0.100 
0.105 
0.149 
0.150 
0.148 
0.158 
0.163 
Greece 
0.106 
0.103 
0.098 
0.099 
0.097 
Total 
0.151 
0.147 
0.149 
0.151 
0.149 
0.149 
0.155 
0.156 
0.162 
0.155 
0.149 
0.143 
0.159 
Total 0.128 0.163 0.176 0.144 0.186 0.158 0.155 0.179 0.119 0.101 0.152 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
Non-Buigues 
0.147 
0.141 
0.144 
0.147 
0.145 
0.146 
0.155 
0.156 
0.161 
0.153 
0.147 
0.142 
0.160 
Group 
0.212 
0.211 
0.220 
0.216 
0.215 
0.198 
0.201 
0.196 
0.217 
0.228 
0.203 
0.183 
0.195 
Total 0.149 0.208 
Group 2 
0.176 
0.172 
0.176 
0.175 
0.161 
0.164 
0.165 
0.157 
0.179 
0.163 
0.173 
0.154 
0.199 
0.168 
Group 3 
0.140 
0.138 
0.132 
0.134 
0.135 
0.122 
0.125 
0.124 
0.131 
0.135 
0.134 
0.130 
0.159 
0.132 
Group 4 
0.153 
0.151 
0.151 
0.152 
0.152 
0.151 
0.154 
0.156 
0.162 
0.155 
0.147 
0.140 
0.147 
0.152 
Total 
0.151 
0.147 
0.149 
0.151 
0.149 
0.149 
0.155 
0.156 
0.162 
0.155 
0.149 
0.143 
0.159 
0.152 
On average, M2 is considerably less than Ml (15% compared with 44%) since the value added 
(the denominator of M2) is usually considerably less than sales (the denominator of Ml). The 
pattern of cross-country and cross-group variation is similar for both measures. 
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C.3. Cross-country differences in margins 
The following table gives the cross-country variance in average margins year by year. 
Table C.4. Cross-country variance in average margins by year 
Cross-country variance No of 
Ml M2 countries 
80 0.00725 0.00096 7 
81 0.00649 0.00096 7 
82 0.00633 0.00078 8 
83 0.00536 0.00066 7 
84 0.00524 0.00055 7 
85 0.00662 0.00067 8 
86 0.00697 0.00077 8 
87 0.00701 0.00109 9 
88 0.00603 0.00074 10 
89 0.00639 0.00070 9 
90 0.00320 0.00049 9 
91 0.00318 0.00039 7 
92 0.00076 0.00565 2 
There is some evidence here of decline in the differences between margins across countries 
since 1987. The results for 1992 are unreliable due to lack of data. 
A quick but unsophisticated test of whether this drop has been statistically significant can be 
achieved by testing: 
Ho: variance the same in every year 
against 
Hi : variance different for the periods 1980-89 and 1990-92 
using an F-test.'The p-values of the F-test are 7.7% for Ml and 5.3% for M2. Thus there is a 
significant change in the variance during the sample period at the 10% level, though not at the 
5% level. 
However, this method of testing does not properly capture the cumulative impact of the single 
market programme from 1986 to 1992, proxying it crudely by a step change in 1990. Thus, 
although the test (just) fails to be significant at the 5% level, more realistic modelling of the 
policy impact might well produce more significant results. 
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C.4. Policy impact 
The aim of the analysis was to identify any potential impact of the single market programme 
on price-cost margins. We can seek to identify this impact by looking at differences in 
margins: 
(a) between time periods when the single market programme was active and when it was 
not; 
(b) between sectors expected to be more affected by integration and those not. 
There is clearly some difficulty in deciding how the single market programme impacted over 
time. The programme started in 1986 and concluded in 1992, with measures being introduced 
incrementally throughout this period. In addition, different sectors are likely to have been 
affected by measures at different times. Given this difficulty in modelling the impact of the 
programme over time, a simple ramped policy variable was created with a linear trend 
between 1986 and 1992. The possibility of a delayed impact of the programme was also 
investigated, with a trend starting in 1987. 
Given the uncertainty about the timing of the impact of the programme, and consequently the 
appropriate definition of the policy variable, a preliminary analysis of the data using dummy 
variables for each year is reported. 
Cross-sectoral variation in the impact of the programme was captured using the Buigues sector 
classification scheme. 
C.5. Evolution of margins 
Given the difficulty in determining the appropriate form for the policy variable, as discussed 
above, a preliminary analysis using time dummies was conducted. This allows the average 
behaviour of margins over time to be investigated without requiring a particular functional 
form to be specified for the policy intervention. 
Margins are known to be strongly affected by the economic cycle. Thus a cycle variable was 
created to take account of this effect. Real GDP figures (source: OECD) were regressed on a 
trend, country-specific effects and country-specific trends. The residual of this regression was 
taken as the cycle variable. 
The results of this analysis are recorded on the following pages. For each of the two 
definitions of margins, a random effects regression was carried out using as explanatory 
variables: the cycle variable; country dummies; time dummies; group dummies; group and 
time interaction dummies. Dummies were omitted for: Germany; the year 1980 and the non-
Buigues sectors, so the reported dummies measure effects relative to these cases. The NACE 
sectors were modelled as having a random effect on margins, thus allowing the systematic 
effects of the Buigues Groups 1 to 4 to be determined. This approach was found to be an 
acceptable specification using the diagnostic statistics reported below (in particular passing the 
Hausman test which checks the validity of the random NACE effects assumption). 
On the basis of these regressions, a table was drawn up of the effects of each Buigues group in 
each successive year. The results have been plotted in the graphs in Chapter 5 (Figures 5.4 to 
5.7) for ease of comprehension. A warning must be made that the standard errors associated 
with the time dummies are rather large, so not too much should be inferred from the graphs in 
296 Competition issues 
the main text; individual points on the graphs have a large measure of uncertainty associated 
with them. This technique is of value in understanding the data, but we claim no more; precise 
statistical tests are formulated in the following section. 
C.6. Preliminary analysis of margin definition Ml 
Table C.5. Ml by group and year 
sd(u_nace) 
sd(e_nace_t) 
sd(e nace t + u nace) 
.0542045 
.0821763 
.0984432 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Number of obs = 7917 
n = 115 
•T-bar = 60.6245 
corr(u nace, X) = 0 (assumed) 
5% 
0.5490 0.7696 
theta — 
median 
0.8264 
95% 
0.8405 
max 
0.8479 
R-sq within = 0.4772 
between = 0.0593 
overall = 0.3729 
chi2( 74) = 7027.93 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
ml 
Cycle 
France 
Italy 
Netherl. 
Belgium 
Luxemb'rg 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Group 1 
Coef. 
.0198245 
.1065755 
.1754828 
.0827653 
.167044 
.0277796 
.0665284 
.0863351 
-.0449652 
-.0389366 
.016468 
Std. Err. 
.0626033 
.0032686 
.0032478 
.0045817 
.003851 
.0082439 
.0034401 
.0069254 
.0036298 
.0051849 
.0395525 
0 
32 
54 
18 
43 
3 
19 
12 
-12 
-7 
0 
ζ 
317 
605 
032 
064 
377 
370 
339 
466 
388 
510 
416 
P>|z| 
0.751 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.677 
[95% Conf. 
-.1028756 
.1001691 
.1691172 
.0737853 
.1594963 
.0116217 
.059786 
.0727616 
-.0520795 
-.0490987 
-.0610535 
Interval] 
.1425246 
.1129819 
.1818483 
.0917453 
.1745918 
.0439374 
.0732708 
.0999086 
-.0378508 
-.0287745 
.0939894 
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Group 2 | 
Group 3 | 
Group 4 | 
81 1 
82 | 
83 | 
84 | 
85 | 
86 | 
87 | 
88 | 
89 | 
90 | 
91 1 
92 | 
81 * Grpll 
82 * Grpll 
83 * Grpll 
84 * Grpll 
85 * Grpll 
86 * Grpll 
87 * Grpll 
88 * Grpll 
89 * Grpll 
90 * Grpll 
91 * Grpll 
92 * Grpll 
81 * Grp2| 
82 * Grp2| 
83 * Grp2| 
84 * Grp2| 
85 * Grp2| 
.0584538 
-.0156215 
-.0239987 
-.0103652 
-.0010668 
.0132272 
.0178346 
.0229607 
.0347906 
.0435777 
.0576942 
.0516419 
.0461861 
.0373321 
.0626626 
.0065693 
.0162052 
.0136935 
.0188095 
-.003359 
-.0123669 
-.0149349 
.0200188 
.0310516 
.0188243 
-.0074882 
-.0351333 
.0130262 
.0175006 
.0079468 
-.0269727 
-.0191799 
.0275998 
.030732 
.0147471 
.006095 
.0062924 
.0064864 
.0063967 
.0063262 
.0062185 
.0061196 
.0057992 
.0059232 
.0059462 
.0062564 
.0099476 
.0317809 
.031774 
.0313361 
.0309452 
.0313259 
.031322 
.0312918 
.0302041 
.0309317 
.031329 
.0318037 
.0444016 
.0212758 
.0212675 
.0212679 
.0212608 
.0209794 
2.118 
-0.508 
-1.627 
-1.701 
-0.170 
2.039 
2.788 
3.629 
5.595 
7.121 
9.949 
8.719 
7.767 
5.967 
6.299 
0.207 
0.510 
0.437 
0.608 
-0.107 
-0.395 
-0.477 
0.663 
1'. 004 
0.601 
-0.235 
-0.791 
0.612 
0.823 
0.374 
-1.269 
-0.914 
0.034 
0.611 
0.104 
0.089 
0.865 
0.041 
0.005 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.836 
0.610 
0.662 
0.543 
0.915 
0.693 
0.633 
0.507 
0.315 
0.548 
0.814 
0.429 
0.540 
0.411 
0.709 
0.205 
0.361 
.0043592 
-.0758552 
-.0529024 
-.0223111 
-.0133997 
.000514 
.0052974 
.0105615 
.0226026 
.0315836 
.0463279 
.0400326 
.0345318 
.0250698 
.0431656 
-.0557202 
-.0460708 
-.0477241 
-.0418419 
-.0647566 
-.0737568 
-.0762658 
-.0391802 
-.0295735 
-.0425794 
-.0698224 
-.1221588 
-.0286737 
-.024183 
-.0337376 
-.0686431 
-.0602988 
.1125484 
.0446122 
.004905 
.0015807 
.0112661 
.0259403 
.0303718 
.0353599 
.0469785 
.0555718 
.0690605 
.0632512 
.0578403 
.0495944 
.0821596 
.0688588 
.0784811 
.0751111 
.079461 
.0580385 
.049023 
.0463959 
.0792177 
.0916767 
.080228 
.054846 
.0518923 
.054726 
.0591842 
.0496312 
.0146977 
.0219391 
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86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
+ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
* 
* 
+ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
* 
+ 
Grp2 
Grp2 
Grp2 
Grp2 
Grp2 
Grp2 
Grp2 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Constant 
-.0282497 
-.0360166 
-.0144186 
-.037707 
.0107285 
-.0031332 
.0214261 
.0104513 
-.000335 
.0004629 
-.0015669 
-.0170289 
-.0241827 
-.023122 
-.0257228 
-.0051559 
-.0005949 
.0153603 
.060695 
.0119319 
.0080385 
.004 6.719 
.0088812 
.0080569 
-.0024522 
.0031822 
-.0012355 
-.0021228 
-.0068306 
-.0097044 
-.016309 
.3397922 
.0207218 
.0203698 
.020054 
.0206102 
.0206181 
.0211733 
.037978 
.0247563 
.0247484 
.0245214 
.0245153 
.0242958 
.0245073 
.0240689 
.0233683 
.0235959 
.0237531 
.0243606 
.0417924 
.0113301 
.0112259 
.0113011 
.0111551 
.0111885 
.0111029 
.0109382 
.0107702 
.0111669 
.0111219 
.0114458 
.0169352 
.0080418 
-1 
-J. 
-0 
-1 
0 
-0 
0 
0 
-0 
0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-1 
-0 
-0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0 
0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
42 
363 
768 
719 
830 
520 
148 
564 
422 
014 
019 
064 
701 
987 
961 
101 
219 
025 
631 
452 
053 
716 
413 
796 
720 
221 
291 
115 
190 
614 
848 
963 
253 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
173 
077 
472 
067 
603 
882 
573 
673 
989 
985 
949 
483 
324 
337 
271 
827 
980 
528 
146 
292 
474 
679 
426 
471 
825 
771 
909 
849 
539 
397 
336 
000 
.0688636 
.0759407 
.0537237 
.0781022 
.0296822 
.0446322 
.0530094 
.0380702 
-.048841 
.0475981 
-.049616 
.0646478 
.0722161 
.0702963 
.0715237 
-.051403 
-.04715 
.0323857 
.0212166 
.0102746 
.0139639 
.0174779 
.0129823 
.0138722 
.0242134 
.0182562 
.0223448 
.0240096 
.0286291 
.0321378 
.0495014 
.3240305 
.0123642 
.0039075 
.0248866 
.0026882 
.0511392 
.0383658 
.0958617 
.0589729 
.048171 
.0485239 
.0464821 
.0305899 
.0238508 
.0240523 
.0200782 
.0410912 
.04596.03 
.0631062 
.1426066 
.0341384 
.0300408 
.0268217 
.0307447 
.029986 
.0193091 
.0246207 
.0198737 
.0197639 
.0149679 
.012729 
.0168833 
.3555538 
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Hausman specification test 
Test: Ho: NACE effects not systematic 
chi2( 70) = (b-B)'[S~(-l)](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re) 
0.00 
Prob>chi2 = 1.0000 
Accept Ho. 
Table C.6. Group and year effects for margin definition Ml 
Year 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
Overall 
0.0000 
-0.0104 
-0.0011 
0.0132 
0.0178 
0.0230 
0.0348 
0.0436 
0.0577 
0.0516 
0.0462 
0.0373 
0.0627 
Group 1 
0.0165 
0.0127 
0.0316 
0.0434 
0.0531 
0.0361 
0.0389 
0.0451 
0.0942 
0.0992 
0.0815 
0.0463 
0.0440 
Group 2 
0.0585 
0.0611 
0.0749 
0.0796 
0.0493 
0.0622 
0.0650 
0.0660 
0.1017 
0.0724 
0.1154 
0.0927 
0.1425 
Group 3 
-0.0156 
-0.0155 
-0.0170 
-0.0019 
0.0006 
-0.0097 
-0.0050 
0.0048 
0.0163 
0.0309 
0.0300 
0.0371 
0.1077 
Group 4 
-0.0240 
-0.0224 
-0.0170 
-0.0061 
0.0027 
0.0070 
0.0083 
0.0228 
0.Ö325 
0.0255 
0.0154 
0.0036 
0.0224 
300 Competition issues 
C.7. Preliminary analysis of margin definition M2 
Table C.7. Fit of margin M2 to time dummies 
Random-effects GLS regression 
sd(u_nace) = .0350403 
sd(e_nace_t) = .04 68162 
sd(e nace t + u nace) = .0584771 
Number of obs = 7 917 
n = 115 
T-bar = 60.6245 
corr(u nace, X) 0 (assumed) 
min 5% 
0.5932 0.7957 
theta -
median 
0.8465 
95% max 
0.8590 0.8656 
R-sq within = 0.2079 
between = 0.1264 
overall = 0.1785 
chi2( 74) = 2042.55 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
m2 | Coef. Std. Err. P> Ι ζ | [95% Conf. Interval] 
cycle 
France 
Italy 
Netherl. 
Belgium 
Luxemb'rg 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
-.0538359 
.0318594 
.0464884 
.0196744 
.0568335 
.0291404 
.0274216 
.0489922 
-.0064897 
-.0298796 
.0647337 
.0217971 
-.0107194 
.0034982 
.0356138 
.0018597 
.0018477 
.0026069 
.0021911 
.0046909 
.0019572 
.00394 
.0020653 
.0029498 
.0245269 
.0172046 
.0190865 
.00919'89 
-1 
17 
25 
7 
25 
6 
14 
12 
-3 
-10 
2 
1 
-0 
0 
512 
131 
160 
547 
939 
212 
011 
434 
142 
129 
639 
267 
562 
380 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
131 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
002 
000 
008 
205 
574 
704 
-.1236377 
.0282144 
.0428669 
.014565 
.0525391 
.0199465 
.0235856 
.0412699 
-.0105376 
-.0356611 
.0166619 
-.0119233 
-.0481282 
-.0145312 
.0159658 
.0355044 
.0501098 
.0247837 
.0611279 
.0383343 
.0312575 
.0567145 
-.0024418 
-.024098 
.1128054 
.0555175 
.0266894 
.0215277 
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81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
I 
89 | 
90 | 
91 I 
92 | 
81 * Grpll 
82 + Grpll 
83 * Grpll 
84 * Grpll 
85 * Grpll 
86 * Grpll 
87 * Grpll 
88 * Grpll 
89 * Grpll 
90 * Grpll 
91 * Grpll 
92 * Grpll 
81 * Grp2| 
82 * Grp2| 
83 * Grp2| 
84 * Grp2| 
85 * Grp2| 
86 * Grp2| 
87 * Grp2| 
88 * Grp2| 
-.007032 
.0059074 
.0012513 
.0025591 
.0019364 
.0058847 
,0127878 
.01698 
.0094281 
.007209 
.0055328 
.0171293 
.0003538 
.0065268 
.0008392 
.0.013257 
-.018422 
.0232069 
.0321061 
.0155308 
.001316 
.0147343 
.0311171 
-.031495 
.0030069 
.004117 
.0007007 
.0128249 
.0126446 
.0188353 
.0257033 
.0104781 
.0034673 
.0035796 
.00369 
.0036389 
.0035989 
.0035376 
.0034813 
.0032991 
.0033696 
.0033827 
.0035592 
.0056591 
.0180795 
.0180755 
.0178265 
.0176041 
.0178206 
.0178184 
.0178012 
.0171825 
.0175965 
.0178224 
.0180925 
.0252592 
.0121033 
.0120986 
.0120989 
.0120948 
.0119348 
.0117882 
.011588 
.0114083 
- 2 . 0 2 8 0 .043 
- 1 . 6 5 0 0 .099 
- 0 . 3 3 9 0 .735 
- 0 . 7 0 3 0 .482 
- 0 . 5 3 8 0 .591 
1.663 0 .096 
3 .673 0 .000 
5.147 0 .000 
2 . 7 9 8 0 .005 
2 . 1 3 1 0 .033 
1.555 0 .120 
3 .027 0 .002 
- 0 . 0 2 0 0.984 
0 .361 0 .718 
- 0 . 0 4 7 0 .962 
- 0 . 0 7 5 0 .940 
- 1 . 0 3 4 0 .301 
- 1 . 3 0 2 0 .193 
- 1 . 8 0 4 0 .071 
- 0 . 9 0 4 0 .366 
0 .075 0.940 
- 0 . 8 2 7 0 .408 
- 1 . 7 2 0 0 .085 
- 1 . 2 4 7 0 .212 
0.248 0 .804 
0 .340 0 .734 
- 0 . 0 5 8 0.954 
- 1 . 0 6 0 0 .289 
- 1 . 0 5 9 0 .289 
- 1 . 5 9 8 0 .110 
- 2 . 2 1 8 0.027 
- 0 . 9 1 8 0 .358 
.0138277 
.0129233 
.0084836 
.0096913 
-.00899 
.0010488 
.0059645 
.0105139 
.0028237 
.000579 
.0014431 
.0060378 
.0357889 
.0289006 
.0357784 
.0358292 
.0533498 
.0581304 
.0669958 
.0492079 
.0331724 
.0496656 
.0665776 
.0810021 
.0207152 
.0195959 
-.024414 
.0365303 
.0360363 
.0419397 
.0484154 
-.032838 
.0002362 
.0011086 
.0059809 
.0045731 
.0051173 
.0128182 
.0196111 
.0234461 
.0160325 
.013839 
.0125087 
.0282209 
.0350813 
.0419542 
.0341 
.0331778 
.0165058 
.0117165 
.0027837 
.0181462 
.0358045 
.020197 
.0043435 
.0180121 
.026729 
.0278299 
.0230126 
.0108805 
.0107471 
.0042691 
-.0029913 
.0118818 
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89 
90 
91 
92 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
* 
* 
+ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
* 
* 
+ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Grp2 
Grp2 
Grp2 
Grp2 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp3 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Grp4 
Constant 
-.0155383 
.0003878 
-.0132467 
.0106734 
.0066871 
-.0015965 
-.0043445 
-.0027265 
-.0149369 
-.0208452 
-.0203146 
-.0224601 
-.0139414 
-.0082431 
-.0057393 
.0117664 
.0040797 
.0021227 
-.0020866 
-.0006844 
-.0022689 
-.0060937 
-.0049286 
-.0053543 
-.0047539 
-.0062371 
-.0095476 
• -.014241 
.1256303 
.0117247 
.0117292 
.0120451 
.0216054 
.0140833 
.0140788 
.0139497 
.0139462 
.0138213 
.0139417 
.0136923 
.0132937 
.0134233 
.0135127 
.0138583 
.023775 
.0064454 
.0063862 
.006429 
.0063459 
.0063649 
.0063162 
.0062225 
.006127 
.0063527 
.0063271 
.0065113 
.0096341 
.0049594 
-1 
D 
-1 
0 
0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-0 
-0 
0 
0 
0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-0 
-1 
-1 
25 
325 
033 
100 
494 
475 
113 
311 
195 
081 
495 
484 
690 
039 
610 
414 
495 
633 
332 
325 
108 
356 
965 
792 
874 
748 
986 
466 
478 
332 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
185 
974 
271 
621 
635 
910 
755 
845 
280 
135 
138 
091 
299 
542 
679 
621 
527 
740 
746 
914 
721 
335 
428 
382 
454 
324 
143 
139 
000 
.0385183 
.0226011 
.0368546 
.0316723 
.0209157 
.0291905 
.0316853 
,0300605 
.0420262 
.0481704 
.0471511 
.0485153 
.0402507 
.0347275 
.0329012 
.0348318 
.0085531 
-.010394 
.0146871 
.0131221 
.0147439 
.0184732 
.0171245 
-.017363 
.0172048 
.0186379 
.0223096 
.0331235 
.1159101 
.0074418 
.0233767 
.0103613 
.0530191 
.03429 
.0259975 
.0229964 
.0246076 
.0121525 
.0064801 
.0065218 
.0035951 
.0123679 
.0182413 
.0214225 
.0583646 
.0167125 
.0146393 
.010514 
.0117533 
.0102061 
.0062858 
.0072674 
.0066543 
.0076971 
.0061637 
.0032144 
.0046414 
.1353506 
Hausman specification test: 
Test: Ho: NACE effects not systematic 
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chi2( 70) = (b-B)'[SA(-1)](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re) 
0.00 
Prob>chi2 = 1.0000 
Accept Ho. 
Table C.8. Group and year effects for margin definition M2 
Year 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
Other 
0.0000 
-0.0070 
-0.0059 
-0.0013 
-0.0026 
-0.0019 
0.0059 
0.0128 
0.0170 
0.0094 
0.0072 
0.0055 
0.0171 
Group 1 
0.0647 
0.0573 
0.0654 
0.0626 
0.0608 
0.0444 
0.0474 
0.0454 
0.0662 
0.0755 
0.0572 
0.0391 
0.0504 
Group 2 
0.0218 
0.0178 
0.0200 
0.0198 
0.0064 
0.0072 
0.0088 
0.0089 
0.0283 
0.0157 
0.0294 
0.0141 
0.0496 
Group 3 
-0.0107 
-0.0111 
-0.0182 
-0.0163 
-0.0160 
-0.0276 
-0.0257 
-0.0182 
-0.0162 
-0.0152 
-0.0118 
-0.0109 
0.0182 
Group 4 
0.0035 ' 
0.0005 
-0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0003 
-0.0007 
0.0033 
0.0114 
0.0151 
0.0082 
0.0045 
-0.0005 
0.0064 
C.8. Assessing policy impact 
It is difficult to assess the impact of integration from the previous tables. In particular, the 
estimates for 1992 are subject to considerable uncertainty due to lack of data. We now 
consider a more careful investigate of the impact of integration. 
We include a policy variable of the type discussed earlier into the regression analysis and 
consider whether there are any significant effects. The following two tables report a variety of 
different model specifications (numbered 1 to 16). These models vary in a number of respects. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
The definition of margin used (Ml or M2). 
The date from which the policy was assumed to impact (1986 or 1987). 
The modelling of the effect of the NACE sectors (either as random or fixed effects). 
Where NACE sectors are modelled as having fixed effects, it is not possible to identify 
group-specific effects so group dummies are omitted from the model. 
Whether a trend which differs across groups was included or not. 
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The preferred models are shown in bold, which are numbers 5 and 13. These are both random 
effects models which pass the Hausman test. The reported t-statistics have all been corrected 
to be robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The coefficients reported for the interaction of the policy variable and the time trend with the 
Buigues sectors should be interpreted as measuring (respectively) the total impact of the trend 
or the policy on that group. The coefficients show the impact per annum on margins for that 
group. For example, the coefficient of -0.002 on 'Trend * Group Γ reported for model 1 
should be interpreted as saying that for Group 1 there was trend of -0.2% per annum in 
margins controlling for other variables. 
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Table C.9. Coefficient estimates for alternative models of margins 
Cycle 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Trend 
Trend * Group 1 
Trend * Group 2 
Trend * Group 3 
Trend * Group 4 
Trend * Non-Buigues 
Policy * Group 1 
Policy * Group 2 
Policy * Group 3 
Policy * Group 4 
Policy * Non-Buigues 
Constant 
115 NACE dummies 
R-squared: 
Hausman p-value 
1 
M2 
Random 
1986 
0.0124 
(0.41) 
0.0321 
(17.37) 
0.0465 
(25.13) 
0.0193 
(7.40) 
0.0577 
(26.38) 
0.0300 
(6.41) 
0.0273 
(13.99) 
0.0521 
(13.54) 
-0.0061 
(-2.99) 
-0.0280 
(-9.58) 
0.0715 
(2.99) 
0.0288 
(1.69) 
-0.0034 
(-0.18) 
0.0060 
(0.66) 
-0.0020 
(-0.81) 
-0.0027 
(-1.61) 
-0.0029 
(-1.46) 
0.0011 
(1.37) 
0.0021 
(4.20) 
0.0021 
(0.54) 
0.0053 
(2.02) 
0.0054 
(1.76) 
-0.0009 
(-0.70) 
-0.0009 
(-1.12) 
0.1188 
(24.61) 
N/A 
0.172 
0 
2 
M2 
Fixed 
1986 
0.0122 
(0.41) 
0.0320 
(27.36) 
0.0464 
(35.94) 
0.0193 
(9.82) 
0.0577 
(22.75) 
0.0300 
(5.43) 
0.0274 
(17.29) 
0.0522 
(7.11) 
-0.0060 
(-3.27) 
-0.0280 
(-9.22) 
-0.0020 
(-0.80) 
-0.0027 
(-1.48) 
-0.0029 
(-1.93) 
0.0011 
(1.46) 
0.0021 
(4.45) 
0.0021 
(0.51) 
0.0053 
(1.65) 
0.0054 
(2.28) 
-0.0009 
(-0.76) 
-0.0009 
(-1.Π) 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
0.482 
N/A 
3 
M2 
Random 
1986 
0.0132 
(0.44) 
0.0321 
(17.35) 
0.0465 
(25.10) 
0.0192 
(7.36) 
0.0576 
(26.33) 
0.0302 
(6.45) 
0.0273 
(13.98) 
0.0521 
(13.52) 
-0.0062 
(-3.01) 
-0.0280 
(-9.57) 
0.0588 
(2.64) 
0.0145 
(0.90) 
-0.0184 
(-1.05) 
0.0030 
(0.34) 
0.0013 
(3.19) 
-0.0027 
(-1.67) 
-0.0005 
(-0.42) 
-0.0007 
(-0.49) 
-0.0012 
(-1.55) 
0.0002 
(0.34) 
0.1212 
(25.78) 
N/A 
0.171 
0.0467 
4 
M2 
Fixed 
1986 
0.0130 
(0.44) 
0.0320 
(27.35) 
0.0464 
(35.98) 
0.0193 
(9.74) 
0.0576 
(22.62) 
0.0303 
(5.52) 
0.0274 
(17.27) 
0.0522 
(7.11) 
-0.0061 
(-3.29) 
-0.0281 
(-9.22) 
0.0013 
(3.28) 
(-1.64) 
-0.0005 
(-0.32) 
-0.0007 
(-0.60) 
-0.0012 
(-1.66) 
0.0002 
(0.36) 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
0.481 
N/A 
5 
M2 
Random 
1986 
0.0262 
(0.90) 
0.0322 
(17.44) 
0.0465 
(25.14) 
0.0191 
(7.34) 
0.0575 
(26.31) 
0.0296 
(6.32) 
0.0273 
(13.98) 
0.0523 
(13.59) 
-0.0060 
(-2.92) 
-0.0279 
(-9.55) 
0.0717 
(3.02) 
0.0285 
(1.68) 
-0.0033 
(-0.18) 
0.0062 
(0.68) 
-0.0016 
(-0.79) 
-0.0018 
(-1.36) 
-0.0022 
(-1.38) 
0.0014 
(2.18) 
0.0025 
(6.20) 
0.0017 
(0.45) 
0.0049 
(1.91) 
0.0054 
(1.79) 
-0.0018 
(-1.46) 
-0.0020 
(-2.55) 
0.1177 
(24.53) 
N/A 
0.172 
0.1338 
6 
M2 
Fixed 
1987 
0.0260 
(0.91) 
0.0321 
(27.48) 
0.0464 
(36.01) 
0.0192 
(9.76) 
0.0575 
(22.70) 
0.0296 
(5.35) 
0.0273 
(17.29) 
0.0524 
(7.13) 
-0.0059 
(-3.19) 
-0.0279 
(-9.19) 
-0.0016 
(-0.80) 
-0.0018 
(-1.22) 
-0.0022 
(-1.83) 
0.0014 
(2.31) 
0.0025 
(6.41) 
0.0017 
(0.45) 
0.0049 
(1.49) 
0.0054 
(2.33) 
-0.0018 
(-1.60) 
-0.0020 
(-2.61) 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
0.482 
N/A 
7 
M2 
Random 
1987 
0.0269 
(0.93) 
0.0322 
(17.42) 
0.0465 
(25.11) 
0.0190 
(7.28) 
0.0575 
(26.25) 
0.0299 
(6.39) 
0.0273 
(13.96) 
0.0522 
(13.56) 
-0.0061 
(-2.95) 
-0.0280 
(-9.55) 
0.0574 
(2.57) 
0.0135 
(0.84) 
-0.0195 
(-1.12) 
0.0024 
(0.28) 
0.0017 
(5.24) 
-0.0037 
(-1.97) 
-0.0010 
(-0.74) 
-0.0011 
(-0.73) 
-0.0023 
(-2.86) 
-0.0007 
(-1.03) 
0.1204 
(25.74) 
N/A 
0.171 
0.1529 
8 
M2 
Fixed 
1987 
0.0267 
(0.93) 
0.0321 
(27.47) 
0.0464 
(36.04) 
0.0190 
(9.65) 
0.0574 
(22.55) 
0.0300 
(5-46) 
0.0273 
(17.25) 
0.0523 
(7.13) 
-0.0060 
(-3.21) 
-0.0280 
(-9.21) 
0.0017 
(5.32) 
-0.0037 
(-2.01) 
-0.0010 
(-0.53) 
-0.0012 
(-0.90) 
-0.0023 
(-3.08) 
-0.0007 
(-1.02) 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
0.481 
N/A 
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Cycle 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Trend 
Trend * Group 1 
Trend * Group 2 
Trend * Group 3 
Trend * Group 4 
Trend * Non-Buigues 
Policy * Group 1 
Policy * Group 2 
Policy * Group 3 
Policy * Group 4 
Policy * Non-Buigues 
Constant 
115 NACE dummies 
R-squared: 
Hausman p-value 
9 
Ml 
Random 
1986 
0.1524 
(2.89) 
0.1071 
(32.99) 
0.1755 
(54.01) 
.0.0821 
(17.92) 
0.1686 
(43.89) 
0.0294 
(3.58) 
0.0660 
(19.22) 
0.0939 
(13.88) 
-0.0443 
(-12.30) 
-0.0362 
(-7.04) 
0.0257 
(0.66) 
0.0772 
(2.76) 
-0.0037 
(-0.12) 
-0.0183 
(-1.22) 
0.0083 
(1.90) 
-0.0003 
(-0.10) 
0.0021 
(0.60) 
0.0092 
(6.60) 
0.0090 
(10.09) 
-0.0052 
(-0.76) 
0.0072 
(1.56) 
0.0060 
(1.10) 
-0.0088 
(-3.97) 
-0.0058 
(-4.06) 
0.3266 
(40.99) 
N/A 
0.3688 
0.9893 
10 
Ml 
Fixed 
1986 
0.1520 
(2.71) 
0.1071 
(52.11) 
0.1756 
(77.80) 
0.0819 
(21.91) 
0.1684 
(41.08) 
0.0298 
(3.16) 
0.0659 
(21.53) 
0.0935 
(8.79) 
-0.0445 
(-12.78) 
-0.0365 
(-4.83) 
0.0083 
(2.14) 
-0.0003 
(-0.10) 
0.0020 
(0.75) 
0.0093 
(7.73) 
0.0090 
(9.94) 
-0.0051 
(-0.78) 
0.0072 
(1.36) 
0.0059 
(1.37) 
-0.0088 
(-4.58) 
-0.0058 
(-3.91) 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
0.6073 
N/A 
11 
Ml 
Random 
1986 
0.1551 
(2.94) 
0.1071 
(32.97) 
0.1755 
(53.99) 
0.0819 
(17.87) 
0.1685 
(43.85) 
0.0295 
(3.59) 
0.0660 
(19.22) 
0.0939 
(13.88) 
-0.0444 
(-12.31) 
-0.0362 
(-7.04) 
0.0238 
(0.64) 
0.0494 
(1.85) 
-0.0245 
(-0.84) 
-0.0175 
(-1.23) 
0.0083 
(11.26) 
-0.0051 
(-1.78) 
-0.0053 
(-2.48) 
-0.0031 
(-1.30) 
-0.0074 
(-5.32) 
-0.0048 
(-3.88) 
0.3288 
(41.76) 
N/A 
0.3682 
0.0068 
12 
Ml 
Fixed 
1986 
0.1548 
(2.76) 
0.1071 
(52.02) 
0.1756 
(77.90) 
0.0817 
(21.86) 
0.1683 
(40.88) 
0.0300 
(3.19) 
0.0659 
(21.51) 
0.0935 
(8.79) 
-0.0446 
(-12.79) 
-0.0366 
(-4.84) 
0.0083 
(11.13) 
-0.0051 
(-1.69) 
-0.0053 
(-2.03) 
-0.0031 
(-1.48) 
-0.0074 
(-5.41) 
-0.0048 
(-3.73) 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
0.6066 
N/A 
13 
Ml 
Random 
1987 
0.1459 
(2.86) 
0.1073 
(33.06) 
0.1755 
(54.04) 
0.0820 
(17.93) 
0.1683 
(43.83) 
0.0288 
(3.50) 
0.0659 
(19.23) 
0.0937 
(13.86) 
-0.0441 
(-12.24) 
-0.0365 
(-7.11) 
0.0266 
(0.70) 
0.0764 
(2.79) 
-0.0034 
(-0.11) 
-0.0170 
(-1.16) 
0.0078 
(2.19) 
0.0005 
(0.21) 
0.0024 
(0.85) 
0.0083 
(7.40) 
0.0087 
(12.34) 
-0.0054 
(-0.80) 
0.0074 
(1.65) 
0.0069 
(1.30) 
-0.0092 
(-4.28) 
-0.0068 
(-4.96) 
0.3264 
(41.89) 
N/A 
0.3693 
1 
14 
Ml 
Fixed 
1987 
0.1456 
(2.73) 
0.1073 
(52.20) 
0.1756 
(77.95) 
0.0818 
(21.96) 
0.1681 
(41.06) 
0.0292 
(3.09) 
0.0658 
(21.54) 
0.0933 
(8.76) 
-0.0443 
(-12.69) 
-0.0369 
(-4.88) 
0.0078 
(2.41) 
0.0005 
(0.20) 
0.0023 
(1.02) 
0.0083 
(8.56) 
0.0087 
(12.30) 
-0.0053 
(-0.82) 
0.0075 
(1.42) 
0.0069 
(1.53) 
-0.0092 
(-4.85) 
-0.0068 
(-4.79) 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
0.6079 
N/A 
15 
Ml 
Random 
1987 
0.1483 
(2.91) 
0.1073 
(33.04) 
0.1755 
(54.02) 
0.0817 
(17.86) 
0.1683 
(43.80) 
0.0290 
(3.53) 
0.0660 
(19.23) 
0.0936 
(13.85) 
-0.0441 
(-12.26) 
-0.0366 
(-7.13) 
0.0234 
(0.63) 
0.0477 
(1-79) 
-0.0255 
(-0.88) 
-0.0183 
(-1.28) 
0.0079 
(13.72) 
-0.0056 
(-1.68) 
-0.0050 
(-2.06) 
-0.0024 
(-0.88) 
-0.0085 
(-5.97) 
-0.0055 
(-4.60) 
0.3292 
(42.08) 
N/A 
0.3687 
0.0422 
16 
Ml 
Fixed 
1987 
0.1480 
(2.77) 
0.1073 
(52.12) 
0.1756 
(78.04) 
0.0815 
(21.88) 
0.1681 
(40.84) 
0.0294 
(3.13) 
0.0659 
(21.51) 
0.0933 
(8.77) 
-0.0444 
(-12.69) 
-0.0370 
(-4.90) 
0.0079 
(13.79) 
-0.0056 
(-1.61) 
-0.0050 
(-1.65) 
-0.0025 
(-1.02) 
-0.0085 
(-6.19) 
-0.0055 
(-4.42) 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
0.6071 
N/A 
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C.8.1. Relative effects on Buigues and non-Buigues sectors 
The following tables report the same models, but measure now the differences of the Buigues 
sectors relative to the non-Buigues sectors. Notice the dummies variables used here are 
different but the overall model is still equivalent to that used in the table above. The trend and 
policy variables in the tables below measure the average impact for the non-Buigues sectors. 
The 'trend * group x' and 'policy * group x' now measure the additional impact for group χ 
above and beyond the impact of the trend or policy for the non-Buigues sectors. 
Table CIO. Estimated coefficients of relative impacts on Buigues sectors 
Model number 
Definition of margin 
NACE effects: 
Policy impact from: 
Trend 
Trend * Group 1 
Trend * Group 2 
Trend * Group 3 
Trend * Group 4 
Policy 
Policy * Group 1 
Policy * Group 2 
Policy * Group 3 
Policy * Group 4 
1 
M2 
Random 
1986 
0.0021 
(4.198) 
-0.0042 
(-1.639) 
-0.0048 
(-2.793) 
-0.0050 
(-2.49) 
-0.0010 
(-1.131) 
-0.0009 
(-1.124) 
0.0030 
(0.767) 
0.0062 
(2.291) 
0.0063 
(2.006) 
0.0000 
(0.026) 
2 
M2 
Fixed 
1986 
0.0021 
(4.447) 
-0.0042 
(-1.615) 
-0.0048 
(-2.604) 
-0.0050 
(-3.277) 
-0.0010 
(-1.24) 
-0.0009 
(-1.174) 
0.0030 
(0.721) 
0.0062 
(1.91) 
0.0063 
(2.598) 
0.0000 
(0.033) 
3 
M2 
Random 
1986 
0.0013 
(3.187) 
0.0002 
(0.337) 
-0.0030 
(-1.923) 
-0.0007 
(-0.69) 
-0.0009 
(-0.733) 
-0.0015 
(-2.559) 
4 
M2 
Fixed 
1986 
0.0013 
(3.276) 
0.0002 
(0.359) 
-0.0030 
(-1.907) 
-0.0008 
(-0.509) 
-0.0009 
(-0.951) 
-0.0015 
(-2.832) 
5 
M2 
Random 
1987 
0.0025 
(6.204) 
-0.0041 
(-1.985) 
-0.0043 
(-3.114) 
-0.0047 
(-2.878) 
-0.0011 
(-1.481) 
-0.0020 
(-2.547) 
0.0037 
(0.962) 
0.0069 
(2.594) 
0.0074 
(2.386) 
0.0002 
(0.145) 
6 
M2 
Fixed 
1987 
0.0025 
(6.406) 
-0.0041 
(-2.012) 
-0.0043 
(-2.807) 
-0.0047 
(-3.784) 
-0.0011 
(-1.593) 
-0.0020 
(-2.609) 
0.0037 
(0.959) 
0.0069 
(2.057) 
0.0074 
(3.083) 
0.0002 
(0.162) 
7 
M2 
Random 
1987 
0.0017 
(5.237) 
-0.0007 
(-1.029) 
-0.0030 
(-1.642) 
-0.0003 
(-0.245) 
-0.0004 
(-0.29) 
-0.0016 
(-2.357) 
8 
M2 
Fixed 
1987 
0.0017 
(5.321) 
-0.0007 
(-1.024) 
-0.0031 
(-1.688) 
-0.0003 
(-0.183) 
-0.0005 
(-0.39) 
-0.0016 
(-2.619) 
Model number: 
Definition of margin 
NACE effects: 
Policy impact from: 
9 
Ml 
Random 
1986 
10 
Ml 
Fixed 
1986 
11 
Ml 
Random 
1986 
12 
Ml 
Fixed 
1986 
13 
Ml 
Random 
1987 
14 
Ml 
Fixed 
1987 
15 
Ml 
Random 
1987 
16 
Ml 
Fixed 
1987 
Trend 
Trend * 
Trend * 
Trend * 
Trend * 
Policy 
Policy 
Policy 
Policy 
Policy 
Group I 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
* Group 1 
* Group 2 
* Group 3 
* Group 4 
0.0090 
(10.092) 
-0.0007 
(-0.149) 
-0.0093 
(-3.081) 
-0.0069 
(-1.975) 
0.0002 
(0.155) 
-0.0058 
(-4.056) 
0.0007 
(0.096) 
0.0130 
(2.724) 
0.0118 
(2.129) 
-0.0030 
(-1.176) 
0.0090 
(9.941) 
-0.0007 
(-0.175) 
-0.0093 
(-2.997) 
-0.0070 
(-2.5) 
0.0003 
(0.186) 
-0.0058 
(-3.909) 
0.0007 
(0.109) 
0.0130 
(2.408) 
0.0118 
(2.628) 
-0.0030 
(-1.35) 
0.0083 
(11.259) 
-0.0048 
(-3.883) 
-0.0003 
(-0.111) 
-0.0005 
(-0.262) 
0.0017 
(0.794) 
-0.0026 
(-2.615) 
0.0083 
(11.13) 
-0.0048 
(-3.726) 
-0.0003 
(-0.101) 
-0.0005 
(-0.207) 
0.0017 
(0.911) 
-0.0026 
(-2.823) 
0.0087 
(12.335) 
-0.0009 
(-0.26) 
-0.0082 
(-3.375) 
-0.0064 
(-2.227) 
-0.0004 
(-0.299) 
-0.0068 
(-4.963) 
0.0015 
(0.216) 
0.0143 
(3.051) 
0.0137 
(2.522) 
-0.0024 
(-0.957) 
0.0087 
(12.303) 
-0.0010 
(-0.291) 
-0.0082 
(-3.269) 
-0.0064 
(-2.706) 
-0.0004 
(-0.33) 
-0.0068 
(-4.792) 
0.0015 
(0.23) 
0.0143 
(2.657) 
0.0137 
(2.952) 
-0.0024 
(-1.074) 
0.0079 
(13.721) 
-0.0055 
(-4.602) 
-0.0001 
(-0.032) 
0.0005 
(0.222) 
0.0031 
(1.182) 
-0.0030 
(-2.501) 
0.0079 
(13.785) 
-0.0055 
(-4.417) 
-0.0001 
(-0.025) 
0.0005 
(0.182) 
0.0030 
(1.355) 
-0.0030 
(-2.692) 
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Table C.ll. Regression results using A/R classification (random NACE effects and 
1987 start of policy impact) 
Margin 
Cycle 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
A 
R 
AR 
Trend 
Ml 
0.150672 
(2.959) 
0.107369 
(33.094) 
0.175536 
(54.059) 
0.081535 
(17.82) 
0.168317 
(43.838) 
0.029473 
(3.585) 
0.065909 
(19.226) 
0.093479 
(13.837) 
-0.0443 
(-12.307) 
-0.03682 
(-7.176) 
0.093249 
(4.739) 
-0.01497 
(-1.019) 
-0.07253 
(-2.303) 
0.007735 
M2 
0.027548 
(0.95) 
0.032263 
(17.45) 
0.046456 
(25.107) 
0.018812 
(7.215) 
0.0575 
(26.279) 
0.029938 
(6.39) 
0.027281 
(13.965) 
0.051992 
(13.506) 
-0.00613 
(-2.987) 
-0.02822 
(-9.653) 
-0.02125 
(-1.677) 
0.009829 
(1.043) 
0.006879 
(0.34) 
0.001768 
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Margin Ml M2 
A * Trend 
R * Trend 
AR * Trend 
Policy 
A * Policy 
R * Policy 
AR * Policy 
Constant 
R-squared 
Hausman p-
(10.739) 
-0.00139 
(-0.783) 
0.001773 
(1.252) 
-0.00015 
(-0.051) 
-0.0063 
(-4.513) 
0.006631 
(1.933) 
-0.00375 
(-1.387) 
-0.00044 
(-0.079) 
0.320073 
(40.221) 
0.407 
0.7448 
(4.309) 
-0.00074 
(-0.728) 
0.000166 
(0.206) 
0.000731 
(0.435) 
-0.0015 
(-1.886) 
0.004522 
(2.314) 
-0.00136 
(-0.883) 
-0.00248 
(-0.776) 
0.122683 
(24.166) 
0.1594 
0.3613 
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